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a better understanding of the core elements of the city system, pro-poor policies, city 
economies, urban land and housing markets, urban environments, and other issues 
germane to the agenda of sustainable urban development.
Cities and Climate Change: Responding to an Urgent Agenda is the fi rst title in the 
Urban Development Series.
CITIES 
AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE
Responding to an Urgent Agenda
Daniel Hoornweg, Mila Freire, Marcus J. Lee, 
Perinaz Bhada-Tata, and Belinda Yuen, editors
Washington, D.C.
© 2011 Th e International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / Th e World Bank
1818 H Street NW
Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000
Internet: www.worldbank.org
All rights reserved
1 2 3 4 14 13 12 11
 
Th is volume is a product of the staff  of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / Th e World 
Bank. Th e fi ndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily refl ect the views 
of the Executive Directors of Th e World Bank or the governments they represent.
Th e World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. Th e boundaries, colors, 
denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgement on the 
part of Th e World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such 
boundaries.
Rights and Permissions
Th e material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without 
permission may be a violation of applicable law. Th e International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / 
Th e World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions 
of the work promptly.
For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete informa-
tion to the Copyright Clearance Center Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; telephone: 978-
750-8400; fax: 978-750-4470; Internet: www.copyright.com.
All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Offi  ce of 
the Publisher, Th e World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: 
pubrights@worldbank.org.
ISBN: 978-0-8213-8493-0
eISBN: 978-0-8213-8667-5
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-8493-0
Cover photo: ©Atlantide Phototravel/Corbis
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cities and climate change : responding to an urgent agenda / edited by Daniel Hoornweg ... [et al.].
  p. cm.—(Urban development series)
 Collection of papers prepared and presented at the World Bank’s Fift h Urban Research Symposium.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN 978-0-8213-8493-0—ISBN 978-0-8213-8667-5 (electronic)
 1. Urban ecology (Sociology—Congresses. 2. Greenhouse gases—Congresses. 3. Climatic changes—
Congresses. I. Hoornweg, Daniel A. (Daniel Arthur), 1961- II. Urban Research Symposium (5th Marseille, 
France 2009) 
HT241.C555 2011
307.76—dc22
2011007569 
Foreword  iii
Acknowledgments xi
Contributors   xiii
Abbreviations   xv
Chapter 1.  Introduction: Cities and the Urgent Challenges 
 of Climate Change 1
Chapter 2.  Greenhouse Gas Emission Baselines 
 for Global Cities and Metropolitan Regions 15
  Christopher A. Kennedy, Anu Ramaswami, Sebastian Carney, 
  and Shobhakar Dhakal
Chapter 3.  Comparing Mitigation Policies in Five Large 
 Cities: London, New York City, Milan, 
 Mexico City, and Bangkok 55
  Edoardo Croci, Sabrina Melandri, and Tania Molteni
Chapter 4.  GHG emissions, Urban Mobility, and Morphology: 
 A Hypothesis 87
  Alain Bertaud, Benoit Lefèvre, and Belinda Yuen
Chapter 5.  The Role of Institutions, Governance, and 
 Urban Planning for Mitigation and Adaptation 125
   Harriet Bulkeley, Heike Schroeder, Katy Janda, 
Jimin Zhao, Andrea Armstrong, Shu Yi Chu, 
and Shibani Ghosh
Contents
■ v
vi ■ CONTENTS
 Chapter 6.  Viral Governance and Mixed Motivations: 
 How and Why U.S. Cities Engaged 
 on the Climate Change Issue, 2005–2007 161
  Toby Warden
 Chapter 7.  Urban Heat Islands: Sensitivity of Urban 
 Temperatures to Climate Change and 
 Heat Release in Four European Cities 175
  Mark P. McCarthy and Michael G. Sanderson
 Chapter 8.  Adapting Cities to Climate Change: 
 Opportunities and Constraints  193
   Dirk Heinrichs, Rimjhim Aggarwal, Jonathan Barton, 
Erach Bharucha, Carsten Butsch, Michail Fragkias, 
Peter Johnston, Frauke Kraas, Kerstin Krellenberg, 
Andrea Lampis, Ooi Giok Ling, and Johanna Vogel
 Chapter 9.  A Conceptual and Operational Framework 
 for Pro-poor Asset Adaptation to Urban 
 Climate change 225
  Caroline Moser
Chapter 10.  Epilogue: Perspectives from the 
 5th Urban Research Symposium 255
Appendix.   Titles and Abstracts of Papers Not Included 
 in Full in This Volume 271
Index.  289
■ vii
Th e 5th Urban Research Symposium on Cities and Climate Change—Responding 
to an Urgent Agenda, held in Marseille in June 2009, sought to highlight how 
climate change and urbanization are converging to create one of the greatest 
challenges of our time. Responding to this challenge eff ectively and sustainably 
is a key objective for governments, authorities, institutions, and other organi-
zations involved in urban development processes. Th e World Bank, the French 
Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing, and 
the French Development Agency were therefore particularly committed to the 
co-organization of the symposium. 
Cities consume much of the world’s energy, and thus produce much of the 
world’s greenhouse gas emissions. Yet cities, to varying extents, are also vulner-
able to climate change impacts, with poor populations facing the greatest risk. 
Th us, adaptation and increased resilience constitute priorities for every city, 
and cities have a key role to play in mitigating climate change. Climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in cities has emerged as a new theme on the global 
agenda, creating a strong desire among governments, the private sector, and the 
academic community worldwide to learn from experiences and good practice 
examples.
Th e 5th Urban Research Symposium made an important contribution to 
the growing body of knowledge and practice in the area of cities and climate 
change. During the three-day symposium, approximately 200 papers were pre-
sented to more than 700 participants representing more than 70 countries. As 
co-organizers, we found it very rewarding to have such an audience and to see 
the wide range of topics discussed, from indicators and measurement to insti-
tutions and governance. 
Th e symposium was made possible through the commitment and contri-
butions of a wide range of partners and cosponsors, as well as through the 
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interest and participation of the wider community of urban researchers 
and practitioners. We were encouraged by the symposium’s success, which 
exceeded many expectations, and therefore wish to further disseminate its 
results. Th is publication is comprised of an edited selection of the many 
papers submitted to the symposium and gives a fl avor of the questions asked 
and possible answers. (Th e entire collection of symposium papers is available 
as an online resource for interested readers.) We look forward to the benefi ts 
that the knowledge gained and the partnerships forged during the symposium 
will have for global eff orts on cities and climate change.
Inger Andersen
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Introduction: Cities and 
the Urgent Challenges of 
Climate Change
The Challenge of Cities and Climate Change
Climate change is among the most pressing challenges that the world faces 
today. Given current atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs), 
the world is already committed to signifi cant warming. Th is is a serious chal-
lenge, given the wide range of expected climate impacts on natural systems, 
as well as on human societies, as assessed in the most recent report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007). Th e severity of 
these impacts will depend in part on the outcomes of global eff orts to mitigate 
climate change. Yet developing countries and poor populations everywhere 
remain the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Even as pov-
erty reduction and sustainable development remain at the core of the global 
agenda—as emphasized in the World Development Report 2010: Development 
and Climate Change—climate change threatens to undermine the progress that 
has been achieved to date (World Bank 2010a).
Urbanization is a defi ning phenomenon of this century. Developing coun-
tries are at the locus of this transformation, as highlighted in the World Bank’s 
2009 Urban Strategy. It is oft en repeated that more than half of the world’s popu-
lation is now urban. Most of the population of industrialized countries is urban, 
with numerous developing countries, particularly in Latin America, also highly 
urbanized (UN 2010). Many developing countries in other regions of the world 
are following the same path. Th is transformation represents a challenge, but also 
a huge opportunity. Th e World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic 
Geography (World Bank 2009) framed this in a new paradigm: to harness the 
1
2 ■ CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
growth and development benefi ts of urbanization while proactively managing 
its negative eff ects.
Cities concentrate wealth, people, and productivity, but they also concen-
trate vulnerability to natural disasters and to long-term changes in climate. Ris-
ing sea levels will aff ect millions of people living in coastal cities. Similarly, 
migration, changes in land use, and spatial development are likely to increase 
the vulnerability of populations to changes in weather and climatic conditions. 
Adaptation to climate change is therefore an imperative for cities, as it is for the 
world at large. Th e urgency of this challenge is also evident when considering 
the massive investments in buildings and infrastructure that cities in develop-
ing countries will undertake in the coming years, which will lock in urban form 
and structure for many decades thereaft er.
The 5th Urban Research Symposium
Th e links between cities and climate change were the subject of the 5th Urban 
Research Symposium held in Marseille in June 2009. Under the main theme, 
Cities and Climate Change—Responding to an Urgent Agenda, the symposium 
aimed to advance the state of knowledge on cities and climate change from an 
applied research perspective. Attended by more than 700 people from more 
than 70 countries, the symposium featured eight teams of commissioned 
researchers and approximately 200 research papers selected from more than 
500 initial proposals. Th e symposium was a groundbreaking event, given its 
scale and its focus on cities and climate change.
Th e symposium’s research topics were organized around fi ve clusters. Th e 
fi rst dealt with models and indicators to measure impact and performance of 
cities. Th e complexity that characterizes climate change at the global level 
is heightened at the city level by the need to defi ne boundaries, to identify 
consumers and producers, and to understand intercity fl ows. Th is is also the 
area where progress has been the most visible, with international partner-
ships and committed local governments working together to harmonize con-
cepts and improve data collection. In turn, the increased availability of data 
and indicators stimulates research to test and apply global models at the 
city level.
Th e second cluster focused on infrastructure, the built environment, and 
energy effi  ciency. Th is area received the largest number of papers, covering issues 
from urban heat islands to urban transport policies and energy conservation. 
Th e insights from this cluster are important given the massive investments 
that cities in the developing world are expected to make in coming decades. 
Cities are also eager to share progress and discuss solutions that have worked 
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elsewhere. Complementing this volume, the Energy Sector Management and 
Assistance Program at the World Bank has published selected papers from this 
cluster on energy effi  ciency in cities (Bose 2010).
Th e third cluster dealt with fi nance and the economic incentives related to cli-
mate change. Th e papers in this cluster focused more on fi nancing requirements 
and the diffi  culties that cities may face in meeting these requirements and less 
on the use of market-based instruments and policies such as carbon fi nance, 
taxes, or incentives to change behaviors or encourage intercity collaboration.
Th e fourth and fi ft h clusters were concerned with the areas of institutions 
and governance and the social aspects of climate change. Both clusters produced 
important papers demonstrating the value of early commitment and participa-
tion in cities, as well as the potential to use local development initiatives for 
mainstreaming climate change concerns in cities.
Th e eight commissioned research papers are representative of the fi ve clus-
ters and cover issues such as the measurement of GHG emissions, city indica-
tors, energy effi  ciency in buildings, and the importance of urban form. Papers 
were commissioned to ensure that leading, cutting-edge research was the orga-
nizing principle of the symposium and to provide better coverage of climate 
risk assessment and resilience, the role of institutions and governance, and the 
social aspects of climate change.
Th e symposium was an intense and research-rich three-day learning event. 
It became clear that experts and academics have diff ering views on any number 
of questions, but the areas of consensus are far greater than the areas of diver-
gence. Although researchers continue to improve our knowledge of the world, 
decision makers cannot wait for all doubts or diff erences to be resolved. Moving 
forward, there is increasing urgency to get cities involved in climate change, not 
only in taking greater leadership roles but also in contributing to cutting-edge 
research at the city scale, defi ning practical solutions for urban and periurban 
areas, and ensuring that research is translated into local policy options. Th e 
symposium represents a start on this longer-term journey in understanding the 
links between cities and climate change—the body of research and projects on 
cities and climate change continues to grow rapidly.
Th is publication presents an edited selection of eight papers from the sym-
posium that cover both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Examples 
and case studies from cities in industrialized and developing countries are 
included, and attention is paid to the perspectives of the poor in adapting to 
climate change. Of necessity, these papers represent only a small segment of the 
vast and rich range of knowledge brought together by the symposium. Abstracts 
of a further selection of symposium papers are included in the appendix to this 
volume. Th e complete set of symposium papers is available on the symposium’s 
website, accessible through www.worldbank.org/urban.
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Th e rest of this introduction presents the main conclusions and key mes-
sages emerging from the symposium from across all fi ve clusters. Th ese are 
organized broadly into sections on mitigation and adaptation, with a fi nal sec-
tion on priorities for future work.
Cities and Climate Change Mitigation
Cities are critical in global eff orts to mitigate climate change. Although ques-
tions remain about how exactly GHG emissions should be attributed geographi-
cally, most of the world’s GHG emissions are ultimately attributable to cities, 
which are centers of economic activity. Cities are responsible for two-thirds of 
global energy consumption, and this proportion is expected to grow further 
(IEA 2008). Yet, because of their density, effi  ciency, and adoption of innovations 
and new technologies, cities can also provide solutions for reducing emissions.
Measuring City GHG Emissions
A fundamental step for cities when it comes to climate change mitigation is to 
quantify the GHG emissions attributable to cities. Emissions must be measurable 
to be manageable; cities will otherwise not be able to set meaningful targets for 
emissions reductions, to track progress toward achieving such targets, or to obtain 
fi nancing readily. In response to this need, much has already been achieved at the 
city level. ICLEI’s (International Coalition for Local Environmental Initiatives, 
now known as Local Governments for Sustainability) Cities for Climate Protec-
tion (CCP) campaign, for example, features a fi ve-milestone process that includes 
establishing a baseline emissions inventory. In 2009, CCP had grown to include 
more than 1,000 local governments worldwide (ICLEI 2010).
Various methodologies for measuring city GHG emissions have been devel-
oped in Europe and North America—such as Bilan Carbone, the Greenhouse 
Gas Regional Inventory Protocol, the International Local Government Green-
house Gas Emissions Protocol, and Project 2 Degrees—raising questions of con-
sistency and comparability. Although most eff orts have sought to follow IPCC 
guidelines, considerable variation is found among these methodologies, for 
example, in terms of the GHGs covered and of the sectors (such as energy, waste, 
transport, and embodied emissions in food and other materials consumed) 
included (Bader and Bleischwitz 2009). Signifi cant questions exist with regard 
to the treatment of emissions associated with transport to and from a city and of 
emissions embodied in materials consumed within a city but produced outside it. 
Another basic methodological issue lies in the defi nition of the city for the pur-
pose of measuring emissions, whether based on administrative borders, a defi ned 
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metropolitan area, or a functional economic space. In many developing country 
cities, the availability and reliability of data also present a challenge.
Th e chapter in this volume by Kennedy and others, “Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions Baselines for Global Cities and Metropolitan Regions,” addresses these 
issues directly and reviews existing methodologies and available published 
results for various cities. Using a consistent, harmonized methodology, the 
authors have calculated per capita emissions for more than 40 cities around 
the world. Th is demonstrates that consistency and comparability are possible 
and constitutes a seminal contribution to the joint eff ort among the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Human Settle-
ments Programme, (UN-HABITAT), and the World Bank to advance an open, 
international standard to measure GHG emissions from cities. Unsurprisingly, 
the results reveal that per capita emissions tend to be higher in the cities of 
industrialized countries compared with developing country cities. Further-
more, although these results show that per capita emissions in cities are gener-
ally lower than corresponding national per capita emissions, recent research on 
U.S. cities suggests that when emissions embodied in materials consumed in 
cities are taken into account, city per capita emissions are in fact very close to 
national per capita emissions (Hillman and Ramaswami 2010).
Factors Infl uencing City Emissions
A variety of factors infl uence a city’s emissions profi le in complex ways. Th ese 
factors include urban form and land use patterns, climate, building design and 
technology, transport modes, and income levels. One would naturally expect 
lower per capita emissions in a city with more energy-effi  cient buildings, higher 
rates of public transport use, or lower income levels. Th e relative importance of 
such factors is explored by Croci and others in their chapter, “A Comparative 
Analysis of Global City Policies in Climate Change Mitigation,” which includes 
case studies of London, New York City, Milan, Mexico City,  and Bangkok. Th e 
authors identify income levels as a major factor in explaining the level of city 
emissions, while also noting a number of methodological issues in calculating 
emissions—Bangkok, for instance, estimates transport emissions from fuels con-
sumed within the city, whereas the other cities use vehicle-kilometers traveled.
Th e emissions profi les of cities can be very diff erent depending on specifi c 
city contexts. Croci and others point this out clearly in their comparison of 
cities across industrialized and developing countries. Th e largest contributor 
to emissions in Bangkok is the transport sector, but in London and New York 
City it is the buildings sector—specifi cally energy consumption in residential 
and commercial buildings, with transport coming second. Bangkok’s climate, 
income level, urban form, and transport systems are all factors that explain this 
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diff erence. Th e implication for mitigation in cities is that although cities can 
certainly learn from one another when developing and implementing mitiga-
tion strategies, specifi c solutions and mitigation measures may not be easily 
transferable or directly relevant for other cities.
The Importance of Urban Form for Emissions
Perhaps of greatest interest for urban planners and managers is the issue of urban 
form and density. It has long been known that denser cities tend to have lower per 
capita energy consumption (see, for example, Newman and Kenworthy 1989) and 
therefore lower per capita emissions, and within a given city, per capita emissions are 
lower in the denser parts of the city. Although this received wisdom has been ques-
tioned (Mindali, Raveh, and Salomon 2004), these correlations have been confi rmed 
in recent work, including from the symposium papers and from research cited in 
the World Development Report 2010 (World Bank 2010a). Yet urban form is shaped 
over longer time horizons, through planning, policy, and investment decisions.
In the chapter “GHG Emissions, Urban Mobility, and Effi  ciency of Urban 
Morphology,” Bertaud and others use the examples of Mumbai, New York City, 
and Singapore to show how price signals—including energy prices and carbon 
market–based incentives—are a key factor in reducing GHG emissions from urban 
transport, in combination with land use and transport planning and policies. Th ey 
suggest that monocentric cities and density can be managed with the right policies 
and that emissions from monocentric cities can be reduced if demand for trans-
port between suburbs and the center increases. In their examination of the factors 
explaining diff erences in demand for urban transport, the authors consider how 
signifi cant reductions in GHG emissions from urban transport can be achieved 
through technological change to reduce carbon content and through a shift  in 
transport mode from private cars to public transit. Th e use of energy pricing based 
on carbon content would promote both of these changes.
Th e demand for urban transport also depends on urban spatial structures. 
Bertaud and others go on to show how in all three cities, spatial policies, includ-
ing fl oor area ratios (FARs), have played an important role. New York City and 
Singapore have been able to maintain a high level of transit share by mandating 
high FARs, prioritizing and improving connections to public transport, ensur-
ing high levels of amenities that make downtown areas attractive, and promot-
ing mixed-use developments located at integrated transport hubs.
Governance Matters for Climate Mitigation in Cities
Armed with a growing understanding of their GHG emissions, many cities are 
already at the forefront of the mitigation challenge, with subnational eff orts in 
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these communities proceeding even as global climate change negotiations have 
made limited progress. Cities are leading and positioning themselves as a sig-
nifi cant part of the solution. Although cities in the industrialized world such as 
Chicago, London, or New York City are oft -cited examples, cities across various 
developing countries, such as Cape Town, Mexico City, and São Paulo, are also 
rising to the challenge. Climate change mitigation plans and responses do vary 
among cities, as shown in the examples studied by Croci and others—London 
has adopted a long-term emissions reduction goal with intermediate steps, New 
York City and Milan have chosen medium-term targets, and Bangkok and Mex-
ico City have shorter-term targets for 2012. All of this is encouraging, because cit-
ies off er humanity the best way to effi  ciently provide critical services and allocate 
increasingly scarce resources.
Th e importance of governance for climate action in cities is demonstrated 
clearly by Bulkeley and others in their chapter, “Th e Role of Institutions, Gov-
ernance and Planning for Mitigation and Adaptation by Cities.” Th e authors 
provide a comprehensive global review of the current state of mitigation and 
adaptation action by cities, focusing mainly on cities in the global South. 
Selected case studies include Beijing, Cape Town, Hong Kong, New Delhi, 
Melbourne, Mexico City, Mumbai, São Paulo, Seoul, and Yogyakarta. Th ey 
examine how these cities are taking action in three key sectors: buildings, 
transport, and urban infrastructure. Issues of governance are dominant when 
it comes to regulating GHG emissions, providing services, and working with 
other jurisdictions. Key factors that shape responses to mitigation at the local 
level include eff ective policy making, access to additional fi nance, the con-
gruence between jurisdictional areas and the spatial scale at which problems 
present themselves, and municipal competencies in key areas such as energy, 
planning, and transport. Governance at the city scale matters, as do the links 
and relationships with institutional and governance arrangements at other 
spatial scales.
Fast-growing cities off er enormous opportunities for investments in new 
energy-effi  cient technologies and for increasing the amount of energy from 
alternative and renewable energy sources. As demonstrated in the chapter by 
Croci and others, the energy sector usually off ers the greatest potential, with 
cities’ mitigation eff orts accordingly focused on promoting energy effi  ciency 
(particularly through standards and regulations for buildings) and striving for 
lower carbon intensity in the energy supply. Across most cities, transport is 
the second most important sector, with policies focused on encouraging pub-
lic transportation instead of the private automobile. Many symposium papers 
refl ected the wide-ranging body of research on green buildings and energy 
effi  ciency. Th ese include low-energy redevelopment in Rotterdam (van den 
Dobbelsteen and others), options for increasing energy effi  ciency in Nigerian 
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buildings (Akinbami and Lawal), rainwater harvesting and evaporative cooling 
in Germany (Schmidt), and sustainable house construction in France (Floissac 
and others).
Th e motivations of cities and city stakeholders for engaging in climate miti-
gation also need to be understood. Warden’s chapter, “Viral Governance and 
Mixed Motivations,” describes some of the factors that led to American cit-
ies committing to address climate change and to the launch of the U.S. Con-
ference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement (USMCPA) in 2005. Th e 
USMCPA has been very successful in motivating mayors in the United States, 
with more than 1,000 mayors signed on in 2010 (USCOM 2010). Growing 
public awareness, a fl exible framework agreement, and having participants as 
proponents all contributed to the “viral” spread of climate engagement among 
U.S. cities. Th e USMCPA remains valuable because of its ability to generate 
awareness and engage a large number of cities on the issue of climate change. 
Although focused on the U.S. experience, Warden’s analysis indirectly helps 
to advance our understanding of the engagement of cities worldwide on 
climate change issues through international networks such as ICLEI and the 
C40 cities.
A key observation is that, globally, climate change action among cities is 
focused more on mitigation than on adaptation. Th is is a point advanced by 
Bulkeley and others and reinforced by the analyses of Croci and others and 
Warden. Th e broad fi eld of proposals submitted to the symposium also refl ected 
a bias toward mitigation. Th is is the case even among cities in developing coun-
tries, even though these cities tend to have lower per capita emissions and thus 
would have relatively fewer mitigation opportunities. Th ese cities’ vulnerability 
to the impacts of climate change would also suggest an urgent need to focus 
on adaptation issues. Although various explanations have been advanced, 
such as the need for greater institutional capacity in developing countries, fur-
ther research exploring this relative emphasis on mitigation is needed, as is 
strengthened understanding of how and why cities are motivated to undertake 
action on adaptation.
Cities and Climate Change Adaptation
Given that cities are concentrated centers of population and economic activities, 
any impact or disruption, whether natural or human induced, has the potential 
to aff ect vast numbers of people. Th e expected impacts of climate change pose 
a massive challenge to cities. Th ese impacts will vary from city to city, as well 
as within a city. For instance, coastal cities are vulnerable to rising sea levels, to 
more intense precipitation that increases the likelihood of fl ooding in low-lying 
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areas and landslides on steep slopes, and to extended heat waves that threaten 
cities unaccustomed to very hot summers. In every city, the poorest popula-
tions are the most vulnerable, because they have the least adaptive capacity 
and oft en occupy areas that are more exposed to hazards. Building resilience 
and adapting to climate change are therefore a high priority for cities. Yet city 
managers and practitioners serving the urban poor oft en point out that the 
multiple competing priorities of today are challenging enough; paying atten-
tion to uncertain future climate impacts is thus seen as a lower priority. In light 
of this, better appreciation of the cobenefi ts from urban poverty reduction and 
adaptation to climate change is needed.
Cities Responding to the Adaptation Challenge
In spite of the emphasis on mitigation thus far, and the many existing press-
ing needs faced by city managers and practitioners, there is a growing body 
of research and practice on adaptation in cities. Again, cities in industrial-
ized countries are commonly cited as examples of good practice in adaptation 
planning, but cities in developing countries are also increasingly interested 
and active in this area. Heinrichs and others present fi ndings from eight cities 
(Bogota, Cape Town, Delhi, the Pearl River Delta, Pune, Santiago de Chile, São 
Paulo, and Singapore) in their chapter, “Adapting Cities to Climate Change: 
Opportunities and Constraints.” Th e full collection of symposium papers also 
refl ected this trend of increased activity in climate adaptation among develop-
ing country cities, for example, in the papers by Carmin and others, which 
examined the cases of Durban and Quito, and by Dodman and others on 
community-level responses in the Philippines. Together, these papers show that 
far from being laggards, in many cases developing country cities are the ones 
turning out to be the fi rst movers and innovators when it comes to preparing 
for, and adapting to, future climate impacts.
Several key enabling factors can be identifi ed among those cities that are 
already responding to the adaptation challenge. Th e importance of identifying 
these enabling factors cannot be overemphasized, because these are essential 
for ensuring that cities are able to adapt. Bulkeley and others argue that these 
factors largely fall under the area of institutions and governance, which suggests 
that eff orts to strengthen institutional and governance capacities in general at 
the city level would have the cobenefi t of enabling better responses for adapta-
tion. Heinrichs and others highlight several factors that also emerge across the 
wider collection of studies, including the availability of information, the need 
for higher levels of awareness, synergies with existing priorities and programs, 
the existence of strong leadership, availability of dedicated resources, and ade-
quate technical and fi nancial capacities.
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Understanding Climate Impacts in Cities
One basic requirement for adaptation planning in any city is a sound analysis of 
possible climate impacts. In itself, this is a challenge of substantial complexity—
there is considerable uncertainty on what future climate impacts might be for 
a given city, although our knowledge and modeling capabilities are constantly 
improving, for example, with downscaling climate models. In “Urban Heat 
Islands: Sensitivity of Urban Temperatures to Climate Change and Heat Release 
in Four European Cities,” McCarthy and Sanderson show how urban areas can 
be included in regional climate models, using the cases of Athens, Cairo, Lon-
don, and Moscow. Th e authors focus on the “urban heat island” eff ect, which 
arises from heat released through human activity in cities, such as the heating 
and cooling of buildings, traffi  c exhaust, and even human metabolism. Urban 
buildings and structures absorb heat during the daytime and release it at night, 
leading to an increase in nighttime temperatures. Th e authors caution that 
future heat waves may be underestimated if fi ner features at the urban scale are 
not included in model simulations. Th e potential for applying this analysis to 
other cities is considerable and would enable individual cities to fi ne-tune their 
knowledge of potential changes in local temperatures.
In general, modeling eff orts are well situated within a broader fi eld of work 
on assessing climate risks in cities. Bulkeley and others and Heinrichs and oth-
ers analyze how cities are already anticipating and planning for future climate 
impacts. One of the symposium’s commissioned research papers by Mehrotra 
and others also addressed this need: It presented a framework for climate risk 
assessment in cities and emphasized the importance of distinguishing among 
the diff erent types of risks faced by diff erent cities. Th e forthcoming Urban Risk 
Assessment, an approach for assessing disaster and climate risk in cities, is being 
developed by the World Bank with UNEP and UN-HABITAT and proposes a 
unifi ed methodology for this purpose. It represents another important step in 
bringing the fi elds of disaster risk management and climate change adaptation 
closer. Although both communities of practice have the common aim to support 
decision making under uncertainty, they have largely operated in isolation from 
each other until recently (Tearfund 2008).
Climate Adaptation and the Urban Poor
An important issue when considering climate change adaptation, especially in 
developing countries, is to ensure adequate focus on the urban poor. Signifi cant 
literature can be found on the economic impacts and costs of adaptation to 
climate change (see, for example, World Bank 2010b). Evidence is also avail-
able that the number of people aff ected by disasters is on the rise, and within 
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cities, most disaster-related injuries and deaths occur among low-income groups 
(UN-HABITAT 2007). Moser and Satterthwaite (2008) clearly demonstrate that 
the main driver of increasing loss of life is poverty, which limits individual and 
household investments, and exclusion, which limits access to public services. In 
this context, not only does climate change exacerbate the existing vulnerabilities 
of the poor, but it also creates new risks as more areas in a city are exposed to 
climate-related hazards. Th e urgency is increased in those cities in developing 
countries with high concentrations of vulnerable urban poor.
A framework for focusing on the urban poor is provided by Moser in “A Con-
ceptual and Operational Framework for Pro-Poor Asset Adaptation to Climate 
Change,” which shows how the vulnerability of the urban poor’s assets can be 
analyzed and off ers examples of asset-based adaptation responses. Vulnerability 
varies depending on hazard exposure and the capacity to cope and adapt; these 
in turn depend on factors such as settlement quality and infrastructure provision. 
At the individual level, factors such as age, gender, and social status also matter. 
Greater assets (both intellectual and physical) reduce vulnerability and improve 
the capacity of the individual and community to react and adapt to disasters, 
including post-disaster reconstruction.
A closer understanding of specifi c vulnerabilities is also useful for taking 
concrete actions. Because many poor settlements are located in vulnerable 
places or lack protective infrastructure, long-term resilience can be increased 
by identifying better locations, increasing property ownership, and improving 
infrastructure. At the community level, improving community capacity and 
resilience is essential. Th e paper by Bartlett and others on the social aspects of 
climate change in urban areas, together with the paper by Dodman and others, 
reveals how community-based organizations and initiatives can be very eff ec-
tive in enabling adaptation among disadvantaged city dwellers.
An emerging conclusion is that the key to adaptation among the urban 
poor is to continue to address the basic poverty reduction and sustainable 
development agenda in cities to improve the livelihoods and resilience of the 
poor—ensuring adequate and eff ective delivery of services such as health, 
education, water, energy, public transport, and waste management; providing 
safety nets and increasing food security; upgrading facilities and infrastruc-
ture in slums and other informal settlements; and providing security of tenure 
and property rights.
Priorities for Future Work
Although the foregoing discussion has distinguished clearly between mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change, responding to the complex challenges of cli-
mate change in cities does not always lend itself to distinct categorizations in terms 
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of mitigation or adaptation. Comprehensive and integrated approaches, which 
include both mitigation and adaptation strategies and the synergies between 
them, are needed to fully address this challenge. Th ey also off er opportunities 
for cities to identify and take advantage of cobenefi ts; for example, investments 
in energy effi  ciency in buildings can both reduce GHG emissions and increase 
resilience in the face of more extreme weather conditions. Although much 
work is already taking place on integrated approaches that deliver cobenefi ts, 
greater awareness of these is needed, as is broader implementation in the fi eld, 
beyond demonstration and piloting.
Th e symposium—its papers, presentations, and discussions—reveals 
numerous areas in which further research is required to strengthen diagnosis 
and policies at the local level, building on what is already under way. Several 
of these are highlighted here. First, the advances made to measure and analyze 
city GHG emissions need to be consolidated and eventually lead to interna-
tionally accepted methodologies used with the same rigor and accountability 
by cities in both the global North and South. Th is will ensure that mitigation 
eff orts are well targeted within cities with progress toward mitigation targets 
properly tracked, and this clarity and consistency will facilitate access to addi-
tional fi nance. Second is the need to continue to expand work on adaptation 
in cities, in terms of both understanding future climate impacts and imple-
menting the most eff ective adaptation actions in response to specifi c risks 
including disasters. Th ird, we need to increase our knowledge of the unique 
circumstances of developing country cities, because considerable variation 
is found among these cities across regions and across diff erent city sizes and 
locations. Fourth is the need to undertake further economic and social analy-
ses of all aspects of climate change in cities; this was especially apparent from 
the relatively small proportion of papers at the symposium on economic and 
social issues: Only a handful of papers addressed the crucial issue of fi nancing 
climate actions in cities. Th e costs and benefi ts of (non)action, social infl u-
ences, and behavioral studies are central to understanding the basis of public 
attitudes and behavior for eff ective climate change action. Last but not least, 
data availability is a critical constraint, for which continued eff orts in data col-
lection and utilization are needed.
Th e overwhelming response to the symposium far exceeded initial expecta-
tions. It is clear that the fi eld of research on cities and climate change is growing 
and rapidly evolving, which bodes well to ensure that the best knowledge and 
analysis is applied to the urgent challenges that cities face in responding to cli-
mate change. Th e World Bank and its partners are committed to working with 
cities, researchers, and other agencies to improve the well-being of cities and 
their residents, especially the poor and the vulnerable.
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Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Baselines for Global Cities and 
Metropolitan Regions
Christopher A. Kennedy, Anu Ramaswami, 
Sebastian Carney, and Shobhakar Dhakal
Increasing urbanization, globalization, and expected climate change will neces-
sitate new forms of urban management in the twenty-fi rst century. New urban 
metrics will be required, including measures of urban competitiveness (Duff y 
1995; Llewelyn-Davies, Banister, and Hall 2004), gross metropolitan product 
(BEA 2009), urban greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Dodman 2009; Harvey 
1993; Kates and others 1998; Satterthwaite 2008), material fl ows (Kennedy, 
Cuddihy, and Yan 2007), and vulnerability to climate change (Rosenzweig and 
others 2009). Such measures will also inform assessment of risks that may be used 
to guide investment in cities. In other words, many of the metrics that are cur-
rently recorded for nations are now needed and can be developed for urban areas.
Th is chapter is concerned with the establishment of baseline measures of 
GHG emissions attributable to urban areas (cities and metropolitan areas). 
Over the past two decades, several entities have been active in establishing 
methodologies for estimating urban GHG emissions. One example is ICLEI 
(International Coalition for Local Environmental Initiatives, now known 
as Local Governments for Sustainability), which is a worldwide coalition of 
local governments (ICLEI 2006). More than 500 of ICLEI’s member cities have 
established GHG baselines using soft ware developed by Torrie-Smith Asso-
ciates, under the Partners for Climate Protection program. Several larger cit-
ies, including, for example, London, Paris, and Tokyo, have developed their 
baselines using their own methodologies. Eighteen European urban areas, 
including eight capital regions, have been studied using the Greenhouse Gas 
2
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Regional Inventory Protocol (GRIP; Carney and others 2009); GRIP has also 
been used for Scotland and Sacramento, California. Additional urban areas 
have been studied by academics (Baldasano, Soriano, and Boada 1999; Dhakal 
2009; Dubeux and La Rovere 2007; Kennedy and others 2009; Ramaswami and 
others 2008) and at meetings such as those hosted by IGES/APN (2002) and 
Nagoya University/NIES/GCP (2009). Th e approaches used to establish GHG 
emissions in these studies are essentially adaptations or simplifi cations of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines. However, 
minor diff erences in methodology need to be resolved—and clearer reporting 
mechanisms need to be established.
Th is chapter fi rst reviews the types of methodology that have been used to 
attribute GHGs to urban areas. We begin by broadly describing the approaches 
used to determine GHG emissions for nations (IPCC 2006) and for corpora-
tions (WRI/WBCSD 2009), both of which inform the attribution of emissions 
to urban areas. We then discuss in more detail the specifi c diff erences in meth-
odology between various studies of urban GHG emissions. Th e approaches 
used to establish emissions for more than 40 global urban areas (table 2.1) are 
used to demonstrate where diff erences in methodology occur (table 2.2).
TABLE 2.1 
Defi nition and Population of Cities and Metropolitan Regions in This 
Chapter
Abbreviated 
name used in 
this chapter Defi nition Study year Population
Europe
Athens Metropolitan region 2005 3,989,000
Barcelona City 2006 1,605,602
Bologna Province 2005 899,996
Brussels Capital region 2005 1,006,749
Frankfurt Frankfurt/Rhine-Main 2005 3,778,124
Geneva Canton 2005 432,058
Glasgow Glasgow and the Clyde Valley 2004 1,747,040
Hamburg Metropolitan region 2005 4,259,670
Helsinki Capital region 2005 988,526
Ljubljana Osrednjeslovenska region 2005 500,021
London Greater London 2003 7,364,100
Madrid Comunidad de Madrid 2005 5,964,143
Naples Province 2005 3,086,622
Oslo Metropolitan region 2005 1,039,536
Paris I City 2005 2,125,800
Paris II Île-de-France 2005 11,532,398
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TABLE 2.1, continued
Abbreviated 
name used in 
this chapter Defi nition Study year Population
Porto Metropolitan region 2005 1,666,821
Prague Greater Prague 2005 1,181,610
Rotterdam City 2005 592,552
Stockholm Metropolitan region 2005 1,889,945
Stuttgart Metropolitan region 2005 2,667,766
Turin Metropolitan region 2005 2,243,000
Veneto Province 2005 4,738,313
North America
Austin City 2005 672,011
Calgary City 2003 922,315
Denver City and county 2005 579,744
Los Angeles County 2000 9,519,338
Minneapolis City 2005 387,711
New York City City 2005 8,170,000
Portland City 2005 682,835
Seattle City 2005 575,732
Toronto Greater Toronto area 2005 5,555,912
Washington, DC District of Columbia 2000 571,723
Latin America
Mexico City City 2000  8,669,594
Rio de Janeiro City 1998 5,633,407
São Paulo City 2000 10,434,252
Asia
Bangkok City 2005 5,658,953
Beijing Beijing government-
administered area (province)
2006 15,810,000
Kolkata Metropolitan area 2000 15,700,000
Delhi National capital territory 2000 13,200,000
Seoul Seoul City 1998 10,321,496
Shanghai Shanghai government-
administered area (province)
2006 18,150,000
Tianjin Tianjin government-
administered area (province)
2006 10,750,000
Tokyo Tokyo metropolitan 
government–administered 
area (Tokyo-to) 
2006 12,677,921
Africa
Cape Town City 2006 3,497,097
Source: Studies as cited in table 2.2.
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TABLE 2.2 
Comparison of Greenhouse Gas Studies for Selected Cities and 
Metropolitan Regions
City or metropolitan regiona
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Europe
Athens
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Barcelona
Kennedy and others 2009 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ?
Bologna
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Brussels
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Frankfurt
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Geneva
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n.a.
Glasgow
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ✓ ✓
Hamburg
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Helsinki
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Ljubljana
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
London
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ neg.
Madrid
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Naples
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Oslo
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Paris I
Mairie de Paris 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ? ? ?
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✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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City or metropolitan regiona
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Paris II
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Porto
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Prague
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n.a.
Rotterdam
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Stockholm
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Stuttgart
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Turin
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
Veneto
Carney and others 2009
✓ ✓ ? ? ? ✓
North America
Austin
Hillman and Ramaswami 
2010
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓*
Calgary
City of Calgary 2003
✓ ? ? ? ? n.a.
Denver
Ramaswami and others 
2008
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓* n.a.
Denver
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓* n.a.
Los Angeles
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Minneapolis
Hillman and Ramaswami 
2010
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓*
New York City
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
TABLE 2.2, continued
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✓ ✓ ✓
continued
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Portland
Hillman and Ramaswami 
2010
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓*
Seattle
Hillman and Ramaswami 
2010
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓*
Toronto
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ neg.
Washington, DC
DC Dept. of Health 2005
✓ ? ? ? ?
Latin America
Mexico City
Secretaria del Medio 
Ambiente 2000
✓ ? ✓
Rio de Janeiro
Dubeux and La Rovere 2007
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
São Paulo
SVMA 2005
✓ ? ✓ ✓
Asia
Bangkok
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓
Beijing
Dhakal 2009
✓ ✓ ✓
Delhi
Mitra, Sharma, and Ajero 
2003
✓ ? ? ? ?
Kolkata
Mitra, Sharma, and Ajero 
2003
✓ ? ? ? ?
Seoul
Dhakal 2004
✓ ? ? ? ?
Shanghai
Dhakal 2009
✓ ✓ ✓
TABLE 2.2, continued
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City or metropolitan regiona
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Tianjin
Dhakal 2009
✓ ✓ ✓
Tokyo
Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government 2006
✓ ? ? ? ? §
Africa
Cape Town
Kennedy and others 2009
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Source: Authors’ analysis using information from studies as cited in sources listed in fi rst column.
Note: The table displays only emissions subcategories for which there are differences between studies. 
AFOLU = agriculture, forestry, and other land use; LTO = landing and take-off cycle; n.a. = not applicable 
neg. = negligible; ? = uncertain/indeterminate; * = aviation emissions are apportioned across co-located 
cities in the larger metropolitan area; † = AFOLU emissions were estimated and found to be less than 
Th is is followed by an extended discussion of critical cross-boundary emis-
sions most relevant to urban areas. A few cities have, independently, quanti-
fi ed their cross-boundary emissions, so called because their emissions occur 
outside the geographic boundary of the city of interest but are directly caused 
by activities occurring within the geographic boundary of a city (such as 
with ecological footprinting). For example, airline travel has been included 
in GHG accounting for Aspen, Colorado, and Seattle, Washington, in the 
United States; some foods (rice and milk) and cement have been included in 
emissions for Delhi and Kolkata, India (Sharma, Dasgupta, and Mitra 2002); 
food, cement, and freight transport have been included for Paris (Mairie de 
Paris 2007); and key urban materials such as food, water, transport fuels, and 
cement are accounted for in Denver (Ramaswami and others 2008). Th is 
chapter discusses how these emissions can play a role in augmenting baselines 
for urban area, the policy implications, and the methodological approaches 
that have been used.
Baseline GHG emissions are presented for 44 urban areas, including those 
in developed and developing nations. Although total emissions have been 
reported for urban areas since the late 1980s (Baldasano, Soriano, and Boada 
1999; Harvey 1993), this chapter primarily presents baselines from recent stud-
ies (such as Carney and others 2009; Dhakal 2004, 2009; Kennedy and others 
TABLE 2.2, continued
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2009; Ramaswami and others 2008). Th ese emission baselines refl ect the meth-
odologies employed and emissions sources considered. Th erefore, the base-
lines are presented either with or without emissions from industrial processes 
(which may be incomplete),1 waste (where methods diff er), and aviation and 
marine (which is subject to debate).
Overview of National, Corporate, and Subnational 
GHG Inventorying Procedures
Th e IPCC (2006) Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories are the 
international standard for national reporting under the the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Th e guidelines describe 
procedures for determining annual (calendar year) inventories of more than 10 
categories of GHG emissions (and removals) that occur as a result of human activ-
ities. Th e aim with national inventories is to include GHG emissions that occur 
within the territory and off shore areas under each nation’s jurisdiction, although 
some special issues are found with transportation emissions, as discussed later. 
Emissions are categorized under fi ve broad sectors: Energy; Industrial Processes 
and Product Use; Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use; Waste; and Others 
(which includes precursor and indirect N2O emissions).
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✓ ✓ ? ✓ ✓? ✓ ✓#
0.1 percent and hence not reported; ‡ = AFOLU and waste emissions for Delhi and Kolkata are given in 
Sharma, Dasgupta, and Mitra (2002); § = includes only aviation emissions within the urban region; 
# = also includes electricity.
a. See table 2.1 for defi nitions.
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Th e methodology for determining most emissions entails multiplication of 
data on a level of human activity by an emissions factor. Th e IPCC guidelines 
include substantial guidance on collecting data, managing uncertainty in cal-
culations, conducting quality assurance procedures, and identifying the key 
categories of emissions. With respect to the accuracy of calculations, the con-
cept of tiers is particularly important. Th e tier indicates the level of complexity 
in methodology, with Tier 1 being basic, Tier 2 intermediate, and Tier 3 the 
most complex. Higher-tier methods have greater data requirements and are 
generally more accurate. Th e tier concept can apply to both activity data and 
emissions factors, where for example, an emissions factor may be nationally 
specifi c or a general one.
Volumes 2 to 5 of the IPCC guidelines provide detailed procedures for 
determining emissions from various subsectors, using Tier 1, 2, and 3 methods. 
In the next section, we will highlight a few specifi c procedural details from the 
IPCC guidelines, where they diff er from approaches used to determine GHG 
baselines for urban areas.
First, however, we outline procedures that corporations have adopted for 
reporting GHG emissions because many municipal governments, given their 
level of jurisdiction, have resorted to tackling their corporate emissions (street 
lighting, for example, has emerged as one possible area of intervention in 
municipalities).
Th e World Resources Institute/World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WRI/WBSCD) procedures have arguably become the best 
practice for reporting GHGs by corporations (and other institutions). Th e 
WRI/WBCSD procedure applies standard accounting principles of relevance, 
completeness, consistency, transparency, and accuracy. Business goals served 
by conducting GHG inventories include managing GHG risk and identify-
ing reduction opportunities. Although the standards are in themselves policy 
neutral, they have been adopted by many GHG programs, including voluntary 
reduction programs, GHG registries, national and regional industry initiatives, 
GHG trading programs, and sector-specifi c protocols (WRI/WBSCD 2009).
Two approaches for attributing GHG emissions to a corporation are pro-
vided: the equity share and control approaches. By the equity share approach, a 
company accounts for emissions based on its share of equity in operations. By 
the control approach, a company accounts for all (100 percent) of the emissions 
from operations over which it has control, whether fi nancial or operational 
(WRI/WBSCD 2009).
Th e WRI/WBCSD procedures make particular eff orts to be supportive of 
national-level reporting programs. First, the procedures use emission factors 
that are consistent with the IPCC. Th e WRI/WBSCD also recognize that offi  -
cial government reporting oft en requires GHG data to be reported at a facility 
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level, rather than at a corporate level. So whether a company uses an equity 
share approach or a control approach to establish its corporate inventory, it is 
also encouraged to itemize emissions from facilities that it operates. Govern-
ments typically require reporting on the basis of operational control, either at 
the facility level or at some consolidation over geographic boundaries.
Th e WRI/WBCSD also introduced the concept of scope of emissions, 
enabling companies to distinguish between emissions from facilities that they 
own or control and emissions that result from broader company activities 
(table 2.3). Scope 1 emissions are those from sources such as boilers, furnaces, 
and vehicles that are owned or controlled by the company (producer). Emis-
sions from electricity consumed by the company are in Scope 2 (consumer), 
whereas other emissions that are a consequence of the company’s activities, 
such as extraction and production of purchased materials, transportation, and 
product use, are in Scope 3 (consumer). Th ese Scope 3 emissions do not neces-
sarily entail a full life-cycle assessment; they are a practical determination of the 
main indirect emissions attributable to the company’s activities.
Th e WRI/WBCSD Scopes 1–2–3 framework has been adopted widely, with 
small variations, by several organizations that seek to establish standards for 
carbon accounting with a view toward future carbon trading. Examples of 
some of these organizations include the California Climate Action Registry 
(CCAR), the Chicago Climate Exchange, the Colorado Carbon Fund, and the 
TABLE 2.3 
Defi nition of Scope 1, 2, and 3 GHG Emissions
Scope 1: Direct GHG emissions
Direct GHG emissions occur from sources that are owned or controlled by the company, 
such as emissions from combustion in owned or controlled boilers, furnaces, and vehicles 
or emissions from chemical production in owned or controlled process equipment. (Direct 
CO2 emissions from combustion of biomass and GHGs not covered by the Kyoto Protocol 
are not included in Scope 1.) 
Scope 2: Electricity indirect GHG emissions
These are emissions from the generation of purchased electricity consumed by the 
company. Scope 2 emissions physically occur at the facility where electricity is generated.
Scope 3: Other indirect emissions
Emissions in this optional reporting capacity are a consequence of the activities of the 
company but occur from sources not owned or controlled by the company. Examples of 
Scope 3 activities are extraction and production of purchased materials, transportation of 
purchased fuels, and use of sold products and services.
Source: Adapted from WRI/WBCSD 2009, 25.
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North American Climate Registry. Many cities and states are participating 
in one or more of these registries, although it is oft en the municipal govern-
ment and not the government emissions that are being reported. For exam-
ple, participants in the Chicago Climate Exchange include U.S. cities such as 
Aspen, Boulder, Chicago, and Portland; U.S. states such as Illinois and New 
Mexico; and Melbourne, Australia. Th e North American Climate Registry 
notes that its participants include several large privately owned utilities, as 
well as local governments from Austin, San Francisco, Seattle, and provinces 
in Canada.
Th us, as we seek to develop community-wide GHG accounting protocols 
at the city scale, adapting the WRI/WBCSD Scope 1–2–3 framework (already 
consistent with IPCC) with relevant modifi cations necessitated by the smaller 
spatial scale of cities, would provide consistency with other GHG accounting 
protocols. Ramaswami and others (2008), in developing a hybrid demand-
based method for GHG emissions accounting in Denver, articulated a set of 
fi ve Scope 3 items that provide a holistic account of the material and energy 
demand in cities (discussed further later in this chapter).
Procedures for attributing GHG emissions to urban areas lie somewhere 
between those used for national inventories and those for corporate invento-
ries. Like the IPCC’s national guidelines, the procedures for urban areas aim 
to attribute emissions to a spatially defi ned area, such as that within a munici-
pal boundary in the case of a city’s (community) emissions. Th e ownership 
of land within the area, public or private, is of no relevance. Similar to the 
WRI/WBCSD Scope 2 and 3 emissions, however, GHG emissions attributed 
to urban areas can include those that occur outside of the area as a conse-
quence of activities within the area. Th e main challenge in developing a single 
global methodology for urban areas is deciding which (if any) emissions that 
occur outside of urban boundaries should be allocated to the urban area (Sat-
terthwaite 2008).
ICLEI’s recently revised (draft ) protocol for local government (community) 
emissions adopts the concept of scopes, similar to the WRI/WBCSD. Under 
Scope 2 emissions, ICLEI (2009) includes indirect emissions from consump-
tion of electricity, district heating, steam, and cooling. All other indirect or 
embodied emissions resulting from activities within the geopolitical boundary 
are classifi ed under Scope 3, although a consistent set of relevant Scope 3 activi-
ties are not yet explicitly defi ned by ICLEI for the city scale.
Care must be taken in interpreting Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions under ICLEI’s 
protocol. Some emissions from utility-derived electricity and heat combustion 
may be accounted as both Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, if they occur both 
within and outside the geopolitical boundary. Similarly, emissions from land-
fi ll waste may be accounted for under Scope 1 and Scope 3. To avoid double 
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counting, ICLEI’s fi nal reporting standard includes all Scope 1 emissions, plus 
additional emissions from electricity, heat, steam, solid waste, and waste water 
that occur outside of the geopolitical boundary.
Moving to a slightly larger scale, the GRIP methodology, developed at the 
University of Manchester, has primarily been applied to European regions 
(although it is also being applied in the United States), typically consisting 
of a large urban center with surrounding industrial and agricultural lands 
(see  defi nitions in table 2.1). GRIP reports emissions from the six main 
GHGs (the Kyoto basket): carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), hydrofl uorocarbons, perfl uorocarbons, and sulfur hexafl uoride 
(SF6). Th e methodology closely follows the IPCC guidelines by reporting, 
for example, energy and industrial process emissions by detailed subsectors. 
Indeed, results are developed so as to be comparable with national invento-
ries as well as other regions. Th e GRIP methodology is also consistent with 
approaches used to study other cities or city regions. For example, it does 
assign electricity emissions associated with electricity generation to the end 
user (for example, GRIP reports Scope 1 and 2 emissions and some Scope 3 
emissions).
A particular strength of the GRIP methodology is its ability to recognize 
and manage diff erences in data quality. GRIP has a three-level reporting 
scheme, where level 1 (green) is for the most certain data, level 2 (orange) is 
for intermediate-quality data, and level 3 (red) is lower-quality data; the last 
example usually is scaled from information in national inventories. (Th e levels 
have some similarities with IPCC tiers but are not the same.) Th e color coding 
is used in the reporting procedure to provide a clear indication of uncertainty 
in the results.
Overall, the urban GHG methodologies used by ICLEI and GRIP, as well 
as the academic studies, are fairly consistent with one another. All draw upon 
IPCC guidelines, with many incorporating out-of-area Scope 2 and Scope 3 
emissions. Th e main diff erences lie with which emissions, particularly Scope 3, 
are included in fi nal reporting.
Review of Methodology for Urban Baselines
Th is section identifi es the specifi c diff erences in methodology between selected 
urban GHG studies and explains how the approaches taken relate to the IPCC 
and WRI/WBCSD procedures. Table 2.2 shows the emissions subcategories 
for which there are diff erences between studies. Emissions are discussed under 
the four main categories of the IPCC: Energy; Waste; Industrial Processes and 
Product Use; and Land Use, Agriculture, and Forestry.
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Energy
Th e energy sector, including stationary combustion, mobile combustion, and 
fugitive sources, is by far the greatest contributor to GHG emissions from 
urban areas.
Th e determination of emissions from stationary combustion in urban areas 
follows the IPCC guidelines, with the exception of emissions from electricity 
use and district heating systems. Of the sectors considered under stationary 
combustion, the residential and commercial/institutional sectors are consis-
tently important in urban areas. Emissions from these sectors can be deter-
mined with high certainty where fuels are metered, such as with natural gas. 
Th ere may be some uncertainty with fuels that are delivered by multiple market 
participants, such as fuel oils, or where many diff erent fuel types are used.2
Th e extent of emissions from stationary combustion in the industrial 
sector varies considerably by urban region. In some studies, fuel use is not 
distinguished by sector. Under GRIP, however, emissions from energy com-
bustion in the manufacturing industries are reported according to IPCC’s 
subcategories. In the inventory for Glasgow and the Clyde, for example, 
emissions from combustion are reported for the following industries: iron 
and steel; nonferrous metals; chemicals; pulp, paper, and print; food process-
ing; beverages and tobacco; nonmetallic minerals industries; and other. (In 
GRIP, emissions from industrial energy combustion may be presented under 
“other industry” where data are not suffi  cient to distinguish between diff er-
ent industrial types.) Such detailed reporting is perhaps more important in 
wider metropolitan regions for which industrial energy use is typically more 
prevalent than in central cities.
For GHGs from electricity and heat production, all the urban areas con-
sidered in table 2.2 include Scope 2 emissions. From our studies, it appears 
to be conventional to allocate emissions from electricity consumption to the 
consumer of that electricity. Moreover, in most studies, the transmission and 
distribution line losses have been included in the determination of emissions 
attributable to urban areas (table 2.2). Th e motivation for including emissions 
from electricity production is that the size of these emissions is dependent 
upon the activity in the urban area (as well as the emissions factor). In Shanghai 
and Beijing, 30 percent and 71 percent of total electricity, respectively, were 
imported across their boundaries in 2006 (Dhakal 2009). Th e same argument 
also applies to some heating systems. Greater Prague, for example, has a district 
energy system that provides 17 percent of the heat used in the urban region; the 
GHG emissions attributable to Prague include those from a coal-fi red power 
plant at Melnik, 60 kilometers away, which generates steam for the heat pipes 
(Kennedy and others 2009).
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Determining GHG emission from mobile sources poses diff erent chal-
lenges than with stationary consumption. For road transportation, questions 
are asked as to whether travel outside of the urban region, that is, by com-
muters, should be included. Th is is a moot issue for metropolitan regions, but 
signifi cant when determining emissions from central cities. In the city of Paris, 
for example, internal automobile trips generate emissions of 3,670 kilotons 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), and trips with origins or destinations 
outside of the city contribute a further 2,862 kilotons of CO2e (Mairie de Paris 
2009); these are life-cycle emissions discussed further below. Nevertheless, for 
all the urban regions considered in table 2.2, tailpipe emissions within the 
urban region were what was quantifi ed, so consensus is seen here. A further 
issue, however, is the means by which travel activity data are determined—
an important issue to address given that GHGs from road transportation can 
account for more than 30 percent (50 percent in Sacramento) of emissions in 
some North American urban regions.
Th e IPCC guidelines on mobile combustion recognize two approaches for 
quantifying emissions for road transportation: (1) based on quantity of fuel 
sold and (2) from vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT). Approach 1 is preferred 
for CO2 emissions, because it is far more accurate. Indeed, for reasons of data 
availability, consistency, and the typically small size of cross-border traffi  c, the 
use of fuel sales to calculate CO2 emissions prevails over the strict application 
of the national territory (IPCC 2006, vol. 2, section 1.28). Emissions of CH4 
and N2O from road transportation are, however, dependent on the age and 
technology of vehicles, as well as the number of cold starts; hence, approach 2 
is preferred for CH4 and N2O.
To quantify GHG emissions from road transportation in urban areas, both 
of the approaches have been used (for the three GHGs associated with energy: 
CO2, CH4, and N2O) and a third approach involving scaling of fuel use from 
wider regions, such as states or provinces (table 2.2). Several potential pitfalls 
are seen here. Fuel sales data are not always available for urban areas—and 
even if one can fi nd such data, an implicit assumption is that the fuel purchased 
within the region is representative of activity within the region. Th is approach 
may be considered compatible with the IPCC guidelines, which suggest the 
use of fuel sales (although this may be more appropriate on a national basis). 
Meanwhile means of determining VKT may be inconsistent between cities 
because of diff erences in computer modeling, surveying, or vehicle-counting 
techniques. Nevertheless, by using multiple approaches for Bangkok, New York 
City, and Greater Toronto, diff erences between the three approaches have been 
shown to be less than 5 percent (Kennedy and others 2010).
Moving to emissions from air transportation, three distinct alternatives 
have been used for urban areas:
32 ■ CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
1. Exclude airplane emissions: In several of the studies in table 2.2, no emis-
sions from combustion of airplane fuels have been counted (or in the case 
of Tokyo, just operations within the area). Other than through fuel con-
sumption on take-off  and landing, airplane emissions occur outside urban 
regions and so are not counted in Scope 1. It might also be argued that emis-
sions from air travel are outside the control of local government, and so it is 
appropriate to exclude them.
2. Include emissions from domestic aviation but include only take-off  and land-
ings for international aviation: Th is approach has primarily been used in the 
18 GRIP studies (Carney and others 2009). It is consistent with the GRIP 
philosophy in that aviation emissions from all regions could be added to 
give the same national total as reported under IPCC guidelines. Emissions 
from cruising on international fl ights are excluded in accordance with the 
UNFCCC.
3. Include all emission from domestic and international aviation: Both London 
(Mayor of London 2007) and New York City (2007) report GHG emissions 
based on all fuels loaded at airports within their boundaries. Th is approach 
was adopted in the study of 10 cities by Kennedy and others (2009), with 
modifi cation for Denver to account for transfers, following Ramaswami and 
others (2008). Th is approach is consistent with the notion of world cities 
as the headquarters, fi nancial centers, and key gateways between national/
regional economies and the global economy, or as global service centers 
(Friedman 1986; Sassen 1991; Taylor 2004).
Th ree diff erent approaches have also been used for emissions from marine 
transportation, where these apply. In some cases, marine travel is excluded. For 
the GRIP studies, only emissions on inland water or within 12 miles of shore 
are included, whereas the studies of Cape Town, Los Angeles, and New York 
City included international marine emissions based on fuels loaded onto ships 
at these cities’ ports.
It is worth noting that no international methodology has been agreed 
to for allocating emissions from international aviation and marine activities. 
In national emissions inventories, the fuel sales and associated emissions are 
reported but are not included in the total. On an urban scale, this is further 
complicated by the fact that their airports may be located outside their jurisdic-
tion. Also, passengers may be using the airport to transfer to another region, or 
the airport or port may handle much freight destined for other areas. All these 
issues make the allocation of emissions to the urban scale a rather diffi  cult task.
Nevertheless, Wood, Bows, and Anderson (2010) suggest a method by 
which to allocate these emissions. Th e emissions associated with the landing 
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and take-off  cycle are allocated to the area in which the airport is based (this 
is the same approach as is adopted in air quality emissions), and the emissions 
associated with the cruise phase are allocated to the region in which the pas-
senger resides. More complicated issues concerning tourists, transferring pas-
sengers, and freight are also discussed next.
Waste
Th e determination of GHG emissions associated with waste is where the greatest 
discrepancies in methodology are apparent. In particular, emissions from the land 
fi lling of solid waste have been calculated using at least three diff erent techniques 
(table 2.2): (1) scaling from national inventories, (2) a total yields gas approach, and 
(3) the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Waste Reduction Model 
(WARM). Two further techniques could also have been used: (4) measurement 
from waste in place and (5) local application of IPCC’s fi rst-order decay approach.
Th e divergence of approaches for determining emissions from waste is per-
haps partly due to the complexity of emissions from landfi lls. Th e biodegrada-
tion of solid waste to form methane and other landfi ll gases occurs over time 
scales extending beyond a single year. Hence, researchers fi nd it challenging to 
assign GHG emissions from waste to a particular year.
Th e IPCC’s recommended approach (5) involves calculation of emissions 
in the inventory year, based on historical waste deposited over previous years. 
An alternative (4) would be to actually monitor and measure emissions in the 
inventory year, but this requires considerable monitoring and may be challeng-
ing for commercial and industrial waste streams if they are managed by the 
private sector.
Scaling solid waste emissions from national inventories (1) should give 
results that approximate those from approaches 4 and 5. Such scaling has been 
used in the GRIP studies (using its aforementioned level 2 and 3 methods; Car-
ney and others 2009).
Th e total yields gas approach (2) was formerly recommended by the IPCC 
(1997). Essentially it takes the total amount of waste produced by an urban 
area in a given year and then determines the total emissions released from this 
waste, regardless of how many years transpire before the full release occurs. 
Th is approach has been used by Dubeux and La Rovere (2007) and Kennedy 
and others (2009, 2010).
Th e EPA’s WARM model (3) uses a life-cycle accounting approach, which 
is ideal in some respects but not in others. Th e model recognizes, for exam-
ple, that the recycling of waste reduces emissions from the harvesting of raw 
materials; hence a credit can be applied. Th e problem is that emissions asso-
ciated with material fl ows of paper and plastics into cities are not currently 
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counted in the GHG emissions for most urban areas. So use of the WARM 
model is not consistent with current means of determining urban GHG emis-
sions, although the life-cycle methodology is indicative of the direction cities 
should be headed as consumption-based inventory procedures develop (this is 
discussed later).
A few other inconsistencies in reporting emissions from waste can be made 
with reference to table 2.2. First, waste emissions were not determined for 
the Chinese city-provinces. Second, the GRIP studies and those of Barcelona, 
Geneva, Prague, and Toronto include emissions from waste incineration within 
the waste category, although where such incineration includes energy recovery 
the IPCC recommends that the emissions be included under stationary com-
bustion. Finally, emissions from waste water/sewerage were omitted in many 
studies, although these are relatively minor.
Industrial Processes and Product Use
GHG emissions from industrial processes and product use include only emis-
sions that are not primarily for energy use purposes (IPCC 2006). A wide 
range of industrial processes and products emit GHGs that are not the result 
of intended combustion. Th e three broad categories of nonenergy use are feed-
stocks, reducing agents, and nonenergy products, such as lubricants, greases, 
waxes, bitumen, and solvents. Emissions from these types of uses can be 
assigned to various industrial sectors:
• Mineral industry (including cement, lime, glass, and other)
• Chemical industry
• Metal industry
• Nonenergy products from fuels and solvent use
• Electronics industry
• Product uses as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances
• Other product manufacture and use
• Others (including pulp and paper, food and beverage).
Given the diversity of these nonenergy industrial processes and products, 
reporting of emissions is recognized to be challenging (IPCC 2006).
Th e reporting of industrial process emissions for urban areas is somewhat 
mixed. Other than the GRIP studies, which have carefully recorded these emis-
sions, other studies have been less consistent. For many of the urban areas 
in table 2.2, no emissions are recorded. Th is could be because there are no 
industrial process emissions or the emissions are unknown. Th e GRIP studies 
perhaps record more industrial process emissions because they are regional 
studies, including industrial areas on the edges of central cities (although emis-
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sions are oft en reported as zero to indicate no activity takes place). Again, it is 
clear that industrial process emissions are missing from some urban areas in 
table 2.2. Also, the emissions associated with “refi lling” air conditioning units 
may require more attention than many studies currently adopt.
Th e magnitude of industrial process emissions is usually small, but these 
emissions are quite city specifi c. For most of the European regions reported by 
Carney and others (2009), the industrial process emissions are typically 1 to 
2 percent of total emissions. Exceptions are found, however: Athens (11 per-
cent), Turin (11 percent), Frankfurt (10 percent), Hamburg (7 percent), Naples 
(7 percent), Venice (7 percent), Paris (6 percent), and Madrid (5 percent). In 
absolute terms, Frankfurt has the largest industrial process emissions with 
4,987 kilotons of CO2e. Among the other urban areas studied, Toronto has 
3,185 kilotons of CO2e of emissions from just two cement plants and a lubri-
cant facility. Given that some of these emissions are quite substantial, better 
reporting of industrial process emissions is generally required for urban areas.
Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use
GHG emissions and removals in the agriculture, forestry, and other land use 
(AFOLU) category are typically small, oft en negligible, for most urban regions. 
Th ese emissions become signifi cant only if the regional boundary is large, 
including substantial rural area in addition to the urban core, or where agricul-
tural activities are particularly intense; this applies to a few cases in the GRIP 
studies (Carney and others 2009).
For many of the urban areas in table 2.2, AFOLU emissions have not been 
quantifi ed because they have been taken to be negligible. Th is may be a reason-
able assumption for many urban regions. In the study of Calgary, for example, 
urban forestry sequesters 13 kilotons of CO2e, but this is less than 0.1 percent 
of total emissions (reported as 16,370 kilotons of CO2e).
Even for cities in the developing world with relatively low total emissions, 
the contribution of AFOLU is small. Sharma, Dasgupta, and Mitra (2002) 
determined the methane emissions from rice cultivation and livestock (dairy 
cattle, nondairy cattle, and buff aloes) for Kolkata and Delhi. Th e emissions 
from 300,000 hectares of paddy fi elds in Kolkata, in 1997–98, were 0.45 kilo-
tons of CO2e. Th is is negligible compared to Kolkata’s CO2 emissions for the 
energy sector, which in 2000 were reported to be 17,270 kilotons (Mitra, 
Sharma, and Ajero 2003). Delhi’s methane emissions from paddy fi elds were 
even smaller than those for Kolkata, but it had substantially more livestock, 
which emitted 15.16 kilotons of CO2e in 1992 (Sharma, Dasgupta, and Mitra 
2002). Here again, though, these methane emissions from livestock are neg-
ligible compared with Delhi’s 19,800 kilotons of CO2 emissions in the energy 
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sector (Mitra, Sharma, and Ajero 2003). Agricultural emissions of 13 kilotons 
of CO2e for Rio de Janeiro were also considered negligible, although emissions 
of 256 kilotons of CO2e for land-use change were reported (Dubeux and La 
Rovere 2007). Th is represents 2 percent of Rio de Janeiro’s emissions, which is 
small but still large enough to be counted.
Among the 18 European regions in the GRIP study, several of the larger 
regions do have substantial emissions for the AFOLU sector (Carney and oth-
ers 2009). In the Hamburg Metropolitan Region, the agricultural emissions of 
4,463 kilotons of CO2e also represent 11 percent of the regions total emissions. 
Over half of these emissions were from agricultural soils; Hamburg is situated 
in the largest fruit-growing region of Europe. For other urban areas in the GRIP 
study, emissions from agriculture were found to be negligible, such as for Brus-
sels, Helsinki, and Oslo. So although AFOLU emissions are usually small or 
negligible for many urban areas, exceptions are found, and this category needs 
to be carefully considered.
Inclusion of Scope 3 “Cross-Boundary” GHG Emissions 
Relevant to Cities
Having discussed Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, some consideration of the 
inclusion of Scope 3 emissions is necessary.
Why Include Scope 3 Items?
Th is section discusses methods for including the GHG impact of activities that 
occur within urban areas that spur production (and associated GHG emis-
sions) elsewhere, oft en outside the geographical boundaries of the city of inter-
est. Before we discuss which Scope 3 items to include, it is useful to articulate 
why Scope 3 items should be included in the fi rst place. Th ere is fairly wide 
acceptance that end use of electricity in urban areas should be systematically 
tracked back to GHG emissions occurring at power plants located outside city 
boundaries, such that these emissions are explicitly counted as Scope 2 emis-
sions for that urban area. Th e same logic could apply, for example, to trans-
port fuels such as diesel and gasoline used for transport in cities—the GHG 
emissions associated with refi ning these fuels should also be included just as 
is the impact of generating electricity. Th e GHG emissions associated with fuel 
refi ning (termed wells-to-pump [WTP]) emissions are 20 to 25 percent of the 
emissions associated with the combustion of the refi ned products in vehicles 
(termed pump-to-wheel [PTW] emissions) and thus are a signifi cant contribu-
tor to global GHG emissions. Likewise, agriculture and food production con-
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tribute 20 to 25 percent of global and national GHG inventories yet are usually 
negligible in city-scale Scope 1–2 GHG accounting because much of the food 
production occurs outside the geographic boundaries of cities; at the same 
time, life in cities would not be possible without food consumption.
Which Scope 3 Items to Include?
Th is discussion suggests two criteria for inclusion of cross-boundary GHG 
emission motivated by activities occurring within urban areas. First, these activ-
ities should be critical for the functionality of cities, and, second, the resulting 
GHG emission should be signifi cant contributors at larger spatial scales, such 
that their exclusion at the city scale creates a discontinuity in GHG accounting 
across spatial scales. We suggest that Scope 1–2–3 emissions accounting not 
be used in place of Scope 1–2 accounting, which may be preferable for carbon 
trading schemes but be used to augment Scope 1–2 reporting.
Several urban areas have included various cross-boundary emissions on an 
ad hoc basis; for example, GHG emissions associated with food consumption 
in cities have been included for Paris (Mairie de Paris 2009), Delhi, and Kol-
kata (Sharma, Dasgupta, and Mitra 2002), with Delhi and Kolkata focusing 
on nonenergy emission from rice and milk production only. Embodied emis-
sions from producing various construction materials such as cement, steel, and 
asphalt have been included in inventories for Kolkata, Delhi, Denver, Paris, and 
Seattle. In pioneering a holistic emissions inventory for Denver, Ramaswami 
and others (2008) articulated a small set of Scope 3 inclusions critical for func-
tionality of cities; these included the following:
• Energy associated with transport of good and people outside city bound-
aries, essential for trade and commuter travel to and from cities, allocated 
equally to origin-destination locations.
• Embodied energy and associated GHG emissions associated with produc-
tion of key urban materials critical for life in cities, such as the following:
• Food
• Transport fuels (other fuels already being accounted for)
• Water and waste water (if such production occurs outside city boundaries)
• Materials for shelter—chiefl y cement because it is the single second-
largest CO2 emitter following fossil fuel combustion.
Th e de minimus rule (CCAR 2007) can be applied, yielding a stopping rule: that 
is, no further Scope 3 activities need be included unless they show more than 
a 1 percent increase in the GHG accounting of a city. (Note that cities may also 
export CO2 embodied in goods and services that needs to be accounted too; 
the “net” is of interest.) Th us, applying a full Scope 1–2–3 accounting can be 
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made practical with the small and relevant list of Scope 3 activities just listed. 
Indeed, a small list of relevant Scope 3 items is the recommendation of WRI 
and the U.S. EPA Climate Leaders Program. Th e Scope 3 items listed focus 
on critical service provisions required for life in cities that oft en occur out-
side city boundaries; other material fl ows are assumed to be balanced out in 
the trade and exchange of goods and services between cities (Ramaswami and 
others 2008).
Measurement Impact
Inclusion of additional Scope 3 items has been shown to increase the GHG’s 
attributed to cities. Incorporating primarily the impacts of fuel refi ning was 
shown to increase GHG emissions associated with eight global cities by as 
much as 24 percent (Kennedy and others 2009). Incorporating all fi ve Scope 3 
items increases the GHG accounting by an average of 45 percent for eight U.S. 
cities studied by Hillman and Ramaswami (2010). Further, incorporating all 
fi ve Scope 3 activities (Ramaswami and others 2008) created consistency both 
in inclusions and in the numeric per capita GHG emission computed at the city 
scale for Denver versus the larger national scale, both of which converged to 
about 25 tons of CO2e per capita (table 2.4).
A similar analysis repeated for eight U.S. cities showed remarkable consis-
tency between per capita city-scale Scope 1–2–3 emissions and national per 
capita emissions in the United States (Hillman and Ramaswami 2010), which 
suggests that inclusion of the specifi c list of fi ve Scope 3 items proposed by 
TABLE 2.4 
Denver’s Average per Capita GHG Emissions Compared with the 
National Average, State of Colorado Average, and Other Colorado Cities
Inclusions
Denver’s per capita GHG 
emissions (million tons 
CO2e per capita)
National, state, or other 
city per capita GHG 
emissions (CO2e per 
capita)
Scope 1 + 2 and waste 
plus airline travel and key 
urban materials
25.3 National: 24.5
Colorado: 25.2
Scope 1 + 2 and waste (no 
airline travel or embodied 
energy of key urban 
materials)
18 Other Colorado cities: 
17.8–18.4
Source: Adapted from Ramaswami and others 2008.
Note: CO2e = carbon dioxide equivalent; GHG = greenhouse gas.
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Ramaswami and others (2008) may help cities develop a more holistic GHG 
emissions footprint that shows the overall impact of a city’s activities on global 
GHG emissions.
Policy Impact
Incorporating a full Scope 1–2–3 accounting provides city residents with 
a measure that helps connect their everyday activities with GHG emissions. 
Important activities such as food consumption and airline travel that appear 
in personal GHG calculators and in national accounts also now appear in city-
scale GHG accounts. Th is facilitates public understanding of GHG emissions 
and can also spur the development of win-win strategies for GHG mitigation 
that link demand for materials and energy in cities with their production. For 
example, accounting for embodied emissions associated with cement in Den-
ver resulted in the city’s adopting green concrete policies that require 15 per-
cent fl y ash inclusion in concrete to reduce cement consumption at the city 
scale (Greenprint 2007). Inclusion of airline emissions resulted in proposals to 
off er air travel off -set programs directly at Denver International Airport.
Furthermore, a Scope 1–2–3 emissions assessment can avoid unintended 
credit being given to policies that may merely shift  emissions “out of boundary.” 
For example, large-scale use of hydrogen-powered cars within city boundaries 
may result in zero PTW Scope 1 emissions, but signifi cant WTP GHG emis-
sions can occur outside city boundaries (Scope 3) if the hydrogen is produced 
from coal or natural gas. Conversely, many cross-sector strategies may be used 
to reduce a city’s overall Scope 1–2–3 footprint. For example, information and 
communication technologies such as teleconferencing and telepresencing may 
increase energy use in buildings while displacing airline travel. Once again, a full 
Scope 1–2–3 GHG accounting protocol would support such innovative cross-
sector, cross-boundary GHG reduction policies and strategies in a manner that 
boundary limited (Scope 1–2) accounting does not.
Methodology, Challenges, and a Proposed Framework 
for Scope 3 Inclusions
In the few studies that have included out-of-boundary impacts, the methodol-
ogy has varied. In estimating GHG emission for Delhi and Kolkata, we estimate 
that Sharma, Dasgupta, and Mitra (2002) used national average consumption 
data for some of the urban materials studied and coupled these with nonen-
ergy GHG emission factors for these materials as specifi ed by the IPCC. Th us 
a city-specifi c material fl ow analysis was not conducted, and only partial emis-
sions (nonenergy) associated with these products (rice, milk, cement, steel) 
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were incorporated. For Paris, the city’s Bilan Carbone (Mairie de Paris 2009) 
reported that national data from the food industry were used to determine aver-
age per capita consumption; however, methods used for estimating cement and 
steel consumption were not fully detailed nor were data sources for the requisite 
emission factors. In Paris, detailed analysis of resident airline travel and freight 
transport was conducted; both incoming and outgoing trips were counted and 
fully allocated to Paris. In contrast, Ramaswami and others (2008) applied a 
50 percent allocation to destination and origin locations for allocating both air-
line and surface transport in Denver; such an origin-destination allocation pro-
cedure ensures that the same trip is not double counted at both ends of a trip.
For key urban materials in U.S. cities, Ramaswami and others (2008) used 
tools from industrial ecology—material fl ow analysis (MFA) and life cycle assess-
ment (LCA). MFA for Scope 3 material fl ows in cities oft en using monetary 
consumption data available at the metropolitan spatial scale. Th ese fl ows are 
calibrated with national material consumption data to ensure no methodologi-
cal double counting for materials occurs. Emission factors for the various mate-
rials considered for Denver—food, cement, and transport fuels (gasoline and 
diesel)—were obtained from nationally calibrated LCA tools such as Carnegie 
Mellon University’s Economic Input Output-LCA (Green Design Institute 2006), 
the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s Life Cycle Inventory database 
(NREL 2009), and the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory’s GREET model (ANL 
2009) for transportation fuels. With the exception of food—which is a complex 
supply chain—embodied energy and GHG emissions from industrial production 
of materials such as cement, steel, and petroleum fuels could be readily computed 
for the United States. Th e IPCC provides specifi c guidance on these parameters 
for international applications, particularly for nonenergy-related industrial emis-
sions from cement production and the like (IPCC 1997, 2006).
Th e review indicates that methods that avoid double counting exist and have 
been applied to assess upstream impacts of key Scope 3 consumption activities 
in cities. International GHG emissions data for most of these materials exist or 
can be researched (for example, IPCC nonenergy emissions), with the excep-
tion of food (see also the work of Birch, Barrett, and Wiedmann 2004 in the 
United Kingdom). When food production activities or cement factories occur 
within city boundaries, case studies in Delhi and Kolkata (Sharma, Dasgupta, 
and Mitra 2002) demonstrate that the emissions from these in-boundary activ-
ities can be allocated to avoid double counting between in-boundary and out-
of-boundary activities.
Th us, careful Scope 1–2–3 accounting of GHGs at the city scale is indeed 
possible. To be consistent with other GHG accounting protocols (WRI, ICLEI, 
CCAR), we propose that all cities and metropolitan regions be encouraged to 
report Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions in their baselines (as well as Scope 3 
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waste emissions, where applicable). In addition, it is highly recommended that 
cities also report on the fi ve specifi c Scope 3 items listed earlier (transport fuel 
production, food production, cement-steel production, water production, and 
origin-destination–allocated external transport emissions), yielding a Scope 
1–2–3 emissions footprint.
Th e city-scale emissions (Scope 1–2) and a broader emissions footprint 
(Scope 1–2–3) can be used together with application of two logic rules, as 
described in Hillman and Ramaswami (2010, 1908):
• “Credit GHG reduction strategies that reduce a city’s Scope 1+2 GHG inven-
tory only if they also reduce the city’s broader Scope 1+2+3 GHG emissions 
footprint; credit is recommended for the smaller of the two reductions. Th is 
prevents unintended incentives to shift  GHG emissions across city boundaries.
• Incorporate fl exibility to award cities credit for innovative strategies that 
demonstrate additionality3 and can quantifi ably reduce their Scope 1+2+3 
GHG footprint, even if the Scope 1+2 emissions inventory does not show 
reductions. For example, GHG mitigation credit could be distributed be-
tween fl y ash suppliers and a city, if the latter’s green concrete policy explic-
itly demonstrates additional fl y ash use to displace cement in concrete, when 
compared to business-as-usual.”
With these rules, Scope 3 accounting can be used in conjunction with exist-
ing protocols for Scope 1–2 accounting to develop more holistic and policy-
relevant GHG management at the city scale.
Baseline Emissions
GHG emissions for 44 urban areas can now be presented using a methodology 
that is consistent other than diff erences in industrial processes, waste, AFOLU, 
and aviation/marine emissions, discussed elsewhere in this chapter. For these 
sectors where there are diff erences in approach, it is necessary to refer to table 2.2.
Th e baselines presented in tables 2.5 and 2.6 are for the same set of urban 
areas shown in table 2.2, other than the following changes:
• Baselines for Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin have been revised, including 
new calculations for emissions from aviation and marine activities and 
waste.
• For Delhi and Kolkata, the AFOLU and waste emissions in 2000 have been 
calculated using per capita emissions taken from the study by Sharma, Das-
gupta, and Mitra (2002).
• Paris I (City of Paris) is excluded because of its unique life-cycle approach, 
but Paris II (Île-de-France) is included.
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TABLE 2.5 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Cities and Metropolitan Regions
million tons of CO2e
City or 
metropolitan 
regiona Year
Energy 
(excluding 
aviation 
and 
marine) Aviation Marine
Energy 
(including 
aviation 
and 
marine)
Industrial 
processes AFOLU Waste
Total 
(excluding 
aviation 
and 
marine) Total
Europe
Athens 2005 35.72 4.38 0.45 1.02 41.57
Barcelona 2006 3.68 2.67 6.35   0.39 4.07 6.74
Bologna 2005 8.93 0.07 0.72 0.25 9.97
Brussels 2005 7.34 0.14 0.02 0.04 7.55
Frankfurt 2005 44.40 4.99 1.61 0.61 51.61
Geneva 2005 2.45 0.74 0.00 3.19   0.16 2.61 3.35
Glasgow 2004 13.77 0.25 0.72 0.56 15.30
Hamburg 2005 33.96 2.82 4.46 0.28 41.52
Helsinki 2005 6.70 0.17 0.03 0.04 6.94
Ljubljana 2005 4.31 0.07 0.19 0.20 4.77
London 2003 46.31 23.00 0.00 69.31 0.00 0.00 1.53 47.84 70.84
Madrid 2005 36.25 2.23 0.36 2.15 40.98
Naples 2005 10.66 0.87 0.49 0.46 12.49
Oslo 2005 3.35 0.11 0.06 0.11 3.63
Paris II 2005 47.01 3.53 6.91 2.20 59.64
Porto 2005 11.14 0.07 0.38 0.56 12.14
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Prague 2005 9.33 1.06 0.00 10.39 0.51 0.00 0.13 9.97 11.03
Rotterdam 2005 17.08 0.15 0.13 0.28 17.64
Stockholm 2005 6.35 0.17 0.24 0.12 6.88
Stuttgart 2005 40.89 0.36 0.87 0.43 42.57
Turin 2005 17.60 2.51 1.47 0.28 21.86
Veneto 2005 39.55 3.29 3.28 1.18 47.29
North America
Austin 2005 10.37 b 10.37 0.11 10.48 b
Calgary 2003 15.94  −0.01 0.44 16.37
Denver 2005 10.11 0.86 10.97 0.11 10.22 11.08
Los Angeles 2000 83.36 17.83 16.10 117.29 2.10  4.65 90.11 124.04
Minneapolis 2005 7.00 7.00 0.03 7.03
New York City 2005 62.65 14.19 6.20 83.04   2.83 65.48 85.87
Portland 2005 8.37 b 8.37 0.10 8.47 b
Seattle 2005 7.75 b 7.75 0.07 7.82 b
Toronto 2005 54.60 4.62 0.00 59.22 3.19  1.81 59.60 64.22
Washington, 
 DC
2000 10.31 10.31 0.01 −0.02 0.74 11.04
Latin America
Mexico City 2000 31.68   0.00 3.59 35.27
Rio de Janeiro 1998 5.78 0.86  6.64 0.24 0.27 4.96 11.25 12.11
São Paulo 2000 9.57 0.94  10.51 0.01 0.00 3.70 13.28 14.22
continued
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TABLE 2.5, continued
City or 
metropolitan 
regiona Year
Energy 
(excluding 
aviation 
and 
marine) Aviation Marine
Energy 
(including 
aviation 
and 
marine)
Industrial 
processes AFOLU Waste
Total 
(excluding 
aviation 
and 
marine) Total
Asia
Bangkok 2005 42.61 10.85  53.46 6.98 49.59 60.44
Beijing 2006 146.93 7.15 0.00 154.09 4.92 151.85 159.00
Delhi 2000 17.31 3.34 20.65
Kolkata 2000 13.83 3.97 17.80
Seoul 1998 42.03 42.03
Shanghai 2006 197.07 8.55 5.00 210.62 1.36 198.43 211.98
Tianjin 2006 116.43 0.41 1.23 118.08 1.17 117.60 119.25
Tokyo 2006 55.88 60.04 1.42 0.56 57.86 62.02
Africa
Cape Town 2006 17.81 1.14 3.34 22.29 3.04 20.85 26.57
Source: Studies as cited in table 2.2.
Note: AFOLU = agriculture, forestry, and other land use.
a. See table 2.1 for defi nitions.
b. Airline data for these cities pending review (Hillman and Ramaswami 2010).
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TABLE 2.6 Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Cities and Metropolitan Regions
tons of CO2e
City or 
metropolitan 
regiona Year
Energy 
(excluding 
aviation 
and 
marine) Aviation Marine
Energy 
(including 
aviation 
and 
marine)
Industrial 
processes AFOLU Waste
Total 
(excluding 
aviation 
and 
marine) Total
Europe
Athens 2005 9.0 1.1 0.1 0.3 10.4
Barcelona 2006 2.3 1.7 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.5 4.2
Bologna 2005 9.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 11.1
Brussels 2005 0.0 7.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 7.5
Frankfurt 2005 11.8 1.3 0.4 0.2 13.7
Geneva 2005 5.7 1.7 0.0 7.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 6.0 7.8
Glasgow 2004 7.9 0.1 0.4 0.3 8.8
Hamburg 2005 0.0 8.0 0.7 1.0 0.1 9.7
Helsinki 2005 6.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 7.0
Ljubljana 2005 0.0 8.6 0.1 0.4 0.4 9.5
London 2003 6.3 3.1 0.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 6.5 9.6
Madrid 2005 0.0 6.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 6.9
Naples 2005 3.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 4.0
Oslo 2005 3.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.5
Paris II 2005 0.0 4.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 5.2
Porto 2005 6.7 0.0 0.2 0.3 7.3
Prague 2005 7.9 0.9 0.0 8.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 8.4 9.3
continued
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TABLE 2.6, continued
City or 
metropolitan 
regiona Year
Energy 
(excluding 
aviation 
and 
marine) Aviation Marine
Energy 
(including 
aviation 
and 
marine)
Industrial 
processes AFOLU Waste
Total 
(excluding 
aviation 
and 
marine) Total
Rotterdam 2005 28.8 0.2 0.2 0.5 29.8
Stockholm 2005 3.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.6
Stuttgart 2005 0.0 15.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 16.0
Turin 2005 7.8 1.1 0.7 0.1 9.7
Veneto 2005 8.3 0.7 0.7 0.2 10.0
North America
Austin 2005 15.4 b 15.4 0.17 15.57 b
Calgary 2003 17.3 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.5 17.7
Denver 2005 17.69 1.5 19.19 0.19 17.88 19.38
Los Angeles 2000 8.8 1.9 1.7 12.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 9.5 13.0
Minneapolis 2005 18.28 b 0.06 18.34 b
New York City 2005 7.7 1.7 0.8 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 8.0 10.5
Portland 2005 12.26 b 12.26 0.15 12.41 b
Seattle 2005 13.5 b 13.57 13.68 13.68 b
Toronto 2005 9.8 0.8 0.0 10.7 0.6 0.0 0.3 10.7 11.6
Washington, DC 2000 18.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 19.3
Latin America
Mexico City 2000 3.7   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 4.1
Rio de Janeiro 1998 1.0 0.2  1.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.0 2.1
São Paulo 2000 0.9 0.1  1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.3 1.4
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Asia
Bangkok 2005 7.5 1.9 9.4 1.2 8.8 10.7
Beijing 2006 9.3 0.5 0.0 9.7 0.3 9.6 10.1
Delhi 2000 1.3 0.3 1.6
Kolkata 2000 0.9 0.3 1.1
Seoul 1998 4.1 4,1
Shanghai 2006 10.9 0.5 0.3 11.6 0.1 10.9 11.7
Tianjin 2006 10.8 0.0 0.1 11.0 0.1 10.9 11.1
Tokyo 2006 4.4 0.0 0. 0 4.7 0.1 0.0 4.6 4.9
Africa
Cape Town 2006 5.1 0.3 1.0 6.4 0.9 6.0 7.6
Source: Studies as cited in table 2.2.
Note: AFOLU = agriculture, forestry, and other land use.
a. See table 2.1 for defi nitions.
b. Airline data for these cities pending review (Hillman and Ramaswami 2010).
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Note that the baselines reported are largely for 2005 or 2006. Only in the 
cases of Calgary, Delhi, Glasgow, Kolkata, London, Los Angeles, Mexico City, 
Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Seoul, and Washington, DC, are emissions given 
for earlier years. Because 2005 is the reporting year for most of the studies, 
it could become a standard baseline year for reporting emissions for further 
urban areas.
A precautionary note on the accuracy of baselines should be made. Th e 
results for total emissions are reported to an accuracy of 10 kilotons in table 
2.5, but this accuracy is only to facilitate the calculation of per capita emis-
sions in table 2.6. Baselines reported in both tables are accurate at best to two 
signifi cant fi gures.
Conclusion
For urban areas to become more eff ective at tackling climate change through 
GHG reductions, two key requirements are found. First, an open, global proto-
col for quantifying GHG emissions attributable to urban areas must be estab-
lished. Second, comparable baseline measures of GHG emissions for urban 
areas are needed.
Th e primary contribution of this chapter has been to present GHG emis-
sions for more than 40 urban areas (cities and metropolitan regions) from fi ve 
continents. Th is has been achieved by assembling and assessing previous stud-
ies of urban GHG emissions and adding further analysis where necessary and 
where data permit. Discrepancies have been found between previous studies in 
the methodology for determining emissions from waste and in the reporting 
of emissions for aviation, marine, agricultural, and industrial processes. Our 
results have been presented (in tables 2.5 and 2.6) so that these diff erences can 
be recognized (through reference to table 2.2).
Despite these oft en minor diff erences, this work has shown that the potential 
clearly exists to establish an open, global protocol for quantifying GHG emis-
sions attributable to urban areas. Such a protocol must be suffi  ciently robust 
and compatible with the UNFCCC, that is, the IPCC, guidelines. Such compat-
ibility should include sectoral methodologies and emissions factors, but not 
necessarily a boundary limited scope.
Th e IPCC guidelines provide help with resolving some of the confl icting 
issues. Emissions from waste, for example, could be determined using the 
IPCC (2006) guidelines; this has primarily been hindered by the signifi cant 
data requirements. Agricultural and industrial process emissions, though small 
for many urban areas, need to be more carefully accounted for; again, the IPCC 
guidelines can be followed. Whether emissions from aviation and marine are 
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excluded or included primarily depends on whether the baseline GHG mea-
sures are only to inform local government policy or are to be a wider refl ection 
of the carbon dependence of urban economies. If aviation and marine emis-
sions are included, then they should refl ect the global connections that exist 
between cities—and thus include all emissions from international transporta-
tion. (Data to support such calculations are already collected at national levels 
but not reported in national totals as per the UNFCCC.) Th e methodology 
of Ramaswami and others (2008) addresses issues with assigning emissions 
when passengers transfer between fl ights and incorporates most relevant cross-
boundary energy fl ows critical for functioning of cities. Overall, resolution of 
these diff erences seems tractable.
Th e emissions attributable to urban areas may be considered from diff erent 
perspectives. Emissions can be strictly based on spatially limited geographic 
boundaries of an urban area or on a broader consideration that also includes 
signifi cant cross-boundary embodied energy fl ows occurring in cities. Emission 
attribution can also be made based on “producer” and “consumer” approaches 
or a combination of both or hybrid approach (Ramaswami and others 2008). 
Care must be taken in applying a hybrid approach to avoid double counting.
It is important that an emissions baseline is produced to meet its purpose. 
It may be of interest to local government, urban policy makers, or both. It may, 
if it is for policy purposes, need to provide data that enable a region to help 
deliver national and international commitments on emissions reduction. It 
may be used for public communication about GHG emissions, which oft en is 
also an implicit goal in developing baselines.
Th e baseline emissions include those for cities and some wider metropolitan 
regions. Merits exist for developing baseline emissions for both. Cities have a 
single administrative authority (albeit subject to national, provincial, and state 
governments), enabling them to have potentially greater control over emissions 
reductions. Metropolitan regions sometimes have more fragmented political 
authority, yet these regions typically have higher per capita emissions than 
cities because of low-density suburbs (Glaeser and Kahn 2008; VandeWeghe 
and Kennedy 2007), airports, and oft en higher concentrations of industry. 
A strong point of the methodology reviewed in this chapter is that it applies 
equally well to cities and to metropolitan regions.
Aside from the discussed diff erences with emissions from, for example, 
waste and airline and marine activities, the greatest uncertainty in urban GHG 
baselines lies with emissions from road transportation. In table 2.2, we dis-
tinguished between three techniques for estimating gasoline consumption in 
urban areas (sales, models and surveys, and scaling). Diff erences between these 
techniques may be less than 5 percent (Kennedy and others 2010). Th is uncer-
tainty might be reduced further, however, if new urban transportation models 
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and surveys were developed specifi cally for determining GHG emissions rather 
than urban transportation planning in general. For example, fuels sales data 
could explicitly be used in model calibration. Such improvements in quanti-
fying urban GHG emissions would also likely support calculations made for 
national inventories.
Further assessment of the uncertainty in quantifying urban GHG emissions 
is warranted. Other than the color-coded scheme used in the GRIP studies 
(Carney and others 2009), little formal analysis has been done of uncertainty in 
urban emissions, such as using Monte Carlo simulation. Volume 1 of the IPCC 
(2006) guidelines provides recommended approaches for uncertainty assess-
ment and quality assurance.
Improvements in the reporting of urban GHG emissions might also be 
made. Under ISO Standard 14064, emissions should be reported for six indi-
vidual GHGs. Th is has not been common for cities (hence, we have not done 
so here). Perhaps more important for quality assurance purposes, urban areas 
should always report the activity data and emissions factors used to determine 
emissions.
A further recommendation of this work is the continued development of 
consumption-based measures of GHG emissions for urban areas. By including 
Scope 2 and 3 emissions, as per the WRI/WBCSD, the overall methodology of 
this work recognizes that emissions should be assigned to urban areas based 
on end-use activities. Th ere are further consumption-based emissions that can 
also be attributed to urban areas, beyond those presented in our results. Th ese 
include those embodied in food and materials consumed in cities and upstream 
emissions associated with the mining and refi ning of the fuels combusted in cit-
ies. Some of these emissions have been quantifi ed in a few studies (table 2.2) but 
not in enough to be consistently applied to all cities at this point. Methodologies 
for determining further consumption-based emissions have been developed 
(Hillman and Ramaswami 2010; Mairie de Paris 2009; Ramaswami and others 
2008), though perhaps they need to be compared. Th e main barrier is lack of 
data on material fl ows into urban areas. Standard approaches for applying prin-
ciples of industrial ecology to urban areas need to be developed.
Notes
We are grateful to the Global Environment Facility for supporting this work. We also 
wish to thank Lorraine Sugar, David Bristow, and Abel Chavez for their help in compil-
ing the results tables.
 1. Th is is one of the main emissions sectors in UNFCCC inventories. Th is sector refers 
to emissions at industrial sites from noncombustion activities. Th e majority of emis-
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sions from industry come from energy combustion, which is considered under 
energy in international reporting.
 2. For example, stationary combustion in Bangkok, including industry, comprises the 
following fuels: 21 percent bagasse, 20 percent fuel oil, 14 percent lignite, 13 percent 
coal/coke, 10 percent natural gas, 8 percent liquefi ed petroleum gas, 5 percent rice 
husks, 5 percent wood, and 4 percent diesel (Kennedy and others 2009; Phdungsilp 
2006). For CO2 emissions from biofuel combustion, care has to be taken to distin-
guish between biological and fossil carbon (IPCC 2006).
 3. Demonstrating additionality means to show that these reductions would not have 
occurred on their own in the absence of the specifi c policy or program.
References
ANL (Argonne National Laboratory). 2009. “Argonne GREET Model.” Argonne Trans-
portation Technology R&D Center. http://www.transportation.anl.gov/modeling_
simulation/GREET/index.html.
Baldasano, J. M., C. Soriano, and L. Boada. 1999. “Emission Inventory for Greenhouse 
Gases in the City of Barcelona, 1987–1996.” Atmospheric Environment 33: 3765–75.
Birch, R., J. Barrett, and T. Wiedmann. 2004. “Exploring the Consumption and Related 
Environmental Impacts of Socio-economic Groups within the UK.” International 
Workshop on Sustainable Consumption. http://homepages.see.leeds.ac.uk/~leckh/
leeds04/5.4%20leeds%20conference%20paper.pdf.
BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 2009. “Gross Domestic Product by Metropolitan Area, 
Regional Economic Accounts.” http://www.bea.gov/regional/gdpmetro/. For global 
measures, also see http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/richest-cities-2005.html.
Carney, S., N. Green, R. Wood, and R. Read. 2009. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Invento-
ries for Eighteen European Regions, EU CO2 80/50 Project Stage 1: Inventory Forma-
tion.” Greenhouse Gas Regional Inventory Protocol (GRIP), University of Manchester.
CCAR (California Climate Action Registry). 2007. General Reporting Protocol. Los 
Angeles, CA: CCAR. http://www.climateregistry.org/tools/protocols/general-reporting-
protocol.html.
City of Calgary. 2003. “Calgary Community Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory.” http://
www.calgary.ca/docgallery/bu/environmental_management/2003_community_
emissions_report.pdf.
DC Dept. of Health (District of Columbia, Department of Health). 2005. “District of 
Columbia Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories and Preliminary Projections.” Air 
Quality Division, Bureau of Environmental Quality, Environmental Health Admin-
istration, Washington, DC.
Dhakal, S. 2004. Urban Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Asian Mega-cities: 
Policies for a Sustainable Future. Hayama, Japan: Institute for Global Environmental 
Strategies.
———. 2009. “Urban Energy Use and Carbon Emissions from Cities in China and Policy 
Implications.” Energy Policy 37 (11): 4208–19.
Dodman, D. 2009. “Blaming Cities for Climate Change? An Analysis of Urban Green-
house Gas Emission Inventories.” Environment and Urbanization 21 (1): 185–201.
52 ■ CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
 Dubeux, C. B. S., and E. L. La Rovere. 2007. “Local Perspectives in the Control of Green-
house Gas Emissions—Th e Case of Rio de Janeiro.” Cities 24 (5): 353–64.
Duff y, Hazel. 1995. Competitive Cities: Succeeding in the Global Economy. London: 
E & FN Spon.
Friedmann, J. 1986. “Th e World City Hypothesis.” Development and Change 17: 69–83.
Glaeser, E. L., and M. E. Khan. 2008. “Th e Greenness of Cities: Carbon Dioxide Emis-
sions and Urban Development.” NBER Working Paper 14238, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Green Design Institute. 2006. “EIO-LCA (Economic Input-Output Life Cycle Assess-
ment).” Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA. http://www.eiolca.net.
Greenprint. 2007. “City of Denver Climate Action Plan: Recommendations to Mayor 
Hickenlooper.” Mayor’s Greenprint Denver Advisory Council, Denver, CO.
Harvey, L. D. D. 1993. “Tackling Urban CO2 Emissions in Toronto.” Environment 35 (7): 
16–20, 33–44.
Hillman, T., and A. Ramaswami. 2010. “Greenhouse Gas Emission Footprints and 
Energy Use Metrics for Eight US Cities.” Environmental Science & Technology 44 (6): 
1902–10.
ICLEI. 2006. “International Progress Report, Cities for Climate Protection.” ICLEI, 
Oakland, CA. http://www.iclei.org/documents/USA/documents/CCP/ICLEI-CCP_
International_Report-2006.pdf.
———. 2009. “International Local Government GHG Emissions Analysis Protocol.” 
Draft  Release Version 1.0. http://www.iclei.org/fi leadmin/user_upload/documents/
Global/Progams/GHG/LGGHGEmissionsProtocol.pdf.
IGES/APN. 2002. Policy Integration & Industrial Transformation towards Sustainable 
Urban Energy Use for Cities in Asia. Proceedings of the IGES/ASPN Mega-city Proj-
ect Workshop and the International Symposium on Sustainable Urban Development 
in Asia, Kitakyushu, Japan, January 23–25, Institute for Global Environmental Strat-
egies (IGES), Japan and Asia-Pacifi c Network for Global Change Research (APN). 
http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/contents/13/index.html.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 1997. “Revised 1996 IPCC Guide-
lines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.” http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_
and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#4.
———. 2006. “2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.” Vol-
umes 1 to 5. http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/index.html.
Kates, R. W., M. W. Mayfi eld, R. D. Torrie, and B. Witcher. 1998. “Methods for Estimat-
ing Greenhouse Gases from Local Places.” Local Environment 3 (3): 279–97.
Kennedy, C. A., J. Cuddihy, and J. Engel Yan. 2007. “Th e Changing Metabolism of Cit-
ies.” Journal of Industrial Ecology 11 (2): 43–59.
Kennedy, C., J. Steinberger, B. Gasson, T. Hillman, M. Havránek, D. Pataki, A. Phdung-
silp, A. Ramaswami, and G. Villalba Mendez. 2009. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Global Cities.” Environmental Science & Technology 43 (19): 7297–7302.
———. 2010. “Methodology for Inventorying Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Global 
Cities.” Energy Policy 38 (9): 4828–37.
Llewelyn-Davies, D. Banister, and P. Hall. 2004. “Transport and City Competitive-
ness: Literature Review.” Department of Transport and Offi  ce of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, London.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION BASELINES ■ 53
Mairie de Paris. 2007. Le Bilan Carbone de Paris: Bilan des émissions de gaz à eff et de 
serre. Paris: Mairie de Paris. http://www.paris.fr/portail/viewmultimediadocument?
multimediadocument-id=94991.
Mayor of London. 2007. “Action Today to Protect Tomorrow—Th e Mayor’s Climate 
Change Action Plan.” Mayor of London. http://static.london.gov.uk/mayor/.../
climate-change/docs/ccap_summaryreport.pdf.
Mitra, A. P., C. Sharma, and M. A. Y. Ajero. 2003. “Energy and Emissions in South Asian 
Mega-cities: Study on Kolkata, Delhi and Manila.” In Proceedings of International 
Workshop on Policy Integration towards Sustainable Urban Energy Use for Cities in Asia, 
East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, Kanagawa, Japan, IGES, February 4–5. http://
www.iges.or.jp/en/ue/pdf/megacity03/HTML/pdf/1.2%20APMitra%20paper.pdf.
Nagoya University/NIES (National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan)/GCP 
(Global Carbon Project). 2009. International Symposium: Realizing Low Carbon 
Cities—Bridging Science and Policy; and International Workshop: Towards Low 
Carbon Cities—Understanding and Analyzing Urban Energy and Carbon, Nagoya 
Japan, February 16–18.
NREL (National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 2009. “U.S. Life-Cycle Inventory Data-
base.” http://www.nrel.gov/lci/.
New York City. 2007. “Inventory of New York City Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Offi  ce 
of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, New York.
Phdungsilp, A. 2006. “Energy Analysis for Sustainable Megacities.” Licentiate of Engi-
neering Th esis, Department of Energy Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, 
Stockholm.
Ramaswami, A., T. Hillman, B. Janson, M. Reiner, and G. Th omas. 2008. “A Demand-
Centered, Hybrid Life Cycle Methodology for City-Scale Greenhouse Gas Invento-
ries.” Environmental Science & Technology 42 (17): 6455–61.
Rosenzweig, C., S. Mehrotra, C. E. Natenzon, A. Omojola, R. Folorunsho, and J. Gil-
bride. 2009. “Creating Risk-Based Climate Change Information for Urban Areas.” 
Paper presented at the 5th Urban Research Symposium Cities and Climate Change: 
Responding to an Urgent Agenda, Marseille, France, June 28–30.
Sassen, S. 1991. Th e Global City. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Satterthwaite, D. 2008. “Cities’ Contribution to Global Warming: Notes on the Alloca-
tion of Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Environment and Urbanization 20 (2): 539–49.
Sharma, C., A. Dasgupta, and A. P. Mitra. 2002. “Inventory of GHGs and Other Urban 
Pollutants from Agriculture and Waste Sectors in Delhi and Calcutta.” In Proceed-
ings of IGES/APN Mega-city Project, Kitakyushu, Japan, January 23–25. Institute for 
Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), Japan, and Asia-Pacifi c Network for Global 
Change Research (APN). http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/contents/13/data/iges_m.
html.
SMA-GDF (Secretaría del Medio Ambiente, Gobierno del Distrito Federal). 2000. Estra-
tegia Local de Acción Climática de la Ciudad de México [Local Climate Action Stra-
tegy Mexico City]. Gobierno del Distrito Federal, México.
SVMA (Secretaria Municipal do Verde e do Meio Ambiente de São Paulo). 2005. “Inven-
tário de Emissões de Efeito Estufa do Município de São Paulo.” Centro de Estudos 
Integradossobre Meio Ambiente e Mudanças Climáticas (Centro Clima) da Coor-
denação dos Programas de Pós-graduação de Engenharia (COPPE), Universidade 
Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro.
54 ■ CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Taylor, P. J. 2004. World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis. New York: Routledge.
Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 2006. Environmental White Paper. http://www2
.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/kouhou/env/eng_2006/index.html.
VandeWeghe, J., and C. A. Kennedy. 2007. “A Spatial Analysis of Residential Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area.” Journal of Industrial Ecol-
ogy 11 (2): 133–44.
 Wood, F. R., A. Bows, and K. Anderson. 2010. “Apportioning Aviation CO2 Emissions 
to Regional Administrations for Monitoring and Target Setting.” Transport Policy 
17: 206–15.
WRI/WBCSD (World Resources Institute/World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development). 2009. “Th e Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Accounting 
and Reporting Standard: Revised Edition.” http://www.ghgprotocol.org/standards/
corporate-standard.
■ 55
Comparing Mitigation Policies 
in Five Large Cities: London, 
New York City, Milan, 
Mexico City, and Bangkok
Edoardo Croci, Sabrina Melandri, and Tania Molteni
Urban areas contribute signifi cantly to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
in particular carbon dioxide (CO2), with some estimates suggesting this con-
tribution may be as high as 80 percent (UNEP and UN-HABITAT 2005). Th is 
refl ects the concentration of people and economic activities in urban agglom-
erations and the high levels of energy consumption associated with residential, 
production, and mobility needs. Th e negative externalities associated with con-
gestion and pollution tend to increase with urbanization. Nevertheless, in most 
cases, major cities have lower per capita CO2-equivalent emissions (CO2e) than 
at the corresponding national level (Dodman 2009).
As cities assume a higher profi le in the area of climate change, many are 
recognizing the potential to reduce emissions and are committing to volun-
tary reduction targets. Th is can happen both individually and as part of collec-
tive commitments (such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection 
Agreement and the European Covenant of Mayors).1 International associations 
and city networks (such as ICLEI and the C40 Climate Leadership Group) play 
a major role in sharing best practices on mitigation. In the past 20 years, many 
cities in industrialized countries have developed climate change plans. More 
recently, cities in developing countries have followed suit, as in the cases of 
Mexico City and Bangkok.
Th e objective of this chapter is to identify the main drivers of emissions and 
the most relevant mitigation measures planned or adopted by fi ve global cities: 
London, New York City, Milan, Mexico City, and Bangkok.2 Th e selection was 
3
56 ■ CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
based on the availability of data, the existence of a mitigation strategy, and the 
desire to have a representative sample of both developing and industrialized 
countries.
Although best eff orts were employed to ensure comparability of the data, the 
results presented includes some biases because of (1) diff erences in territorial 
units referenced by the data: defi nitions of urban areas diff er among countries, 
city administrative boundaries do not always coincide with the limits of the 
urban agglomeration,3 and not all global cities have a metropolitan body man-
aging the wider urban area and (2) diff erences in methodologies to estimate 
local emissions at the local level: Th ere is as yet no single accepted international 
standard for city emissions inventories across sectors and sources.
Th e analysis is structured in four main sections: the fi rst compares invento-
ries across cities according to criteria applied to collect and organize data, the 
second analyzes the emissions context of each city through a set of indicators, 
the third compares the main components and measures of each city’s mitiga-
tion plan, and the last draws some conclusions with regard to the coherence, 
eff ectiveness, and effi  ciency of city mitigation plans.
Comparative Analysis of Local Emission Inventories
In this section, we compare city-level emissions inventories with specifi c reference 
to fi ve global cities: London, New York City, Milan, Mexico City, and Bangkok.
City Emissions Measurement
In recent years, the use of city emissions inventories has increased as more cit-
ies become engaged with climate change issues. In the absence of an agreed-
upon international standard providing methodological guidance for cities’ 
inventories, many cities use the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) methodology (IPCC 2006), which was developed for national emis-
sions inventories. Th e main challenge cities face in compiling urban emission 
inventories is to identify and defi ne the precise area and activities that should 
be included, as well as the decision on whether to include direct and indirect 
emissions. Direct emissions are associated with emission sources (point, linear, 
diff used) located inside city boundaries. Indirect emissions are emissions from 
sources that are neither controlled by a city government nor located within its 
jurisdiction, but that occur wholly or in part as a result of the city’s activities 
(for example, purchased electricity or emissions embedded in the consumption 
of goods and services).4 ICLEI’s protocol (ICLEI 2008) suggests three scopes for 
classifying emissions at the community level:
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TABLE 3.1 
Comparison of Emission Inventories
Quantifi ed by the inventory London
New York 
City Milan
Mexico 
City Bangkok
Gases      
CO2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
CH4 ✓ Q* ✓ ✓
N2O ✓ Q* ✓  
HFC ✓ Q*   
PFC ✓ Q*   
SF6 ✓ Q*   
Direct emissions     
Domestic heating ✓ ✓ ✓ n.a.  n.a.
Commercial/tertiary heating ✓ ✓ ✓ n.a.  n.a.
[Road transport] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Public transport ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  n.s.
Private transport ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  n.s.
Aviation Q Q    
1. Direct emissions, from sources located within the city boundary.
2. Indirect emissions, from sources located outside the city boundary, but that 
result from activities occurring within the boundary.
3. Other indirect or embodied emissions, which can be included when more 
comprehensive accounting is desired.
Th ese scopes should enable emissions to be categorized while avoiding double 
counting.
GHG Accounting Methods
Th ere are two main approaches for estimating emissions: “top-down” and 
“bottom-up.” Th e top-down approach uses estimates derived from national or 
regional data and scales them to the area being analyzed (Hutchinson 2002) 
according to such variables as population, energy consumption, and mobility. 
Th e bottom-up approach uses local data, from single sources whenever pos-
sible. Th is is naturally the preferred method and is used in this chapter. For the 
fi ve city cases, table 3.1 summarizes the types of GHGs, activities, and indirect 
emissions included.
continued
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Quantifi ed by the inventory London
New York 
City Milan
Mexico 
City Bangkok
Shipping Q Q n.a.  n.a.  
Waste management  ✓ Q* ✓ ✓
Wastewater management  ✓   ✓
[Industry] ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓  
Energy use in industrial buildings ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Energy use for industrial processes 
(combustion) ✓ ✓ ✓
Emissions from industrial processes 
(non-combustion)  ✓  
Agriculture   Q* ✓ ✓
Sinks   ✓ ✓
Energy supply plants within the city 
boundaries ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n.s.
Indirect emissions  
[Purchased electricity] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Domestic (electricity) ✓ ✓ ✓
Commercial/tertiary (electricity) ✓ ✓ ✓
Transport (electricity) ✓ n.s.
Industrial (electricity) ✓ ✓ ✓
Source: Authors for different source data: AMA 2007; BMA 2008; BMA, Greenleaf Foundation, and 
UNEP 2009; City of New York 2007b, 2008b; IEFE 2009; SMA-GDF 2008; Mayor of London 2006b; 
Pardo and Martínez 2006.
Note: Inventories were available for the following base years: 1990–2000, 2003, 2004–05 (London); 
2005, 2006, 2007 (New York City); 2005 (Milan); 2000, 2004 (Mexico City); 2005 (Bangkok). The 
inventory considered in the checklist is highlighted in italics. For Greater London, the checklist was fi lled 
with reference to the 2003 inventory (called the London Energy and CO2 Emissions Inventory), which 
focuses on CO2 emissions. The 2004–05 inventory (called the London Energy and GHG Inventory) also 
comprises estimates of CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, and SF6. Estimates for Greater London Authority’s opera-
tions and buildings are included in the Climate Change Action Plan.
HFC = hydrofl uorocarbon; PFC = perfl uorocarbon; Q = quantifi ed but not included in the emission 
values of the plan base year; Q* = non-CO2 gases had been quantifi ed in a previous inventory (AMA 
2007), but these emissions have not been included in the Climate Plan of Milan because they added a 
negligible quantity to total emissions; n.a. = not applicable; n.s. = not specifi ed.
TABLE 3.1, continued
All inventories report at least emissions of carbon dioxide. Recent guidelines 
recognize that collecting detailed local data on all Kyoto GHGs may be quite 
onerous and thus suggest focusing on carbon dioxide and methane, the two most 
relevant gases at the city level.
In terms of sectors, heating sector emissions are considered in all cities’ 
inventories, except Bangkok and Mexico City, because of their relatively warm 
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climates. Emissions from industry have been reported in all inventories, except 
for Bangkok, in relation to energy use within industrial processes and to the 
operations of industrial buildings. Emissions from power plants within city 
boundaries are generally quantifi ed by all cities.
For road transport, there are two main approaches: Bangkok estimates 
emissions from fuels consumed within city boundaries, whereas Mexico 
City, London, New York City, and Milan use kilometers traveled by dif-
ferent categories of public and private vehicles. New York and London 
consider kilometers traveled within city boundaries, whereas Milan also 
includes kilometers traveled by vehicles crossing city borders. Furthermore, 
London estimates emissions from taxiing aircraft and during take-off and 
landing, including these in ground-based transport emissions. Only New 
York City and London quantify emissions from aviation and shipping, 
using different methodologies while excluding these from their emissions 
targets.
All cities consider GHG emissions from waste except London, which in its 
climate plan considers only CO2 emissions sources. New York City quantifi es 
methane emissions from previously disposed solid waste in in-city landfi lls 
each year over the life of the gas. Mexico City and Bangkok quantify methane 
emissions from landfi lls but the latter does not specify the location of these 
landfi lls. Milan quantifi es emissions from waste only in relation to combustion 
in waste-to-energy. Methane from wastewater plants is quantifi ed only in the 
inventories of New York City and Bangkok.
Agriculture has no relevance in the urban contexts of Greater London and 
New York City and has limited relevance in the other cities. CO2 and meth-
ane have been estimated in relation to fuel consumption and emissions from 
agricultural operations in the inventories of Mexico City and Bangkok. Both 
inventories also evaluate the off setting potential of sinks—urban forestry and 
green areas within administrative boundaries.
As for indirect emissions, all inventories include emissions related to 
imported electricity but exclude emissions embedded in goods and services 
consumed within the city. Only New York City, London, and Mexico City detail 
electricity consumption for each end-use sector.
Inventories are based on international references. New York City uses 
ICLEI’s protocol for the inventory structure and soft ware to convert all data 
on energy use, transportation patterns, waste disposal, and other inputs into 
GHG emissions. London and Milan use the CORINAIR5 methodology for the 
choice of main sector-based sources and emissions factors (even if both refer, 
in some cases, to their own emissions factors). Mexico City refers to the IPCC 
methodology for calculation methods and emissions factors.
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Emissions by Source
Th e collected data and emissions inventories show that energy consumption 
is the most important determinant for city GHG emissions. Direct emission 
sources such as industrial processes, power stations, and agricultural activi-
ties are usually located outside city boundaries or in periurban areas. Because 
“urban” power supply covers a limited part of local consumption, cities gener-
ally rely on end uses to estimate emissions: Th at is, if the energy was consumed 
in the city (regardless where it was produced), then its estimated emission 
impact is attributed to the city. All inventories analyzed in this research assign 
emissions due to energy uses. Emissions per capita in the selected cities are thus 
strictly related to local energy demand and consumption.
Table 3.2 suggests some interesting relationships. First, per capita emissions 
are clearly related to per capita gross domestic product (GDP), with the excep-
tion of Bangkok, which has higher emissions than would be expected for a city 
at its level of per capita GDP because of higher energy intensity of GDP. Second, 
energy consumption follows a similar pattern in relation to per capita GDP. 
New York City and Bangkok have the highest per capita emissions (7.7 and 7.1 
tons of CO2 per capita, respectively) but with substantial diff erences in energy 
consumption (24.6 and 20.0 megawatt-hour [MWh] per capita, respectively) 
and in electricity consumption (6.7 and 4.8 MWh per capita, respectively). 
Milan and London have similar per capita emissions, energy, and electricity 
consumption. Mexico City produces the least emissions per capita (3.9 tons of 
CO2 per capita) and shows the lowest energy (10.9 MWh per capita) and elec-
tricity consumption per capita (1.7 MWh per capita).6
Th ese diff erences in per capita emissions are due to diff erences in carbon 
intensity of energy consumption, energy intensity of production, and GDP 
per capita (the Kaya identity).7 Carbon intensity is determined by emission 
factors of fuel consumption, energy intensity depends on morphological and 
territorial features as well as on socioeconomic and behavioral characteris-
tics of the city’s population, and GDP per capita is an indicator of economic 
activity.
Th e carbon intensity of energy consumption depends on the share of elec-
tricity in energy consumption and on the carbon intensity of the fuels used to 
generate this electricity. In terms of energy consumption patterns, Milan has a 
higher share of electricity consumption than London (table 3.3), and this may 
explain the diff erence in average carbon intensity of energy between the two 
cities. Bangkok and Mexico City show diff erent energy consumption values but 
a similar fuel consumption pattern and similar carbon intensities. Bangkok’s 
lower carbon intensity may be explained by a lower emission factor used to 
estimate emissions from electricity for this city.8
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TABLE 3.2 
Emission Values and Main Emission Indicators 
London
New 
York City Milan
Mexico 
City Bangkok
Base year of emission values 2006 2005 2005 2000 2005
Total emissions 
(million tons CO2e)
a
44.2 63.1 7.0 33.5 42.8
Emissions per capita 
(tons CO2e per capita)
a
5.9 7.7 5.4 3.9 7.1
Emissions from the transport 
sector per capita (tons 
CO2e per capita)
a
1.28 1.69 1.10 1.68 3.53
Emissions from the building 
sector per capita (tons 
CO2e per capita)
a
4.19 5.94 4.22 0.93 2.48
Energy consumption 
per capita (MWh per capita)b
20.7 24.6 21.7 10.9 20.0
Electricity consumption 
per capita (MWh per capita)c
5.2 6.7 5.3 1.7 4.8
Carbon intensity of energy 
consumption 
(tons CO2e per GWh)
d
284 310 250 317 300
Energy intensity 
of GDP (kWh/$)b,e 
0.45 0.47 0.61 0.76 2.55
GDP per ppp ($ per capita)e 46,200 52,800 35,600 14,300 7,845
Source: Authors for different source data:
a. BMA 2008; City of New York 2008b; IEFE 2009; Mayor of London 2007a; Pardo and Martínez 2006. 
For London and Milan, emission values refer to CO2 only.
b. AMA 2007; BMA 2008; Kennedy and others 2010; Mayor of London 2007b; Pardo and Martínez 
2006. For Bangkok, the energy consumption value refers only to sectors for which GHG emissions were 
calculated.
c. BMA 2008; City of New York 2008a; IEFE 2009; Mayor of London 2007b; Pardo and Martínez 2006.
d. BMA 2008; IEFE 2009; Kennedy and others 2010; Mayor of London 2007a, 2007b; Pardo and 
Martínez 2006.
e. OECD 2006, except for Bangkok (Yusuf and Nabeshima 2006).
Note: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development indicators do not refer to the 
administrative boundaries of the cities, but to comparable areas that have been defi ned as follows: New 
York City as an area including New York county, nine other counties of New York state, and 12 counties 
of New Jersey; Milan as the province of Milan and seven adjacent provinces; Mexico City as the federal 
district of Mexico City and 53 adjacent districts; and London as Greater London and 10 adjacent counties.
 Bangkok seems to have an energy consumption index comparable to those of European cities, but this 
value may be affected by a signifi cant error according with an underestimation of Bangkok’s population. 
The National Institute of Development Administration estimated that Bangkok’s unregistered population 
could be around 3.2 million, compared with a total registered population of 5.6 million (NIDA 2000, in BMA 
and UNEP 2002).
 Per capita values have been calculated by authors. Sources for population values: BMA 2009; Comune 
di Milano 2007; GLA 2008b; U.S. Census Bureau. GDP = gross domestic product; GWh = gigawatt-hour; 
kWh = kilowatt-hour; MWh = megawatt-hour; ppp = parity purchasing power.
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TABLE 3.3 
Energy Consumption by Fuels 
percent
Fuel London
New 
York City Milan
Mexico 
City Bangkok
Natural gas 53 36 25 7
Oils (transportation) 19 23 16 62 76
Oils (nontransportation) 2 16 10 15
Electricity 25 25 45 15 24
Waste (used as fuel) 3
Biomass: wood 0.3
Coal and similar substances <0.1
Other 0.2 1
Source: Authors on different source data: AMA 2007; BMA 2008; Kennedy and others 2010; Mayor 
of London 2007b; Pardo and Martínez 2006. Oils for transportation include gasoline and diesel; 
nontransportation oils include fuel oils, liquefi ed petroleum gas, and kerosene.
TABLE 3.4 
Emissions by Sectors 
percent
New 
York City 
(CO2e)
London 
(CO2)
Mexico 
City 
(CO2e)
Milan 
(CO2)
Bangkok 
(CO2e)
2005 2006 2000 2005 2005
Energy use in buildings 77 71 24 78 35
Transportation 22 22 43 20 50
Industrial 7 22 2
Waste (landfi ll emissions) 0.4 11 3
Agriculture 1 13
Other 0.3
Source: Authors on different source data: BMA 2008; City of New York 2008b; IEFE 2009; Mayor of 
London 2007a; Pardo and Martínez 2006.
As for sectors, buildings and transportation are the most emissive sources (see 
table 3.4). In industrialized cities (London, New York City, Milan), emissions 
from energy use in buildings (residential, commercial, tertiary, and public) 
amount to approximately 70 percent of the total. In developing cities, emissions 
from buildings are the second most relevant source and amount to 24 percent 
of emissions in Mexico City and 35 percent in Bangkok. Transportation is a 
relevant emission source in all selected cities, representing almost half of total 
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emissions in Mexico City and Bangkok, but much less in New York City, Lon-
don, and Milan. Th e industrial sector shows a limited contribution to total 
emissions, refl ecting the sector’s relatively small contribution to the economies 
of the selected cities, with the exception of Mexico City. Solid waste stored in 
landfi lls scarcely contributes to urban emissions, except for Mexico City, whose 
landfi ll emissions account for 11 percent of the total. For Bangkok, agriculture 
accounts for 13 percent of emissions, but this sector also contains unspecifi ed 
emissions.
As expected, there is a strong correlation between emissions and energy 
consumption, as well as between emissions and economic activity, measured 
by GDP. Because these indicators are infl uenced by local conditions and life-
styles, the following section takes account of urban features that may char-
acterize each local context and discusses diff erences in the emission levels of 
those cities.
Comparative Analysis of Local Emissions Contexts
We now turn to a comparison of the local context in which each city is found, 
identifying a number of key factors that infl uence emissions.
Drivers for the Characterization of Local Emissions Contexts
Almost all anthropogenic GHG emissions come from the consumption of mate-
rial goods and energy and the production of waste, which depend on living 
standards and behaviors. As cities concentrate population, high living standards, 
and economic activities, they are responsible for consuming large amounts of 
goods, services, and, indirectly, energy (Dhakal 2004). Energy use, in particular, 
is strongly infl uenced by specifi c urban features, namely, the spatial structure 
of the city, its infrastructure, and the characteristics of urban population and 
activities. Th ese factors have been identifi ed as follows (Dhakal 2004):
• Compactness of the urban settlement
• Urban zoning and functions
• Nature of the transportation system
• Income level and lifestyle
• Energy effi  ciency of key technologies
• Nature of economic activities
• Building technologies and building fl oor space use
• Waste management
• Climate factors
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Analyses of energy consumption and GHG emissions have been developed 
mainly at the national level. Studies at the city scale are limited because of diffi  -
culties in obtaining data at urban level and in linking decisions on energy issues 
(usually taken at the national level) to urban contexts (Dhakal 2004).
Th is section focuses on a set of city indicators that characterize the popula-
tions’ living standards and can be understood as drivers of energy consumption, 
energy intensity, production, and consequently emissions at urban level. Th e 
indicators are classifi ed as socioeconomic features, urban territorial features, 
local climate, urban transportation, and waste production and management 
(table 3.5).
Socioeconomic Features
Cities from industrialized countries show similar socioeconomic features in 
terms of population, age structure, and labor force, as described by the elderly-
young ratio and the activity rate.9 Milan stands out for its old-age population 
structure and Bangkok for the highest activity rate. Cities from developing 
countries show a relatively younger population.
Urban Territorial Features
Density and compactness of a city may infl uence energy demand for transpor-
tation and heating/cooling. High levels of both population and dwelling density 
characterize all fi ve cities. New York City and Milan show the highest densities, 
Bangkok, the lowest.10 Higher emission levels seem related with higher popula-
tion and dwelling density, but emissions vary signifi cantly among cities whose 
densities are similar (such as London and Mexico City).
As far as green spaces are concerned, cities from industrialized countries 
have high availability of green public spaces per capita, whereas cities from 
developing countries show a low availability of green spaces. However, low 
emissions are not necessarily associated with a high supply of green urban 
spaces. Th is urban feature may be better interpreted as an indicator of local 
environmental quality, resulting from territorial policies implemented by the 
city government.
Local Climate
Local climate conditions aff ect energy consumption for heating and cooling 
and thus emissions associated with buildings. Table 3.6 shows average tem-
perature for the selected cities. Th e local climate in London, New York City, and 
Milan is more variable throughout the year compared with Mexico City and 
Bangkok. In particular, Bangkok has a tropical monsoon climate with a yearly 
average temperature signifi cantly higher than the other cities, which leads to 
greater electricity demand for air conditioning.
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TABLE 3.5 
Drivers That Characterize the Local Emission Context 
Socioeconomic 
features
London New York 
City
Milan Mexico 
City
Bangkok
Elderly/young ratioa 65.5 64.0 190.0 31.0 30.55
Activity rate (%)b 48.5 46.7 48.0 39.2 77.4
Territorial features 
Population density 
(residents per square 
kilometer)c
4,780 10,470 6,990 5,810 3,610
Dwelling density 
(dwellings per square 
kilometer)d
1,990 4,080 3,250 1,420 1,330
Public green space 
per capita (square 
meter per capita)e
25.5 16.6 15.9 5.4 1.8
Monthly average 
temperature (°C)
See table 3.6
Urban transportation
Car ownership ratef 310.8 228.1 623.5 164.0 271.0
Waste production and 
management
Amount of solid waste 
collected (tons per 
capita per year)g
0.59 0.81 0.57 0.55 0.54
% waste collected for 
recyclingh
18.1 37.8 30.6 n.a. 8.04
Source: Authors for different source data:
a. Comune di Milano 2009; GLA 2008c; SEDECO 2009; UNESCAP 2009; U.S. Census Bureau.
b. OECD 2006, except for Bangkok (UNESCAP 2009).
c. BMA 2009; DF 2007; EUROSTAT Urban Audit 2010; GLA 2008a; U.S. Census Bureau.
d. BMA 2009; GLA 2007; IEFE 2009; Pardo and Martínez 2006; U.S. Census Bureau.
e. Comune di Milano 2007; DF 2010; GLA 2008b; Thaiutsa and others 2008.
f. EUROSTAT Urban Audit 2010; NYS 2006; APERC (Asia Pacifi c Energy Research Centre) in 
Shrestha 2008.
g. DF 2006; EUROSTAT Urban Audit 2010; NYC Department of Sanitation 2004, 2007; Phdungsilp 2006. 
All data refer to domestic and commercial solid waste. For Mexico City index, data are not specifi ed.
h. BMA and UNEP 2002; HDR 2004; NYC Department of Sanitation 2004; Mayor of London 2007b; Pitea 
2008. All data refer to domestic and commercial waste.
Note: Other sources (INEGI 2005) estimate availability of green spaces per capita in Mexico City as 15.1 
square meters; this value includes private green spaces, ecological reserves, and other areas with limited 
accessibility. Trucks, motorcycle, and commercial vehicles are not included for New York City car owner-
ship rate. Data on selective collection of waste for Mexico City are not comparable with the other values.
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Urban Transportation
Th e car ownership rate (the number of registered cars per thousand inhabit-
ants) shows no relevant diff erences among the case studies, except for Milan, 
which is characterized by the highest rate. Th e cities chosen from developing 
countries have reached a car ownership rate that is similar to cities in industri-
alized countries. To defi ne a picture of local transportation that includes urban 
trips, data on the modal share of total daily trips within the city have been con-
sidered. Table 3.7 shows that public transport covers at least 35 to 45 percent of 
daily trips in all cities. For Mexico City, the share of public transport amounts 
to 80 percent of total trips.
Despite the high modal share of public transport, the contribution of trans-
portation to total emissions in Mexico City is considerable, and its per capita 
emissions due to transportation are similar to cities with a lower share of public 
transport (table 3.2). Th is comparison suggests that the effi  ciency of the operat-
ing public transport, the motor vehicle stock, and kilometers traveled by circulat-
ing vehicles are determinants in characterizing emissions in this sector.
TABLE 3.6 
Average Temperature
degrees Celsius
Annual Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
London 10 3 3 6 7 11 14 16 16 13 10 6 5
New York 
City
12 — 1 6 11 17 22 25 24 20 14 8 2
Milan 11 1 3 7 10 15 19 22 21 18 12 6 2
Mexico 
City
15 12 14 16 18 18 17 17 17 16 15 14 12
Bangkok 28 26 28 29 30 30 29 29 28 28 28 27 26
Source: Weatherbase.
TABLE 3.7 
Modal Share on Daily Trips 
percent
Modes of transport London
New York 
City Milan
Mexico 
City Bangkok
Private auto/motorcycle 51 50 61 17 54
Taxi 1 5 — 5 —
Public transport 46 46 36 78 46
Bicycle 2 — 3 — —
Source: Authors for different source data: City of New York 2007c; IEFE 2009; SMA-GDF 2008; TfL 2007; 
World Bank 2007.
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Waste Production and Management
Indicators on waste show a similar amount per capita, except for New York 
City, which has the highest production of solid waste per capita. Still, the per-
centages of solid waste collected for recycling show quite diff erent patterns: 
Bangkok has the lowest recycling rate, whereas cities from industrialized coun-
tries (such as New York City and Milan) have signifi cant recycling rates. Within 
the latter group, London has the lowest recycling rate. London’s and Milan’s 
emission values do not account for emissions from landfi ll waste. For these cit-
ies, it would be misleading to consider waste production and management as 
an emission driver.
Links between Drivers and Emissions
Th e small size of our sample limits our ability to draw general conclusions on 
which drivers have the most profound eff ect on emissions. Nonetheless, a few 
preliminary observations can be made:
• First, emission levels appear to be related with key features of industrialized 
countries, namely, the age structure of the population (elderly-young ratio) 
and GDP per capita.
• Second, no direct relationship was found between spatial features, in par-
ticular, population density and per capita emissions levels. Th is is probably 
because of the sample of cities from countries with diff ering lifestyles and 
income levels. Yet recent studies suggest that densely populated regions have 
lower CO2 emissions per capita, compared with other urban and rural areas 
in the same country.11 Th is is an area in which further research is urgently 
needed.
• Th ird, mobility patterns, in particular transit use, are more relevant than 
private vehicle ownership in determining levels of GHGs from urban trans-
port. Recent data from the International Association of Public Transport 
(Allen 2009) show that cities with a high share of transit and nonmotorized 
modes (overall higher than 55 percent) are able to limit CO2 emissions from 
transport below one ton of CO2 per capita. Furthermore, the characteristics 
of the motor vehicle stock—size and age—as well as behavioral factors, such 
as driving and maintenance habits, and the effi  ciency of the transport net-
work, also signifi cantly aff ect emissions.
• Fourth, it is not possible to compare values for emissions from waste be-
cause they are measured by diff erent criteria. Nonetheless, waste manage-
ment appears as a policy area that may be targeted eff ectively by mitigation 
measures, as in the case of Mexico City.
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Comparative Analysis of City Plans
Th is section compares the plans of the cities to reduce emissions in order to 
mitigate climate change.
Main Components of the Local Climate Plans
According to ICLEI, building a local emissions inventory is the fi rst step for 
local governments wishing to implement a mitigation strategy. Th e inventory 
provides a basis that is necessary to identify mitigation options and actions. 
Besides, it provides a basis to elaborate a business-as-usual (BAU) projection of 
future GHG levels, against which reduction targets may be set and the eff ective-
ness of mitigation measures assessed.
Mitigation strategies in the fi ve cities are compared by reviewing the con-
tents of each plan and taking into account the following:
• Th e local BAU scenario: Which assumptions and drivers have been consid-
ered in projecting future local emissions?
• Th e choice of the base year and of reduction targets: Which criteria has 
the local government followed in choosing and defi ning its reduction 
commitment?
• Mitigation measures: How relevant is each measure, and which roles does 
the local government play in each sector?
• Implementation and monitoring: Does the plan identify who will be respon-
sible for the plan’s implementation and the monitoring system?
• Financing: Does the plan address the funding of measures?
Comparison of Plan Components
We now compare the elements within the cities’ plans, with specifi c reference to 
baselines, targets, reduction measures, and fi nancing.
Business as Usual Scenarios
BAU scenarios estimate future GHG emissions if no additional measures, other 
than those that would naturally occur or already conceived, were implemented 
(Dubeux and La Rovere 2007). Th ey provide a basis to assess the results of 
new climate mitigation actions. According to the IPCC, the main driving forces 
of future GHG trajectories are demographic trends, socioeconomic develop-
ments, and the rate and direction of technological change (Nakicenovic and 
Swart 2000).
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BAU emission projections are available in all plans of the selected cities. In Lon-
don, New York City, Milan, and Mexico City, BAU emissions projections are 
based on estimates of future energy consumption, namely, heating for buildings, 
electricity use, and fuel consumption for transportation. London also includes 
emissions from the industrial sector, whereas Mexico City and New York City 
include emissions generated from solid waste. Forecasts of the main drivers are 
based on the expected evolution of socioeconomic conditions (London, Mex-
ico City, and Milan) or from historical emissions growth rates (New York City), 
assuming steady city growth.
Population and economic activities are projected to grow in all scenarios, 
leading to growing demand for energy, transport, and housing. Th e underlying 
assumption is that these global cities will continue to attract people, because 
of job and study opportunities (London, New York City, and Mexico City) 
or because of specifi c local policies aimed at increasing density (Milan). Th e 
projections were made before the 2008–09 global fi nancial crisis and do not 
account for the restraining eff ect that the crisis may have on energy demand 
and emissions.
Base Year and Reduction Targets
Guidelines on local GHG accounting suggest choosing the base year accord-
ing to the completeness of data in the local emission inventory. Data for 
the Kyoto reference year (1990) are usually diffi  cult to obtain at the local 
level. Th e European Union (EU) Covenant of Mayors suggests—for local 
authorities that have not yet developed an emissions inventory—2005 
as a base year, to maintain homogeneity with the EU energy and climate 
targets. In most of the case studies, inventories are available for a unique 
year. For New York City, inventories were also available for 1995 and 2000, 
but 2005 was chosen to be consistent with the climate change mitigation 
strategy and the wider sustainability framework of PlaNYC (City of New 
York 2007b). London chose 1990 to align with national and international 
targets.
As for reduction targets, London adopted a long-term reduction target with 
intermediate steps, whereas New York City and Milan chose a medium-term 
target. Milan, in particular, refers to 2020 for coherence with the time frame of 
EU energy and climate policies. Bangkok and Mexico City adopt a shorter-term 
target (2012). Table 3.8 shows the average yearly emission reduction that needs 
to be achieved in each city to comply with its planned target. Interestingly, the 
required annual reductions in each city, as a percentage of the respective base-
line, are similar, although some cities have chosen longer-term horizons than 
others.
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TABLE 3.8 
Reduction Targets, Base Years, and Target Years in the Case Studies
London
New York 
City Milan
Mexico 
City Bangkok
Targeted 
GHGs
CO2 CO2,CH4, 
N2O
CO2 CO2, CH4, 
N2O
CO2, CH4
Reduction 
target and 
target year
−20% 
(2016), 
−60% (2025)
−30% (2030) −20% (2020) 7 million 
tons CO2e to 
be reduced 
in the period 
2008–12
−15% (2012)
Base year 
GHG level
1990: 45.1 
million tons 
CO2
2005: 63.1 
million tons 
CO2e
2005: 7.05 
million tons 
CO2
2000: 33.5 
million tons 
CO2e; 2006: 
36.2 million 
tons CO2e
2005: 42.65 
million tons 
CO2e
Estimated 
GHG level 
for target 
year (BAU 
scenario)
2025 BAU: 
51 million 
tons CO2
(+15%)
2030 BAU: 
80.1 million 
tons CO2e 
(+27%)
2020 BAU: 
8.03 million 
tons CO2 
(+8%)
2012 BAU: 
35–49 
million tons 
CO2e (+11% 
low, +25% 
medium, 
+35% high)
2012 BAU: 
48.69 million 
tons CO2e 
(~+14%)
Emission 
reductions 
to be 
achieved, 
calculated 
for the 
target year
33 million 
tons CO2
36 million 
tons CO2e
2.4 million 
tons CO2
7 million tons 
CO2e to be 
reduced in 
the period
2008–12
7 million tons 
CO2e
Annual 
reductions 
over the 
plan time 
frame (% of 
base year)
2.1 2.3 2.3 4.1 2.13
Source: Authors on different source data: BMA 2008; City of New York 2007a; IEFE 2009; Lapeyre and 
others 2008; Mayor of London 2007a.
Note: 2005 is the base year for the emissions inventory for Bangkok. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
fi xes a reduction target of −15 percent below 2012 BAU emission levels. Net emissions: Parks and trees 
absorb 0.1 million tons CO2e every year. BAU = business as usual.
In each city, mitigation potential is infl uenced by roles the local government 
can play to regulate or control each emissive sector, emissions, or both. Th is 
varies according to the specifi c national context and administrative structures. 
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National, state, and regional policies on climate and energy may aff ect city 
policies, legislation, and instruments and may overlap with local mitigation 
strategies. Th is is the case in the climate plan of London, which assesses the 
achievable reductions, highlighting the roles of the national government and 
the EU level in the following sectors:
• Energy supply: Because the city imports most of the consumed electricity 
from the national grid, national policies on energy supply directly infl u-
ence carbon emissions associated with citizens’ consumption. Furthermore, 
national legislation can directly enable or discourage the use of decentralized 
or renewable supply systems (such as in London, statutory barriers prevent 
combined cooling, heat, and power plants from being installed).
• Energy effi  ciency and savings in the building sector: Th e national govern-
ment defi nes standards for new buildings; is responsible for the implemen-
tation of directives on energy effi  ciency in appliances and buildings (such as 
EU Performance of Buildings Directive, EU Energy End Use and Effi  ciency 
Directive); and may provide grants, incentives, or advice to support the real-
ization of energy effi  ciency measures.
• Transport sector: In addition to funds for transport infrastructure, the na-
tional level may infl uence circulating vehicles with taxes and incentives.
BOX 3.1
City Governments’ Roles and Climate Change
A city government can act as one or more of the following:
• Consumer, intervening directly on municipal energy and transport consumption
•  Planner and regulator, orientating urban development and using authoritative 
powers to set mandatory conditions related to energy effi ciency
•  Provider and supplier, investing in infrastructure in the transport, waste, and 
energy supply sectors, either directly or by owning companies providing such 
public services
•  Enabler and adviser, infl uencing other actors through information campaigns 
on sustainable behaviors or supporting them directly with incentives and 
counseling aimed at enhancing measures that can contribute to climate 
change mitigation.
Source: Adapted from Alber and Kern 2008.
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Alber and Kern (2008) classify the governing mode that each role implies:
• Self-governing is the capacity of the local authority to govern its activities 
through reorganization, institutional innovation, and investments. It is asso-
ciated with the role of the local government as consumer.
• Governing by authority refers to regulations and sanctions the city govern-
ment can set. It is based on the authoritative powers of the local government.
• Governing by provision consists in delivering resources and services, and it 
is thus connected with the “provider and supplier” role.
• Governing by enabling refers to the capacities of the local government to co-
ordinate actors and encourage community engagement, as in the adviser and 
enabler role.
Mitigation Measures
With governing modes as a basis, emission reduction measures included in 
the climate plans are categorized for the sectors of energy, transport, waste, 
and urban planning. To weigh mitigation measures in each local strategy, the 
expected impacts of measures included in plans are analyzed.12 Th e weight 
of each measure is expressed as a percentage of the total emission reductions 
that should derive from the implementation of the plan. Emission reductions 
that are achievable through each measure are usually expressed in the plans as 
annual reductions.
Table 3.9 shows that New York City, London, and Milan assign great rel-
evance to policies concerning energy supply, energy effi  ciency, and savings 
throughout all governing modes. Policies combine advice and counseling to 
citizens with incentives to support both energy effi  ciency measures in exist-
ing buildings and installation of renewable energy microplants. More than half 
of expected emissions reductions for London and Milan come from measures 
in these fi elds. Th ese cities assign a relevant role for mitigation to their main 
energy supplier, whom they are able to infl uence. For London, infl uence on 
carbon intensity is limited because it is related to the national government poli-
cies on lower carbon intensity in the national grid and national targets within 
European directives on renewable sources (Mayor of London 2007a). Milan has 
more power in infl uencing strategic investments of its main energy supplier, 
A2A, because the municipality is a majority shareholder in the company. New 
York City authorities schedule a set of energy measures, with the collaboration 
of its main energy supplier, to secure a cleaner energy supply to the city.13
In the plans of Mexico City and Bangkok, the highest local mitigation poten-
tial is in the transport sector, enhanced by investments in infrastructure for sus-
tainable use of public transport: Th is sector contributes nearly half of expected 
emissions reductions. Transport reductions also contribute signifi cantly to 
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TABLE 3.9 
Mitigation Measures of the Plans Classifi ed in Sectors and Governing Modes
Governing 
modes Mitigation measures London
New York 
City Milan
Mexico 
City Bangkok
Energy
Self-governing Energy effi ciency schemes and use of CHP within municipal buildings <1 1 2 <1
Procurement of energy-effi cient appliances
Purchasing of green energy
Eco-house and renewable energy demonstration projects <1
Enabling Campaigns for energy effi ciency 37 9 7 28
Advice on energy effi ciency to businesses and citizens
Promotion of the use of renewable energy
Provision Minor carbon intensity in the main energy supplier 17 22 <1
Decentralized energy supply (CHP, waste-to-energy) 19 7
Network upgrading to improve energy savings <1
Energy service companies
Provision of incentives and grants for energy effi ciency measures 11 <1
Provision of incentives and grants for renewable energy in private 
buildings
1
Authority Strategic energy planning to enhance energy conservation
Mandatory use of renewable energy in the new build sector <1 
Energy effi ciency standards in the new building sector 4 6
Subtotal: Energy 78 57 14 29
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TABLE 3.9, continued
Governing 
modes Mitigation measures London
New York 
City Milan
Mexico 
City Bangkok
Transport
Self-governing Mobility management for employees <1
Green fl eet 2
Enabling Education campaigns 6
Green travel plans
Quality partnerships with public transport providers 11 6
Provision Public transport service provision 37 39
Provision of infrastructure for alternative forms of transport 4 5 <1
Upgrading of road network to increase traffi c effi ciency 17
Logistic centers for goods transport and freight management 4 2
Incentives to purchase low-emission cars 25
Authority Transport planning to limit car use and provide walking and cycling 
infrastructure
2
Workplace levies and road-user charging Study
Subtotal: Transport sector 22 42 42 56
Waste
Self-governing Waste prevention, recycling, and reuse within the local authority
Procurement of recycled goods
Enabling Campaigns for reducing, reusing, and recycling waste 3
Promotion of the use of recycled products
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5
Provision Waste service/waste water treatment provision 9 <1
Installations for recycling, composting, and waste-to-energy facilities 4 Study
Recycling, composting, and reuse schemes 1
Methane capturing from landfi lls (energy production) 31
Authority Regulations on methane combustion from landfi ll sites
Subtotal: Waste sector (if applicable) 44 5
Urban planning and land use
Self-governing High energy-effi ciency standards and use of CHP in new public 
buildings
Demonstration projects: house or neighborhood scale
Enabling Guidance for architects and developers on energy effi ciency and 
renewables
Promotion of tree planting 3
Authority Strategic land-use planning to enhance energy effi ciency and 
renewables
Planning of sites for renewable installations
Strategic land-use planning to enhance public transport
Urban forestation <1 7
Subtotal: Urban forestry and land use sector (if applicable)  1 10
Source: Authors for different sources, based on Alber and Kern 2008: BMA 2008; City of New York 2007a; IEFE 2009; SMA-GDF 2008; Mayor of London 2007a.
Note: Numbers refer to the weight of specifi c measures on annual total emission reductions expected from the implementation of the plan. CHP = combined heat and power. 
Shaded cells mean that these measures are included in the respective city’s plan; no shading and no number means that the measure does not have a quantitative target to 
go with it in the plan.
76 ■ CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
the plans of London and Milan. For Milan, relevant reductions are expected 
from local policies aimed at reducing the use of private cars and lowering 
the average carbon emissions factor in circulating vehicles, including a pol-
lution charge. Th ese policies are complemented by incentives to consumers 
for the purchase of low-emissions vehicles provided by regional and national 
authorities.
Measures on urban planning are diffi  cult to associate with quantifi ed emis-
sions reductions. Planning policies usually set a framework that indirectly 
infl uences the building and transport sector. Within land use, only Milan and 
Bangkok evaluate a potential increase in urban forestry and assign a role to 
tree planting in the comprehensive mitigation strategy (1 and 10 percent of 
all expected reductions. respectively). In the waste sector, Mexico City identi-
fi es mitigation potential in a project for energy production from landfi ll meth-
ane (31 percent of expected reductions). London, New York City, and Milan 
address issues related to solid waste in specifi c plans and do not include mea-
sures in this sector in their local climate strategies.
Weights assigned to mitigation measures reveal that climate plans in these 
cities are coherent with emissions contexts defi ned in the local inventories. Th is 
aspect is verifi ed by comparing the contribution of the two most relevant sec-
tors (buildings, transportation) to emissions, expressed as a percentage of total 
emissions, with the weights of measures belonging to these sectors within each 
plan (fi gure 3.1). Th e plans of London, Milan, Mexico City, and Bangkok iden-
tify a reduction potential for emissions from energy use in buildings and trans-
portation that is very similar to the sectors’ shares of total emissions. Milan’s 
plan shows a gap in defi ning measures targeting energy consumptions in 
buildings. Mexico City’s plan assigns a signifi cant weight to measures on waste 
(44 percent), despite a more limited contribution of this sector to total emis-
sions (11 percent). Th e plan does not include measures for the industrial sector, 
which contributes considerably to total emissions (22 percent). Th is aspect may 
be due to diffi  culties in identifying local measures to target the industrial sector. 
Conclusions regarding the effi  ciency of these plans are not possible, because 
marginal costs of emissions abatement are not available for specifi c measures. 
In fact, effi  cient plans would require the equalization of marginal abatement 
costs among included measures.
Implementation and Monitoring
Two alternative approaches are used to implement urban mitigation plans: 
(1) a unit in charge of climate policy is created in each relevant department or 
(2) a group with climate change competencies (climate steering group, coordi-
nation offi  ce, overarching unit) is established in the local government (Alber 
and Kern 2008). Th e second approach seems more promising if the climate 
COMPARING MITIGATION POLICIES ■ 77
Source: Authors for different sources: Mayor of London 2007a (London), IEFE 2009 (Milan), Ministry of 
Environment, Mexico City 2008 (Mexico City), and BMA 2008 (Bangkok).
Figure 3.1 Coherence among Emission Sectors (Inventories) and 
Reduction Measures (Local Mitigation Plans)
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group can act within a general framework (strategic plans with sector-based 
targets, policies, and measures) and if a project-based approach is adopted, 
because it prevents departmental segregation. Competencies for climate 
change policy are oft en concentrated in environmental departments, and this 
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feature may lead to coordination and integration problems if such skills are not 
complemented by competencies to implement comprehensive concepts (Alber 
and Kern 2008).
London and New York City have chosen the second approach. New York 
City has created the Mayor’s Offi  ce of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, 
an offi  ce charged with coordination and implementation of the sustainabil-
ity vision of the city, including climate change issues. Th is offi  ce cooperates 
with city agencies and the Mayor’s Advisory Board. A specifi c agency, the NYC 
Energy Planning Board, will be created to coordinate all energy supply-and-
demand initiatives of the city.
London has assigned to a preexisting institution, the London Climate 
Change Agency (LCCA), the task of implementing all measures in the city’s 
climate action plan related to advice and counseling, such as giving support 
to citizens and businesses in investing in energy effi  ciency and renovation of 
buildings (that is, activities categorized under “enabling” in table 3.9, energy 
sector). Furthermore, as the public half of the London Energy Service Com-
pany formed with EDF Energy Ltd, LCCA directly manages CO2 reduction and 
energy effi  ciency projects.
Mexico City has assigned coordination of measures to the environmental 
secretariat (Secretaría del Medio Ambiente). For each measure, the internal 
sectors and external actors that are responsible and jointly responsible for 
implementation are identifi ed. Bangkok and Milan have not yet defi ned issues 
concerning implementation. Milan’s plan has been developed by the environ-
mental department, with the support of a municipal agency with competencies 
on mobility, environment, and territorial issues (Agency for Mobility, Environ-
ment, and Territory). Th e eff ectiveness of the coordination role of specifi c units 
or environmental units within city climate change strategies should be investi-
gated in future research.
Inventory updating is identifi ed as a key tool to assess progress toward tar-
gets (London, New York City, and Milan). Monitoring reports are assigned 
to units charged with plan implementation (New York City) or to an ad hoc 
monitoring and evaluating committee (Mexico City). London, besides peri-
odic reporting by the mayor, includes CO2 reduction reporting in assessments 
provided by agencies and departments linked to climate-relevant sectors. Th is 
feature may be considered as a sign of a high degree of integration of climate 
strategy in the local government and its institutionalization therein.
Financing
Financial aspects of mitigation are addressed in various ways: estimating the 
costs for each measure (Mexico City) or foreseeing a budget allocation (Lon-
don and New York City). For Mexico City, Clean Development Mechanism 
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(CDM) credits and revenues from the Kyoto market will be essential for fi nanc-
ing mitigation measures. Th ese resources will be included in the Public Envi-
ronmental Fund of the Federal District. Th e use of Kyoto credits as a means to 
off set emissions can be found only in the plan of Milan, which considers the 
possibility of relying upon CDM projects to compensate for indirect emissions 
from purchased electricity.
Conclusions and Future Research
Th e analysis of emissions inventories shows that local emissions strongly 
depend on energy uses, particularly in buildings and transportation. Consider-
ing the main indicators of emissions, GDP is a major factor explaining emis-
sions levels of the selected cities, except for Bangkok, whose emissions are more 
characterized by energy intensity of production.
Th e sector-based urban drivers analyzed are not suffi  cient to explain cities’ 
GHG emissions. Th is suggests that further analysis of more specifi c determi-
nants, such as the characteristics of the building stock, dwelling density, motor 
vehicle stock, and transport network, is needed. Even among cities with similar 
emissions levels, the sources of emissions may vary: Th is is the case with New 
York City and Bangkok, where the contributions of the transport and buildings 
sectors to total emissions are very diff erent.
Comparing emissions values and mitigation strategies reveals that cities 
from industrialized countries, namely, London, New York City, and Milan, 
share similar emissive contexts and mitigation strategies. For these cities, the 
highest contribution to urban emissions is related to energy consumption in 
buildings (residential, commercial, and institutional). Th eir climate plans point 
to the energy sector as having the greatest potential, and their policies share the 
following essential features:
• Stimulating energy effi  ciency and savings from individual actions, of both 
citizens and businesses (that is, direct incentives or tax breaks and technical 
counseling)
• Promoting high-energy effi  ciency and renewable energy in the newly built 
sector, mainly through standards, regulation, and incentives
• Supporting decentralized supply and combined heat and power systems
• Relying on lower carbon intensity in the energy supply of the main provider 
(London and Milan).
Th is last point will depend mainly on the kind of relationship that exists 
between each city government and its major energy supplier. Where the energy 
supplier is a public utility owned by the local government, the municipality 
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may engage it in programs that aff ect the energy mix of electricity production. 
Otherwise, agreements between the city government and energy providers may 
promote investments that contribute to the local GHG reduction objective (see 
the cases of Calgary and Heidelberg in Kamal-Chaoui and Robert 2009).
Th e transport sector is the second-highest contributor to urban emissions 
for London, New York City, and Milan and is targeted by policies aimed at 
enhancing the existing public transport infrastructure and its use. Daily modal 
share of public transport is already high in these three cities, but private motor-
ized travel shows potential for further reductions. Investments planned by the 
municipality of Milan to extend the underground network, combined with 
incentives to support the renewal of cars in use, are highly coherent with the 
markedly high car ownership that is typical of this city. Bangkok and Mexico 
City share an emissive context and mitigation strategies strongly infl uenced 
by transportation. Th eir climate strategies identify the most relevant mitiga-
tion potential within the transport sector and strongly rely on public transport 
provision.
All cities considered in the chapter have defi ned a strategy that is coherent 
with their local emission contexts because they focus mitigation measures on 
sectors identifi ed as most relevant in determining their urban emissions.
As local mitigation policies and city planning instruments for climate change 
are developed worldwide, a wider range of case studies will become available. 
Further research may also benefi t from a greater availability of comparable 
city-level data on energy, GHG emissions, and territorial features. Emissions 
values in particular can be standardized through the establishment of a com-
mon methodology for local GHG emissions inventories. Research is urgently 
needed on the costs of local mitigation measures and, more broadly, the costs 
of implementing local climate plans.
As cities publish data and progress reports on their climate strategies, the 
eff ectiveness and effi  ciency of each mitigation strategy may be assessed and 
compared to identify the most cost-eff ective measures, instruments, and gov-
erning modes in pursuing reduction targets. Mitigation strategies should be 
reviewed in relation to other city plans to explore synergies, cobenefi ts, and 
links. Finally, the integration of mitigation and adaptation strategies should be 
further explored.
Notes
 1. Th e U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement sets the American 
Kyoto target at the city level and is currently endorsed by more than 1,000 munici-
palities (http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm); the European 
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Covenant of Mayors already involves more than 2,200 municipalities and commits 
them to adopt a sustainable energy action plan, with a target going beyond the 
20 percent reduction of GHG emissions by 2020 (http://www.eumayors.eu/).
 2. See the defi nition of global cities in Sassen (2001).
 3. Several boundaries can be identifi ed within large cities: the core city, the contiguous 
built-up area, the metropolitan area, and an extended planning region (Satterthwaite 
2008). 
 4. Th e defi nition has been adapted from Hakes (1999). Other classifi cations are pos-
sible (Dodman 2009).
 5. Th e European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme/European Environment 
Agency (EEA) air pollutant emission inventory guidebook (CORINAIR) provides 
guidance on estimating emissions from both anthropogenic and natural emission 
sources. See the website of the EEA, http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/emep-
eea-emission-inventory-guidebook-2009.
 6. Although London, Mexico City, Milan, and New York City have lower emissions per 
capita than their respective countries, Bangkok produces much higher emissions per 
capita than the rest of Th ailand. Per capita emissions in 2002 were the following: 9.7 
tons, Italy (UNFCCC 2003); 9.8 tons, Mexico; 3.2 tons, Th ailand; 4.2 tons, United 
Kingdom; 20 tons, United States (UNEP/GRID 2005). 
 7. Th e Kaya identity expresses global GHG emission levels as the product of the follow-
ing inputs: CO2 emissions per capita = Carbon content of energy × Energy intensity 
of economy × GDP per capita (Kaya 1990, in Nakicenovic and Swart 2000). 
 8. Carbon intensity of electricity consumption shows the following values: Bangkok, 
509 grams of CO2/KWh (BMA 2008); London (supplied from the National Grid), 
520 grams of CO2/KWh; Mexico City, 683 grams of CO2/KWh (Pardo and Martínez 
2006); Milan, 311 grams of CO2/KWh (IEFE 2009).
 9. Th is elderly-young ratio is the ratio of the number of inhabitants aged over 60 to the 
number of inhabitants aged under 19. Th e activity rate is the percentage of the total 
population aged from 15 to 65 years in the labor force. 
10. If we consider the estimate of Bangkok’s registered and unregistered population of 
8.8 million inhabitants, the density of Bangkok would be 5,612 inhabitants/km2, 
similar to the other selected cities. 
11. A study by the Greater London Authority compares the environmental performance 
of London with other regions of England that are on average 14 times less dense 
than London. London turns out to be the region with the lowest domestic CO2 emis-
sions per capita and the lowest CO2 emissions per billion pounds gross value added, 
whereas the transport sector has low CO2 emissions per passenger bus and the highest 
CO2 emissions per vehicle kilometer traveled, mainly because of traffi  c congestion 
(GLA 2008b).
12. New York’s plan does not include estimates on emission reductions that should 
derive from each measure. 
13. Th e New York City plan foresees (1) facilitating repowering and construction of 
cleaner power plants and dedicated transmission lines, (2) expanding Clean Distrib-
uted Generation connected to the city grid, (3) fostering the market for renewable 
energy, and (4) supporting expansion of the city’s natural gas infrastructure (City of 
New York 2007a).
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GHG Emissions, 
Urban Mobility, and 
Morphology: A Hypothesis
Alain Bertaud, Benoit Lefèvre, and Belinda Yuen
Introduction
Th is chapter explores the link between greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
transport mode, and city shape. Urban productivity is dependent on people’s 
mobility within a metropolitan area. GHG emissions, however, are only weakly 
linked to the number of kilometers traveled per person because of large varia-
tions between the emissions per passenger kilometer of diff erent transport 
modes and diff erences in the carbon content of the various energy sources 
used for transport. Th us, to reduce urban GHG emissions due to transport, 
it is important to look at all the parameters that contribute to emissions. In 
this chapter, three concurrent strategies that could contribute to reducing GHG 
emissions due to urban transport are reviewed: technological improvements 
within mode, mode shift , and land-use strategy allowing spatial concentration 
of jobs. In particular, the chapter explores options for improving travel in urban 
areas by investigating the links between GHG emissions and transport modes, 
with consideration of associated travel costs and city shape. However, it is our 
contention that none of these strategies are likely to succeed if not supported by 
an energy pricing policy directly linking energy price to carbon content.
Th e central hypothesis is that carbon-based energy pricing could trigger 
a demand shift  toward transit in dominantly monocentric cities, providing 
adequate zoning changes were made. More specifi cally, this chapter seeks to 
develop and determine the following:
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 Hypothesis 1: Price signals, including energy prices and carbon market–
based incentives, road tolls, and transit fares, are the main drivers of techno-
logical change, transport modal shift , and land-use regulatory changes.
 Hypothesis 2: Price signals could shift  transport mode from individual cars to 
public transit for trips from the periphery to the central business district (CBD) 
only in cities that are densely populated (more than 50 people/hectare (ha) in 
built-up areas) and already dominantly monocentric.
GHG Emissions and Urban Transport
Urban GHG emissions per person in large cities are a fraction of the national 
average (fi gure 4.1). Th is diff erence appears as a paradox because cities have a 
higher gross domestic product (GDP) per person than the national average, 
and it is usually assumed that higher GDP means higher GHG emissions. In 
fact, modern cities with a large proportion of service jobs consume less energy 
per capita than smaller towns and rural areas. However, because GHGs are 
emitted in urban areas by a very large number of small sources—cars, appli-
Figure 4.1 CO2 Emissions in Cities Compared with Countries
Source: EIU 2008; World Resources Institute 2009.
Note: CO2e = carbon dioxide equivalent.
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ances, individual buildings—as opposed to concentrated sources such as power 
plants or factories, it is diffi  cult to develop an emission reduction strategy that 
would work for all emitters.
Reliable data on emissions in cities are diffi  cult to collect because of ambi-
guity in determining which sources to include as urban. Should urban GHG 
emissions be limited to sources located within metropolitan boundaries? Or 
should emissions be counted on the basis of urban residents’ consumption in 
urban areas? Th e data for cities shown in fi gure 4.1 correspond to the fi rst defi -
nition, although emissions from electricity are accounted for on the basis of 
consumption and not on emissions at the location of the power plant.
Some analyses solve the problem posed by emission location versus location 
of consumption by including life-cycle emissions (Button 1993; McKinsey and 
Co. 2007; Schipper, Unander, and Marie-Lilliu 1999). For instance, the emissions 
of a car are not limited to the fuel consumed but include also the energy used to 
manufacture it, to maintain it, and to scrap it aft er its useful life. Although this 
type of defi nition is reasonable, the resulting numbers are diffi  cult to calculate, 
and the method implies a number of assumptions, in particular, concerning the 
number of years and the number of kilometers traveled during the useful life 
of a vehicle. It is important to be aware of the limitations of the data set avail-
able when comparing cities’ performance in GHG emissions. Some apparent 
inconsistencies in the data presented below can be attributed to slightly diff erent 
assumptions in the data collected about emissions attributions.
Th e sample of fi ve large cities1 in high-income countries shown in fi gure 4.1 
gives a range of emissions from 4 to 7 tons per person per year in 2005 (EIU 
2008). It is likely that GHG emissions in cities in low- and middle- income 
countries, for which no reliable data are available, are even higher than the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) cities 
shown in fi gure 4.1. Th e use of older cars and buses, and the prevalence of two-
stroke engines for motorcycles and three-wheelers, might contribute to higher 
GHG emissions per capita. Th e three main sources of GHG emissions in cities 
are buildings, transport, and industries. In the sample of fi ve high-income cities 
included in fi gure 4.1, the proportion of GHG emissions due to transport var-
ies from 25 percent of total emissions in New York City to 38 percent in Rome 
(fi gure 4.2).
Th is chapter will be limited to identifying the best strategies to reduce GHG 
emissions due to transport in a context of increasing urban productivity. Th e con-
clusions of this study would be particularly relevant to cities that have more than 
1 million inhabitants. According to United Nations data and projections, cities 
with populations above 1 million accounted for about 1.2 billion, or 18 percent 
of the world population, in 2005. By 2025, it is expected that this will increase 
to 1.85 billion and will then represent 23 percent of the world population.
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Transport is a key driver of the economy and is highly dependent (98 percent) on 
fossil oil. Although already a signifi cant sector of GHG emissions, it is also the 
fastest growing sector globally. Between 1990 and 2003, emissions from the trans-
port sector grew 1,412 million metric tons (31 percent) worldwide. Th e sector’s 
share of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is also increasing. In 2005, the transport 
sector contributed 23 percent of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. It is 
also the sector where the least progress has been made in addressing cost-eff ective 
GHG reductions (Sperling and Cannon 2006). As mentioned earlier, the frag-
mentation of emissions sources and the complexity of demand and supply issues 
in urban transport explain the lack of progress. Making transport activity more 
sustainable must be a top priority policy if climate change is to be addressed.
In most cities, numerous urban problems are transport related, such as con-
gestion on urban roads, poor air quality, fragmented labor markets, and social 
fractioning due to poor access to economic and social activity and the like (Ng 
and Schipper 2005; World Bank 2009). Road transport accounts for, by far, the 
largest proportion of CO2 emissions from the transport sector, principally from 
automobile transport. Against the projected increase in car ownership world-
wide (expected to triple between 2000 and 2050), road transport will continue 
to account for a signifi cant share of CO2 emissions in the coming decades. 
Within cities, modal share and measures facilitating less GHG-intensive modes 
Figure 4.2 CO2 Emissions in Five High-Income Cities
Source: EIU 2008.
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such as public transport require closer examination. Modal shift  policies are 
generally inadequately assessed in CO2 policy (OECD 2007). Because GHG 
emissions caused by urban transport have to be reduced while urban produc-
tivity has to increase, it is important to establish the links between urban trans-
port, labor mobility, and city productivity.
Mobility and Cities’ Economies
Economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, linking the wealth of 
cities to spatial concentration is quite abundant and no longer controversial 
in academic circles (Annez and Buckley 2009; Brueckner 2001; Brueckner, 
Th isse, and Zenou 1999). Th e World Bank’s World Development Report 
(2009), “Reshaping Economic Geography,” and the Commission on Growth 
and Development report “Urbanization and Growth” (Annez and Buckley 
2009) exhaustively summarize and document the theoretical and empirical 
arguments justifying the economic advantage provided by the spatial concen-
tration of economic activities in large cities. Th e necessity to manage urban 
growth rather than to try to slow it down is eventually reaching mayors, city 
managers, and urban planners. Th e size of cities is not critical; what matters is 
the connectivity insured by urban transport networks2 between workers and 
fi rms and between providers of goods and services and consumers, whether 
these consumers are other fi rms or individuals. Th is connectivity is diffi  cult to 
achieve in large cities. It requires coordination between land uses and invest-
ments in transport networks; diffi  cult pricing decisions for road use, parking, 
and transit fares; and fi nally, local taxes and user fees that makes the main-
tenance and development of the transport network fi nancially sustainable 
(Staley and Moore 2008).
Traffi  c congestion in slowing down mobility represents a management fail-
ure on the part of city managers. Congestion has a double negative eff ect: It acts 
as a tax on productivity by tying down people and goods, and it oft en increases 
GHG emissions even for vehicles that would otherwise be performing satisfac-
torily. It is conceivable that mismanaged large cities may reach a level of con-
gestion that negatively off sets the economic advantage of spatial concentration. 
In this case, these cities would stop growing. However, the positive economic 
eff ect of agglomeration must be very powerful to off set the chronic congestion 
of cities such as Bangkok and Jakarta that are still the economic engine of their 
region in spite of their chronic congestion.
Poor migrants moving to large cities oft en have diffi  culties in participating 
in the urban economy, either because their housing is located too far from the 
urban transport networks or because they cannot aff ord the cost of transit or 
motorized transport. It has been observed that some slums appear to be self-
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suffi  cient and that many slum dwellers are able just to walk to work. Some have 
argued that slum dwellers’ lack of motorized mobility and inclination toward 
walking would constitute an advantage in terms of GHG emissions and should 
be emulated by higher-income groups. Th is argument is a cruel joke on the 
poor because their lack of mobility condemns them to live in large cities with 
all its costs but none of its benefi ts. Th e lack of mobility in many slums and 
in some badly located government housing projects constitutes a poverty trap 
rather than an advantage to be emulated in the future (Gauteng in South Africa 
being a case in point).
Although walking and cycling do constitute an indispensable transport 
mode in large cities, people using these modes should do it by choice, not 
because they are forced to do so by lack of access or aff ordability of other means 
of transport. Because mobility is a necessity for economic survival in large cit-
ies, a reduction of GHGs should not be made by reducing mobility and cer-
tainly not by preventing an increase in mobility for the poor. Th e reduction of 
the number of passenger kilometers traveled (PKmT) should not be targeted 
for reduction to reduce GHG emissions. To the contrary, because of the lack of 
mobility of a large number of poor people living in large cities, PKmT should 
increase in the future. Various alternative solutions to decrease GHG emissions 
while increasing PKmT are discussed.
Identifying Key Parameters in Urban Transport GHG Emission 
Sources
GHG emissions from transport are produced by trips that can be divided into 
three broad categories:
1. Commuting trips
2. Noncommuting trips
3. Freight
Commuting trips are the trips taken to go from residence to work and back. In 
most low-income cities, commuting trips constitute the majority of trips using 
a motorized vehicle (with exceptions in some East Asian cities where nonmo-
torized trips still constitute a large number of commuting trips). Noncommut-
ing trips are trips whose purpose is other than going to work, for instance, trips 
to schools, to shops, or to visit family or other personal reasons.
In high-income countries, commuting trips constitute only a fraction of total 
trips. For instance, in the United States, commuting trips represented 40 percent 
of all motorized trips in 1956; in 2005, they represented only slightly less than 
20 percent of all motorized trips (Pisarski 2006). In low-income cities, most of 
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these trips involve short distances and are using nonmotorized transport. When 
noncommuting trips become more numerous and longer they tend to be made via 
individual cars or motorcycles because destinations are not spatially concentrated 
and transit networks cannot easily accommodate them. For instance, in New 
York City in 2005, transit was used for 30.8 percent of all commuting trips but 
only for 9.6 percent of all commuting and noncommuting trips (O’Toole 2008).
Freight trips, including public vehicle travel and urban goods and services 
travel, constitute a sizable portion of all trips but vary signifi cantly between 
cities. Because freight trips within urban areas are always done by individual 
vehicle and cannot use transit, these trips are adversely aff ected by road conges-
tion, which results in signifi cant costs to the economy of cities.
Will the trends observed in the United States anticipate what will happen in 
other parts of the world when these cities reach a level of income comparable to 
that of the United States today? Th is appears unlikely because of diff erences in 
city density between the United States and other parts of the world. Most cities 
outside the United States have a density far higher than U.S. cities, oft en by two 
orders of magnitude. Although densities of large cities tend to decrease over 
time, the decrease is slow and is unlikely to ever reach the low density of U.S. 
cities. It is probable that in high-density cities noncommuting trips will largely 
use nonmotorized transportation, taxis, or transit, as is the case in high-density 
Manhattan today.
Analysis in this research will therefore concentrate on emissions from 
commuting trips because these trips are the most common type in low- and 
middle-income cities. In addition, commuting trips require the most capi-
tal investment because of the transport capacity required during peak hours. 
Commuting trips oft en defi ne a transport network whereas the other types of 
trips, including freight, piggy-back onto the transport investments made ini-
tially for commuting trips.
In East Asia, commuting trips, using walking or bicycles, constituted the 
majority of commuting trips in the 1980s and 1990s. During the past 20 years, 
because of the physical expansion of cities and increase in fl oor space con-
sumption due to rising incomes, the share of nonmotorized transport has 
unfortunately been shrinking. In 2006, for instance, the share of nonmotorized 
commuting trips has been reduced to about 20 percent in Shanghai from about 
75 percent in the early 1980s.
Disaggregating Commuting Trips by Mode
Commuting trips can be disaggregated into three modes: nonmotorized mode 
(walking and cycling, and increasingly included in this category, people work-
ing at home and telecommuting); motorized self-operated vehicles (SOVs), 
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including motorcycles and private cars (car pools included); and transit mode 
(minibuses, buses, bus rapid transit [BRT], light rail, subways, and suburban 
rail). Th e types of vehicles used in the last two modes vary enormously in 
emission performance. In addition, within each mode—SOV and transit—
each city has a fl eet of vehicles, which have a wide range of GHG emissions 
performance. Comparisons between vehicles oft en diff er by orders of magni-
tude depending on technology, maintenance, age of vehicle, energy source, 
and load (the average number of passengers per vehicle). To see more clearly 
the impact of diff erent transport strategies on the reduction of GHG emis-
sions, we have built a simple model linking the various vehicle fl eet parameters 
to GHG emissions per commuter. Th e model is limited to analyzing CO2 emis-
sions from commuting trips, which are still the most common motorized trips 
in low- and middle-income cities. For each mode, the inputs of the model are 
the following:
1. Th e percentage of commuters using the mode
2. Th e average commuting distance (in kilometers)
3. Th e CO2 equivalent (CO2e) emission per vehicle kilometer traveled (VKmT), 
calculated for full life cycle when data available
4. Th e load factor per type of vehicle
Numerous publications provide GHG emissions expressed in grams of CO2 
per PKmT (table 4.1). However, the data assume a passenger load to calculate 
the CO2 per PKmT. Because the load is a crucial parameter in the model, it 
has been necessary to calculate the CO2 emissions per VKmT. However, fuel 
consumption may vary for the same vehicle, depending on the load; there-
fore, load and fuel consumption are not completely independent variables. We 
have therefore slightly adjusted the energy consumption values by VKmT to 
refl ect this. A more sophisticated model would establish more accurately the 
relationship between load and fuel consumption for each type of vehicle. For 
demonstration purposes of the proposed methodology, results were found to 
be robust enough to allow this simplifi cation. Th e equation used in the model 
showing the daily GHG emissions as a function of the number of passengers 
using diff erent modes, with diff erent average commuting distances, load factor, 
and engine fuel performance, is presented in the annex.
Based on the equation given in the annex, it can be shown that trying to 
reduce the average commuting distance per day (variable D)—de facto reducing 
labor mobility—would not provide much eff ect on Q (GHG emissions per day) 
compared with a change in vehicle fl eet performance (variable E), a mode shift  
(variable P), or an increase in the load factor (variable L). As seen in table 4.1, 
the possible values taken by E vary by a factor of four between a hybrid diesel 
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and an SUV, and by a factor of two between the New York City subway and a 
Toyota Prius! By contrast, land-use changes might, at best, reduce average com-
muting distance D by 5 to 10 percent within a minimum period of 20 years. Th is 
model, which could be used as a rough policy tool, was tested for parameters for 
New York City and Mexico City. Th e inputs and outputs of the model using New 
York City parameters in 2000 are shown in table 4.2.
Th e model shows the diff erence of performance in terms of GHG emissions 
between transit and cars in New York City: Emissions per car passenger per 
year are nearly six times more than the emissions per transit passengers. Th e 
model allows testing of the impact of alternative strategies; for instance, what 
would be the impact of an increase of hybrid cars over the total number of cars, 
everything else staying constant? Or what would be the impact of an increase 
in transit passengers, or in the load factor of buses, and so on? Table 4.3 shows 
the impact of two alternatives in reducing GHG emissions.
Table 4.3 demonstrates the potential impact in New York City of a change 
in the composition of the car fl eet and, alternatively, a mode shift  from cars to 
transit. Th e changes concern only the value of variable P in the model’s equation. 
Th e current situation in 2005 is shown in column A. In column B, an increase 
from 0.5 to 19 percent in the number of commuters using hybrid cars, repre-
senting about one out of fi ve cars used by commuters, bring a 28 percent reduc-
tion in GHG emissions. In column C, a mode shift  from car to transit, raising 
the share of transit from 36 percent of commuters to 46 percent, decreases GHG 
TABLE 4.1 
GHG Emissions for Various Vehicles with 
Various Passenger Load Assumptions
Vehicle type
Grams of CO2 
per passenger mile
Grams of CO2 
per passenger kilometer
SUV 416 258
Average U.S. car 366 227
Motor buses 221 137
Light rail 179 111
Commuter rail 149 93
Hybrid gas 147 91
Toyota Prius 118 73
Hybrid diesel 101 63
Metro 94 58
New York MTA 73 45
New York subway 58 36
Source: Demographia 2005; EIU 2008; O’Toole 2008.
Note: MTA = Metropolitan Transportation Authority.
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TABLE 4.2 
Input and Output of GHG Emissions for New York City
Average 
distance per 
passenger per 
commuting 
trip
Number of 
commuters 
per mode
Percent of 
commuters 
per mode
Grams of 
CO2e per 
VKmT
Load factor 
of vehicle
Load factor 
as % of 
total vehicle 
capacity
Grams of 
CO2e per 
PKmT
Total tons 
of CO2 
emitted by 
commuters 
per day
Units Km people % gr CO2e people % gr CO2e T CO2e
Mode / Symbol D Pn P E L L/Ca % Qi
Walk  2.5 470,000  5 —  1 100 — —
Cycle  5.0 94,000  1 —  1 50 — —
Car (gasoline)  19.0 4,324,000  46.0 375  1.63 33 230 37,802
Car (diesel)  19.0 47,000  0.5 256  1.63 33 157 281
Car (hybrid)  19.0 47,000  0.5 105  1.63 33 64 115
Car (electric)  19.0 —  0 163  1.63 33 100 —
Motorcycle 2-stroke  8.0 94,000  1 119  1.1 55 108 163
Minibus gasoline  20.0 —  0 720  7 58 103 —
Minibus diesel  20.0 —  0 600  7 58 86 —
Bus diesel  20.0 564,000  6 1,000  30 50 33 752
Bus natural gas  20.0 1,128,000  12 1,200  30 50 40 1,805
Rail transit  20.0 2,632,000  28 3,950  110 73 36 3,781
9,400,000  100 Tons per day  Q = 44,698 
Total transit  46
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Number of people 
 in New York City 
 MSA
14,687,500 Kg/per year per commuter 1,240
E/P ratio (%) 64 Kg/year by transit passenger 38
Number of 
 commuting days 
 per year
261 Kg/year by Car passenger 2,217
Source: Authors’ analysis.
Note: Total number of commuters (T) = 9,400,000. Figures in italics are input of the model, other fi gures are output. MSA = metropolitan statistical area; PKmT = passenger kilome-
ter traveled; VKmT = vehicle kilometer traveled.
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emissions by 13 percent. Further reductions could be achieved by introducing 
hybrid buses or increasing loads of both cars and transit.
Th e use of the model allows a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact 
of potential changes in technology and transport mode on GHG emissions. Th e 
model does not have anything to say about the feasibility or the probability 
of such a change to occur. Although the rough calculations shown imply that 
the combined impacts of technology change and mode shift  could be large, 
how to achieve these changes remains the main problem to be solved. Most of 
the vehicle technology, such as hybrid engines, that reduces fuel consumption 
has been around for at least 10 years. Rail transit using electricity has been 
common in large cities for more than 100 years. Th e fact that in many cities 
the use of transit represents a minority mode raises important questions about 
Table 4.3 
Potential Impact of Vehicle Shift and Mode Shift on GHG Emissions in 
New York City Metropolitan Area
(A) (B) (C)
i
Mode / 
Symbol P P
Change in 
CO2e 
emissions P
Change in 
CO2e 
emissions
 1 Walk  5%  5%   5%
 2 Cycle  1%  1%   1%
 3 Car (gasoline)  56%  37.5% −33%  46%  −18%
 4 Car (diesel)  0.5%  0.5%   0.5%
 5 Car (hybrid)  0.5%  19.0% n.a.  0.5%
 6 Car (electric)  0%  0%   0%
 7 Motorcycle 
2-stroke
 1%  1%  1%
 8 Minibus 
gasoline
 0%  0%   0%
 9 Minibus 
diesel
 0%  0%  0%
10 Bus diesel  5%  5%   6%  20%
11 Bus natural 
gas
 10%  10%  12%  20%
12 Rail transit  21%  21%   28%  33%
Tons per day  51,545  36,918  44,698 −13%
Kilograms per year 
per commuter 
 1,418  1,024 −28%  1,240 −13%
Source: Authors’ analysis.
Note: n.a. = not available.
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consumer preferences for urban transport. Th e transport mode split for New 
York City in 2005 shown in table 4.2 represents a state of equilibrium. It is 
important to know what factors could change this equilibrium to a new state 
that would be more favorable for GHG reductions.
Consumers’ Demand for Transport
Th e loss of transit share over the past few decades in most of the world’s major 
cities has to be acknowledged. Even in Singapore transit mode share declined 
from 55 percent of commuters in 1990 to 52.4 percent in 20003 (Singapore 
Department of Statistics 2000). Th is decrease is striking because Singapore 
has had the most consistent transport policy over two decades favoring tran-
sit, including strict limits on car ownership, and has been a world pioneer for 
congestion pricing using advanced technology. In addition, Singapore has 
always had excellent coordination between land use and transport investments. 
Although the preceding section has shown that there is an overwhelming case 
for increasing transit mode to reduce GHG emissions, consumer choice seems 
to follow the opposite trends. It is therefore important to understand why tran-
sit is losing ground in so many cities and what alternative strategies exist and in 
which type of cities the trend could possibly be reversed.
Consumers’ decisions to use one mode of transport over others depend on 
three main factors:
1. Cost
2. Speed
3. Convenience, as determined by frequency and reliability of service and 
comfort
For low-income commuters, the cost of transport is the major consideration. 
For very low-income commuters, walking is oft en the only aff ordable option, 
which signifi cantly lowers their ability to take advantage of the large labor mar-
ket off ered by large cities. In Mumbai, for instance, about 4 million people walk 
to work every day (about 45 percent of the active population). Middle- and 
low-income users above extreme poverty are the prime customers for transit, 
as buying and maintaining a car is beyond the means of most of these, although 
subsidized fares frequently exist to make transit more aff ordable. However, in 
numerous middle- and high-income countries, some cities retain a signifi cant 
number of transit users who are middle or high income—for instance, Hong 
Kong, London, New York City, Paris, and Singapore, among others. How these 
cities have managed to maintain a high use of transit among affl  uent house-
holds will be described in the next section.
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In an increasing number of cities in low- or middle-income countries, the 
dispersion of employment makes it inconvenient to use transit, because no transit 
route goes directly to their location of employment. For those commuters who 
cannot aff ord to use individual cars or motorcycles, the most convenient options 
are collective taxis or minibuses. Commuting by microbuses at the expense of 
transit has become the dominant transport mode in Gauteng, Mexico City, and 
Tehran, for instance. As households’ income increases, the speed of transport 
and convenience become more important factors than cost, or rather, higher-
income commuters give a higher value to the time spent commuting than do 
lower-income ones. Speed of transport is limited in most transit system by fre-
quent stops and the time required for transfers. In city structures where a car is a 
feasible alternative mode of transport, commuters who can aff ord the cost would 
normally switch to individual cars.
Th e exhaustive study conducted by Pisarski (2006) on commuting char-
acteristics in U.S. cities gives an order of magnitude of the speed diff erence 
between transit and individual cars in those cities (fi gure 4.3). Th e average 
commuting distance is about the same between the diff erent modes except for 
walking, cycling, and rail transport. One can see that in spite of the congestion 
prevalent in most U.S. cities, commuting time by transit requires about double 
the time required by individual cars. Travel time for car pooling when involving 
Figure 4.3 Average Travel Time in U.S. Cities by Transport Mode
Source: Pisarski 2006.
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more than four people becomes similar to transit. Th is explains in great part the 
loss of transit share in U.S. cities in the past two decades.
In Singapore, with one of the most effi  cient transit systems in the world, 
the ratio of transit travel time to car driving time is lower than in U.S. cities. 
However, the diff erence in travel time is signifi cant enough (see table 4.4) to 
indicate that transit would not be a fi rst-choice transport mode for people who 
can aff ord an alternative. Th e high speed of car commuting is, of course, part 
of the success of Singapore’s transport strategy. Congestion pricing, constantly 
adjusted to facilitate fl uid traffi  c, ensures high speed for all car commuters who 
can aff ord the high premium paid for car ownership and for congestion tolls.
Th e challenge is to propose urban transport strategies that would result in 
reducing GHG emissions while maintaining mobility as refl ected by commut-
ers’ mode preference. Th ese diff erent strategies would have to be adapted to dif-
ferent spatial forms of urban growth—monocentric, polycentric, high and low 
densities—and to a context of increasing urban income and a decreasing cost 
of car acquisition. Th ese strategies will have to rely on the three tools available 
to urban managers: pricing, regulations, and land-use policy.
Energy Pricing, GHG Emissions, and Market-Based 
Incentives
As discussed earlier, a signifi cant reduction in GHG in urban transport could 
be achieved in two ways: technological change to reduce carbon content per 
VKmT and transport-mode shift  from private car to transit. As alluded to ear-
lier, the pricing of energy based on its carbon content is an indispensable policy 
instrument to trigger these changes to reduce GHGs in the long run. Th e pric-
ing of energy based on carbon content could be achieved through a carbon tax 
or through “cap and trade.” Th e merit of each approach is discussed next.
TABLE 4.4 
Singapore: Travel Time by Transport Mode
Mode
Median travel time 
(minutes)
Distance
(kilometers)
Speed 
(kilometers/hour)
Car 27 29.2 65
Metro 41 11.5 17
Metro + bus 51
Bus alone 38  
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics 2000.
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In each city the current use of low-carbon technology and the ratio between 
transit and car commuting is refl ecting an equilibrium state between supply 
and demand. Any change in technology or transport-mode share will require 
a move to a new state of equilibrium in the economy of transport. Signifi cantly 
higher gasoline prices, as experienced in 2008, temporarily modifi ed this state 
of equilibrium. Demand for transit increased and VKmT decreased. However, 
as long as renewable energy sources were not available at a competitive price, 
the high price of oil made it cheaper to generate electricity from coal or shale 
oil. Electricity is used mostly as a source of energy for rail transit, but electri-
cal cars that would recharge their batteries from the electricity grid will use 
it increasingly. Electricity produced by coal-burning power plants generates 
twice as much GHG per kilojoule than power plants using natural gas. Without 
a system of pricing energy based on its carbon content, higher oil and natural 
gas prices could increase GHG emissions rather than reducing them by shift ing 
electricity generation to coal-fueled power plants.
However, carbon pricing cannot be decided at the local level and is depen-
dent on national policy and increasingly on international agreements. It must 
be acknowledged that these policy instruments will have a limited impact in 
the absence of carbon pricing.
Various policy instruments are currently available to reduce GHG emis-
sions due to urban transport. Th eir eff ectiveness is oft en limited by the qual-
ity of national and local governance, as well as a city’s income distribution 
and spatial structure. Policy instruments can be divided among three princi-
pal categories:
1. Regulatory instruments, such as limitations on the number of vehicles on 
the road on a given day (for example, Beijing, Bogota, and Mexico City pico 
y placa (peak and [license] plate) and limitation on the number of cars reg-
istered in the city (for example, Singapore car quota system)
2. Pricing instruments modifying relative prices between private car and 
transit modes, such as road pricing: fi xed tolls and congestion pricing (for 
example, London, Singapore, and Stockholm); a fuel tax, which needs to be 
compared with an increase in the price of a barrel of oil due to oil market 
evolution (for example, Bogota, Singapore, Chicago, and most other U.S. 
cities); transit fare subsidies (for example, Los Angeles and San Francisco); 
and pricing and taxing of parking (for example, Edinburgh, New York City, 
Peterborough, and Sheffi  eld) 
3. Investment in transport infrastructure in order to increase and improve the 
supply of transit modes (for example, Bogota, Jakarta, and Singapore)
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Regulatory Instruments
Regulatory instruments aiming at mode shift  from car to transit are generally 
not eff ective because the choice of a transport mode must be demand driven. 
Regulatory instruments aiming to limit or reduce car ownership and car usage 
could seriously limit mobility in the absence of adequate investments in tran-
sit to replace the decrease in car trips. Th e example of Singapore in fi xing a 
quota for car growth is rather unique. It could have been very disruptive to the 
economy if the government had not simultaneously been able to fi nance and 
develop a very eff ective transit system consistent with its land-use policy. Th is 
important aspect will be developed later.
In countries with high economic inequality (such as Colombia or Mexico), 
policies such as pico y placa4 create an incentive for higher-income households 
to buy a second car. Th is second car is oft en a secondhand car with worse engine 
performance than most recent models. As a result, the pico y placa policy has 
oft en resulted in worse pollution and higher GHG emissions than the status 
quo ante. Th e availability of a new type of low-cost car—the Tata Nano, for 
example—could make this policy even more ineff ective.
Pricing Instruments
Pricing instruments are normally aimed at pricing transport at its real eco-
nomic price (Button 1993; Goodwin, Dargay, and Hanly 2004). When this 
can be achieved, it removes the distortions that hidden subsidies introduce in 
resource allocation. Congestion pricing and parking pricing, for instance, aim 
at adjusting the price of using a highway or of a parking space to refl ect its real 
economic value, including externalities due to congestion (Luk 1999). Th e aim 
of economic pricing is not to be punitive but to seek a more effi  cient allocation 
of resources. Pricing instruments also include subsidies, which have a diff erent 
aim than economic pricing. Subsidies aim at being redistributive. For instance, 
most transit fares are heavily subsidized.5 Transit-fare subsidies are aiming at 
increasing the mobility of low-income households, allowing them to fully par-
ticipate in a unifi ed metropolitan labor market.
It is tempting also to use transit-fare subsidies as a fi nancial incentive to 
convince car commuters to switch to transit. Th is is not a very eff ective way to 
increase transit-mode share in the long run. Th e subvention for transit opera-
tion and maintenance oft en comes from local government budget allocation. 
Th e larger the number of users, the larger the subsidies required. Th is works 
as a reverse incentive for the transit operator to improve services. In the long 
run, the subsidies paid by the government to the transit authority usually fall 
short of the real cost of operation and maintenance, resulting in a deterioration 
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of service. An example of this problem came to light during the latest fi nancial 
crisis in the United States. Local governments, because of increasing defi cits, 
were obliged to scale down transit services, including frequency, right at the 
moment when the high price of fuel and declining households’ income were 
forcing some commuters to switch from car to transit commuting.
Transit-fare subsidies, when they exist, should be targeted to low-income 
households or to the unemployed. Transit-fare subsidies directed to the affl  u-
ent are in fact a transfer payment made by government to commuters for not 
polluting instead of charging car commuters for the externalities they cause.
Pricing instruments refl ecting real economic costs have a value in them-
selves because they contribute to better allocation of resources. However, they 
do not necessarily change consumer behavior. For instance, a toll charge on a 
highway may not reduce congestion if it is set too low. Congestion pricing, as 
practiced in Singapore, involves increasing tolls until the desired decrease in 
congestion is achieved. Congestion pricing consists of increasing or decreasing 
prices until equilibrium between supply and demand is reached. Congestion 
pricing does not aim at recovering the cost of a highway, but at limiting traffi  c 
volume to obtain a desired speed.
Pricing parking at the market price is equivalent to congestion pricing: Th e 
operator will increase the price of parking until all the parking spaces are fi lled. 
In New York City, the municipality taxes a private parking space at 18 percent 
of the daily rate paid (in addition to the property tax and business tax). In this 
way, the municipality recovers a share of the private market rate without having 
to set a municipal parking rate. Th e transaction cost of recovering the rate from 
consumers and adjusting it to the market price is paid by the private operator. 
Taxing privately operated parking garages might be a more eff ective way of 
recovering an area-wide congestion fee than the way it is currently recovered 
in London.
Congestion pricing is not always possible. It requires technology investment 
that may be expensive to install and operate, and the high transaction cost may 
greatly reduce the income of the operator. In some cases, congestion pricing 
is not politically acceptable. For instance, it would be diffi  cult to increase or 
decrease the transit fare every hour depending on the number of commuters 
boarding at any given time.
In the case in which congestion pricing is not feasible, the eff ectiveness of 
increasing or decreasing prices (that is, changing prices to increase or decrease 
demand) depends on the price elasticity of demand. Th e price elasticity of 
demand depends on numerous factors and can be measured from empirical 
experience, but it cannot be calculated in advance without empirical data. Vari-
ous factors aff ect how much a change in prices impacts travel demand for a 
given travel mode: type of price change, type of trip, type of traveler, quantity 
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and price of alternative options, and time period (short term [one year] and 
long term [5–10 years]).
Nearly all studies assume that the eff ects of a reduction are equal and oppo-
site to the eff ects of an increase or, in other words, that elasticity is “symmet-
rical” (Goodwin, Dargay, and Hanly 2004). Empirical evidence suggests that 
this assumption might not be true. However, because of the number of factors 
aff ecting elasticity, it is oft en diffi  cult to extrapolate with certainty results from 
one city to another in the absence of an empirical local database. With this 
caveat, available data from the literature on the price elasticity of demand in 
urban transport are reviewed. Th e current literature on price elasticity in trans-
ports could be summarized as follows:
• Long-run elasticities are greater than short run ones, mostly by factors of 
2 to 3 (Goodwin, Dargay, and Hanly 2004).
• Fuel consumption elasticities to fuel price are greater than traffi  c elasticities, 
mostly by factors of 1.5 to 2.0 (Goodwin, Dargay, and Hanly 2004).
• Motorists appear to be particularly sensitive to parking prices. Compared 
with other out-of-pocket expenses, parking fees are found to have a greater 
eff ect on vehicle trips, typically by a factor of 1.5 to 2.0 (Gordon, Lee, and 
Richardson 2004): A $1 per trip parking charge is likely to cause the same 
reduction in vehicle travel as a fuel price increase that averages $1.50 to 
$2.00 per trip.
• Shopping and leisure trips elasticities are greater than commuting trip elas-
ticities. Although we can reduce or avoid travel or the need to travel for 
shopping, we are more likely to continue traveling to commute.
• Road pricing and tolls eff ects depend on the pricing mechanism design. Luk 
(1999) estimates that toll elasticities in Singapore are −0.19 to −0.58, with an 
average of −0.34. Singapore may be unique; the high cost of car ownership 
constitutes a very high sunk cost, which may tend to make travel less sensi-
tive to price.
• Transit price eff ects are signifi cant: Balcombe and others (2004) calculate that 
bus fare elasticities average around −0.4 in the short run, −0.56 in the medium 
run, and 1.0 over the long run, whereas metro rail fare elasticities are −0.3 in 
the short run and −0.6 in the long run. Bus fare elasticities are lower during 
peak (−0.24) than off -peak (−0.51).
Carbon-Based Investment in Transport Infrastructure
Carbon-based investments in transport infrastructure face three main barriers: 
fi nancial, institutional, and political. Carbon markets have been positioned as an 
economically effi  cient market-based incentive for answering these three barriers. 
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Today, however, their usage for cities, and even more for urban transportation, is 
limited for several reasons:
• Cities’ participation in carbon markets is limited to fl exibility mechanisms 
such as off set, voluntary, or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)/Joint 
Implementation projects.
• Th ese markets have been rarely used for promoting a more energy- and car-
bon-effi  cient urban transportation pattern: To date, 1,224 CDM projects have 
been registered by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Exec-
utive Board, and only two have been transportation projects, representing less 
than 0.13 percent of total CDM projects (the Bogota BRT TransMilenio and 
the Delhi subway regenerative breaking system).
• Carbon markets favor low-hanging fruit projects, which do not have the 
greatest potential to reduce GHG emissions: Th e majority of the CDM 
transportation projects accepted or proposed claim their emission reduc-
tions through switching fuels used. Some entail improvements of vehicle 
effi  ciency through a diff erent kind of motor or better vehicle utilization. Few 
projects deal with modal shift , and none involves a reduction of the total 
transportation activities.
Given these barriers, two questions must be addressed. Th e fi rst is, How and why 
are carbon markets biased against projects targeting urban transportation? Sev-
eral explanations can be explored:
1. CDM and transport projects diff er widely in terms of challenges and oppor-
tunities. Th ere is a scale gap between the two realities in which the main 
leaders of each project evolve:
 a.  (Local) transport projects aim to change the city and make it economically 
attractive. Challenges include involving all stakeholders in the decision-
making process.
 b.  (International) challenges for CDM projects are technical (convincing 
CDM executive boards and international experts) and fi nancial.
2. Diff use emissions, such as in the transportation sector, are costly to aggre-
gate, thus the CDM “act and gain money” incentive has rather limited 
eff ects.
3. Classic CDM challenges are particularly vexing for the transport sector:
 a.  Defi ning project boundaries, because of complex up- and downstream 
leakages.
 b. Establishing a reliable baseline, when behavioral parameters are key.
 c.  Implementing a reliable monitoring methodology, because data genera-
tion is costly.
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Th e consequences of this bias are that transport and CDM projects are con-
ducted in parallel; without interaction, cities outsource CDM projects to inter-
national experts and organizations without much involvement; and CDM 
project-based design is missing the main GHG reduction opportunities. Th us, 
within their existing framework, carbon markets can be used as a source of 
funding signifi cant only at the local level to do the following:
• Subsidize (and reduce) transit fares.
• Finance intermodality infrastructures and thus facilitate modal shift .
• Finance well-bounded technology-oriented CDM projects, such as changes 
in fuels and technology, optimization of the balance between bus supply and 
demand, traffi  c-light systems, and more generally, new information technol-
ogies for vehicle or system operations. Th ese well-bounded, technology-
oriented CDM projects could be levered by bundling them through the 
newly existing programmatic CDM.
Th e second question asks: How could the design of carbon markets evolve to 
be more “urban transportation friendly”? In the perspective of the post-2012 
transportation sector, a unanimous call is heard for changes in the carbon mar-
kets’ design. Many important opportunities for transportation emission reduc-
tions would not easily fi t into an individual CDM project. Various propositions 
are under discussion:
1. A sectoral policy-based approach crediting new green policy or enforce-
ment of standards. A sectoral approach would not reduce methodological 
diffi  culties. Its advantages would rather be to scale activities up to a level 
that is equal to the scale of the challenges faced in redirecting transport into 
a more sustainable direction.
2. Cities’ commitment to reduce GHG emissions and a “No Loose Target” approach.
3. Registries including National Appropriate Mitigation Actions for cities and 
the urban transportation sector.
4. Integrate Global Environment Fund and Offi  cial Development Assistance in 
CDM funding, notably to fi nance transaction costs, to fund capacity-building 
activities, and to generate data.
In brief, a broader and fl exible approach, based on a bottom-up mechanism, 
would do the following:
• Foster cities to take the lead on GHG emissions reduction strategies (fi nan-
cial and electoral motivations)
• Give cities incentives to act for the short term (low-hanging fruits) as well as 
for the long term and, thus, change the urban development trajectory
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• Leave intact their ability to create and implement solutions that are relevant 
and palatable with local specifi cities—for example, to implement land-use 
policies that increase the fl oor area ratio (FAR) in CBDs or transport policies 
that modify the relative prices of diff erent transport modes
Urban Spatial Structures and Transport Mode
Price and speed are not the only determinant of consumers’ choice for trans-
port mode; urban spatial structures play a major role in determining the type of 
transport that is likely to be the most convenient. Urban structures are defi ned 
by the spatial distribution of population densities within a metropolitan area 
and by the pattern of daily trips. Depending on a city’s spatial structure, com-
muters may be able to switch from car to transit, or their choices may be limited 
between individual cars, minibuses, and collective taxis. In high-density cities, 
sidewalks and cycle lanes could be designed in such a way as not to discour-
age walking and cycling. Although urban structures do evolve with time, their 
evolution is slow and can seldom be shaped by design. Th e larger the city, the 
less it is amenable to change its structure. However, it is important for urban 
managers to identify the opportunities present in their city and to take full 
advantage of them to reduce GHG emissions with transport strategies consis-
tent with their spatial structures. Identifi ed next are the most common types of 
spatial structures and the transport strategies that would have the most chances 
of success for each type of spatial structure.
Type of Urban Spatial Structures and Choice of Transport Modes
Urban economists have studied the spatial distribution of population densities 
intensively since the pioneering work of Alonso (1964), Mills (1970), and Muth 
(1969, 1985), which developed the classical monocentric urban density model. 
Empirical evidence shows that in most cities, whether they are polycentric or 
monocentric, the spatial distribution of densities follows the classical model 
predicted by Alonso, Muth, and Mills (Bertaud and Malpezzi 2003).
Th e density profi le of most large cities shows that the traditional monocen-
tric city model is still a good predictor of density patterns. It also demonstrates 
that markets remain the most important force in allocating land, in spite of 
many distortions to prices due to direct and indirect subsidies and ill-conceived 
land-use regulations. Th e profi le of the population densities of 12 cities on four 
continents (fi gure 4.4) shows that in spite of their economic and cultural dif-
ferences, markets play an important role in shaping the distribution of popula-
tion around their centers. All the cities shown in fi gure 4.4 follow closely the 
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negative sloped gradient predicted by the classical monocentric urban model, 
although several cities in the samples are defi nitely polycentric (Atlanta, Mexico 
City, Portland, and Rio de Janeiro). Th e density profi le indicates that some parts 
of metropolitan areas are incompatible with transit. In areas where residential 
densities fall below 50 people per hectare, the operation of transit is ineff ective.
Land use and the transport network determine the pattern of daily trips 
taken by workers to commute to work. As income increases, noncommuting 
trips—trips to shopping centers, to take children to school, to visit relatives, or 
to take leisure trips—become more important. Th e proportion of commuting 
trips in relation to other types of trips is constantly decreasing.
Figure 4.5 illustrates in a schematic manner the most usual trip patterns in 
metropolitan areas. In monocentric cities (fi gure 4.5A) where most jobs and 
amenities are concentrated in the CBD, transit is the most convenient transport 
mode because most commuters travel from the suburbs to the CBD. Th e origin 
of trips might be dispersed, but the CBD is the most common trip destination. 
Small collector buses can bring commuters to the radials, where BRT or an 
underground metro can bring them at high speed to the CBD. Monocentric 
cities are usually dense (density more than 100 people per hectare).
In polycentric cities (fi gure 4.5B), few jobs and amenities are located in 
the center, and most trips are from suburbs to suburbs. Although a very large 
Figure 4.5 Urban Trip Patterns in Monocentric and Polycentric Cities
Source: Bertaud 2006. 
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The Classical Monocentric Model
- strong high-density center with
 high concentration of jobs and amenities
- radial movements of people from
periphery toward center
The “Urban Village” Model
- people live next to their place of employment
- people can walk or bicycle to work
- this model exists only in the mind of planners,
  it is never encountered in real life
The Polycentric Model
- no dominant center, some subcenters
- jobs and amenities distributed in a near
  uniform manner across the built-up area
- random movement of people across the
  urban area
The Composite Model
- a dominant center, some subcenters
- simulateneous radial and random movement
  of people across the urban area
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number of travel routes are possible, most will have few passengers per route. 
Th e trips have dispersed origins and dispersed destinations. In this type of city 
structure, individual means of transportation or collective taxis are more con-
venient for users. Mass transit is diffi  cult and expensive to operate because of 
the multiplicity of destinations and the few passengers per route. Polycentric 
cities usually have low densities because the use of individual cars does not 
allow or require much concentration in any specifi c location.
Figure 4.5C shows the so-called urban village model that is oft en shown in 
urban master plans but does not exist in the real world. In this model, there are 
many centers, but commuters travel only to the center that is the closest to their 
residence. Th is is a very attractive model for urban planners because it does 
not require much transportation or roads and it dramatically reduces VKmT 
and PKmT and, as a consequence, GHG emissions. According to this model, 
everybody could walk or bicycle to work even in a very large metropolis. Th e 
hypothesis behind this model is that urban planners are able to perfectly match 
work places and residences! Th is model does not exist in reality because it con-
tradicts the economic justifi cation of large cities. Employers do not select their 
employees on the basis of their place of residence, and specialized workers in 
large cities do not select jobs on the basis of their proximity from their resi-
dence (with the exception of the very poor who walk to work and are limited to 
work within a radius of about 5 kilometers from their home). Th e “urban vil-
lage model” implies a systematic fragmentation of labor markets, which would 
be economically unsustainable in the real world.
Th e fi ve satellite towns built around Seoul are an example of the urban vil-
lage conceit. When the towns were built, the number of jobs in each town was 
carefully balanced with the number of inhabitants, with the assumptions that 
these satellite towns would be self-contained in terms of housing and employ-
ment. Subsequent surveys are showing that most people living in the new sat-
ellite towns commute to work to the main city, and most jobs in the satellite 
towns are taken by people living in the main city.
Th e “composite model” shown in fi gure 4.5D is the most common type of 
urban spatial structure. It contains a dominant center, but a large number of 
jobs are also located in the suburbs. In this type of city most trips from the 
suburbs to the CBD will be made by mass transit, whereas trips from suburb 
to suburb will use individual cars, motorcycles, collective taxis, or minibuses. 
Th e composite model is, in fact, an intermediary stage in the progressive trans-
formation of a monocentric city into a polycentric one. As the city population 
grows and the built-up area expands, the city center becomes more congested 
and progressively loses its main attraction. Th e original raison d’être of the CBD 
was its easy accessibility by all the workers and easy communication within the 
center itself because of spatial concentration.
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As a city grows, the progressive decay of the center because of congestion 
is not unavoidable. Good traffi  c management, timely transit investment, strict 
parking regulations and market price of off -street parking, investments in 
urban environment (pedestrian streets), and changes in land-use regulations 
allowing vertical expansion would contribute to reinforce the center, to make 
it attractive to new business, and to keep it as a major trip destination. Th ese 
measures have been taken with success in New York City, Shanghai, and Singa-
pore, for instance. However, the policy coordination between investments and 
regulations is oft en diffi  cult to implement. Th is coordination has to be carried 
out consistently for a long period to have an impact on the viability of urban 
centers. Failure to expand the role of traditional city centers through infrastruc-
ture and amenities investments weakens transit systems in the long run because 
the number of jobs in the center becomes stagnant or even decreases while all 
additional jobs are created in suburban areas.
Th e comparison between the distributions of population in Jakarta (Jabo-
tabek) and Gauteng (fi gure 4.6) explains why Jakarta is able to successfully 
Figure 4.6 Spatial Distribution of Population in Jakarta and Gauteng 
Represented at the Same Scale
 Source: 2001 census.
Gauteng: 8.7 Million people
Jakarta (Jabotabek) 16 Million people
Scale 100,000 people
50 km0
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implement a BRT network in addition to the existing suburban rail network, 
whereas in Gauteng suburban rail is carrying barely 8 percent of commuters, and 
the great majority of low-income commuters rely on microbuses. Th e dispersion 
of population in Gauteng is due in part to its history of apartheid. In the past 
10 years, a very successful subsidized housing program has contributed to fur-
ther disperse low-income people in distant suburbs while signifi cantly attenu-
ating the extreme poverty created by apartheid. Th e comparison as seen on the 
three-dimensional representation of population densities between the resulting 
city structure of Gauteng and that of Jakarta is striking. A BRT is being planned 
for the municipality of Johannesburg (one of the municipalities in the Gauteng 
metropolitan region), but the current urban structure will make it diffi  cult to 
operate for a long time. In addition, the violent opposition of microbus opera-
tors is making the project politically diffi  cult. A change in transit mode involves 
a new equilibrium of transit types, which creates losers as well as winners. Th is 
is not an easy process, even when the fi nal long-range outcome seems desirable 
for all.
Th e structure of cities is path dependent. Once a city is dominantly polycen-
tric, it is nearly impossible to return to a monocentric structure. Monocentric 
cities, by contrast, can become polycentric through the decay of their tradi-
tional center. Th e inability to adapt land-use regulations, to manage traffi  c, and 
to operate an effi  cient transit system are the three main factors that explain the 
decay of traditional CBDs.
Transport Strategies Need to Be Consistent with Cities’ Spatial 
Structures
Findings concerning the relationship between urban spatial structures and 
transit can be summarized as follows:
• Transit is effi  cient when trips’ origins are dispersed but destinations are 
concentrated.
• Individual transport and microbuses are more effi  cient when origin and 
destinations of trips are both dispersed and for linked trips if amenities are 
dispersed.
• Mode shift  toward transit will happen only if price and speed are competi-
tive with other modes.
• Trips toward dense downtown areas (more than 150 people/ha) should be 
prevalently made by transit. Failure to provide effi  cient transit service to the 
CBD and to regulate traffi  c and parking would result in a dispersion of jobs 
in suburban areas, making transit ineffi  cient as a primary means of trans-
port in the long term.
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Th e question to be answered is then: Is it possible to have a land-use and traffi  c 
policy to reinforce commuting destination concentration and enabling transit 
to be competitive with car trips?
Two cities are maintaining a high ratio of transit trips: Singapore with 
52.4 percent of total commuting trips (Singapore Department of Statistics 
2000) and New York City with 36 percent. Th eir performance is particularly 
intriguing because these two cities have a high-income population, and higher-
income households are less likely to use transit than lower-income ones. By 
contrast, Mexico City, with a density more than twice that of New York City, has 
only 24 percent of commuters using transit. It implies that both New York City 
and Singapore have long had successful policies to keep such a large number of 
commuters using transit. Are these examples replicable in lower-income cities 
with less performing governance?
New York City, Singapore, and the Counterexample 
of Mumbai
Th is section reviews the policies of New York City and Singapore, comparing 
these with the counterexample of Mumbai, where transit is the dominant com-
muting mode but where city managers try to disperse jobs and housing
New York City
Th e high ratio of transit trips in New York City is the result of a deliberate 
policy of spatial concentration and diversifi cation of land use. Th e extremely 
high concentration of jobs is the most striking feature of the spatial structure 
of the New York City metropolitan area: 35 percent of the total number of jobs 
are concentrated in Manhattan, which represents only 0.9 percent of the total 
metropolitan area (53 square kilometers). Within Manhattan, four districts 
(19 square kilometers) have 27 percent of the jobs in the entire metropolitan 
area (population 15 million). Th is concentration did not happen by chance; 
it was the result of a deliberate regulatory policy, which was responding to 
the high market demand for fl oor space in Manhattan. Th e Midtown district 
reaches the astonishing density of 2,160 jobs per hectare! Th is extreme spatial 
concentration of people and jobs is extremely intellectually fertile, innovative, 
and productive, in spite of the management problems it poses for providing 
services in such a dense area.
Th e zoning regulations controlling FARs6 is one of the main factors contrib-
uting to this concentration. Th e map of Manhattan regulatory FARs shows high 
FARs in the Midtown and Wall Street areas (FAR values ranging from 11 to 
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15). Th e pattern of high FARs shows that the regulations have been adjusted to 
demand as the two main business centers in Manhattan expanded over time. 
Th e zoning of Manhattan also allows a mix of zoning for offi  ce space, commerce, 
theaters, and housing. Th e mixed land use favors transit because it generates 
trips outside the traditional rush hours. Because of the theater districts, the sub-
way and buses run late at night, making transit more convenient for workers 
who work diff erent shift s. In a diff erent setting of homogenous land use, those 
workers with schedules outside normal hours would have to commute with 
individual cars. Th e land use in Manhattan makes it possible for New York City 
transit to have a high passenger load, signifi cantly reducing GHG emissions, as 
discussed earlier. Th e urban management initiatives taken in New York City that 
contribute to a high share of transit use and, as a consequence, to a lower GHG 
emission per capita include the following:
• High FAR responding to market demand
• Mixed land use in the CBD
• Encouraging amenities in or close to the CBD (museums, theaters, and 
universities)
• Providing the majority of parking off  the street in privately operated parking 
areas charging market price, but also specially taxed by the municipality; a 
complementary strategy is progressive removal of most on-street parking 
except for loading and unloading
• Improving the transit system continually with a radial-concentric pattern of 
routes
Singapore
In Singapore, the transport sector was the second-largest contributor to CO2 
emissions in 2005. Eff orts to mitigate GHG emissions have mainly concen-
trated on buildings, and the transport sector has received less attention. Unlike 
the United States and other OECD countries, where transport data are readily 
available, statistics on Singapore’s transport sector and CO2 emissions by mode 
are extremely diffi  cult to locate.
Like New York City, Singapore is a highly dense, compact city. It has a land 
area of 700 square kilometers, accommodating a population of 5 million. Th e 
average density in the built-up area was about 110 people per hectare in 2000. 
Th rough comprehensive planning, Singapore has expanded its downtown and 
redistributed population throughout the city-state. Transport infrastructure is 
closely integrated with land use. Key infrastructure such as the airport, port, 
and network of expressways and mass rapid transit is planned and safeguarded 
in the city’s long-term development plan to support a good living environ-
ment. Th e long-term planning frame gives the assurance that projected needs 
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can be met within the city’s limited land area. To keep Singapore economically 
vibrant, its transport planning is focused on access and mobility with emphasis 
on a transit-oriented and compact urban structure, vigorous restraint of private 
car ownership and usage, and strong commitment to public transport. Urban 
development has been increasingly planned in such a way as to reduce the need 
to travel and dependence on motorized vehicles.
At the neighborhood level, neighborhoods and their new towns are struc-
tured with a host of amenities and services that could be readily reached within 
a fi ve-minute walk. Smart infrastructure design reduces the need for transpor-
tation. Public housing towns where 80 percent of the population lives are con-
nected to one another and to the city by public transport, principally the mass 
rapid transit. At the city level, with the redistribution and growth of population 
in new towns in the suburbs, new growth centers have been planned in these 
regions in immediate proximity of the transit network to provide employment 
to the local population in concentrated areas, which are easily accessible by 
transit.
Decentralizing some economic activities to the dense regional centers helps 
bring numerous jobs closer to homes and facilitates linked trips using public 
transport. It also reduces the usual peak hour traffi  c congestion to and from the 
CBD. At the same time, these centers provide lower costs for businesses that do 
not require a central area address, supporting a competitive economy. Over the 
next 10 to 15 years, more regional centers will be developed.
To manage the usage of private cars, much focus is given to travel demand 
management, including a choice of transport mode and making public motor-
ized transport more effi  cient. Singapore is one city that has actively promoted 
the use of public transport as a more sustainable way to travel. Strong policy 
measures have been implemented to discourage private car usage, including 
high vehicle and fuel taxation measures and parking management, vehicle 
quota systems, and congestion pricing. Th ese deterrents are complemented by 
mode-shift  strategies aimed at improving the public transport system and new 
solutions such as car sharing. Improvements to public transport involve the 
following:
• Expanding the system or service, such as extending the geographical cover-
age of the bus and rail networks, including an extensive rail network that has 
been planned to serve high-population areas
• Improving the operation of the system, such as mode transfer improve-
ments, better coordination of schedules, through ticketing, and increased 
frequency
• Improving the service with increased vehicle comfort and bus shelter/rail 
station enhancements
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Th e government continues to invest in the mass rapid transit network to 
improve its accessibility to the population as the city grows. It has announced 
an additional $14 billion investment to double the rail network from the pres-
ent 138 to 278 kilometers by 2020, thus achieving a transit density of 51 kilo-
meters per million people, comparable to that of New York City. To allow more 
rail usage, land use is intensifi ed around the mass rapid transit stations, and 
mixed-use developments are encouraged.
One of the most crucial land-use decisions has been to develop a new 
downtown area adjacent to the existing CBD. To increase the accessibility of 
the new and current downtown, fl oor area ratios have been kept high (some 
lots have a FAR of 25, but the majority of FAR values are about 12). Once 
completed, this new downtown will reinforce the eff ectiveness of the radial-
concentric metro system.
Mumbai
Mumbai, with a metropolitan population of 18 million people in 2001 and a 
density of about 390 people per hectare in the municipal built-up area, is both 
much denser and larger than Singapore or New York City. Th e transit mode 
share is evaluated at 71 percent of commuters using motorized travel (the num-
ber of people walking to work is estimated to be around 4 million). Th e main 
modes of transit are buses and two main lines of suburban train. Private cars, 
taxis, and rickshaws account for about 12 percent of commuting trips, and 
motorcycles 17 percent (Baker and others 2004).
Since 1964, Mumbai urban managers have tried to reduce congestion by 
reducing the number of people living in the city and by trying to disperse jobs 
and people in far-away suburbs or satellite towns such as Navi Mumbai. Strict 
control of the FAR, which was progressively reduced from an initial 4.5 in the 
CBD (Nariman Point) to the current 1.33, has been the main tool used to reach 
their dispersion objective. Th e objective was to promote a density reduction in 
the central areas of the city and a dispersion of jobs. In a certain way, Mumbai 
urban managers were trying to transform a dense monocentric Asian city into a 
“Los Angeles” model where jobs and population are dispersed randomly within 
the metropolitan area.
However, the suburban railway lines carrying 6.4 million commuters a day 
converge on the traditional CBD. Th e policy of reducing the FAR to promote 
dispersion did not succeed because it contradicted the pattern of accessibility 
established by the transit network. Th e highest demand for offi  ce space is still 
in Nariman Point, the traditional CBD. Th e price of offi  ce space in Nariman 
Point is about the same as the average in Manhattan. Th e number of passen-
gers boarding and exiting at various suburban train stations shows that the two 
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stations closest to Nariman Point handle most commuters. Th e map of maxi-
mum regulatory FARs completely contradicts demand as expressed by fl oor 
space price and the pattern of boarding and exiting railway stations. A FAR 
value of 1.33 imposed on the CBD of a dense city of 18 million people is com-
pletely unrealistic (as compared with 15, the value in New York City, and 25, 
the highest value in Singapore). Th e highest FAR values are 4 in the slum of 
Dharavi and in the new business center of Bandra-Kurla, which is not currently 
connected to the railway network, thus requiring a bus transfer to access it from 
the railway network. Th e railways are operating at full capacity with the existing 
tracks, and although new metro lines are being planned, it is without a clear 
spatial strategy for changing the current land-use regulations to adapt them to 
the new transport system and consumers’ demand.
Th e very low FAR values in Mumbai have succeeded only in making land 
and fl oor space more expensive. Density has increased because location is 
everything in a large metropolis, but fl oor space consumption has decreased to 
one of the lowest in India (and probably in Asia).
Th e absence of a clear spatial strategy linking land use regulations, con-
sumer demand, and the transport network has been the major failure of the 
urban management of Mumbai. Th e major lesson to be drawn from the Mum-
bai example is that designing cities through regulations without taking into 
account consumer demand does not achieve the desired results. If the strict 
low limit put on the FAR regulations had succeeded and jobs and population 
had dispersed, the impact on GHG emissions would have been disastrous. Th e 
current transit system, for all its fl aws, would have been made less effi  cient 
because it would have not have been able to connect commuters to dispersed 
businesses. Motorcycles and minibuses would have become the most practical 
and effi  cient modes of transportation.
Summary of Measures in New York City and Singapore That 
Maintain a High Level of Transit Share
Singapore and New York City are succeeding in maintaining a high rate of tran-
sit use even among high-income populations. Th is strategy will contribute in 
the future in signifi cantly lowering GHG emissions due to transport. It is useful 
to summarize the measures that have been taken by New York City and Singa-
pore to maintain a high density of jobs and activities in their downtown areas:
• High FARs in the CBD (up to 15 in midtown Manhattan, up to 25 in Singapore)
• Physical expansion of the downtown area through land reclamation in both 
Singapore and New York City
• Prioritizing and improving connections to public transport, including a 
high level of transit services by buses and metro (in other cities, BRT might 
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prove more cost eff ective than underground metro for conveying commut-
ers toward areas with high job concentrations)
• Charging relatively high prices for the use of cars in downtown areas, imple-
mented through congestion pricing in Singapore, tolls to enter Manhattan 
from bridges and tunnels, and allowing parking prices to be set by the mar-
ket in New York City and Singapore
• Ensuring a high level of amenities that make the downtown area attractive 
outside offi  ce hours, such as theater districts, museums, and the new Chel-
sea art gallery district in New York City, and cultural centers, auditoriums, 
rehabilitation of ethnic districts and waterfront with restaurants, leisure and 
entertainment, commerce, seaside promenade, pedestrian streets, and so on 
in Singapore 
• As in Singapore, promoting large-scale but compact mixed-use develop-
ment located at integrated bus-transit transport hubs such as Ang Mo Kio 
and Woodlands, new towns where shopping centers, amenities, offi  ces, and 
civic functions in the bus/metro hub allow linked trips while using transit
Conclusions
Diff erential pricing of energy sources based on carbon content is oft en pos-
ited as the only way to promote better urban transport effi  ciency and to reduce 
GHG emissions due to urban transport in the long run for most cities. As dem-
onstrated in this chapter, integrating transport and land-use planning, invest-
ing in public transport, improving pedestrian environment and links, and 
dynamically managing parking provision and traffi  c management are equally 
important for improving the eff ectiveness of the transport network serving the 
city. GHG emissions arising from suburb-to-suburb trips will be reduced not 
only through energy carbon pricing but also from better traffi  c management to 
reduce congestion and improvements in car technology.
GHG emissions in many dense and still monocentric cities could be reduced 
if the demand for suburbs to CBD trips increased. Th is would require coordi-
nating carefully land use and transit networks. Large increases in the FAR in 
CBDs could trigger a transport mode shift  toward transit if coordinated with 
new BRT networks and parking pricing policy.
An increase in the job concentration in CBDs could also increase urban pro-
ductivity by increasing mobility without increasing VKmT or trip time. How-
ever, this does not mean that all economic activities should be concentrated 
in the CBD. To the contrary, fl exibility in zoning should allow commerce and 
small enterprise to grow in the best location to operate their business, as has 
been the case in Singapore. Too oft en, zoning laws overestimate the negative 
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externalities created by mixed use—preventing, for instance, small retail shops 
from locating in residential areas—while underestimating the positive exter-
nality of reducing trip length for shopping or even entertainment. Most current 
zoning laws should be carefully audited to remove the bias against mixed land 
use and against large concentrations of businesses in a few areas.
Th e coordination needed between transport investment and management, 
pricing of roads and parking, and land use to manage existing and future trans-
port infrastructure and capacity is diffi  cult to achieve in the real world. Urban 
problems cannot be solved sector by sector but spatially. Th is is why the auton-
omy of municipal authorities is so important. In some cities, urban transport 
is managed by national line agencies (this is the case in Mumbai). However, in 
very large cities the urban area covers several autonomous local governments, 
making it diffi  cult to coordinate land use, transport networks, and pricing 
across the many boundaries of a typical metropolitan area.
Th e population of New York City includes less than half of the metropolitan 
area population, making coordination and policy consistency diffi  cult. Most 
of Mumbai’s regulatory decisions and infrastructure investment budget are 
decided by the legislature of the state of Maharashtra, not by the municipal 
corporation, which may explain the lack of spatial development concepts being 
applied to zoning regulations. Singapore, being a city-state, has the advantage 
of avoiding the contradictions and cross-purpose policies of a metropolitan 
area divided into many local authorities with diverging interests. Th is may 
explain in part the extraordinary consistency and continuity in urban develop-
ment policies over a long period that has contributed to create such a successful 
city. Th e same could be said of Hong Kong, continuing the tradition of Italian 
renaissance city-states such as Venice and Florence.
Although good governance and policy consistency are important in reduc-
ing GHG emissions, in the long run only the pricing of energy based on carbon 
content will be able to make a diff erence in urban transport GHG emissions. 
Pricing transport as close as possible to the real economic cost of operation and 
maintenance is the only way to obtain a balance between transport modes that 
refl ects consumer convenience and maintains mobility.
Annex
For each motorized transport mode:
Q = VKmT × E,
VKmT = PKmT/L,
PKmT = 2D × P,
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where
Q  is the total carbon equivalent emitted per day by passengers while commuting 
to work (does not include noncommuting trips) in metric tons per day
VKmT is the total VKmT
E is the carbon equivalent emitted per vehicle kilometer traveled
PKmT is the PKmT per day
L is the load factor
D is the average commuting distance per passenger
P is the number of passengers per day using the transport mode.
Q = T × ∑
N
i = 1
2 × Di × Pi × Pi
Li × 106
where
Q  is the total carbon equivalent emitted per day by passengers while commuting 
to work (does not include noncommuting trips) in metric tons per day
T  is the total number of commuters per day
N  is the number of commuting transport modes types numbered from 1 to N
Di  is the average commuting distance one way per passenger in kilometers per 
type i of commuting mode
Pi  is the percentage of commuters using transport mode type i
Ei  is the carbon emissions of vehicle used for mode i in grams of carbon equiva-
lent (full life cycle) per VKmT
Li  is the load factor expressed in average number of passengers per vehicle of 
type i.
Notes
 1. London, New York City, Rome, Stockholm, and Tokyo.
 2. We defi ne urban transport network as including all public or private spaces and sys-
tems devoted to circulation of good and people, from sidewalks, elevators, and cycle 
tracks to bus rapid transit networks and underground rail. 
 3. Th is fi gure from the 2000 census refl ects resident working persons aged 15 years and 
above by mode of transport to work, which includes public bus, mass rapid transit, 
or taxi.
 4. Pico y placa consists of limiting the number of vehicles on the road on a given day by 
allowing on alternative days only vehicles with a license plate ending with an odd or 
even number. 
 5. Th e Hong Kong metro is an exception: Neither capital cost nor operation and main-
tenance are subsidized.
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 6. Th e limits imposed on FAR is a common regulation linked with zoning. A FAR of 
2, for instance, allows building an area of fl oor space equal to twice the area of the 
plot on which it is built. A FAR of 2, therefore, would allow 2,000 square meters of 
fl oor space to be built on a 1,000 square meters plot. If half of the land is built on, 
the building would have four fl oors to fully use the allowed FAR. A regulatory limit 
put on FAR is therefore not the equivalent of a limit on height or number of fl oors 
because most buildings have to leave some of their lot open for light ventilation or 
circulation or oft en to follow regulations on setbacks.
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The Role of Institutions, 
Governance, and Urban Planning 
for Mitigation and Adaptation
Harriet Bulkeley, Heike Schroeder, Katy Janda, Jimin Zhao, 
Andrea Armstrong, Shu Yi Chu, and Shibani Ghosh
Introduction
Two major waves of activities may be discerned in municipal action on climate 
change since the 1990s. Th e fi rst involves individual cities and transnational 
municipal networks, such as ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection (CCP), Cli-
mate Alliance, and Energy Cities, which started to mobilize action for reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). For the most part, 
national governments and the emerging international regime for governing cli-
mate change showed little interest in these activities (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; 
for an exception, see Sugiyama and Takeuchi 2008, 425). It was dominated by a 
few pioneer cities, predominantly in North America and Europe, and it focused 
on mitigation (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Bulkeley and Kern 2006; Alber and 
Kern 2008). Th e second wave is more recent, where transnational municipal 
networks have grown and multiplied and a more geographically diverse range 
has emerged. Th e emergence of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and 
the Rockefeller Foundation Climate Change Initiative, together with the con-
tinued work of ICLEI, is leading to increasing involvement of global and mega-
cities in the urban climate change agenda. At the same time, the predominant 
focus on mitigation is giving way to the emergence of municipal climate policy 
in which both mitigation and adaptation are considered signifi cant.
Th e research and evidence base is lagging behind this new trend. Th e earliest 
work on local climate policy and governance was conducted in the mid-1990s 
5
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(such as Collier 1997; DeAngelo and Harvey 1998; Harvey and Danny 1993; 
Lambright, Chagnon, and Harvey 1996), and a large body of research has now 
been accumulated (for a review see Betsill and Bulkeley 2007). However, this 
research has tended to focus on mitigation and individual case studies, pre-
dominantly in cities in Australia, Canada, Europe, and the United States (see 
Allman, Fleming, and Wallace 2004; Betsill 2001; Bulkeley 2000; Bulkeley and 
Betsill 2003; Bulkeley and Kern 2006; Davies 2005; Kousky and Schneider 2003; 
Lindseth 2004; Yarnal, O’Connor, and Shudak 2003), although important work 
has been conducted in Asia, Mexico, and South Africa (Bai 2007; Dhakal 2004, 
2006; Holgate 2007; Romero-Lankao 2007) and work has begun on urban cli-
mate adaptation in the global South (see Alam and Rabbani 2007; Huq and 
others 2007; Satterthwaite and others 2008).
Th ere has also been a tendency to focus on “leaders,” those cities that have 
been fi rst-movers on the issue of climate change, whatever their signifi cance 
in political and climate terms. As a result, we know little about the particular 
challenges for global and megacities—which may be both the most signifi cant 
in carbon terms and the most important in relation to the impacts of climate 
change—and how climate change is being addressed in “ordinary” cities across 
the world. Th is research agenda may be particularly challenging because, as 
Bai and Imura (2000, cited in Bai 2007, 22) found, environmental issues facing 
“today’s developing cities are complex in nature, as poverty-related issues, 
industrial-pollution-related issues, and consumption- and lifestyle-related 
issues are manifesting themselves in a telescoped, compressed manner.”
The Challenges of Urban Governance and Planning
Climate change presents a number of challenges for urban governance and 
planning, in terms of both mitigation and adaptation.
Mitigating Climate Change
Over the past two decades, the main focus of both urban policy and research 
with respect to climate change has been on the issue of climate change mitiga-
tion—that is, on the reduction of GHG emissions from urban activities. Cit-
ies represent concentrations of economic and social activity. Th e International 
Energy Agency recently estimated that cities may be the location for approxi-
mately 70 percent of energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA 2008), 
and the Stern Review suggests that “by some estimates, cities account for 78% of 
carbon emissions from human activities” (Stern 2006, 457). Other researchers 
have critiqued these fi gures, particularly the implicit arguments that all cities 
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are equally culpable and that it is cities—rather than those that live in them—
that are responsible for GHG emissions (Satterthwaite 2008a). However, in an 
increasingly urbanizing world with emissions-producing activities concen-
trated in cities, the question of how municipal authorities and other actors 
might intervene to reduce their impact remains a signifi cant one.
If urban GHG emissions can be considered part of the climate change prob-
lem, municipal action may also be part of the solution. Municipal governments 
have a (highly variable) level of infl uence over GHG emissions through their 
roles in energy supply and management, transport, land-use planning, and 
waste management. Some local authorities focus on emissions over which they 
have direct control (municipal emissions), whereas others focus on so-called 
community-wide emissions. In general, municipal emissions account for only 
a small percentage of the overall GHG emissions from a city, though where a 
municipality owns the energy or water supply company, such as is the case in 
Los Angeles, this proportion can rise considerably (Schroeder and Bulkeley 
2008). Schreurs (2008, 353) fi nds that “the kind of climate change initiatives 
that local governments can most easily do appear to be such activities as cli-
mate change and renewable energy target setting, energy effi  ciency incentive 
programs, educational eff orts, green local government procurement standards, 
public transportation policies, public-private partnership agreements with 
local businesses, and tree planting.”
Although some municipalities have developed a systematic approach to cli-
mate policy through the stages of undertaking inventories of GHG emissions 
and determining emissions reduction targets, climate change action plans, 
and various implementation plans, “numerous cities, which have adopted 
GHG reduction targets, have failed to pursue such a systematic and structured 
approach and, instead, prefer to implement no-regret measures on a case by 
case basis” (Alber and Kern 2008, 4; see also Jollands 2008). Despite the range 
of GHG emissions reduction activities that municipalities could engage with, 
research has found that “attention remains fi xed on issues of energy demand 
reduction” (Betsill and Bulkeley 2007, 450; see also Bulkeley and Kern 2006), 
and primarily orientated around municipal emissions.
Particularly signifi cant are issues of governance capacity, in terms of the 
ability to regulate GHG emissions, to provide services and infrastructure, and 
to work with others, enabling action to take place. We fi nd that the literature 
suggests that policy entrepreneurs, access to additional sources of fi nance, 
municipal competencies, the framework established by national (and regional) 
levels of government, the support off ered by transnational networks, and the 
ability to reframe the issue of climate change within the local context are most 
critical in building this governance capacity. Th ese factors vary in their signifi -
cance in relation to the diff erent “modes” of governance under consideration. 
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For example, municipal competencies are critical with respect to the regulating 
and provision modes, and sources of additional fi nance and involvement with 
transnational networks are critical in terms of an enabling mode of climate 
governance. In the case studies that follow, we consider how these diff erent 
“modes” of governing climate change have been deployed and with what eff ect. 
Adapting to Climate Change
Adaptation policy is crucial for dealing with the unavoidable impacts of climate 
change, but this has so far been underemphasized at the urban level around the 
world. Th e economic cost of adapting to the eff ects from climate change will be sig-
nifi cant; in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries alone, making new infrastructure and buildings resilient to climate 
change is estimated to cost around $15 to $150 billion a year (0.05 to 0.5 percent 
of gross domestic product; Stern 2006). Adaptation addresses the consequences of 
climate change, such as heavy rainfall, fl ooding, or extreme temperatures. Th ese 
are issues already aff ecting societies, independent of their role in causing climate 
change. As a result, the benefi ts from urban adaptation can be direct for a city, in 
contrast with the rather indirect benefi ts felt in the case of mitigation in the form 
of political or economic gains or improvements in the local environment. Not only 
does adaptation provide many local benefi ts, it can also be realized without long 
lead times (Stern 2006). Even though the impetus for economic development has 
traditionally been viewed as incompatible with considerations for environmental 
protection or climate change policies, mitigation and adaptation are increasingly 
being reframed as economic opportunities (Halsnæs and Verhagen 2007; Hay and 
Mimura 2006; Tanner and others 2008; UK WGCCD 2007).
 Although the notion that adaptation and mitigation can be pursued simulta-
neously is increasingly being advocated, important trade-off s must also be con-
sidered when devising mitigation and adaptation strategies. Some mitigation 
options may exacerbate urban vulnerability to climate change. For example, 
although increasing urban density may contribute toward reducing emissions 
from transport, this will have negative implications for adaptation, such as 
intensifying the urban heat island eff ect and posing problems for urban drain-
age. Improving our understanding of the synergies, confl icts, and trade-off s 
between mitigation and adaptation measures would enable more integrated 
and eff ective urban climate policy (McEvoy, Lindley, and Handley 2006).
In addition, adaptation-specifi c challenges make urban governance and 
planning in this area particularly challenging. Th e lack of data and expertise at 
the local level is perhaps even more critical when it comes to adaptation than 
mitigation. Th ere is a lack of scientifi c assessment as to what impacts might be 
expected and of social, economic, and scientifi c research as to potential impacts 
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and implications of diff erent measures of climate change adaptation in cities 
(Qi and others 2008; Satterthwaite 2008a; Tanner and others 2008). A lack 
of municipal capacity exists with respect to the most vulnerable populations 
in cities because such groups tend to live outside the formal jurisdictions of 
municipal governments, are ill-served by urban infrastructures, and may be 
subject to forms of discrimination and exclusion (Satterthwaite 2008b; Tanner 
and others 2008). At the same time, municipal governments have lacked the 
resources and the wherewithal to fund projects, to engage partners, and to 
involve communities in responses to climate change. We fi nd a lack of coordi-
nation between departments at the municipal level and a strong dependence of 
local government on the policies and actions in this fi eld by national authorities 
(Adger, Arnell, and Tompkins 2005; McEvoy, Lindley, and Handley 2006).
Th ese specifi c challenges mean that, as well as similarities, crucial diff er-
ences are found between the drivers and challenges for adaptation and mitiga-
tion at the urban level. Most important, although leadership has been identifi ed 
in the literature as critical for municipal action on mitigation, this is not the 
same for adaptation. Municipal leaders can create signifi cant political capital 
on the issue of mitigation, but addressing adaptation requires a diff erent kind 
of leadership—based on inclusive or good governance, that is, foresight and the 
willingness to develop a safety net for citizens, especially for the urban poor. 
In adaptation, as with mitigation, we fi nd that access to resources to make the 
necessary structural and capacity investments is crucial. However, as far as 
adaptation is concerned, municipalities are oft en starting from an infrastruc-
ture defi cit—of basic provisioning, especially to the urban poor—that greatly 
exacerbates the challenge of adapting to climate change.
Rather than being framed as an opportunity—for green growth or address-
ing other urban environmental problems—we fi nd that adaptation is oft en a 
marginal concern on the political agenda, given the challenges of meeting basic 
needs and everyday survival. At the same time, with limited implementation 
of adaptation policies and measures documented in the literature, to date little 
evidence is found of political confl icts emerging over climate adaptation in the 
same manner as is the case for mitigation. However, the research community 
acknowledges that the “political economy” of adapting to climate change may 
soon become a critical factor, as contests emerge about how, and for whom, 
climate change adaptation should take place (Huq and others 2007).
Urban Climate Change Policy and Action in Cities 
in the +8 Countries
In this section, we examine the current state of urban climate change policy 
and action by drawing on 10 case studies of cities in the “+8” countries—those 
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considered most likely in academic and policy circles to be faced with some 
form of emissions reduction target in the post-2012 era and where many of 
the world’s largest and potentially most vulnerable cities are located. Th is focus 
directs our attention to what is taking place in cities in the global South and 
newly industrialized and non–Annex I countries under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea), as well as in Aus-
tralia, a country that joined the Kyoto framework in late 2007. Th e case stud-
ies—conducted in Beijing, Cape Town, Hong Kong, Melbourne, Mexico City, 
Mumbai, New Delhi, São Paulo, Seoul, and Yogyakarta—therefore provide 
important evidence about the drivers and challenges facing cities in rapidly 
industrializing countries in addressing climate change. Given the range of cities 
included, and the diff erences in socioeconomic context, insights can be gained 
from these cases that have broader applicability, though it is recognized that 
these insights may have limited validity for cities in low-income countries.
Climate Change and the Built Environment
Th e built environment—comprising domestic, commercial, and public build-
ings—is a signifi cant contributor to global GHG emissions. Th e building sector 
consumes roughly one-third of the fi nal energy used in most countries, and it 
absorbs an even more signifi cant share of electricity. Electricity use in com-
mercial buildings is driving peak demand in Japan, the United States, and some 
of the wealthier countries in the global South. As a result of concerns about 
the implications for climate change, and historical concerns about energy costs 
and security of supply, governments in both industrialized countries and the 
global South have initiated policies to reduce energy consumption in buildings. 
Most of these policies can be grouped into one of the following three categories: 
economic incentives (such as taxes or energy pricing), regulatory requirements 
(such as codes or standards), or informational programs (such as energy aware-
ness campaigns or energy audits). More recently, growth in voluntary public-
private partnerships (such as Energy Star in the United States and the Carbon 
Trust Standard in the United Kingdom) and the role of private actors (such as 
the C40 and the Clinton Climate Initiative) have changed the landscape for 
improvement by setting more ambitious “stretch” goals for the building indus-
try and its clients and by resetting norms for how energy is used in buildings.
Although historically the main focus of action with respect to climate change 
and the built environment has been on issues of mitigation, the challenges 
posed by adaptation are increasingly being recognized. Such challenges are 
usually framed in terms of “resilient” buildings. One such example is buildings 
designed to recover quickly from the impact of fl ooding through ensuring that 
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essential services (power, water, and sanitation) experience minimal disrup-
tion (such as by placing power sockets above likely fl ooding levels). Although 
to date little literature on resilient buildings is available, what such buildings 
might require is subject to signifi cant debate, with some researchers favoring 
passive low-energy buildings and others placing faith in “smart” buildings (for 
example, Adaptive Building Initiative 2009; Roaf, Crichton, and Nicol 2005). 
Equally, minimal policy initiatives have been taken to realize either of these 
approaches; achieving adaptation to climate change in the built environment is 
likely to involve a combination of regulation, fi nancial incentives, information, 
and voluntary approaches.
Self-governance
Th e mode of “self-governance” has been central to municipal eff orts to address 
climate change, particularly in cities in the global North. In the sector of the 
built environment, one popular approach has been to increase the energy 
effi  ciency of municipal operations, either through retrofi tting buildings or 
through improving the energy effi  ciency of appliances (such as offi  ce equip-
ment and lighting) used by the municipality. In Cape Town, a target of increas-
ing energy effi  ciency within the municipality by 12 percent by 2010 was set. In 
Yogyakarta, since 2003 a program to retrofi t lights and reduce air-conditioning 
hours and bulbs in government buildings has been undertaken, and in Beijing, 
a program of energy effi  ciency improvements to government buildings was 
due to be completed by 2010. In Melbourne, energy-saving behavior among 
municipal staff  members has been encouraged by the promise of a 0.5 per-
cent performance-related pay increase if environmental targets are met; this 
demonstrates that climate change issues are being mainstreamed within the 
local authority. In contrast, action in Delhi has been primarily driven by power 
shortages in the city rather than concerns for climate change per se. Nonethe-
less, this has led to a comprehensive eff ort at energy conservation, including 
the banning of incandescent lighting in government buildings and a manda-
tory requirement for new government buildings to adopt green building tech-
nology, including effi  cient lighting, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and 
water usage (DTL 2008). Th ese initiatives demonstrate the potentially power-
ful eff ect that reframing climate change concerns with respect to other issues 
aff ecting energy conservation in the built environment can have in motivating 
action at the local level.
As research elsewhere has found, our case studies demonstrate that munici-
pal initiatives in the self-governing mode have also involved the development of 
“exemplar” or best practice buildings to showcase the possibilities of new tech-
nologies and energy effi  ciency standards. In Seoul, the municipal government 
has consulted the German Fraunhofer Solar Research Institute on  recycled 
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heat in the new 26-story city hall. In Melbourne, the recently completed Coun-
cil House 2 building has been recognized as a leading example of what can 
be achieved within the confi nes of inner-city building sites, reaching the top 
six-star rating on the Green Star rating scale.
Regulation
Across diff erent countries, research suggests that the built environment is one 
sector in which the regulatory mode of governing climate change is prominent 
(Janda and Busch 1993, 1994). Energy standards for buildings range from vol-
untary guidelines to mandatory requirements, which may apply to one or many 
building types.1 Although mandatory standards are embedded in structures 
of formal regulation, voluntary standards provide a form of “soft ” regulation, 
oft en used to direct changes in practice on the implicit or explicit assumption 
that without such improvements mandatory measures will be implemented. 
Such standards are usually set at the regional or national level. To understand 
the potential for action with respect to energy standards in the built environ-
ment in our case-study cities, a literature review and online survey were con-
ducted to gather information on standards in 81 countries.2
In terms of the countries in which these case-study cities are based, Austra-
lia, China, and Korea have mandatory standards for residential and commercial 
buildings; Mexico has mandatory standards for nonresidential buildings; and 
India, Indonesia, and South Africa have voluntary standards for nonresidential 
buildings, but there are currently no standards in place in Brazil. With its historic 
independence, Hong Kong SAR, China, has been in a position to implement its 
own building energy standards. A decade ago, the voluntary Hong Kong Energy 
Effi  ciency Registration Scheme for Buildings was established, which promotes 
the application of a comprehensive set of building energy codes—for building 
energy services and setting effi  ciency standards for lighting, air conditioning, 
electrical, elevator, and escalator installations.3 In 2008, a public consultation on 
the mandatory building energy codes was conducted, and the necessary legisla-
tion was introduced in the Hong Kong Legislative Council during 2010. Despite 
the prevalence of building energy standards, it is important to note that their 
eff ectiveness varies greatly from country to country (Koeppel and Ürge-Vorsatz 
2007). Koeppel and Ürge-Vorsatz suggest that eff ectiveness of energy standards 
may be particularly low in developing countries, given diffi  culties with enforce-
ment and even corruption. Even in developed countries, the estimated savings 
from energy codes range from 15 to 16 percent in the United States to 60 per-
cent in some countries in the European Union.
One problem with national energy standards is that they are usually set at a 
level to avoid worst practice rather than to encourage best practices. Although 
municipal governments usually have little infl uence over the levels of improve-
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ment set by national building energy standards, our case studies show that they 
can mandate additional measures for the built environment within their juris-
diction that can have an impact on GHG emissions. In Melbourne, a man-
datory energy performance requirement of 4.5 stars for offi  ce developments 
greater than 2,500 square meters has been introduced under the municipality’s 
planning powers. In New Delhi, solar water heating systems have been made 
mandatory in certain categories of buildings, including government offi  ces, 
hospitals, educational institutions, and the hospitality sector, and the use of 
incandescent bulbs in all new and existing government establishments has been 
banned (DTL 2008). Similar standards have been established in São  Paulo, 
where, since 2007, buildings with more than three bathrooms, whether they are 
homes, apartments, trade, services, or industrial buildings, must use solar water 
heating systems (TCG 2008). Mexico City has devised a new “Clean Building 
Label” for all new construction required as part of its Plan Verde (Mexico City 
2008). Th ese examples show that, even where direct municipal competencies 
for establishing building standards may be missing, local governments moti-
vated to go beyond standard practice have a range of tools at their disposal to 
augment the energy performance of the built environment. 
Provisioning
In contrast with the use of a regulation mode of governing, we fi nd that gov-
erning through “provisioning”—of infrastructures or services, which shape 
behavioral choices and restructure markets—has been limited with respect to 
the built environment. We fi nd only one example across our case studies where 
a municipal authority is involved in directly providing energy-effi  cient infra-
structures and services, and this is Mexico City. Here the municipality is install-
ing 30,000 square meters of green roofs each year until 2012. It is also launching 
a new social housing model that integrates green areas, public spaces, and 
environmental design (Mexico City 2008). Although formulated as mitigation 
strategies, these moves address adaptation as well through enabling residents to 
better cope with extreme temperatures indoors, especially in housing that lacks 
heating or cooling devices or for residents with limited income. Th e lack of evi-
dence from the other cases of municipalities adopting this role suggests either 
that municipal governments have a limited role in the provisioning of built 
environments (such as social housing) in these cities or that they are engaged in 
other means of providing low-energy services, including enabling and partner-
ship approaches, which we will discuss further.
 Enabling
Our case studies show that providing information, reward, and recognition 
are key means through which municipal governments can enable action by 
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private sector organizations and by individuals. Th e government of Hong Kong 
SAR, China, has been involved with a program to promote energy effi  ciency in 
homes through reducing the demand for cooling by keeping indoor environ-
ments at 25.5 degrees Celsius. In Mumbai, an eco-housing program that has 
been introduced to encourage environmental effi  ciency in residential buildings 
is a voluntary building certifi cation program for new and existing housing. It 
is proposed that developers as well as consumers participating in this program 
will be off ered incentives, and although the incentivization scheme is yet to 
be fi nalized with the state government, rebates in the form of reduced devel-
opment charges and assessment taxes have been approved by the Municipal 
Corporation of Greater Mumbai in principle (MCGM 2008). As this example 
demonstrates, fi nancial incentives are also an important element of enabling 
action to reduce GHG emissions from the built environment. In Delhi, the state 
government established an Energy Effi  ciency and Renewable Energy Manage-
ment Centre, which provides partial monetary aid to domestic users for the 
installation of solar water-heating systems, and in Seoul incentives are off ered 
to buildings with high levels of energy effi  ciency.
Our case studies also show that other forms of reward and recognition can be 
successful in enabling other actors to respond to mitigating climate change in 
the built environment. In Melbourne, the Savings in the City program involved 
30 city hotels in a milestone and reward program to reduce energy and water 
use and to avoid waste. By providing these businesses with independent recog-
nition of their success—and setting up a degree of competition between them 
to achieve results—signifi cant savings of GHG emissions have been achieved. 
Th is example shows that, in addition to providing information and fi nancial 
incentives, establishing the right frameworks through which communities 
and businesses can act on climate change is an important aspect of the role of 
municipal governments.
 Partnership
As well as enabling others to act, our case studies suggest that, increasingly, 
acting on climate change in cities is dependent on a range of partnership and 
private sector initiatives. In Beijing, somewhat surprisingly given the city’s 
otherwise limited role in climate change policy and the nature of the state, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been important actors in rais-
ing awareness about the possibilities of behavioral change for reducing GHG 
emissions from the built environment through a joint campaign to maintain a 
26 degrees Celsius room temperature led by Friends of Nature Beijing. In 2008, 
the Environmental Protection Department and the Electrical and Mechanical 
Services Department in Hong Kong SAR, China, drew up a set of “Guidelines 
to Account for and Report on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals for 
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Buildings (Commercial, Residential or Institutional Purpose) in Hong Kong” 
(EMSD and EPD 2008). Th ese guidelines  will identify areas for energy effi  -
ciency improvement as part of voluntary programs to reduce or off set emis-
sions arising from buildings. Since its introduction, 37 institutions have signed 
up as Carbon Audit Green Partners, including private corporations, public 
hospitals, and universities. One further example of this sort of public-private 
partnership is in Mumbai, where in February 2008 Mumbai-based K Raheja 
Corp, one of the biggest real estate developers in India, signed the fi rst agree-
ment with Johnson Controls to retrofi t the largest mall in Mumbai under the 
aegis of Mumbai’s membership in the C40 network and with funding provided 
through the Clinton Climate Initiative (Sinha 2008).
Two projects from Cape Town also illustrate the growing importance of 
nongovernmental actors in addressing climate change in the built environment 
at the municipal level. Th e Kuyasa Low-Income Housing upgrade is the fi rst 
African project under the Clean Development Mechanism and attained the 
fi rst Gold Standard status in the world (SSN 2008). Th e project started in June 
2008, with the intention of installing solar water heaters, effi  cient lamps, and 
insulated ceilings in 2,300 existing low-income housing in Khayelitsha, Cape 
Town, over the next 21 years. Th ese retrofi ts are expected to reduce about 2.85 
tons of CO2 per household per year, and the revenue gained from the selling of 
emissions credits will be channeled back to setting community-owned energy 
services and microenterprises, which in turn create local employment (SSN 
2008). At a smaller scale, Sustainable Energy Africa’s commercial offi  ce built in 
2004 has demonstrated the potential of “green buildings” in Cape Town. It was 
designed to incorporate passive solar design, low energy- and water-use con-
siderations, and maximized recycled building materials; it has been positively 
evaluated for its low environmental footprint.4
Transportation
Th e transport sector is a signifi cant contributor to GHG emissions, representing 
23 percent (worldwide) and 30 percent (OECD countries) of CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion in 2005 (Kahn Ribeiro and others 2007). Th ese 
shares have risen over the past three decades and are expected to continue to 
increase (Kahn Ribeiro and others 2007). From 1990 to 2004, CO2 emissions 
from the transport sector rose by 36.5 percent (Kahn Ribeiro and others 2007). 
In developing countries, especially China, India, and other Asian countries, 
although transport’s share of GHG emissions is low, the transport sector is 
growing much faster than other sectors (Karekezi, Majoro, and Johnson 2003). 
Increasing demand for fossil fuels and automobile-oriented infrastructure is 
leading to greater GHG emissions and deteriorating air quality. Th us, urban 
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transport has become an important sector for achieving GHG emissions reduc-
tions targets, although issues of adapting transport infrastructures to climate 
change have yet to feature substantially on the urban policy agenda.
Th e mitigation strategies taken by cities that have reduced carbon emis-
sions include promoting the capacity and quality of public transport systems, 
integrating transport and urban planning to facilitate effi  cient and low-carbon 
modes of transport, strengthening transport demand management, increas-
ing investment in cleaner or alternative fuel vehicle technologies, tightening 
vehicle emissions and effi  ciency standards, and encouraging nonmotorized 
transport, such as biking and walking. Th e governance approaches adopted by 
municipalities include forms of self-governance (such as staff  travel planning, 
vehicle fl eet fuel switching), regulation (such as emissions standards, planning 
laws), provisioning (such as of public transport services or of infrastructures 
for alternative modes of travel), enabling (such as information), and partner-
ships (such as public-private fi nancing for new modes of transportation).
Self-governance
One of the most common policies with respect to transportation has been for 
municipalities to replace their vehicle fl eets with alternative fuels. Alternative 
fuel vehicles are vehicles powered by substantially non–petroleum-based fuels, 
including compressed natural gas (CNG), methanol, ethanol, propane, lique-
fi ed petroleum gas (LPG), biodiesel, and electricity. Th is approach has been 
popular among our case studies, although it should be noted that although 
these measures are oft en framed in terms of their potential impact in terms of 
mitigating climate change, there is uncertainty about whether some alternative 
fuels will in fact lead to a meaningful reduction in GHG emissions. Beijing 
has about one-third (4,158) of 20,000 buses powered by CNG. Th ree fuel-cell 
buses began operations in June 2006, and a hydrogen refueling station began 
operating in November 2006 within the Beijing Hydro Demo Park. About 500 
advanced alternative fuel vehicles were used by the Beijing Organizing Com-
mittee for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and Paralympics, including 20 fuel 
cell cars, 50 lithium-ion battery-powered electric buses, 25 hybrid buses, and 
75 hybrid cars (Zhao 2008). Th e hybrid vehicles and natural gas–powered vehi-
cles around the village all meet Euro IV emission standards and helped achieve 
“zero emissions” in the central Olympic area. Th ese vehicles were developed 
and supported by China’s national research and development program, for 
which the Beijing Olympics was used as a testing ground.
In Seoul, the metropolitan government plans to replace government vehi-
cles with hybrids and to increase the number of CNG buses (SMG 2008; SMG 
News 2008), and in Mexico City there is a plan to replace the entire city gov-
ernment car fl eet with low-emission vehicles. In Delhi, the government has 
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also introduced new vehicles in its fl eet, in the form of modern low-fl oor CNG 
buses in the city, with plans in place to phase out the existing bus fl eet in the 
coming years. Th is move follows a 1998 order of the India Supreme Court that 
all the buses in New Delhi be converted from diesel fuel to CNG and its further 
decision, despite opposition by the Delhi government, that Delhi’s entire public 
transport fl eet (buses, taxis, and auto-rickshaws) should be converted to CNG 
by 2003 (Rosencranz and Jackson 2003). Th is was hailed as a major success for 
the environmental lobby. As of 2008, there were more than 130,000 vehicles 
running on CNG in the city (GoD 2008).
Municipal governments can also seek to improve their own impact on 
climate change through the transport sector by seeking to change the travel 
behavior of employees. Usually this is pursued through staff  travel plans or edu-
cation campaigns. One of our case studies provides an example of a more rigor-
ous approach. In early 2008, the mayor of Yogyakarta passed a resolution that 
forbids city workers living within a 5-kilometer vicinity of municipal buildings 
to commute to work in motor vehicles, forcing them to use public transporta-
tion (Bailey 2008). Th is approach is unique among our case studies but points 
to the potential impact that municipalities might be able to have on the culture 
of transportation in their cities.
Regulation
Th e regulation of emissions and energy effi  ciency of vehicles is viewed as the 
most prominent and widely used tool to improve vehicle fuel consumption and 
to reduce carbon emissions (Sperling and Cannon 2007, 259). Th ese standards 
focus on vehicle effi  ciency and emissions for traditional pollutants, such as par-
ticulate matter, Nitrogen oxide, and carbon monoxide, but do not include CO2 
explicitly. Nonetheless, reducing such air pollutants can have a positive eff ect 
on GHG emissions, although this is by no means a certainty. Our case studies 
show that this has been a popular regulatory measure, refl ecting the connec-
tions between transportation, air quality, and health. Since 2005, all new vehi-
cles registered in Mumbai have to comply with Bharat Stage III (equal to Euro 
III) effi  ciency norms, and by 2010, they will have to be Bharat Stage IV com-
pliant (equal to Euro IV). Older vehicles are being taken off  the road or being 
converted to CNG (Takeuchi and others 2007). In Delhi, all new four-wheeled 
vehicles have to meet Bharat Stage III norms for emission control. From 2010, 
this bar will be raised, and vehicles will have to meet Bharat Stage IV norms. 
Th e implementation of these standards originates in the 1995 Clean Air Cam-
paign by the Centre for Science and Environment, one of India’s leading envi-
ronmental NGOs (Véron 2006), with the result that, in compliance with India 
Supreme Court orders, between 1994 and 1996 new fuel-quality standards were 
introduced in India’s four major cities, including Delhi.
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In Hong Kong SAR, China, vehicles meeting the energy effi  ciency and 
exhaust emission criteria can have the First Registration Tax reduced.5 In 
Delhi, a similar mixture of standard setting and incentives is seen. Th e state 
government also has initiated a program to provide a 30 percent subsidy on the 
purchase of battery-operated vehicles in the city. It is funding this subsidy from 
the diesel tax it has levied since early 2008. Th e program, which is also sup-
ported by a subsidy provided by the central Ministry of New and Renewable 
Energy, was introduced at a time when the price of crude oil was skyrocketing. 
Th e government is keen on encouraging the use of alternate fuel and is particu-
larly eager to reduce the number of diesel vehicles, which currently account for 
30 percent of the city’s automobiles population of the city (MNRE 2008). Th ese 
examples suggest that regulation may be most eff ective when it is combined 
with other, more enabling, modes of governing.
Beyond regulating vehicle standards and emissions, there is little evidence 
that our case-study cities deploy the regulatory mode of governing in the trans-
port sector. One exception is Mexico City, where restrictions are placed on a 
car one day per week, based on a car’s license plate number. In 2008, these 
restrictions were extended to include Saturdays. Mexico City also introduced a 
pilot scheme for mandatory school bus transportation in 2008 with 34 schools 
that will enforce the use of school buses for all private school students by 2012. 
Another example is Beijing, which had a two-month-long vehicle control pro-
gram in place based on odd-even license plate numbers for the Olympic Games 
in 2008. Beginning in October 2008, the city started a vehicle-driving control 
based on the last digit number of license plate numbers so that each vehicle can 
drive only four days out of every fi ve working days (Xinhua News 2008).6 
Provisioning
Improving the effi  ciency and coverage of public transportation is critical for 
encouraging the public to change their travel mode to reduce energy use and 
emissions associated with the growth of private motorized transport. In this 
context, many municipalities are playing critical roles in providing infrastruc-
tures that promote less carbon-intensive travel. For example, large-capacity 
buses, light-rail transit, and metro or suburban rail are increasingly being used 
for the expansion of public transport. In some cases, municipalities are the 
direct providers of such services, and elsewhere they are critical actors in build-
ing the necessary infrastructure for their operation.
Providing a higher-quality public transport system is regarded by our case-
study cities as an effi  cient and eff ective approach to reducing traffi  c jams, 
air pollution, and carbon emissions. Most cities have made enormous invest-
ments in public transport infrastructure and plan to continue doing so. Hong 
Kong enjoys a well-developed mass transit system; 90 percent of the 11 million 
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commuter trips each day are made on the public transport system,7 and plans 
are under way for fi ve diff erent extensions in the next fi ve years. Th e state of São 
Paulo invested $7.285 billion during 2007–10 to upgrade the metropolitan sub-
way and other public transport systems, using funds from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (SSP 2008). Th ese investments will help modernize train 
lines and build 100 kilometers of new lines for buses in the city of São Paulo, 
Santos, and Campinãs (TCG 2008). By 2010, these upgrades were expected to 
have reduced 700,000 tons of GHGs, generating credits that can be sold in the 
clean development mechanism (CDM) markets (SSP 2008).
Over the past decade, Beijing has invested heavily in public transport 
infrastructure such as buses, bus rapid transit (BRT) lines, subways, and pub-
lic transport transfer systems to improve air quality to meet the requirements 
of the 2008 Olympic Games. Beijing had only two subway lines, 54 kilometers 
long, in 2001 when the city won its bid for the Olympics. By 2008, six more 
lines had been built, extending the network to 200 kilometers and estab-
lishing new subway networks in north and central Beijing. Th ree BRT lines 
have been built in Beijing to link the center of the city to the east and north 
(Greenpeace 2008).
Similarly, in Delhi, the fi rst phase of the Delhi metropolitan railway sys-
tem (metro) came into operation in December 2002. Th e second phase of 
the system has been under construction with completion in 2010, in time 
for the Commonwealth Games. Th e project is a combination of surface and 
over-ground trains. At the same time, BRT lines also have been opened in 
some parts of Delhi. Th e BRT system has exclusive bus lanes operating in the 
central verge of the road. It also dedicates a lane for cyclists and improves 
pedestrian crossings and paths. Bus travelers, cyclists, and pedestrians are 
reported to be satisfi ed with the new system, but there has been major criti-
cism of severe traffi  c congestion in some areas caused by the reduction in 
the number of lanes for other vehicles (Hidalgo and Pai 2009). BRT systems 
(MyCiTi bus services) were also introduced in Cape Town in time for the 
2010 World Cup to reverse a recent trend toward the use of private motorized 
vehicles and informal minibus taxis. Th ese last three examples demonstrate 
the importance of global events in shaping urban transport infrastructures, a 
point to which we will return.
As well as providing for public transport, municipalities can also develop 
infrastructures for alternative modes of transport, a less common approach 
in our case studies. One example is in Seoul, where a free bike program was 
launched in August 2007 following the example of Paris (SMG 2008). Approx-
imately 200 bike stations will be provided in the Songpa-gu area, where cycle 
routes are well established, and there are about 5,000 bikes. Th e project will be 
expanded to other areas of the city but to a degree remains hampered by the 
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lack of infrastructure such as cycle routes and bike racks. Mexico City has a 
plan to build about 300 kilometers of bicycle highways by 2012 to help reach 
the government target of at least 5 percent of person-trips to be made by bike. 
Primarily, though, it is clear that across our case-study cities, the provision of 
public forms of transportation is favored over nonmotorized alternatives.
Enabling
A key aspect of the enabling mode of governing for transportation has been the 
use of incentives. One approach has been to adopt economic incentive policies 
such as pricing policies to encourage the shift  to public modes of transport. 
To resolve the problem of public transport use being well below capacity, the 
Beijing municipal government started an integrated circuit (IC) card ticket 
system, replacing the paper tickets used for more than 50 years (Li, Yunjing, 
and Yang 2008). Th e IC card can be used for both buses and subways, and 
there is a discount for using IC cards on buses and BRT lines. It currently costs 
1 yuan ($0.13) for a regularly priced bus ticket; therefore, with an IC card, an 
adult need pay only 0.4 yuan ($0.06) and a student 0.2 yuan ($0.03) per trip. 
Th e price subsidies for public buses and subways are fi nanced by the Beijing 
municipal government and have led to increased use of these services, espe-
cially by senior retired persons. Th e Seoul government encourages citizens to 
travel on public transport by charging a price for travel anywhere within Seoul 
of approximately $1 (SMG 2008; SMG News 2008). Incentive programs have 
also been used to encourage the use of alternative fuels. In 2000, Hong Kong 
SAR, China, introduced an incentive program to replace diesel with LPG, and 
by the end of 2003, nearly all taxis had switched to LPG, although this may not 
in fact reduce GHG emissions. A similar scheme was adopted in 2002 for light 
buses to replace diesel with LPG or electricity, and thus far, 2,500 light buses 
have done so (EMSD 2008). In Mexico City, the use of nonmotorized transport 
is also promoted through the use of incentives.
A second set of strategies for enabling the governance of transportation sys-
tems relies on information. Some cities, working with national governments 
or on their own, adopt public campaigns to increase public awareness and 
knowledge of cleaner transportation. China launched its fi rst nationwide urban 
public transport week in September 2007, with 108 cities participating (includ-
ing Beijing) and a theme of “Green Transport and Health” to raise residents’ 
awareness of energy savings and environmental protection. Th e campaign 
encouraged people to walk, ride bicycles, and take public transport. Along with 
other cities, Beijing set September 22 as No Car Day for one area of the city, 
which was opened only to pedestrians, bicycle riders, and taxi and bus passen-
gers between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m.10 Seoul also held a Car Free Day on September 
22, 2008, which was estimated to reduce CO2 emissions by 10 percent. Simi-
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNANCE, AND URBAN PLANNING ■ 141
lar awareness-raising initiatives have also been developed in Melbourne, and 
in the Greater Melbourne area, the city of Darebin promotes “living locally” 
through informing residents of the services available locally to reduce demand 
for travel.
Partnership
In contrast with the built environment sector, in the arena of transportation, 
we  fi nd few examples of partnerships between municipalities and nonstate 
actors seeking to address climate change. One exception is in the state of São 
Paulo, where the fl ex-fuel technology, which enables vehicles to run either 
ethanol, gasoline, or a mix, has been developed in collaboration with inter-
national manufacturers such as Fiat, GM, Peugeot, and Volkswagen. On this 
basis, the state-led Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Program (PROCONVE) 
sets standards for gasohol, ethanol, CNG, and diesel vehicles. Although it does 
not cover CO2, nitrous oxide, or sulpher oxide directly, between 2010 and 2020 
cumulative CO2 emission reductions in the state resulting from this program 
are expected to be between 2.6 to 57.2 million tons of CO2 (Hewlett Founda-
tion 2005). 
Another case is that of the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), which 
has registered a project based on regenerative braking in trains as a CDM proj-
ect with the UNFCCC in 2007. Th is is an example of a “partnership” between a 
municipal government and the international regime, orchestrated by the CDM 
board, which also includes private actors. It is expected to earn 400,000 certifi ed 
emissions reductions (CERs) over a 10-year period beginning December 2007. 
Th e DMRC will earn Rs. 12 million ($240,000) each year from this project, 
which will be used to off set additional investment and operatign costs. Another 
CDM project is being planned wherein the DMRC will claim CERs for the 
reduction of tailpipe emissions as commuters switch to the metro. Th ese sorts 
of projects could potentially pave the way for signifi cant sources of fi nance for 
public transport infrastructures in the global South, though they do, of course, 
come with all the usual caveats about CDM projects and the benefi ts (environ-
mental, social, or economic) that they may be able to realize in practice.
Urban Infrastructures
Urban infrastructures—for example, energy (electricity and gas networks), 
water and sanitation systems, urban fl ood drainage, and coastal defenses—are 
critical in mediating the relation between climate change and cities. On the 
one hand, inadequate provision of infrastructure or its poor maintenance can 
exacerbate the impacts of climate change and the vulnerability of urban popu-
lations. On the other hand, the nature of utility provision—for example, fossil 
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fuel–based or renewable energy—can infl uence the GHG intensity of daily 
decisions and the cumulative impact of the city on the global environment. 
Governing urban infrastructures is, however, a complex matter. Frequently, 
such systems lie outside the direct control of municipal governments, or, even 
where they are supposedly the responsibility of local authorities, inadequate 
funding combined with a lack of recognition of the rights of those living in 
informal settlements (Satterthwaite 2008b, 11) can lead to their neglect. Th e 
signifi cant sums of money involved in developing urban infrastructure systems 
oft en require municipal governments to work in partnership with national gov-
ernments, private sector actors, and donor organizations, leading to potential 
confl icts among priorities and problems of interagency coordination. In addi-
tion, the planning and development of urban-scale infrastructure systems can 
take several decades to come to fruition and is frequently unable to predict or 
track the sorts of social, economic, and environmental changes that might be 
witnessed over such timescales.
Because of the long time horizons and large fi nancial investments involved, 
issues of social and environmental justice are particularly pertinent in respond-
ing to climate change in the infrastructure sector. As Huq and others (2007, 14) 
have argued, the “kinds of changes needed in urban planning and governance 
to ‘climate proof ’ cities are oft en supportive of development goals. But … they 
could also do the opposite—as plans and investments to cope with storms and 
sea-level rise forcibly clear the settlements that are currently on fl oodplains, or 
the informal settlements that are close to the coast.” In equal measure, mitiga-
tion strategies, such as smart meters for demand reduction or the embedding 
of energy-generation technologies in household infrastructure, could open up 
new divides between those who are able to pay and participate in mitigation 
measures and those for whom they will lead to new forms of social and eco-
nomic exclusion.
 Self-governance
In general, the urban infrastructures that municipalities have direct control 
over tend to be those through which the mitigation of climate change can be 
addressed, and even here they remain rather small in scale. Some municipali-
ties have sought to shift  their reliance on fossil fuel–based electricity provision 
through national grids through the development of small-scale, decentral-
ized (off -grid) low-carbon or renewable energy systems. One example we fi nd 
in our case studies is Melbourne, where, in addition to the Council House 2 
project already discussed, which involves the production of renewable energy, 
demonstration photovoltaic cells have been built on the roof of the city center’s 
Queen Victoria Market—providing some electricity for the municipality but 
also acting as a demonstration project as to what it might be possible to achieve. 
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Similarly in New Delhi, solar hot water systems have been made mandatory 
for government buildings, displacing conventional fuels used for this purpose.
Street lighting represents a kind of infrastructure that is the direct respon-
sibility of municipal authorities. One of the most ambitious projects to address 
mitigation found in our case studies lies in this domain. Over the period 
2001–06, under the auspices of the CCP program, Yogyakarta developed a 
streetlight management program, which involved the retrofi t of 775 light bulbs 
and the installation of 400 energy meters at a cost of $1.7 million, resulting in 
an annual saving of 2,051–3,170 tons of carbon dioxide (annual energy savings 
4,278,408 kilowatt-hours) and an estimated $211,765 (ICLEI 2004). In Beijing, 
a “green lighting” project has been implemented to promote a more effi  cient, 
energy-saving lighting system for the entire city. Similar projects have also been 
advanced by local authorities across Greater Melbourne, who have in the main 
found their eff orts frustrated by the private companies involved in providing 
energy and maintaining the street lighting system, together with the long time 
horizons (20 years) over which bulbs are replaced. Missing the “window of 
opportunity” to eff ect change now can therefore result in signifi cant avoidable 
emissions of GHGs over the next two decades, suggesting that advanced plan-
ning and gathering suffi  cient political momentum is particularly important in 
this area of urban governance.
Regulation
Our case studies demonstrate that where regulation is being used to shape the 
development of urban infrastructures, this is mainly through the use of planning 
requirements rather than the direct regulation of, for example, water provision 
or energy services. Several of our case studies have integrated environmental 
and urban planning in place, particularly with regard to water, urban green 
spaces, and environmental health (Melbourne, Mexico City, and São Paulo). 
One example of where the planning system has been used to improve the resil-
ience of a city to climate change is in Seoul and the restoration of the Cheong 
Gye Cheon River for fl ood-risk management (Kim 1999). Th e project, which 
dismantled a highway and allowed the channel to revert back to its original 
natural course, ran from July 2003 to September 2005, covering 5.84 kilometers 
and with an estimated cost of 390 billion won (approximately $300 million).
Although the aim of the project was fl ood aversion, benefi ts included biodi-
versity restoration, decrease in ambient temperature, reduction of health risks 
on fl oodplains, and increased number of visitors (Pitts and Kim 2005). More 
explicitly directed at concerns for climate change have been eff orts to shape 
the development of coastal areas. Cape Town commissioned a Framework for 
Adaptation to Climate Change study in 2006 and conducted a comprehen-
sive risk assessment of sea-level rise as a port city in 2008 (CCT 2006, 2008a). 
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Th e 2005 Vulnerability Assessment of Western Cape proposed creation of a 
5-meter buff er zone along the coast (Midgley and others 2005). In Mumbai, 
climate change is also beginning to have an eff ect on coastal zone planning. 
In 1991, the union government issued regulations to demarcate coastal areas 
as coastal regulation zones (CRZs), and restrictions were placed on the nature 
and extent of development that could take places in such zones. In May 2008, 
the government issued a notifi cation proposing amendments to the 1991 regu-
lations, which would in eff ect make the restrictions stricter. Because Mumbai 
lies in one of the CRZs, the 2008 notifi cation, if approved, is likely to improve 
the management of the coastal resources and to protect the city from extreme 
weather events.
Provisioning
Until the mid-1990s, many municipal authorities around the world owned their 
energy generation, water provision, and waste services. In eff ect, they provided 
utilities for their communities. In this manner, “local governments were able 
to control the nature of infrastructure development and to infl uence practices 
of public consumption and waste in such a way as to limit emissions of green-
house gases” (Bulkeley and Kern 2006, 2245) and potentially to enhance their 
resilience to the impacts of climate change. With the rising tide of neoliberal-
ism in the utilities sector, many such municipally owned companies in Europe 
and Australia were sold during the 1980s and 1990s, though in parts of the 
United Kingdom and United States this took place much earlier, so that the 
direct provisioning of services has declined (Bulkeley and Kern 2006; Schro-
eder and Bulkeley 2009). Nonetheless, our case studies indicate that munici-
palities still play a critical role in the provisioning of urban infrastructures and 
services. Th ese roles include the maintenance of existing systems and the devel-
opment of new forms of infrastructure.
Water supply is one area of infrastructure maintenance that is critical for 
both climate change adaptation (in terms of reducing vulnerability to water 
shortages) and mitigation (given the energy-intensive nature of cleaning and 
distributing water for drinking and sanitation systems). For example, the Delhi 
Jal Board, the government agency responsible for water supply in Delhi, has esti-
mated that distribution losses approach 40 percent of the total water supplied, 
due to leakages and unauthorized use. Th e board is in the process of replacing 
parts of the water mains because signifi cant portions of the pipelines are 40 to 
50  years old. In Cape Town a similar program of water system repair is also 
under way.
In terms of the development of new infrastructures, policies and projects are 
few and far between, and attention in our case studies has focused primarily 
on low-carbon and renewable energy. In Beijing, renewable energy currently 
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provides only 1 percent of the electricity supply. A pilot Guanting Windfarm 
(fi rst phase) was established to generate electricity and supply electricity to 
all of the 2008 Olympic Games venues, and 15 more renewable energy pilot 
villages and 10 to 15 biomass pilot projects are planned. In 2008, the Seoul 
metropolitan government devised a New Town Development Plan, which 
aims to build 277,000 new apartments with district heating, estimated to cost 
$2.6 billion. Although the energy and carbon dioxide savings, and propriety of 
the process, have been called into question, it demonstrates that making large-
scale infrastructure changes to the provision of energy are on the agenda in 
Seoul in a way that is not yet apparent in most of the other case studies included 
in this report.
 Enabling
In the main, strategies for enabling action by communities and stakehold-
ers with respect to urban infrastructures are focused at the level of individual 
buildings and have already been discussed here. However, our case studies do 
reveal examples of more comprehensive approaches aimed at reducing the use 
of resources to tackle issues of poverty as well as energy and water shortages 
(with consequent implications for climate change mitigation and adaptation). 
In Delhi, rainwater harvesting is being promoted in the city, and monetary 
assistance is being given to individuals, resident organizations, and institutions 
to put in place the required system (GoD 2008). In Cape Town, two innovative 
schemes have been developed to address the combined eff ects of poverty and 
resources shortages. Th e city was the fi rst to launch a “poverty tariff ,” where 
50 kilowatt-hours of free electricity per month was being provided to house-
holds using below 400 kilowatt-hours per month on average over the 12 months 
up to May/June 2008 (CCT 2005; 2008b). To address future water shortages 
and stressed wastewater treatment rather than climate change, the city of Cape 
Town devised a Water Conservation and Water Demand initiative, which won 
an award from the national Department of Water Aff airs and Forestry in May 
2008 (CCT 2007; 2008c). Th e initiative involved installing advanced meters 
programmed to dispense a pre-agreed-upon amount of water each day, as little 
or as much as the householder can aff ord. Any unused amount will be car-
ried over to the next day, but once the agreed-upon daily allocation has been 
reached, the fl ow stops until the next morning (CCT 2007). By 2009, more 
than 30,000 water management devices had been installed. Th e city will repair 
all internal leaks before the meter is set, with the intention of protecting both 
the consumer and water resources. Th is example does, however, raise concerns 
about issues of justice and access to resources and whether these should be 
determined by price alone. Furthermore, with respect to energy, in May 2008, 
South Africa’s ruling part, the African National Congress, agreed that power 
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prices will double to about R 46 cents per kilowatt-hour by 2012. Hence, Cape 
Town faces considerable challenges as it attempts to juggle energy and water 
poverty, the rising energy prices demanded by industry, power shortages, and 
environmental objectives in the future.
 Partnership
Across our case studies, two forms of partnership are involved in the urban 
governance of infrastructures in response to climate change. Th e fi rst involve 
CDM projects, facilitated through the international climate change agree-
ments and overseen by the CDM board composed of state and nonstate 
actors. In Delhi, a CDM project was registered in 2007, which processes 
municipal solid waste to produce fuel that would then be used to generate 
electricity. Th e project is expected to earn 2.6 million tons of CERs over the 
next 10 years. In Delhi, at least four other similar projects have applied for 
registration under the CDM, and in Mumbai, a further project has been regis-
tered. Th is type of CDM project is also taking place in São Paulo, with energy 
being sourced from two of the largest landfi lls in the world, Bandeirantes and 
São Joao, which receive CDM credits (TCG 2008). Although Attero São Joao 
reached its full capacity in 2007, Aterro Bandeirantes continues to receive 
half of the waste (7,000 tons) from São Paulo every day. At the end of 2008, 
7 percent of the city of São Paulo households were supplied by energy gen-
erated at both landfi lls. However, Bandeirantes is scheduled to close, and 
hence the city is planning to transport waste to neighboring municipalities 
by December 2010, meaning that the energy supplied will also no longer be 
available (Keith 2007).
Th e second set of partnership projects take place on a smaller scale and usu-
ally involve the private sector working with the municipality to develop new 
forms of infrastructure rather than in maintaining existing systems or working 
to improve their resilience for climate change adaptation. Several of these types 
of projects are taking place in Hong Kong SAR, China, including the HSBC 
project to install renewable energy in schools and the development of off shore 
wind farms by two power utilities that are currently under review. Similar 
strategies to develop the energy base of the city are being developed elsewhere 
but have reached a more advanced stage. In April 2007, Oh Se-hoon, Seoul’s 
mayor, signed a memorandum of understanding with Korean Midland Power 
to expand the city’s green energy. In Cape Town, to meet its target of producing 
10 percent of electricity from renewable energy by 2020, the municipality has 
entered into a power purchase agreement with the Darling Wind Farm. Th e 
agreement provided fi nancial and risk assurance for the generator whereby the 
city guarantees purchase for the next 20 years and plans to sell the green elec-
tricity at a premium price (R 22 cents per kilowatt-hour above current electric-
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ity rates) (CCT 2008b). However, Cape Town has yet to secure willing buyers. 
Meanwhile, Darling Wind Farm had not been able to attract investors in view 
of potential technical and legal complexities in contractual arrangements with 
the National Energy Regulator of South Africa and the electricity utility Eskom. 
Th is example shows that as such partnerships scale up from individual build-
ings to broader scale, the technical, legal, and fi nancial challenges involved can 
be substantial.
Case-Study Findings and Implications
On the basis of the evidence from the case studies, we now consider the broader 
implications of our fi ndings for the governing of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation at the municipal level.
Modes of Governing Climate Change in the Case Studies
Overall, we fi nd across our case studies an increasing engagement with the 
issue of climate change, though primarily action remains focused on issues of 
mitigation rather than of adaptation. Given the dominance of cities from the 
global South in this selection, and the long-running argument that mitigation 
should be an issue addressed in the North before countries in the global South 
should take on such responsibilities, this may be a somewhat surprising fi nd-
ing. It suggests that climate change mitigation is becoming part of a discourse 
about the responsibilities of global and megacities, for reasons that we will dis-
cuss, despite the continuing international confl icts over what “common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities” might entail.
In terms of the sectors covered, we can see that action for climate change 
mitigation is taking place across the built environment, transport, and urban 
infrastructure domains, but that action for climate adaptation is primarily 
related to infrastructures and that both are usually as a side benefi t of policies 
to address issues of air and water pollution, green space, and urban develop-
ment more broadly. In contrast with previous studies based on cities in the 
North that have suggested that self-governance and enabling modes dominate 
urban responses to climate change, our case studies suggest that regulation and 
provision, together with partnership initiatives led by other actors, are also 
important. Th e use of the regulation and provision modes in the transport sector 
is particularly prominent; although even in regard to the built environment—
where self-governance and enabling modes might be easier to implement—
regulation still has an important role.
In terms of the specifi c focus of policies and measures, as has been found in 
other research, eff orts with respect to energy effi  ciency dominate (Bulkeley and 
Kern 2006). As Rutland and Aylett (2008, 636) have argued in the analysis of the 
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development of climate change policy in Portland, Oregon, energy effi  ciency 
is a particularly powerful mobilizing device because it can “advance diverse 
(and oft en divergent) goals in tandem,” serving to translate various interests 
into those concerning climate change and eff ectively forging new alliances. 
In our case studies, concerns over energy security and the economic benefi ts 
of energy savings are serving to push energy effi  ciency actions up the climate 
change agenda. At present, this eff ort appears primarily directed toward corpo-
rate and government buildings rather than the domestic housing stock, which 
suggests that our case studies refl ect a diff erence in approach from that which 
dominates municipalities in Australia, Europe, and North America where 
interventions in the domestic sphere have been much more common. Th is 
focus could bring a distinct politics to energy effi  ciency in the built environ-
ment in cities in the global South, resting more on the involvement of corporate 
partners and their corporate social responsibility agendas than the involvement 
of individual householders, refl ecting a diff erent “geography” of responsibility 
for emissions reductions in these places. With respect to urban infrastructures, 
notable mainly for their absence in the eff orts to date to mitigate climate change 
across these case studies are initiatives to promote or develop sizable renewable 
energy installations. Th is may refl ect the fi nding by Lasco and others (2007, 17) 
that a “discourse of unrealism” with respect to renewables that is more extreme 
than is warranted appears to have taken hold and be widely accepted. Also in 
contrast with research on cities in other parts of the world, attempts to address 
GHG emissions from the transport sector are more common than might be 
expected, though here the predominant motivations are addressing air quality 
and health concerns and reducing congestion. Nonetheless, potential is seen 
for considerable side benefi ts in terms of reductions of GHG emissions to be 
realized as municipalities in the global South seek to tackle this most promi-
nent of local environmental concerns.
Drivers for Action
In common with previous research, our case studies suggest that the four fac-
tors of leadership, the authority of local governments, resources, and issue 
framing have been critical drivers for climate policy and action.
In terms of leadership, we fi nd that individual political champions, such as 
the mayor of Yogyakarta, have been important in terms of driving initiatives 
forward. More important, though, have been opportunities for the municipal-
ity to display “global” leadership on issues of climate change and environment. 
In three of our case studies (Beijing, Cape Town, and Delhi), the window of 
opportunity created by global sporting events has been used as a vehicle for 
promoting action on climate change within the city. In Seoul, membership in 
the C40 network and the forthcoming meeting in May 2009 were also seen 
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to be important in galvanizing action. Such “trigger events” provide the moti-
vation, and physical opportunity, for intervening in the urban landscape (for 
example, transportation systems, housing) to address climate change.
We found that adaptation measures oft en get adopted only in response to 
specifi c local or regional natural disasters, which may or may not be climate 
related. For example, in Mumbai, aft er the 2005 deluge fl ooding, the Greater 
Mumbai Disaster Management Plan was revised in 2007, strengthening the 
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai’s Disaster Management Commit-
tee and raising disaster preparedness of the city (Gupta 2007). In Yogyakarta, 
the 2006 earthquake highlighted the lack of government management capacity 
and understanding of disaster response. Consequently, a Disaster Management 
Bill and a National Action Plan for 2007–09 were enacted (Hadi 2007b). At 
the local level, Yogyakarta’s provincial and local agencies conducted a dam-
age loss assessment and formulated a local action plan, including regulatory, 
institutional, and funding frameworks and recognizing the need to enhance 
institutional capacity and networks among government, the private sector, and 
civil society (Hadi 2007a).
With regard to the authority of municipal governments, the impetus of 
national government action (in China and Korea, in particular) has been an 
important factor in creating the political space for local government action on 
climate change. Municipalities that have a broader range of competencies (such 
as for street lighting or the provision of public transport) have been able to 
intervene across the diff erent modes of governing for climate change, whereas 
those with more restricted authority have had less scope to become directly 
involved.
Seoul is one case study in which numerous signifi cant initiatives have taken 
place, made feasible partly by the availability of funding. In August 2007, 
Seoul expanded the scope of the City Gas Business Fund to a broader climate 
change fund with a goal to raise more than $100 million by 2010 to fi nance 
research, technological development, and mitigation projects; to support 
renewable energy; to improve energy accessibility to the poor; and to promote 
energy-effi  cient appliances (SMG News 2008). Th e country’s private sector also 
raised six funds totaling about $100 million in 2007 for climate change pur-
poses (Oh 2008). Such resources are scarce among our case-study cities. One 
means through which additional resources have been garnered is the CDM, 
with projects in the transport and infrastructure sectors in Delhi, Mumbai, and 
São Paulo. Th is suggests that the CDM could be an important mechanism for 
addressing climate change in cities in the future.
Issue framing has also been important. We earlier outlined the importance 
of both “localizing” climate change and “issue bundling,” both strategies 
that serve to make climate change an important issue on local agendas and 
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that cuts across other (priority) sectors. Our case studies suggest that issue 
framing has been very important in moving climate action forward: fi rst, 
with respect to energy security, energy effi  ciency, and fuel poverty, which 
have proved to be driving factors in almost all the case studies, and second, 
with respect to air quality and health, which have provided the impetus for 
action in the transport sector in all of the case studies. Th e exception in both 
cases is Melbourne, which is located in a region with abundant coal resources 
and where issues of local air pollution, although important, have not served 
to drive climate change action.
 Barriers
Th e factors that have driven climate change action in some of our case stud-
ies—opportunities for leadership, the authority to tackle the issue, access to 
resources, and issue framing that has attracted political support—can also serve 
to hamper eff orts for governing climate change in cities. Th is may account for 
why climate change adaptation is relatively low on the agenda, with few oppor-
tunities to demonstrate leadership (repairing water systems is hardly headline 
grabbing), a lack of an explicit remit to address climate adaptation, limited 
access to resources to repair infrastructure systems or enhance the resilience of 
the urban environment, and an absence of issue framing that has linked adap-
tation to pressing urban social, economic, and environmental issues. It also 
explains why some cities—such as Mumbai in our case—have to date taken 
little action to mitigate climate change. In the midst of other pressing environ-
mental, health, and economic concerns, the issue does not have the traction or 
the support required to ensure that it is on the urban agenda.
In addition, however, we fi nd one other obvious set of issues that have acted 
as a barrier to further action at the municipal level: the relation between con-
tinued fossil fuel use and economic growth. In most of our case-study cities, 
demands for travel and energy consumption are increasing exponentially, and 
the majority of these needs will be met through the continued provision of fos-
sil fuel–based energy.
Lessons
By disaggregating urban climate change governance across diff erent sectors 
and in relation to the diff erent “modes” of governing employed, we can identify 
specifi c lessons from the built environment, transportation, and urban infra-
structures that may be applicable beyond the case studies considered here. As 
has been noted earlier in this chapter, the cases from which these lessons are 
derived represent a particular subset of cities in rapidly industrializing coun-
tries and in which there is both a capacity to govern at the urban level and a 
growing impetus to address climate change. Th e relevance for cities in low-
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income countries or where urban governance capacity is virtually nonexistent 
will therefore be limited.
Built environment
1. Energy conservation is a critical local “hook” for municipal action on cli-
mate change, and the built environment is a key sector in which such ap-
proaches can be put into action. Signifi cant opportunities exist to pursue 
this agenda, especially in the commercial sector.
2. Municipal governments have the capacity to go beyond national building 
standards and to adopt additional means of regulating energy use in the 
built environment. Forms of “soft ” regulation can be eff ective in this regard.
3. Municipal governments have various means of enabling action by stake-
holders and communities in reducing energy use in the built environ-
ment through the provision of information, recognition, and reward for 
achievement.
4. Stakeholders outside local government are important drivers of action in 
this sector. Th is is particularly the case in the commercial built environment. 
Potential is seen for further partnership work and for action on climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in the absence of signifi cant municipal 
capacity for climate governance.
Transportation
1. In the transportation sector, action on climate change benefi ts from a strong 
link to issues high on the agenda of rapidly expanding cities—air pollution, 
congestion, sprawl—but is reliant on the planning and governance capacity 
of municipalities as well as the availability of funding from national govern-
ments or external agencies.
2. Municipalities have been able to use various forms of regulation, predomi-
nantly concerning effi  ciency and emissions standards but also relating to be-
havioral change, to address transport issues in ways that could have benefi ts 
for GHG emissions.
3. Municipal provision of low-carbon transport infrastructures is another key 
means through which local governments can combine local priorities and 
climate change agendas.
4. Our cases also suggest that a number of incentives are available that munici-
palities can deploy to achieve behavioral change, though these are underdevel-
oped compared with regulatory and service provision modes of governing.
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Urban infrastructure
1. Primarily, addressing climate change is a marginal issue in the development 
and maintenance of urban infrastructures, and any benefi ts that arise in 
terms of mitigation and adaptation are incidental.
2. Street lighting is one important arena in which municipal governments have 
been taking action to reduce energy use and save money, but this requires 
signifi cant investment, and the timing of intervention is crucial.
3. One case, that of Cape Town, shows that addressing climate change in terms 
of reducing energy use and securing water supplies can go hand in hand 
with development goals of meeting basic needs, but this faces considerable 
challenges in a context of rising energy costs and inadequate infrastructure 
provision.
4. Th e availability of carbon fi nance—in the form of CDM projects and volun-
tary off setting schemes—may provide a resource that municipalities can use 
to deliver low-carbon infrastructures and meet sustainability goals, but the 
potential impacts of such programs on diff erent sectors of society will need 
to be carefully considered.
 Conclusions
Our review of the evidence on urban climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion strategies found a strong bias toward the former, a history of engagement 
primarily by cities in the North, and a focus on issues of energy conservation. 
Although there is evidence of a new “wave” of urban climate change response, 
encompassing a broader geographical range of cities and placing adaptation on 
the agenda, the emphasis remains on mitigation in both research and policy. 
Our case studies confi rmed this fi nding, with evidence of action to mitigate 
climate change across the built environment, transportation, and urban infra-
structure sectors, whereas action on climate adaptation has remained marginal 
and is usually a secondary impact of policies designed to tackle other urban 
problems. We found evidence that municipalities are deploying multiple modes 
of governing climate change, with more emphasis on regulation and provision 
than is the case in many cities in the North, and that there is evidence, espe-
cially with respect to the built environment, that urban responses to climate 
change are being undertaken by other stakeholders. Across all three sectors, 
concerns for energy effi  ciency—rather than the provision of alternative sources 
of energy or demand management—dominate.
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In terms of the key drivers and challenges for climate change at the urban 
level, our literature review and case-study research concur that the key factors 
shaping responses to mitigation are the following:
• Eff ective policy entrepreneurs
• Municipal competencies in critical areas such as transportation, infrastruc-
ture, energy. and planning policy
• Access to additional fi nancial resources, and fl exibility in their deployment
• An enabling policy framework at national and regional levels
• Th e fi t between jurisdictional areas and problem boundaries
• Th e ability to engage partners to achieve action beyond the municipality
• Th e knowledge and resource capacity, as well as political support, generated 
by networks and partnerships
• The reframing of climate change as an issue of local importance and the 
absence of conflict between addressing climate change and other local 
priorities.
In terms of adaptation, we fi nd the following key factors:
• Availability of data and information about local impacts from climate change
• Good governance
• Access to fi nancial and human resources provided by the national govern-
ment or international donors
• Coordination of policies and measure across both local agencies and levels 
of government
• Empowerment and training of civil society to help strengthen service provi-
sion, environmental management, and the livelihoods of the most vulnerable 
people
• Nurturing a sense of readiness for disaster emergency.
In part, the diff erences in the drivers and the challenges faced refl ect the dif-
ferent type of city upon which the research base has been built. In relation 
to climate change mitigation, our case studies and most of the available evi-
dence, relate to cities that have at least a minimal level of governance capacity 
and oft en quite signifi cant resources for regulating, providing services, and 
enabling stakeholder engagement. In low-income countries and cities with 
minimal if any urban governance capacity, the challenges of addressing cli-
mate change are of a diff erent order. Th is is refl ected in our review of urban 
responses to adaptation in which the literature stresses the importance of basic 
governance functions and the provision of infrastructure to meet basic needs. 
Nonetheless, our case-study fi ndings suggest that even where governance 
capacity exists, climate change adaptation remains marginal. We suggest that 
this could derive from the relative lack of action by transnational networks 
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on climate adaptation to date, a lack of opportunities for leadership, limited 
knowledge on which to base decisions, a lack of resources for the provision 
and maintenance of infrastructure systems, and an absence of issue framing 
that has linked adaptation to pressing urban social, economic, and environ-
mental issues, with the result that adaptation has limited traction or support 
on a local scale.
Notes
 1. We use the word “standard” to refer interchangeably to what also might be called 
codes, criteria, guidelines, norms, laws, protocols, provisions, recommendations, 
requirements, regulations, rules, or standards. Depending on the country, the “stan-
dard” may be contained in one document, be part of another larger document (such 
as a general building code), or comprise several documents. 
 2. Th is research updates a similar study completed in 1994 on the worldwide status of 
energy standards for buildings (Janda and Busch 1993, 1994).
 3. See http://www.arch.hku.hk/research/BEER/besc.htm.
 4. See http://www.sustainable.org.za/greenbuilding/index.htm.
 5. Eligible car list (subject to question because preparers rely on automakers to pro-
vide information): http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/air/prob_
solutions/environment_friendly_private_cars.html#3.
 6. Also see http://auto.sohu.com/20081013/n260001979.shtml.
 7. Hong Kong Environmental Protection Department website, http://www.epd.gov.hk/
epd/english/climate_change/transport.html.
 8. See http://en.beijing2008.cn/bocog/environment/sports/n214159224.shtml.
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Viral Governance and 
Mixed Motivations: How and 
Why U.S. Cities Engaged on the 
Climate Change Issue, 2005–2007
Toby Warden
Cities are oft en considered a valuable starting place for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions to address global warming. As primary actors on urban policies, 
city leaders are also responsible for decisions on local land-use planning and 
waste management—domains essential to the implementation of environmen-
tally sustainable policies (Betsill 2001; Bulkeley 2000). In addition, mayors and 
city offi  cials are oft en the fi rst responders when a natural disaster or an extreme 
weather event has urgent local consequences.
Yet municipalities might abstain from eff orts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions for numerous reasons. Betsill (2001) identifi ed the challenge of allo-
cating scarce local resources for a problem that was largely framed as a global 
issue. Additionally, questions have been posed as to whether there can be suc-
cessful locally based mitigation without wide-scale national and international 
participation. DeAngelo and Harvey (1998) pointed out that although a com-
munity may strive to control emissions locally, the resulting impact may not be 
felt where the mitigation eff orts have taken place, thereby decreasing tangible 
incentives for action.
Furthermore, global warming has been largely considered to be a “creep-
ing” problem; people have had a tendency to feel removed from the problem 
in “space and time” (Betsill 2001; Wilbanks and Kates 1999). Turnpenny and 
6
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others (2005, 11) summarized this prominent challenge: “Ultimately, climate 
change is rather peripheral to mainstream policies such as pursuance of eco-
nomic growth or housing development, mainly because of its overwhelmingly 
long-term nature and lack of tangible current pressures for action”
In 2005, in an eff ort to inspire U.S. cities to address the climate change result-
ing from global warming, Mayor Greg Nickels of Seattle, Washington, launched 
the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (USMCPA) via the City of Seat-
tle’s Offi  ce of Sustainability and Environment. Th e agreement encouraged U.S. 
municipalities to take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Th e four-
page written pledge asked mayors to “strive” to meet or exceed the guidelines 
for emissions reduction for a developed country as set forth in the Kyoto Proto-
col. Simply, a mayoral signature in support of this mission earned participation 
in the USMCPA (USCOM 2005).
Mayor Nickels’s goal was to enlist 141 U.S. cities, a number that symbolically 
paralleled the amount of participating nations required to enter into force the 
Kyoto Protocol. In February 2005, when Mayor Nickels launched his nation-
wide campaign, the required 141 nations as signatories (less the United States) 
had been secured, and the protocol went into eff ect.
Within a few months, Mayor Nickels exceeded his goal of enlisting 141 cit-
ies; 400 U.S. mayors signed the USMCPA. Participation in the agreement and 
municipal engagement on the issue of climate change grew rapidly thereaft er. 
Th is chapter examines how and why this widespread and rapid engagement 
took place.
Methods and Analysis
Th e data analyzed for this investigation included 200 archival sources of news 
articles, government documents, conference summaries, and websites. Direct 
statements capturing motivations for participation in the USMCPA were ana-
lyzed from 125 U.S. cities. In-depth, semistructured interviews conducted with 
key informants (mayors, city offi  cials, and representatives of relevant organiza-
tions) from nine cities and eight organizations served to triangulate the fi nd-
ings as well as to off er deeper insight into the outcome under investigation.
Th e primary analysis applied to the data was Policy Network Analysis 
(PNA), an analytical framework developed and refi ned by political science 
scholars Rhodes, Marsh, and Smith (Marsh and Smith 2000; Rhodes 1997; 
Rhodes and Marsh 1992). Th e PNA model explains policy outcomes through 
an iterated analysis of the actors, contexts, and interactions tied to an issue 
area. Th e key policy network under investigation for this study was the core 
group of individuals and organizations coalescing and interacting around the 
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issue area of U.S. cities and climate change as anchored by the USMCPA from 
2005 to 2007.
Th e analysis of the data revealed that the rapid policy momentum and 
municipal engagement of U.S. cities on the climate change issue from 2005 to 
2007 evolved from a set of factors. Th e engagement is explained by (1) examin-
ing the actions and interactions of a group of key organizations and mayoral 
actors, (2) considering the context of an emerging national awareness of cli-
mate change, and (3) investigating the nature of cities.
The Agreement
Th e initial four-page agreement described the need for governmental involve-
ment from the federal, state, and municipal levels (USCOM 2005). Th e agree-
ment outlined various steps that cities could take to reduce their emissions. 
Th is mayoral eff ort grew quickly to become the largest coordinated U.S. mu-
nicipal undertaking to address climate change. By February 2007, more than 
400 U.S. mayors, representing nearly 60 million U.S. citizens, had signed the 
agreement.
Although the agreement’s success called attention to the role that cities play 
in addressing the climate change, groundwork had begun over a decade earlier 
by ICLEI. In 1990, ICLEI, a membership association of local governments and 
regional and national-level organizations committed to sustainable develop-
ment, was established at the inaugural World Conference of Local Govern-
ments for a Sustainable Future at the United Nations. ICLEI’s mission was to 
target local governmental action as a prescription for complex, global environ-
mental problems.
In 1993, ICLEI created Cities for Climate Protection (CCP), a campaign to 
enlist municipalities from around the world to commit to a fi ve-step process to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in their communities. CCP provided techni-
cal tools and support to cities and counties to develop targets, to implement 
timelines, and to monitor progress for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
U.S. participation in the program grew steadily from 10 local governments in 
1995 to more than 160 U.S. cities and counties by February 2006 (ICLEI 2006). 
When the USMCPA was launched in 2005, CCP had already established itself 
as the leading organized, municipal-centered climate change program in the 
United States.
Th e USMCPA, however, presented a less structured platform for coalescing 
cities on the issue of climate change; participation was fl exible, nonbinding, 
and without a formal enforcement mechanism. Cities were presented with an 
opportunity to easily and quickly join a broad eff ort to address a global issue 
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with local dimensions. Th e policy landscape for U.S. cities and climate change 
is in no way confi ned to the USMCPA (one example being the longevity of the 
work of ICLEI’s CCP campaign). In addition, from 2005 to 2007, many actors 
were active in the global warming policy arena, from local to international lev-
els (see Selin and VanDeveer 2007). Th is study focuses primarily on U.S. cities 
and climate change anchored by the USMCPA,  as the agreement presents a 
valuable focal point from which to consider the rapid engagement of U.S. cities 
on the climate change issue from 2005 to 2007.
Interactions and Infl uence: Key Policy Network Actors
Th e engagement was infl uenced by a decentralized cooperative policy network 
of fi ve key actors: (1) Mayor Nickels and the Seattle Offi  ce of Sustainability and 
the Environment, (2) the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCOM), (3) ICLEI and 
the CCP Campaign, (4) the Sierra Club Cool Cities Campaign, and (5) Mayor 
Rocky Anderson of Salt Lake City, Utah. All fi ve actors have been investigated 
for their catalyzing contributions that served to spur municipal engagement on 
the climate change issue. Th ey are described in greater detail in table 6.1.
TABLE 6.1 
Key Policy Network Actors
Actor Description
Mayor Greg Nickels 
of Seattle
Creator of the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement
USCOM The U.S. Conference of Mayors is the offi cial nonpartisan association 
of U.S. cities with a population of 30,000 or more. The conference 
endorsed the USMCPA in June 2005 and created the U.S. Mayors 
Council on Climate Protection in 2006.
ICLEI/CCP ICLEI is a nonprofi t membership association of local governments 
committed to furthering worldwide sustainability development. In 
1993, the organization launched the Cities for Climate Protection 
Campaign, a city-centered effort to address climate change from the 
local level. 
Sierra Club Cool 
Cities Campaign
The Sierra Club, one of the country’s oldest environmental orga-
nizations, launched the Cool Cities Campaign in October 2005 to 
increase participation in the USMCPA and to provide a platform for 
citizen involvement with the climate change issue.
Mayor Rocky 
Anderson
of Salt Lake City
Notable leader in the area of cities and global warming, organized 
catalyzing conferences with ICLEI and the Sundance Preserve, an 
environmental nonprofi t organization led by Robert Redford
Source: Warden 2007.
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Th ese actors were linked through a shared urgency about the climate change is-
sue, a shared mission to engage cities in action, and the mutual desire to see the 
federal government generate a robust regulatory action plan to reduce green-
house gas emissions. Th e result was an informal, decentralized policy network. 
Network-based policy structures have been described as “characterized by high 
levels of interdependence involving multiple organizations, where formal lines of 
authority are blurred and where diverse policy actors are knitted together to focus 
on common problems” (Schneider and others 2003, 143–44).
A collection of conferences, summits, and interactions by and among the 
key policy network actors served as catalysts in two signifi cant ways. Th e activi-
ties contributed to the premise that cities play a central role in addressing the 
climate change challenge. Th e gatherings served as points of “contagion” and 
reinforced the policy network’s shared mission.
Th e inaugural Sundance Summit: A Mayors’ Gathering on Climate Protec-
tion was held in July 2005. Th e event was cohosted by ICLEI, Salt Lake City 
mayor Rocky Anderson, and actor and director Robert Redford (his nonprofi t 
conference organization is called Sundance Preserve). In addition to Redford, 
former vice president Al Gore was in attendance. Several participants identi-
fi ed the summit as a valuable platform for creating both awareness of the issue 
and generating interaction among stakeholders; the second Sundance Summit 
took place in the fall of 2006 and similarly fostered generative and generous 
exchange among attendees, which furthered municipal engagement on the cli-
mate change issue (Warden 2007) .
In 2006, ICLEI held a separate mayoral summit in Alaska titled “Strengthen-
ing Our Cities: Mayors Responding to Global Climate Change, Anchorage.” In 
attendance were more than 30 mayors from 17 states (Municipality of Anchor-
age 2006). Th e Alaskan backdrop was a powerful platform to host a conference 
on climate change; mayors visited a native village facing relocation because of 
the eff ects of global warming.
Also in 2006, USCOM held an event titled “Emergency Summit on Energy 
and the Environment” in May as a response to rising energy costs. Nearly 
40 mayors as well as some of the key policy network actors (Michelle Wyman 
of ICLEI and Anderson, a keynote speaker) were present. Th e attendees, who 
also included experts on the global warming issue, gathered to discuss national 
energy policy and the role of cities in taking action.
A month later, the U.S. Mayors Council on Climate Protection was formed 
at the conference’s annual June meeting. Mayor Greg Nickels and Mayor 
James Brainard of Carmel, Indiana, were appointed cochairs of the council. 
In September 2006, the conference held a second summit focusing on the 
environment. In January 2007, USCOM held their annual winter meeting in 
Washington, D.C., with a plenary session on global warming. It was here that 
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Mayor Nickels, as cochair of the council presented a request for a $4 billion 
energy and environmental block grant from Congress (USCOM 2007). 
Th e mayors presented a unifi ed voice in addressing the federal level of 
government.
Th e Cool Cities Campaign, a separate Sierra Club initiative inspired by the 
USMCPA, was launched in October 2005, just four months aft er the mayors 
agreement was endorsed by USCOM. Th e campaign’s mission was to encour-
age mayors to join the USMCPA, to highlight the successes of participating 
mayors, and to encourage citizens to hold their mayors and cities accountable 
for their commitments (O’Malley 2005).
Th is collection of interactive municipal gatherings and activities served to 
further engage mayors and their cities on the global warming in tandem with 
the USMCPA. Participants identifi ed an acquired sense of municipal self-
effi  cacy toward tackling the problem, inspiration from other cities to take 
action, and the formation of valuable networks among municipal actors as 
valuable outcomes of these gatherings (Warden 2007).
Municipal engagement was also fostered by the design of the mayors agree-
ment, which was basic, fl exible, and nonbinding: Download the form from the 
website, sign it, and submit it. Soon aft er, the name of city and the name of 
the mayor would be posted on Seattle’s promotional website for the agreement. 
Some mayors were required to gain approval from their city councils; other 
mayors signed it and submitted it on their own accord. Th ere were no follow-
up requirements or accountability mechanisms. Th e fl exibility of the agree-
ment meant that cities could develop their own approach to participation and 
in some cases their own interpretations of what the agreement meant (Warden 
2007). Participation was easy, and the cost was low.
The Context for Engagement
Municipal engagement was also nurtured by a fertile societal context; the issue 
of climate change caused by global warming was rising on the agenda of the 
U.S. collective consciousness. Although the federal government remained inac-
tive in terms of regulatory policies, global warming became a pressing concern 
in the public and private sectors. A shift  was taking place from “Should we do 
anything?” to “What should we do?” (Selin and VanDeveer 2007, 4).
Following the Kyoto Protocol ratifi cation in February 2005, multiple con-
textual elements emerged that served to emphasize the urgency of the need to 
address global warming. Th e issue received extensive press with cover stories in 
prominent news outlets such as Time, Newsweek, and the Economist. During the 
fall of 2005, the New York Times ran a series of print and online articles, along-
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side a multimedia presentation titled “Th e Big Melt” on the New York Times 
website, depicting the multifaceted issues surrounding global warming and the 
melting Arctic (Kraus and others 2005; Myers and others 2005; Revkin 2006). 
Other magazines, such as Vanity Fair, followed suit with “green” editions, oft en 
mentioning both Mayor Nickels and the mayors agreement.
In 2006, the documentary fi lm An Inconvenient Truth, featuring Al Gore, 
told the global warming story and explained the climate science (Guggenheim 
2006). At the conclusion of the fi lm, Gore praised cities for taking action on the 
issue and provided a list of the hundreds of mayors who had signed on to the 
initiative by the time of fi lming. Th e USMCPA generated direct, ongoing press 
coverage as well, with sustained media coverage nationally and internationally.
Th e energy crisis in the spring of 2006 contributed to municipal awareness 
of the issue, one example being a mayoral summit on energy and the envi-
ronment hosted by USCOM. Other contextual catalysts included a campaign 
to place the polar bear, whose threatened existence became symbolic of the 
dangers of global warming, on the endangered species list. In 2006, “carbon 
neutral” was voted “word of the year” by the New Oxford American Dictionary.
Notable celebrities and established corporations had solutions for global 
warming high on their agendas. Richard Branson of Virgin Records pledged $3 
billion to alternative fuels research. General Electric launched its pro-environ-
ment “Eco-magination” campaign, which linked the company’s mission to the 
concept of sustainability.
Leading energy corporations, such as Duke Energy, formed the U.S. Cli-
mate Action Partnership to present a unifi ed business voice to Congress on 
the need for greenhouse gas regulation. Former President Clinton, through 
the Clinton Foundation, launched the Clinton Climate Initiative in Septem-
ber 2006. Th is initiative reinforced not only the urgency of the issue, but also 
the discourse that placed cities at the core of the solution; the initiative’s focus 
was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the 40 largest cities in the world. 
Hurricane Katrina propelled the concept of an “extreme weather event,” oft en 
mentioned as a future consequence of global warming, to the forefront of the 
national consciousness. Nearly a year aft er the hurricane, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents to a Zogby America telephone poll (74 percent) said 
they were now more convinced that global warming was real than they were 
two years earlier (Zogby International 2006).
A congressional investigation to address charges that federal offi  cials had 
manipulated climate science fi ndings in governmental reports to decrease the 
severity of the global warming issue made headline news. In the fall of 2006, Nich-
olas Stern, noted British economist and former chief economist of the World Bank, 
released a report commissioned by the British prime minister that concluded the 
cost of global inaction on global warming would be devastating (Stern 2006).
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Rounding out this two-year awareness-generating period, the fi rst install-
ment of the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report was 
released in February 2007, which created an even greater consensus on the sci-
entifi c aspects of the issue (IPCC 2007). Th e report, and the lead-up during the 
few months before its release, generated more press on the problem. Global 
warming was less thought of as a “creeping problem.” It was here.
Th is broad collection of infl uential contextual factors, or the “eff ective con-
text” (Stokols 1996), contributed to a more fertile environment for mayors and 
cities across the United States to engage. From a decision-making perspective, 
a “policy window” was open (Kingdon 1995).
The Nature of Cities
In addition to the open “policy window,” the catalyzing activities of the key 
policy network actors, and the simple design of the USMCPA, common 
municipal themes also served as catalysts for engagement. Th e sharing of use-
ful information between cities and a spirit of friendly competition triggered 
municipal engagement across the United States.
When questioned for this study, city representatives oft en cited a moral 
imperative to help other cities by sharing information on how best to address 
climate change. Th is recurring and prominent practice has been conceptual-
ized under the concept of city solidarity, or camaraderie among cities. Addi-
tionally, these fi ndings were supported by responses from key informants 
from leading green cities who described a duty to help other cities take action 
(Warden 2007).
Friendly competition to be the greenest city also served to further amplify 
engagement (Warden 2007). In this study, the phrase green capital has been 
applied to describe the desired outcome of friendly competition. Th e greener 
city may promote itself as such when striving to keep its city healthy in terms of 
business and resident retention. As promotional benefi ts accrue from engage-
ment on the global warming issue, a positive green image creates incentive for 
that city and other cities to be green. Green action—in this case, engagement 
to address climate change—spread as cities promoted themselves (and were 
promoted by policy actors), competed with each other, and inspired other cities 
to go green.
For the mayors agreement, city solidarity and green capital fueled a self-
replicating policy eff ort through the sharing of information and friendly com-
petition. Participation was amplifi ed as the media publicized mayoral and 
municipal activity to address climate change and as the collective conscious-
ness of the United States became more aware of global warming.
VIRAL GOVERNANCE AND MIXED MOTIVATIONS ■ 169
Thematic Categories for Participation
An analysis of the archival data in terms of the question “Why are cities par-
ticipating in the USMCPA?” yielded 10 thematic categories. Th ese categories 
reveal ways in which mayors and municipal offi  cials understood their partici-
pation in the USMCPA while speaking as representatives of their cities. De-
scriptions of these themes and occurrence levels are provided in table 6.2.
Th ese 10 themes demonstrate that mayors and city offi  cials were thinking 
about the global warming issue in diff erent ways when making public statements 
on behalf of their cities. Two of these leading themes—city solidarity and green 
capital—have been identifi ed as sources of “contagion” for the overall policy 
TABLE 6.2 
Occurrence Levels and Thematic Categories for Participation 
in the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement
Why and How Cities Participate in the USMCPA, 2005–07
Occurrence levelsa Emergent themes Emergent theme description
25 Local urgency Local consequences make action urgent
8 Global urgency Global consequences make action urgent
18 Moral urgency There is a moral imperative to act now
27 Future generations Intergenerational equity, sustainability, 
and responsibility for future generations 
(keyword: future)
33 Environmental 
protection 
Responsibility to the environment, 
stewardship
26 Economic incentive Economic rationales for environmental 
policy citing either past or future fi nancial 
benefi ts
14 Absence of federal 
action 
Failure of the federal government to take 
suffi cient action
31 Green capital Desire to be a green leader among cities; 
green leadership by example to encourage 
action by constituent base
10 Power in numbers The more, the better—number of partici-
pants is important for solutions
35 City solidarity Cities and mayors are part of collective 
group; cities and mayors work together; 
cities have a collective strength and share 
information; cities draw strength from unity; 
cities are at the center of global warming 
solutions
Source: Warden 2007.
a n = 125 cities (227 thematic occurrences).
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eff ort, addressing the “how” of engagement. Of additional interest is that the 
diversity of the statements suggests city representatives had their own, diff erent 
reasons for participation.
Across the United States, cities diff er in many ways. Th ey vary, for exam-
ple, across population, governance structures, global warming consequences, 
capacity for implementing policy, economic resources, and stage of develop-
ment. As already noted, the cities had not only diff erent understandings of the 
global warming issue and motivations for participation, but also diff erent inter-
pretations of what the USMCPA meant.
Viral Governance
Th e interactions, activities, and shared mission of the key policy network when 
combined with an open policy window, city solidarity, quest for green capital, 
simple policy design of the USMCPA, and diff erentiated nature of cities con-
tribute to the proposal of a theory of governance, identifi ed here as viral gover-
nance. Th is explanation of viral governance draws from the principles of viral 
marketing; viral marketing refers to the use of preexisting social networks to 
rapidly and cheaply create brand awareness (Domingos 2005; Jurvetson 2000; 
Wilson 2000). Th e word “viral” was used, “not because any traditional viruses 
were involved, but because of the pattern of rapid adoption through word of 
mouth networks” (Jurvetson and Draper 1997, 1).
In viral marketing, the infected “host” passes on the message to others: “each 
new user becomes a company salesperson, and the message spreads organi-
cally” (Jurvetson and Draper 1997). With the USMCPA, each city became 
a promoter of taking action on the issue. As noted, once a mayor offi  cially 
signed on, the names of the city and mayor were shortly thereaft er posted on 
the agreement’s promotional website. Participation was amplifi ed among the 
broader target population by the concept of city solidarity. Some mayors and 
city representatives adopted the practice of sharing information, which served 
to inspire more participation. Additionally, “friendly competition” made cit-
ies strive to outdo one another and created a platform for the accrual of green 
capital. City solidarity and quest for green capital became vessels of contagion 
through positive feedback, in a viral fashion, in the broader social ecosystem 
of U.S. cities.
A relevant viral marketing principle is to “minimize the friction of market 
entry” by generating a simple message that has a low participation cost and 
compelling reason for involvement (Jurvetson and Draper 1997). Th e mayors 
agreement was simple, had a low cost to participate, and drew on the compel-
ling reason that cities were at the center of global warming solutions.
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In summary, viral governance captures the spreading of a policy measure 
wherein the key policy network actors, those executing the governance, begin 
an eff ort fueled by positive feedback that then takes on a momentum of its 
own. Because participation in the USMCPA was simple, low cost, and had a 
compelling reason behind it, it was easy for cities to participate, and as a con-
sequence, more cities were compelled to engage on the issue. Th e simple and 
fl exible nature of the agreement also made it accessible to a diverse group of 
potential municipal participants. Diff erent cities could attach their own mean-
ings to participation based on their individual resources, needs, and capacities, 
which can vary greatly across the municipal population.
Since 1997, as strategies of viral marketing have evolved in the business sec-
tor, one of the downsides of the strategy has emerged. In some circumstances, 
strategists may successfully execute a viral strategy wherein a viral message 
spreads rapidly and cheaply, without giving adequate forethought to the next 
strategic step.
Jurvetson and Draper highlighted the potential for missing this step: As 
more companies can grow more rapidly than ever before, they can also die out 
quickly if they have not established “switching barriers.” According to these 
authors, switching barriers are the mechanisms that bring the customer to the 
next step, past engagement and to the retention phase (in the case of business, 
where income is generated). Jurvetson and Draper further warned that “rapid 
growth is of no value without customer retention.”
Th is admonition parallels a key fi nding from this study. Although “engage-
ment” on the issue spread, the next step of implementation and turning engage-
ment into action was not adequately addressed at the outset. Key informants 
pointed out that that if cities were not brought to the next step, damage could 
be done to the overall policy eff ort (Warden 2007).
A viral outcome of engagement has limitations. Th e rapid growth of the 
USMCPA must be tempered with an awareness of the challenges of the next 
step: translating engagement into concrete implementation for reducing green-
house gases. Viral solutions must be coordinated with solid next steps or else 
the viral outcome may lead to unfulfi lled expectations. Nearly all of the key 
policy network participants and municipal representatives interviewed for 
this study expressed awareness of the challenges ahead. Th ey identifi ed the 
USMCPA as an important “fi rst step,” but only a “fi rst step.”
Implications for Policy and Future Research
Th is study contains numerous implications for policy and practice. A viral 
solution can have tremendous merit, especially because it has the capacity to 
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rapidly canvass a diverse policy issue landscape of a complex problem area. 
Th e rapidity hails not only from the simplicity of the strategy, but also from the 
participant as promoter model, wherein members of the target populations—in 
this case, cities—become primary points of contagion. However, forethought 
must be given to “customer retention”—or, in this case, policy action— moving 
cities past engagement and to concrete implementation strategies. In particular, 
as novel governance structures continue to emerge, it is important to examine 
how, why, and if these strategies are successful.
Conclusion
Th e rapid and widespread engagement of U.S. cities and the climate change is-
sue between 2005 and 2007, as anchored by the USMCPA, has been explained 
by (1) examining the actions and interactions of a group of key organizations 
and mayoral actors, (2) considering the context of an emerging national aware-
ness of climate change, and (3) investigating the nature of cities. A theory of 
viral governance has been proposed as an explanatory concept to better under-
stand how and why U.S. cities engaged with the climate change issue. Partici-
pation in the USMCPA spread in viral fashion even without additional eff ort 
by the key policy actors. Th e fl exible and nonbinding design of the mayors 
agreement served to facilitate widespread engagement with a simple design 
that accommodated the nuances of dissimilar cities.
Th e overall consensus of participants in this study was that the U.S. Mayors 
Climate Protection Agreement, from 2005 to 2007, remains valuable because 
of its ability to generate awareness and to engage a large number of cities on 
the issue of climate change. However, the agreement must be considered only a 
fi rst step. Th e agreement lacks accountability mechanisms that lead to tangible 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Th ere is still much work to be done to 
ensure that cities have the will, capacity, and action to follow through on their 
climate change mitigation commitments. Furthermore, although cities have 
presented a collective stance, solidarity must not overshadow the complexity of 
concrete solutions. Individually, cities have vastly diff erent needs and situations 
that must be both acknowledged and addressed in the development and imple-
mentation of future policy measures. Continued coordinated dialogue between 
multiple stakeholders and an increase in resources are essential to realizing the 
commitments of so many U.S. cities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
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Urban Heat Islands: Sensitivity of 
Urban Temperatures to Climate 
Change and Heat Release 
in Four European Cities
Mark P. McCarthy and Michael G. Sanderson
Introduction
It has long been recognized that urban areas have their own climates (Howard 
1818; see also Arnfi eld 2003 and Oke 1982) and are generally warmer than 
surrounding rural areas. Th e urban environment has the capacity to store heat 
during the day, which originates from both absorption of solar radiation and 
human activity (for example, exhaust gases from traffi  c, heating and cooling of 
buildings, and human metabolism). Th is absorbed heat is then released at night. 
Many buildings are designed to take account of this phenomenon as a means of 
keeping their interior temperatures within defi ned limits. Because of this heat 
release, night-time air temperatures in urban areas are higher than surround-
ing rural areas. Th e temperature diff erence between the urban and rural area 
is referred to as the “urban heat island” (UHI). Th e UHI is also sensitive to the 
ambient weather and climate. Urban populations are therefore exposed to both 
urban-induced climate modifi cation and larger-scale climate change resulting 
from increasing greenhouse gas concentrations. An understanding of current 
and possible future changes in the magnitude of the UHI is therefore necessary 
for planning and developing of adaptation and mitigation strategies.
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Many diff erent models have been developed to model and understand the 
UHI. Th ese can be broadly categorized as empirical models based on relation-
ships between observed temperatures and various characteristics of the urban 
environment (Unger 2006), key atmospheric variables (Wilby 2003), or physi-
cal models that attempt to simulate the important heat and moisture exchanges 
above an urban area (Best 2006; Masson 2006). However, not all of these models 
are suitable for estimating future UHI intensities. Empirical models are specifi c 
to certain cities or climate domains, and statistical relationships between atmo-
spheric variables and the UHI may change in the future. Representing cities 
within climate models is therefore necessary to study climate impacts on urban 
populations and understand the links between the UHI and the climate of the 
surrounding areas. Th is is the objective of this chapter.
Th e Met Offi  ce Hadley Centre in Exeter, England, has developed a land-
surface scheme, which can be used within a climate model to represent sur-
face heterogeneity at scales smaller than the model’s resolution. Th is scheme 
(MOSES2; Essery and others 2003) operates at the same spatial scale as the cli-
mate model and divides each surface grid square of the climate model into up 
to nine diff erent surface types (called tiles), of which one represents urban areas 
and the others represent grass, trees, and other surfaces. Th is surface scheme has 
been used in a global climate model (GCM) to simulate the UHI of London.1 An 
additional heating term may be added to the surface energy balance equation of 
the urban area, which represents the anthropogenic heat source present in all cit-
ies. More recently, MOSES2 has been implemented into a regional climate model 
(RCM) that has a much higher horizontal resolution than the GCM. Th e RCM 
and the land surface scheme are described here. Th e model simulations presented 
explore the sensitivity of urban temperatures to the location of the urban area, 
climate change, and anthropogenic heat release. Th e simulations do not represent 
a robust projection of future climate in any given location.
The Met Offi ce Hadley Centre Regional Climate Model 
(HadRM3) and Land Surface Scheme (MOSES2)
At the scale of a GCM, which generally has a horizontal resolution of the order 
of hundreds of kilometers, the infl uence of urban areas on the simulated cli-
mate is negligibly small and has generally been ignored within the climate 
change–modeling community. Limited-area RCMs are now available that have 
much higher spatial resolutions. Th e Met Offi  ce Hadley Centre RCM HadRM3 
(Buonomo and others 2007) uses a horizontal resolution of 25 kilometers. 
However, even this resolution is not suffi  cient to explicitly capture UHIs. Urban 
areas are poorly resolved, but a methodology has been developed to capture 
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the city-scale impacts of urbanization on climate. Th e urban tile within MOSES2 
is used to provide a representation of cities, and a more complete description 
of the urban model is given elsewhere (Best 2005; Best, Grimmond, and Villani 
2006). Another tile within MOSES2 is classifi ed as grass (and represents boreal 
grasslands). For all model grid cells, the UHI is calculated using surface air tem-
peratures of the boreal grass and urban tiles.
In the RCM simulations, the urban surface properties are not modifi ed geo-
graphically. Consequently, the urban tile represents a hypothetical city with 
identical surface properties located within each grid cell of the climate model. 
Determining and validating appropriate parameter settings for the urban model 
at diff erent locations is beyond the scope of this study. For example, details of the 
surface albedo, thermal properties of buildings, ratios of building heights to street 
widths, and orientation of streets would be needed (Unger 2006). Th e implemen-
tation of MOSES2 within the RCM means that the climate of all nine tiles is calcu-
lated for every model grid square, regardless of whether that land type is present. 
Th e climate of each tile is not used further in the model unless it is present in the 
model grid square. Th is feature is useful because it allows potential UHIs to be 
calculated at all locations in a consistent way within the model domain.
Th e area studied with the RCM is Europe and the Mediterranean coastal areas 
of North Africa (see fi gure 7.1 for a map of this area). Th e infl uence of global 
climatic change is introduced at the boundaries of the regional model by pre-
scribing temperatures, winds, and other key meteorological variables. Th e cli-
mate projections from the RCM are therefore consistent with the driving GCM 
projections and add realistic detail at the fi ner spatial scales.
As mentioned in the introduction, an additional and well-documented driver 
of urban climate is anthropogenic heat released through human activity in cities, 
such as heating and cooling of buildings, exhaust gases from traffi  c, and even 
human metabolism. Energy-use statistics for London and Manchester have been 
analyzed to estimate the heat fl ux for these cities (GLA 2006). Th e results sug-
gest that heat fl uxes averaged over a 25-kilometer RCM grid cell located over 
the city centers to be about 25 W m−2, and for urban areas excluding the center 
to be approximately 15 W m−2. Based on these estimates, a value of 15 W m−2 
has been used as a default heat fl ux for the urban tile at the RCM resolution 
except for a small number of cities (including London, Moscow, and Paris) with 
25 W m−2. Estimates of energy consumption and heat released in these latter cit-
ies support the higher value. Two additional sets of climate simulations have been 
conducted, with the heat fl ux set to 0 and 45 W m−2 (75 W m−2 for the larger cit-
ies). It is outside the scope of this chapter to assess future energy use for cities, 
but these experiments will provide a quantitative assessment of the sensitivity of 
urban areas to changes in the anthropogenic heat fl ux. It might be expected that 
the heat release during winter will fall as temperatures warm, whereas it may rise 
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in summer owing to increased cooling demands. Th ese potential changes in the 
seasonality of the anthropogenic heat release could impact on the modeled urban 
temperatures. In the present study, the anthropogenic heat release was assumed 
to be uniform throughout the year and is included as an additional source term 
to the surface energy balance equation of the urban tile.
Model Experiments
Th e diff erent experiments performed with the RCM are listed in table 7.1. In 
total, seven diff erent experiments have been carried out to validate the regional 
model and to test the sensitivity of the simulated urban and rural tempera-
 Figure 7.1 Comparison of Modeled and Observed Daily Mean 1.5-Meter 
Temperatures for Winter and Summer over Europe
Source: Authors.
Note: The model data have been averaged over the period 1971–90, and the observations 1961–90.
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TABLE 7.1 
Regional Climate Model Experiments 
Run name Period
Anthropogenic heat 
fl ux (W m−2) Notes
a 1971–90 0 Urban fractions set to zero; urban 
temperatures calculated at every 
location within the model domain, but 
only nonurban tile climates feed back 
onto the modeled atmosphere
b 1971–90 0 Fully coupled urban areas
c 1971–90 15/25 As run (b) plus anthropogenic heat fl ux
d 1971–90 45/75 As run (b) plus tripled anthropogenic 
heat fl ux
e 2041–60 0 Fully coupled urban areas
f 2041–60 15/25 As run (e) plus anthropogenic heat fl ux
g 2041–60 45/75 As run (e) plus tripled anthropogenic 
heat fl ux
Note: RCM control run with rural surfaces only feeding back to modeled climate. Urban climate calculated 
but not used in the simulation. The urban fractions have all been set to zero, so surface fractions of rural 
tiles have been increased where necessary so they sum to 1. (b) Same as run (a) but urban areas included 
fully in simulation. A comparison of runs (a) and (b) allows any feedbacks between the urban climate and 
the larger modeled climate to be quantifi ed. Run (c) as (b) but with an anthriopogenic heat source to the 
urban tile included. Run (d) as (c) but the anthropogenic heat source is tripled. Runs (e), (f), and (g) are 
repeats of runs (b), (c), and (d), respectively, for the future period 2041–2060.
tures to climate change and, in the case of urban areas, to diff erent assumptions 
regarding anthropogenic heat release. For all the regional climate simulations, 
suitable boundary conditions were supplied from a climate projection for the 
period 1950–2099 created with the global model HadCM3 (Collins and others 
2006). Th is global model simulation used greenhouse gas emissions from a 
medium-high emissions scenario (A1B; Nakićenović and Swart 2000). Th is 
scenario assumes rapid introduction of new and effi  cient technologies, with 
a balance between fossil fuel use and alternative energy sources (IPCC 2007).
Results
Th e results obtained from the model experiments are discussed next.
Validation of Modeled Temperatures
Simulations of surface air temperatures from run (a) (see table 7.1) are compared 
with observations in fi gure 7.1 to validate the model. Th ese observations have 
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had any infl uence of urban areas removed (Brohan and others 2006) and so are 
representative of rural temperatures. Th e data shown are daily mean surface air 
temperatures averaged over the period 1961–90; for the model results, tempera-
tures averaged over all rural tiles are shown. A visual comparison of the observed 
and modeled daily mean temperatures suggests that the model reproduces the 
observed temperature patterns in both winter and summer very well, although a 
quantitative comparison has not been performed. Th e model does overestimate 
summer temperatures by approximately 2 degrees Celsius over parts of Europe. 
Th is overestimation is not signifi cant for the purpose of this study.
Urban and Rural Temperature Differences
Th e diff erences between the urban and nonurban surface daily minimum and 
maximum temperatures averaged over the period 1971–90 are shown in fi gure 
7.2, using results from run (a). In run (a), although the urban fractions are 
zero, the surface temperatures of the urban tiles are still calculated (table 7.1). 
Th e temperature diff erences between the urban and grass tiles from run (a) are 
shown in fi gure 7.2. It is clear that the urban areas surface characteristics have 
a large impact on daily minimum temperatures in both seasons, which are 1 
to 4 degrees Celsius larger than the rural areas, but with a larger heat island 
overall in summer than winter. Daily maximum temperatures are 0.5 to 2.0 
degrees Celsius higher in summer and 0 to 1 degrees Celsius higher in winter. 
Th is result is in qualitative agreement with observations of urban temperatures. 
Th e simulated UHI for London has been compared with the UHI calculated 
using measured temperatures from two locations within the city and a suitable 
rural location (data not shown). Using monthly mean values, the modeled heat 
island lies between the two heat islands calculated from observations. How-
ever, no comparison of modeled and observed urban climates was conducted 
for other cities. Th e model experiments are designed to explore the sensitivity 
of urban temperatures to the location of the urban area, anthropogenic heat 
release, and climate change.
Impact of Climate Change on Modeled Urban and Nonurban 
Temperatures
Th e impact of climate change on modeled urban and nonurban temperatures is 
shown in fi gure 7.3. Th ese results are the diff erences in temperatures between 
runs (e) and (b). Both runs used fully coupled urban areas but no anthropo-
genic heat source. A positive value indicates that the temperatures for the period 
2041–60 (run [e]) are warmer than those for the period 1971–90 (run [b]). 
Panels (a) through (d) show the changes in minimum temperatures (Tmin), and 
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Source: Authors.
Note: A positive value indicates that the urban temperatures are higher than the rural temperatures. The 
daily minimum temperatures are between 1 and 4 degrees Celsius higher in both winter and summer, 
but overall are larger in summer. Daily maximum temperatures in summer are higher by 0.5–2.0 degrees 
Celsius and in winter are 0–1 degrees Celsius higher in the urban tile. The warmer temperatures of the 
urban tile are an addition to the modeled climate. The warm bias in the modeled climate for summer 
means that the urban temperatures could be overestimated very slightly, but not by enough to change 
the conclusions of this study.
Figure 7.2 Mean Difference in Daily Minimum (Tmin) and Maximum (Tmax) 
Temperatures between Urban and Nonurban Areas for Summer and Winter
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Figure 7.3 Impact of Climate Change on Maximum and Minimum Daily 
Temperatures for Urban and Nonurban Surfaces for Summer and Winter
degrees Celsius degrees Celsius
 (c) Nonurban Tmin change in winter  (d) Nonurban Tmin change in summer 
degrees Celsius degrees Celsius
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Figure 7.3 Impact of Climate Change on Maximum and Minimum Daily 
Temperatures for Urban and Nonurban Surfaces for Summer and Winter 
(continued)
Source: Authors.
Note: Panels show the mean temperature differences between the periods 1971–90 and 2041–60. A 
positive value indicates that temperatures in the future period are warmer than those for the present.
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the panels (e) through (h) show the diff erences in maximum temperatures (Tmax). 
In all cases the diff erences are positive, indicating that temperatures in the future 
are warmer than those in the present. Minimum temperature changes in winter 
are similar for the urban and nonurban tiles except for northwestern Europe, 
where a larger increase occurs on the nonurban tiles. For summer, the patterns 
and magnitudes of the increases in Tmin (between 2 and 4 degrees Celsius) are 
similar for the urban and rural tiles, but overall the urban tiles are warmer.
Th e winter changes in Tmax are between 1.5 and 4.0 degrees Celsius, and sum-
mer changes lie between 2.5 and 3.5 degrees Celsius, for both urban and nonur-
ban tiles; the summer temperature increases are fairly uniform across the model 
domain. Th ese results suggest that climate change is the main driver of increases 
in daily maximum temperatures, whereas increases in daily minimum tempera-
tures are caused by the properties of the urban area itself.
Impact of Anthropogenic Heat Release on Future Urban 
Temperatures
As previously discussed, the release of heat within urban areas could have a sig-
nifi cant impact on urban temperatures. Th e set of experiments listed in table 7.1 
assesses the possible impact of this heat release on future urban temperatures. In 
this section, results from runs (b), (e), and (g) are compared. In these three runs, 
a fully coupled urban tile was included in the model, allowing any feedbacks 
between the urban environment and the atmosphere to be simulated. Th e model 
will still calculate a temperature for the urban tile at all locations in the model, 
even if the urban fraction is zero. Subtracting the temperatures in run (e) from 
run (g) gives the size of the temperature increase for the future period (2041–60) 
caused by the anthropogenic heat release. Th e simulation using the tripled heat 
fl ux (run [g]) was chosen because it is assumed that the heat fl ux will increase in 
the future. Only changes in urban minimum temperatures are shown in fi gure 
7.4; minimum temperatures increase by the largest amounts, as has been shown 
previously. Th e urban temperature increases from fi gures 7.3(a) and 7.3(b) have 
been repeated here, so the temperature increases due to climate change can be 
compared with those from the anthropogenic heat release.
A comparison of fi gures 7.4(b) with 7.4(a) and 7.4(e) with 7.4(d) shows that 
the anthropogenic heat release has increased minimum temperatures in both 
winter and summer, and the greater impact is seen in winter, particularly over 
northern Europe. Th e increases in urban tile minimum temperatures resulting 
from the anthropogenic heat release only are shown in panels (c) and (f) for 
winter and summer, respectively. Th e anthropogenic heat release is respon-
sible for increases in urban temperatures between 0.2 and 1.0 degrees Celsius, 
again with a larger impact in winter than summer. Th is increase is signifi cant 
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compared with the magnitude of the modeled UHI with no heat release of 1 
to 4 degrees Celsius. A detectable feedback is seen between the urban areas 
of the largest cities and the atmosphere at the scale of the RCM, resulting in 
further elevation of the UHIs. For example, in panels (c) and (f), small circular 
areas with temperature increases of approximately 0.6 to 0.8 degrees Celsius 
are located over London, Moscow, and Paris, indicating that these urban areas 
(which are represented in the model) are warmer than identical urban areas 
where no feedback occurs.
Figure 7.4 Impact of Climate Change and Climate Change +45 W m−2 
Anthropogenic Heat Flux on Minimum Temperatures of the Urban Tile, 
for Winter and Summer, between 2041–60 and 1971–90
Source: Authors.
Note: Panels (a) and (d) show temperature differences between runs (e) and (b), and panels (b) and 
(e) show the temperature differences between runs (g) and (b). The impact of the heat release only 
is shown in panels (c) and (f), which are the differences between panels (b) and (a) and (e) and (d), 
respectively.
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Case Study: Simulations of UHIs of Athens, Cairo, London, 
and Moscow
Th e separate impacts of climate on the maximum and minimum temperatures of 
the four cities Athens, Cairo, London, and Moscow, and on their respective UHIs, 
is now assessed. Th ese four cities were chosen because they lie in very diff erent 
parts of Europe. Two lie in the north of Europe, and the other two are located 
in the Mediterranean area and have hotter climates. First, the seasonal cycles in 
minimum and maximum temperatures for each city are shown, together with the 
sizes of the modeled UHIs. Next, the occurrence of extreme temperatures for the 
present day and future are calculated and discussed.
Seasonal Cycles of Surface Temperatures
Figure 7.5 depicts the seasonal temperature cycles for each city. Th e data shown 
are monthly mean values averaged over the period 1971–90 from urban areas 
in run (b) and rural areas in run (a) (see table 7.1). First, the cycles of maxi-
mum and minimum temperatures for urban and rural areas are considered. In 
all four cases, the lowest temperatures are found in winter and the highest in 
summer. Th e temperature range is greatest for Moscow and Athens. Th e UHI is 
defi ned as the diff erence in temperature between the urban and rural tiles asso-
ciated with each city and is shown in the lower two panels of fi gure 7.5. Con-
sidering the UHI Tmin data, it can be seen that the largest UHI is seen during 
the summer months for London and Moscow, but little seasonality is seen for 
Athens and Cairo. Th e modeled seasonal cycle for London (using Tmin) agrees 
well with an observed cycle based on temperature measurements within the 
city and a rural location. Th e seasonal cycle of the UHI Tmax values are broadly 
similar for all four cities. Th e largest UHIs are seen during the summer months 
and are greatest for London and Moscow. Th e UHI Tmax cycle for Cairo also 
peaks during summer, but the peak is very broad. Th e UHI Tmax for Athens does 
not display a clear seasonal cycle. Th is behavior might be due to the proximity 
of Athens to the Mediterranean Sea.
Frequency of Extreme Hot Temperatures
Finally, the occurrence of extreme hot temperatures is calculated for the four 
cities. Th e cumulative eff ects of the UHI (that is, the characteristics of the urban 
areas), climate change, and anthropogenic heat release are assessed. For this 
analysis, daily maximum and minimum temperatures for the summer period 
only (defi ned as June, July, and August) are considered, because the highest 
temperatures are simulated for this period. Extreme temperatures for each city 
were defi ned as those exceeding the 95th percentile of the Tmin and Tmax values 
of the urban tile from run (a), over the period 1971–90. Run (a) had all surface 
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Figure 7.5 Seasonal Cycles of Minimum and Maximum Temperatures for 
the Urban and Rural Tiles Associated with Each of the Four Cities Athens, 
Cairo, London, and Moscow
Source: Authors.
Note: The UHI is the temperature difference between the urban and rural tiles.
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urban fractions set to zero. Th resholds were calculated separately for each city. 
Figure 7.6 shows the number of days when these threshold temperatures are 
exceeded under runs (b)–(g). Exceeding the Tmin threshold is classed as a hot 
night, and exceeding the Tmax threshold is classsed as a hot day.
Simulated hot nights for London and Moscow exhibit similar behavior. For 
the period 1971–90, the number of hot nights increases with the sequence rural, 
urban, and urban +25 W m−2 heat release, although the rural-to-urban increase 
in hot nights is larger than that caused by the addition of the anthropogenic 
heat release. In the future (2041–60), the UHI is projected to result in consid-
erably more hot nights for both London and Moscow, with further increases 
resulting from the low and high values of the heat release. For London, urban 
areas experience up to three times more hot nights (40 days) than rural areas, 
and for Moscow, the fi gure is slightly smaller, at 30 days. For the other two cit-
ies, Athens and Cairo, the impact of urbanization on the number of hot nights 
for present day values is smaller than for London and Moscow but is signifi cant 
for the future. Th e heat release has a relatively smaller impact on the number 
of hot nights for Athens and Cairo than for London and Moscow. Th e assumed 
anthropogenic heat release for London and Moscow is larger than that for Ath-
ens and Cairo. However, this heat release is a larger proportion of the energy 
budget for London and Moscow, because these cities receive much less solar 
energy than Athens and Cairo. Th ese results show that the characteristics of the 
urban area itself are responsible for the majority of the increases in hot nights, 
with the anthropogenic heat release having a smaller but signifi cant eff ect.
Th e UHI does not have a signifi cant impact on the frequency of hot days 
in all four cities for the control period (1971–90). However, it does result in 
additional hot days for the future, although the impact for Moscow is small. In 
all four cases, the addition of either magnitude of anthropogenic heat release to 
the urban area produces little or no increase in the number of hot days.
Overall, these results show that the characteristics of the urban areas are 
responsible for a large proportion of the increases in the number of hot days 
and nights in the future, with the anthropogenic heat fl ux having a smaller 
but oft en signifi cant impact. Th e number of hot nights projected for the two 
cooler northern cities (London and Moscow) appears to be more sensitive to 
the anthropogenic heat fl ux than the two warmer Mediterranean cities (Athens 
and Cairo), as we have discussed. If the same-sized heat fl uxes had been used 
for all four cities, this conclusion would still be true. It should be noted that a 
comprehensive comparison of the simulated climate against observations for 
each of these cities has not been conducted (except for London). Th e main 
emphasis of these results is on the sensitivity of urban temperatures to climate 
change and anthropogenic heat release. Th ey do not represent a robust predic-
tion of future climate change in any of these four locations.
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Note: A hot day or night is defi ned as the 95th percentile of the Tmax or Tmin urban temperatures for that city from run (a); see table 7.1. Each panel shows the average 
number of times that the 9 5th percentile temperature is exceeded for the periods 1971–90 and 2041–60, for rural areas (white), urban (black), urban +15/25 W m−2 heat 
release (gray), and urban +45/75 W m−2 heat release (pattern). For the period 1971–90, the rural and urban data were calculated from run (b), and the urban +15 W m−2 
data from run (c). For 2041–60, the rural and urban data were calculated from run (e), the urban +15 W m−2 from run (f), and the urban + 45W m−2 from run (g).
Figure 7.6 Occurrence of Extreme Temperatures During the Day and Night for Athens, Cairo, London, and Moscow during 
Summer (June, July, and August)
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Conclusions
Th is chapter presents an analysis of regional climate change in Europe, with a 
focus on the infl uence of the urban environment and urban anthropogenic heat 
release. Th e regional model used reproduces observed surface temperatures in 
nonurban areas well for both winter and summer. Th e results indicate that the 
UHI has the largest impact on minimum temperatures during winter and a 
smaller but signifi cant impact on summer maximum temperatures. Projected 
changes in temperature by the decade of 2050 are similar for urban and non-
urban surfaces. Th e model shows that climate change itself is the main driver 
of increases in daily maximum temperatures, but the urban area characteris-
tics are the main cause of increases in daily minimum temperatures. However, 
regional variations are apparent. Th e model also simulates the interactions 
between the urban area and the atmosphere, resulting in larger UHIs compared 
with a simulation in which the urban temperatures were calculated in isolation. 
Th ese results show that the UHI is likely to change over time, and so a present-
day UHI cannot be added to a future climate.
Th e UHI also responds signifi cantly to changes in the anthropogenic heat 
emissions of a city. Th e sensitivity study has shown that including this heating 
(at the high value of 45/75 W m−2) can increase temperatures by as much as 0.5 
degrees Celsius. Th e heat emission values are probably reasonable at the scale 
of the RCM, but within the core of large cities, heat emissions can be consider-
ably larger.
As for the cumulative impact of climate change and UHIs on the frequency 
of extreme temperature events, it is apparent that the UHI itself will be the 
main cause of an increase in extreme temperatures during both day and night 
in a city, with the anthropogenic heat release having a smaller eff ect. It is essen-
tial to consider the dual role of global warming and local urban warming for 
assessing potential risks to people and infrastructure within cities.
Note
 1. R. Betts and M. Best, “Relative Impacts of Radiative Forcing, Landscape Eff ects and 
Local Heat Sources on Simulated Climate Change in Urban Areas,” Betwixt Technical 
Briefi ng Note 6, version 1, http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/projects/betwixt.
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Adapting Cities to Climate Change: 
Opportunities and Constraints
Dirk Heinrichs, Rimjhim Aggarwal, Jonathan Barton, 
Erach Bharucha, Carsten Butsch, Michail Fragkias, 
Peter Johnston, Frauke Kraas, Kerstin Krellenberg, 
Andrea Lampis, Ooi Giok Ling, and Johanna Vogel
Introduction
Adaptation of cities to climate change had not been a prominent issue in aca-
demic and political debate on societal responses to global climate change for a 
long time (IIED 2007). Th e associated concern is that increased attention on 
adaptation would reduce the pressure for mitigation action—and thus foster 
(or at least indirectly allow) the continuing emission of anthropogenic green-
house gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere. Th is perspective is starting to change. 
Today adaptation is increasingly seen as an essential and integral part of pro-
posed and implemented climate policy. Th e recent Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Report (IPCC 2007, 7) states: “Th ere is high agreement 
and much evidence that with current climate change mitigation policies and 
related sustainable development practices, global GHG emissions will continue 
to grow over the next few decades.” In the meantime, cities and their residents 
have no choice other than to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Th is view 
coincides with a growing political voice for adaptation mainly in countries and 
cities that are likely to be aff ected most severely (Pielke and others 2007).
Cities around the world have started to design and implement adaptation 
strategies, oft en independent of existing national planning frameworks. Th ese 
8
Th is work was a collaborative initiative by associates of the Urbanization and Global Environmental Change Core 
Th eme of the International Human Dimensions Programme. It was supported by the German Federal Ministry for 
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“proactive” experiences have been studied and documented to some extent (see 
the special issues of Environment and Urbanization [2007] and Habitat Debate 
[2009]). Th is chapter goes beyond the investigation of “good practices” and 
explores the variety of adaptation options that cities have started to implement. 
It draws on the experience of eight cities—Bogota, Cape Town, Delhi, Pearl 
River Delta, Pune, Santiago de Chile, São Paulo, and Singapore—and compares 
their progress toward adaptation. Th e chapter focuses on two related questions: 
What motivates early adaptors to develop and implement adaptation plans? 
and What obstacles may explain the reluctance of some cities to take on the 
adaptation challenge? Th e eight cities were selected to refl ect a diversity of con-
ditions, including climatic zones, political-administrative organization, steer-
ing capacity, and state of progress toward adaptation planning and action. At 
the same time, they are large urban agglomerations that can be expected to play 
an important role in further advancing the global adaptation agenda.
Th e concept of coping capacity, defi ned as the ability to manage both the 
causes of environmental change and the consequences of that change, is central 
to this study (Tompkins and Adger 2005). Coping capacity is dependent on the 
availability of resources, authority, human capital, and social capital, as well as 
the ability to manage information, the availability of technological innovation, 
and public perception of attribution (Yohe 2001). It also depends on normative 
or motivational contexts (Haddad 2005) as well as human behavior and choices 
(Burch and Robinson 2007). Based on this, we take the view that response 
action to climate change depends on both the ability and willingness of (single 
and collective) actors to take action. In this context, we explore coping capacity 
to better understand the opportunities and obstacles to adaptation and how 
they translate into scenarios of response or nonresponse.
Th e fi rst section of this chapter provides relevant background information 
on the cases, including demographics, spatial location, administrative organi-
zation, annual temperature and precipitation, scenario trends, and whether the 
locations have national and local adaptation frameworks and action plans. Th e 
second section reports on the individual exposure of cities to climate change 
and shows the climate-related trends and existing local driving forces. As all 
the cases confi rm, climate change exacerbates many existing vulnerabilities. 
In the third section, we turn to coping capacity and explore how and to what 
extent cities are integrating climate change into local strategies and action. Th is 
pertains to questions of temporal scales, multisectoral structures and coordina-
tion, strategic orientation, new priorities, and governance arrangements. Th e 
fourth section provides an analysis across all eight cases of the opportunities 
and motivating factors that drive or obstruct adaptation planning and action. 
In the fi nal section, we elaborate on our recommendations for policy and 
research. Th e source papers (individual case reports) are available from the 
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authors as separate documents (Aggarwal 2009; Barton 2009; Bharucha and 
others 2009; Fragkias 2009; Heinrichs, Krellenberg, and Vogel 2009; Johnston 
2009; Lampis 2009; Ooi 2009).
Background of the Case Studies
As mentioned, eight cities and regions are included in this case study: Bogota, 
Cape Town, Delhi, Pearl River Delta, Pune, Santiago, São Paulo, and Singapore. 
All the cities are representative of large urban agglomerates (table 8.1). Th eir 
populations range from three to fi ve million (Cape Town and Pune) to 19 mil-
lion (São Paulo). Pearl River Delta, and the nine prefectures of its Guangdong 
province, are estimated to have a population of about 48 million people, includ-
ing 12–14 million migrants from remote provinces. Th e population changes in 
the eight cities refl ect various stages of urbanization. Th e Latin American cities 
have already passed their urbanization peak and show a rather consolidated 
status of urbanization. Annual increase in population has slowed to less than 
2 percent and takes place mainly in the suburban and periurban areas. How-
ever, intense inner-city restructuring is still taking place. Asian cities are at a 
much earlier stage of urbanization and show an impressive annual increase in 
population of about 3 to 5 percent (UN 2008).
All eight cases bundle important political and administrative functions as 
national, regional, or provincial capitals or secondary centers. Th is generally 
creates more favorable conditions in terms of access and control over politi-
cal, fi nancial, and administrative resources. However, the internal political-
administrative structures and distribution of power and capacity between local 
and regional bodies vary signifi cantly from case to case.
Because of their diff erent geographical locations and climatic zones, the 
average annual temperatures and precipitation levels in the case cities range 
from tropical climates in Singapore and Pune with seasonal monsoons; to sub-
tropical climates in São Paulo, Bogota, and Pearl River Delta; to a mild Mediter-
ranean climate in Santiago de Chile.
Cape Town, Singapore, and Pearl River Delta are the only three coastal city 
regions explored in this study. Th ese cities are therefore the only three cities 
here at risk from the eff ects of sea-level changes. Because the other fi ve cases 
are located in noncoastal areas, the study provides an opportunity to study 
anticipated changes and eff ects that go beyond the threat of sea-level rise. 
For example, other expected climate change–related challenges include tem-
perature increases and changing precipitation rates and seasonality as well as 
extreme events such as storms and fl oods. Th eir impacts will increase over time 
and will contribute to severe risks (IPCC 2007). An increase in annual median 
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TABLE 8.1 
Background Information
City
Projected 
average 
temperature 
changea 
Projected an-
nual rainfall 
change 
Anticipated 
changes in 
extreme events
Sea-level 
change 
Bogota 2–4°C increase 15% decrease Increasing 
intensity of 
rainfall events, 
heat waves, 
electrical storms
Not applicable
Cape Town 2–3°C increase 
in maximum/
minimum 
temperatures 
(by 2050)
Up to 20% 
increase in 
winter months; 
10% runoff 
decline by 2015
Increase 
of already 
signifi cant 
number and 
intensity of 
storms
Rise by 2 cm per 
decade over the 
past decade, 
projected at 
200–900 mm 
by 2100
Delhi 3–4°C increase 
(by end of 
century)
Predicted 
increase of 
about 10% in 
Gangetic plains; 
not quite clear 
from regional 
climate models
Increasing 
intensity of 
rainfall events 
and total rainfall, 
heat waves, 
increased 
drought, disease 
transmission
Not applicable
Pearl River 
Delta 
3.5°C increase 
(by end of 
century)
1% increase per 
decade during 
the 21st century
Increasing 
intensity of heat 
waves (increase 
in number of 
very hot days 
and hot nights in 
summer)
Projected at 
30 cm by 2030; 
40–60 cm 
by 2050; the 
southern part 
of the delta 
lies between 
−0.3 and 0.4 m 
relative to mean 
sea level
Pune 2.5–5.0°C 
increase (by end 
of century)
Increase 
according to 
current regional 
climatic model; 
new data 
suggest there 
could be a 
decrease
Increasing 
intensity of 
rainfall events, 
local heat 
waves, disease 
transmission
Not applicable
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National 
strategy for climate change 
National 
climate change action plan 
Local/city 
adaptation plan
Integrated National 
Adaptation Project, planned 
2008–13, implemented only 
2007 ($400,000 World Bank 
and Japanese cooperation)
Guidelines for a National 
Climate Change Policy 
(2002): estimate impacts, 
protect high mountain 
systems (water), adapt 
to sea-level rise and to 
changing epidemiological 
patterns
Nonexistent, planned in 
2008, not yet included 
in the recently published 
environmental policy 
guidelines
The national climate plan 
fl owed almost directly out of 
the Western Cape plan
Approved 2008 Approved 2006
National Environmental 
Policy 2006, National Action 
Plan on Climate Change 
passed in June 2008
Solar energy, energy 
effi ciency, sustainable 
habitat, conserving water, 
sustaining the Himalayan 
ecosystem, green India, 
sustainable agriculture, 
and strategic knowledge 
platform for climate change
“Climate Change Agenda 
2009–2012,” approved in 
2009
Nonexistent National adaptation plan 
addressing regional 
adaptation in coastal zones
Nonexistent
National environmental 
policy 2006
Approved 
June 2008
Nonexistent
continued
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City
Projected 
average 
temperature 
changea 
Projected an-
nual rainfall 
change 
Anticipated 
changes in 
extreme events
Sea-level 
change 
Santiago 2–4°C increase 40% decrease in 
lower lying areas, 
less in higher 
areas
Increasing 
intensity of 
rainfall events
Not applicable
São Paulo No information Increasing 
intensity of 
rainfall events
Not applicable
Singapore Corresponding 
to IPCC 
projections; 
increase of 
annual rainfall
Increasing 
intensity of 
rainfall events
Corresponding 
to IPCC 
projections
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: °C = degrees Celsius.
a. IPCC 2007.
TABLE 8.1, continued
temperatures has been projected for all regions where the case cities are located, 
ranging between 2 and 5 degrees Celsius. An increase in extreme events has 
been identifi ed for all city cases, including intensity in rainfall, heat waves, and 
storm events.
Although climate action plans exist on the national level for all cases, only 
Cape Town, Delhi, and São Paulo have started to formally incorporate adapta-
tion strategies into their local agendas through dedicated climate action plans.
Exposure to Climate Change and Anticipated Effects
Th is section summarizes the sectors or urban functions where impacts of cli-
mate change are anticipated. It summarizes local conditions and trends that 
reinforce local exposure to climate change impacts.
As a striking observation, all case cities are expected to face major stresses on 
water availability (table 8.2). Particular concerns relate to issues of supply scar-
city, contamination and salt water infi ltration, higher demands, and growing 
dependency on external supply. In various cases (Cape Town, Delhi, Santiago, 
and Singapore), there is explicit reference to potential distribution confl icts 
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National 
strategy for climate change 
National 
climate change action plan 
Local/city 
adaptation plan
Approved 2006 Approved December 2008 Nonexistent
Approved 2008 No information Plano Municipal de 
Mudancas Climaticas; 
approved in June 2009
Approved March 2008 Sustainable Singapore 
Blueprint approved in 2009; 
several sector action plans
Not applicable
between sectors and population groups. Th e impacts of climate change on 
health are another area of concern, including air pollution (Pearl River Delta, 
Santiago, and São Paulo), heat island eff ects (Delhi, Pearl River Delta, Pune, 
Santiago, and São Paulo), and the spread of disease vectors (all cities). Th e con-
sequences on human settlements due to sea-level rise or coastal and inland 
fl ooding in Pearl River Delta and Singapore are a further concern that could 
lead to serious disruption in the transportation and infrastructure service. 
As a consequence of increasing global temperatures, rising energy demands 
(in conjunction with heat island eff ects) are identifi ed as an issue of concern 
primarily in tropical cities. Disruption of sensitive ecosystems (from fi re or 
environmental degradation), loss of biodiversity (as in the case of Pune), and 
food security are most notably of concern in Bogota and Cape Town. Although 
they are quantifi ed in only a few of the case cities, economic losses due to cli-
mate change are signifi cant, cross-cutting impacts.
Interestingly, high convergence is seen in terms of the local conditions and 
trends that reinforce the anticipative impacts of climate change in the case 
cities (table 8.3). In-migration to ecologically sensitive areas and associated 
land-use changes are major issues. Another common factor is the adoption 
of western consumption patterns that increase per capita demands for water, 
energy, food, and land. Th is is mentioned in connection with the already 
high dependency on “external supply” of resources (such as drinking water 
or energy). A fi nal aspect is the highly inequitable distribution of associated 
risks across population groups and locations, with rising vulnerability within 
marginalized populations.
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TABLE 8.2 
Exposure of Case Cities to Climate Change Impacts 
Affected 
sector/service/use Bogota Cape Town Delhi
Pearl 
River 
Delta Pune Santiago
São 
Paulo Singapore
Water ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ecosystems ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Food ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Health ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Infrastructure ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Energy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Human settlement 
(fl oods, sea-level rise)
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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TABLE 8.3 
Exposure of Cities to Climate Change
City Anticipated impacts, knock-on 
effects
Reinforcing local conditions
Bogota Rise in fi re risk, heat effects on 
population, disease vectors, 
changing crop patterns, and food 
security
In-migration due to civil confl ict
Cape Town Water scarcity and potential 
distribution confl icts, increased 
energy consumption, heat-related 
health risks, increased water use, 
fl ooding (beaches, shorelines, 
coastal areas, infrastructure), 
stresses (fi re) on indigenous 
vegetation
High in-migration, adoption of 
western consumption patterns
Delhi Water shortages, heat waves, 
higher energy demands, fl ooding, 
rise in disease vectors
Urbanization in vulnerable areas, 
rising in-migration, increasing 
poverty levels
Pearl River Delta Haze pollution and air quality, 
regional air pollution exacerbated 
by (regional) climate change, 
contamination of local drinking 
supplies with salt water, fl ooding, 
water shortage (partly due to 
loss of mountain glaciers), heat 
island effects, food and energy 
security, urban infrastructure 
(transportation networks) risks
Regional land-use change due 
to rapid urbanization degrading 
ecosystem services, regional 
climate effects of urbanization, 
long-term droughts (generally 
anomalous wet and dry 
conditions)
Pune Water shortages, energy security 
challenges, fl ooding, siltation, 
land-use transformation, 
biodiversity loss, disease risk
Urbanization in vulnerable areas, 
rising in-migration, increasing 
poverty levels
Santiago Water scarcity, supply defi cit and 
confl icts, fl ooding, heat island 
effects
Urbanization in vulnerable areas, 
inequitable exposure to climate 
change impacts across spatial 
scale and social groups
São Paulo Spread of vector-borne diseases 
(dengue, malaria), higher water 
demand, higher energy demand 
(cooling), effects on infrastructure, 
fl ooding
Unregulated settlement leading 
to loss of green spaces and 
vegetation cover, loss of drainage/
retention function of rivers, 
building materials in Favelas 
(corrugated iron roof heats up 
houses)
continued
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City Anticipated impacts, knock-on 
effects
Reinforcing local conditions
Singapore Economic infrastructure (port, 
airport, petrochemical plants, 
refi neries in coastal areas); water 
supply becomes threatened 
(water is already purchased from 
Malaysia), increase in the spread 
of vector-borne disease, energy 
demand
Land reclamation in the low-lying 
island state (addition of 10% to 
preexisting area)
Source: Authors’ compilation.
TABLE 8.3, continued
Our fi ndings support the hypothesis that climate change eff ects add to already 
existing inequalities and vulnerabilities that are connected to high dependency 
on scarce resources. Th ese eff ects are not limited by far to coastal or deltaic cities 
alone. Clearly, eff ects need to be seen in connection with “reinforcing” local con-
ditions and factors. Crucial across all cities is the issue of water scarcity, especially 
where existing supplies are running into defi cits (Cape Town, Delhi, Pune, and 
São Paulo) and are leading to distributional confl icts.
City Adaptation Capacity and Response
Th is section examines the state of adaptation planning and action in the 
selected cities. First, we examine national-level actions. Th en we examine the 
city or regional scale. Here our descriptions focus primarily on cases where 
local action plans have been approved, implemented (Cape Town and Singa-
pore), or about to be approved (Delhi and São Paulo). Th is is complemented by 
information on the national-level experience for all eight cases.
We adopt three focal points for the discussion of responses. First, what 
action do cities take? Second, who are the main actors? Th ird, what tools and 
instruments are prescribed and used to implement adaptation action?
Actions
Our fi rst question examines motivations for adaptation as well as the fi elds of 
urban policy in which cities decide in favor of dedicated action. We also explored 
what types of responses have been initiated in the sample cities (table 8.4).
Looking at national-level strategy and action-plan preparation, the city 
responses are largely driven by the will to comply with international commit-
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ments. In one case (Colombia), fi nancial incentives and technical support have 
been available. In Delhi, Pearl River Delta, and Pune, the strategy formulation 
is used to demonstrate international “leadership.” Th e case of Cape Town is 
probably somewhat diff erent, because the preparation of the national action 
plan emerged almost directly from the Western Cape provincial plan.
At the city level, the driving factors of “early” action vary quite signifi cantly. 
In Delhi, city managers emphasize the responsibility of the city as a global 
leader. At the same time, they see the opportunity to advance their existing 
development agenda (basic service provision) through strategically accessing 
fi nancial instruments (Clean Development Mechanism). In Singapore, adapta-
tion is taken as an opportunity for technological innovation with signifi cant 
investment in research and development. In Cape Town, the preparation of 
the Western Cape provincial plan was largely driven by the experience with 
disasters and the anticipated worsening eff ects of climate change. In the case 
of São Paulo, a driving factor is the mayor’s involvement in the C40 initiative. 
Th is highlights the potential for new ideas, networks, and leadership as well as, 
especially, the variety of motivations and incentives for diff erent actors.
With regard to policy fi elds or sectors where adaptation actions are being 
implemented, plans at the national level normally break down the action plans 
and oft en quite generally prescribe guidelines for sectoral action. Surprisingly, 
no specifi c urban focus or agenda is found, except perhaps in those cases where 
frameworks and plans have identifi ed coastal areas as a concern.
City-level actions concentrate on a range of sectors, including water, energy, 
waste, infrastructure, land use, human settlement, and disaster management. 
A concern across all cases is anticipated water supply scarcity. In Cape Town, 
this has led city managers to initiate a range of actions under the adaptation 
plan to address residential consumption patterns. Behavioral change is also a 
strong emphasis in Singapore with respect to energy consumption. Th e city also 
initiated several programs for technology development with regard to water 
(desalination and recycling) and energy (for example, solar energy). Aside from 
linking supply management with demand management, action in all cases dis-
plays an increasing awareness for integrating key sectors. Some examples include 
disaster management and land use (São Paulo) or land use and transportation 
(Singapore). In Cape Town, the framework for adaptation to climate change 
represents a citywide and coordinated approach that reviews direct impacts on 
natural resources as well as secondary impacts on the socioeconomic conditions 
and livelihood of communities, and it references specifi c strategies in response 
to these impacts (Mukheibir and Ziervogel 2007). In all cases, the actions for-
mulated in the local action plans tie in to (preexisting) strategies and goals for 
sustainable development (Cape Town and Singapore) or global competitiveness 
(Delhi and Pune). Likewise, actions are legitimized by linking them to problems 
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TABLE 8.4 
Response Capacity (Action)
City What motivated action
Policy fi elds in which dedicated 
climate action has been introduced Type of action
Bogota External funding for the National 
Adaptation Project
No information No dedicated action, preexisting sectoral 
initiatives
Cape Town Existing threats, experiences with 
disasters
Water resources conservation and 
consumption, disaster management and 
preparedness
Adaptation linked to goal and ongoing 
initiatives of reducing vulnerability and 
sustainability, proactive and protecting, 
knowledge driven
Delhi National Action plan, which underlies 
India’s intention to be recognized as a 
key player in climate negotiations with 
Delhi playing a lead role domestically and 
seeking to enhance its global stature; 
need to address problems related 
to basic services provision and the 
opportunity to capitalize on CDM and 
other fi nancial mechanisms 
“Air Ambience Fund” to promote clean 
air policies, transportation (condensed 
natural gas buses), energy sector 
(greater reliance on solar, shutting down 
coal powered plants), water (rainwater 
harvesting, solar heaters), waste 
management (interceptor sewer canals)
Action plans primarily focused on 
mitigation, strongly driven by need to tap 
opportunities offered by CDM; adaptation 
linked to existing development concerns 
and largely follows a sectoral approach 
Pearl River Delta Scientifi c fi ndings and consensus on 
climate change risks, international 
collaboration (UNFCCC [common but 
differentiated responsibilities], IPCC, 
DFID), participation in international 
environmental agreements
No urban policy but China’s National 
Climate Change Program (national policy 
established by central government)
Ecosystem protection, disaster 
prevention and reduction, other 
key infrastructure construction 
(antifl ood safety of large rivers, key 
cities and regions, guarantee safe 
drinking water and sound social and 
economic development), technological 
advancement
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Pune No climate change motivators, poverty 
alleviation, disaster management
No dedicated climate change action, 
sectoral interventions in fl ooding, water 
supply, and transport (mitigation: BRT)
No dedicated action, preexisting 
sectoral initiatives, shifting of slums along 
fl ood-prone river bed, BRT system
Santiago On national level, response to international 
commitments (OECD, UN)
No dedicated plan of action No dedicated action, preexisting sectoral 
initiatives
São Paulo Mayor brought back the idea from a C40 
meeting
Disaster management, vulnerability 
analyses, “Plan Parque Lineares,” 
transportation, energy, waste 
management, health, building standards, 
land use, and resettlement
Adaptation linked to prominent concerns 
(transportation); mix of retreating, 
accommodating, and protecting; 
short-term and project orientation
Singapore Adaptation as the continuation of a 
well-established long-term/coordinated 
planning approach
Infrastructure planning: drainage of 
recent tidal barrier and reservoir, 
transportation-coordinated land use, 
energy effi ciency (technology, audits, 
standards, behavior change), water 
supply (desalination, recycling), urban 
greening
Protecting, linking with science and 
technology 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: BRT = Bus Rapid Transit; CDM = Clean Development Mechanism; DFID = U.K. Department for International Development; OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development; UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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that are “prominent” and debated in public. An example is São Paulo, where 
much of the rhetoric is linked to the transportation situation, which attracts 
much of the public debate. Th ese two aspects (continuity of the agenda, public 
relevance of the topic) seem to be important “strategic” considerations in bring-
ing adaptation action into the mainstream of local development.
With the exception of Cape Town and its clear focus on adaptation with a 
dedicated “framework for adaptation to climate change,” the city-level action 
cases do not make explicit distinctions between adaptation and mitigation. In 
Delhi, there is some indication that a focus on mitigation, motivated by the 
opportunities off ered by the Clean Development Mechanism, has thus far pre-
vented a stronger consideration of adaptation measures.
Looking at the type of response, it is useful to diff erentiate between accom-
modating, protecting, or retreating action. Coastal cities facing sea-level rise 
and extreme events seem to favor “protective” approaches (Cape Town and 
Singapore). With respect to impacts that relate to resource availability and 
redistribution, accommodating responses are adopted (Cape Town), whereby 
a main instrument is to adjust (minimize) consumption or to seek technologi-
cal solutions. For São Paulo, retreating options in the form of resettlement are 
discussed and written into the local adaption plan.
Actors
Our second question explores which actors have taken the lead on climate 
change adaptation, how responses are being coordinated (vertically and hori-
zontally), and how public and local community participation is organized.
Across all eight case study cities, the lead responsibility for adaptation lies 
with governments. In China, a concerted top-down strategy has been devel-
oped with the establishment of a “regional administration system” to coor-
dinate local responses to climate change. In all other cases, local or regional 
responsibility exists independently from national strategies. In cities with exist-
ing local action plans, three principal alternatives have materialized. (1) In 
Cape Town and Singapore, the lead responsible actor is the agency concerned 
with the environment (Environmental Resource Management section within 
the Department of Environmental Aff airs, Development and Planning in Cape 
Town, and the National Environment Agency, Ministry of Environment and 
Water Resources in Singapore). Th is may correspond to the existence of a 
strong environmental sustainable development agenda. (2) In São Paulo, the 
lead initiative is more in the political domain of the mayor’s offi  ce. Here this 
may be due to the strong personal interest and engagement of an individual 
leader. (3) In Delhi, the government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi 
is mandated to take up action in several core areas defi ned by a national plan. 
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At the city level, the Delhi climate action plan outlines diff erent projects that 
are taken up by specifi c local departments.
In cities with dedicated local action strategies, the primary mechanism for 
coordination is the action plan or framework itself. Th e process of implementa-
tion, however, varies substantially (table 8.5). In some cases (Cape Town and 
Singapore), technical working groups took over the responsibility to advance 
specifi c projects such as the Western Cape Reconciliation Strategy Study 
(WCRSS) to facilitate the reconciliation of predicted future water requirements 
over a 25-year horizon. In the case of São Paulo, the local action plan prescribes 
the formation of a dedicated multistakeholder committee (Comite Municipal 
de Mudanca do Clima e Ecoeconomia) under the Environment Department.
Th e task of engaging private sector, civil society, and local community 
stakeholders is undertaken in diff erent ways in each city. In Cape Town, the 
WCRSS involves citizens through newspaper advertisements, public meetings, 
capacity-building exercises, newsletters, and workshops with key stakehold-
ers. Th e objective is to induce behavioral change in water consumption. In São 
Paulo, the dedicated multistakeholder committee invites the private sector, civil 
society, and science community to participate. Across almost all cases, partici-
pation is generally “top-down” oriented. Th is may be associated with the per-
ception that action is primarily undertaken within the public sector domain. 
An important exception is Pune, in which a large number of nongovernmental 
organizations act as important drivers of change. A reason for strong public 
engagement is the limited civil society engagement and level of organization, 
either in general (Cape Town and Singapore) or with respect to adaptation 
in urban areas in particular. In São Paulo, a noticeable sensitivity for climate 
change and adaptation exists, but this is largely associated with the issue of the 
Amazon rainforest. With respect to local communities and individual citizens, 
some evidence across cities suggests that climate change adaptation is still only 
loosely connected to individual living conditions or lifestyles, especially in the 
emerging middle classes, which are becoming increasingly globalized as their 
resource demands and supply patterns change.
Tools and Instruments for Implementation
Our third question reviews the knowledge base and means of communica-
tion for planning eff orts. More specifi cally, we ask: How do the actors com-
municate information and generate awareness, what measures are in place to 
ensure compliance and evaluation of action, and how are adaptation projects 
fi nanced?
Not surprisingly, all existing local plans and resulting projects benefi t 
somehow from research on the uncertainty of local climate change impacts 
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TABLE 8.5
Response Capacity (Actors)
City Lead agency Principal participants Coordination mechanisms 
How participation is 
organized
Bogota Mayor, Regional Autonomous 
Corp. of Cundinamarca
National Environment Council, 
Environmental District 
Secretariat, Emergency 
Prevention and Attention 
Directorate
Cape Town City Environment Department Local authority departments, 
provincial departments, 
consultant teams
Formation of technical working 
groups 
Interactive workshops 
Delhi Government of National 
Capital Territory of Delhi, 
mandated to take up action 
in core areas defi ned by the 
National Plan
Department of Environment, 
Department of Power, Public 
Works Department, Delhi Jal 
board (autonomous water 
management agency), Delhi 
Transportation Corporation, 
NGOs
At national level, prime 
minister’s advisory council 
on climate change provides 
overall coordination of action 
plans, lead agency for 
implementation is Ministry of 
Environment and Forests
Largely top-down, occasional 
meetings of core participants
Pearl River Delta Top tier of the hierarchy 
(national government), National 
Leading Group to address 
climate change, headed by the 
Chinese premier, was set up 
in 2007 to draw up important 
strategies, policies, and 
measures related to climate 
change and to coordinate the 
solving of major problems 
Supported by a regional 
governance system; in 2007, 
the state council called on all 
regions and departments to 
strictly implement the National 
Plan for Coping with Climate 
Change
Plan’s presence and mandate 
for regional application will 
motivate action at the local 
level; establishment of a 
regional administration system 
for coordinating the work in 
response to climate change; 
building local expert group on 
climate change
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Pune Pune Municipal Corp. Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal 
Corp., cantonment 
administrations, Maharashtra 
State Electricity Board, 
Maharashtra Housing 
Development Agency, NGOs
Potential advisory by citizen 
groups to the Pune Municipal 
Corporation of environment-
related NGOs
Meetings at the Pune 
Municipal Corp.
Santiago National Environment Agency 
(CONAMA)
Government ministries and 
agencies
National Climate Change 
Committee under CONAMA, 
Agriculture and Climate 
Change Committee (Ministry 
of Agriculture)
Few meetings of core 
participants
São Paulo City government (Prefeitura de 
Cidade de São Paulo), mayor’s 
offi ce, lead delegated to the 
Environment Department
ICLEI, Fundacao Getulio 
Vargas, FADESP (Research 
Institute), Ministerio de 
Saneamiento e Energia 
(Estado de São Paulo)
Comite Municipal de Mudanca 
do Clima e Ecoeconomia 
(municipal government, 
São Paulo state, civil society, 
private sector, science 
community)
Possibility to participate on the 
committee
Singapore National Environment Agency State agencies with authority 
over land use and transport 
development and building 
controls; civil society 
organizations tend to be 
small in terms of membership 
numbers and resources; public 
sector: strong support for state 
initiative as they converge with 
their own priorities
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization.
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(table 8.6). Th e necessity of additional knowledge to identify the challenges of 
climate change therefore is highlighted in all national action plans. However, 
fundamental gaps exist in many action plans because proven local or regional 
climate scenarios are left  out in all cases. Research action to close these gaps has 
been proven to be quite diff erent. Cape Town and Singapore have engaged scien-
tifi c expertise to study long-term local eff ects of climate change. In Delhi, eff orts 
to improve the understanding of local climate eff ects are driven by national-level 
initiatives and involve both national and local research institutions. São Paulo 
engages in a process to elicit local knowledge through a series of stakeholder 
consultations with the assistance of the ICLEI and the Fundação Getulio Vargas, 
a local foundation. Obviously all cases (including those that have not yet formu-
lated “formal” action plans) benefi t from the research institutions in place.
Th e eight cities pursue options for communicating relevant information and 
creating awareness. Th e communication eff orts include general information on 
climate change and the benefi ts of adaptation, increasing awareness about the 
implications of consumption patterns, and communication about the impacts 
of climate change–related events. Cape Town has taken the most extensive ini-
tiative in relation to its water demand management activities to gain collabora-
tion by the citizens. Th e city has engaged in another project, which modeled the 
physical, biological, and social impacts arising from a “sea-level event” (inun-
dation) in the city. Th e dramatic results were publicized widely through local 
media. Th e public response to the study has been vociferous on the one hand, 
where interest groups such as land owners have objected to the report as alarm-
ist, and muted on the other hand, where the nonaff ected population regards the 
scenarios as “someone else’s problem.” Looking across the eight cases, however, 
the entire fi eld of communication, information, and awareness creation appears 
somewhat neglected even in cities where the topic of climate change has been 
picked up explicitly. More commonly, initiatives are developed in conjunction 
with related projects instead of linked directly to a climate change agenda. In 
Delhi, for example, the “Clean Yamuna” (river) water-harvesting and solar-
heating projects are being implemented essentially as awareness campaigns.
What measures are in place to ensure compliance and assessment? Singa-
pore has introduced such measures as the green mark standard for energy-
effi  cient buildings and energy audits as well as encouraging households to 
conserve energy, for example, through the 10 percent energy challenge to 
encourage energy-effi  cient habits. Th is involves mandatory energy labeling for 
common household appliances to ensure that consumers can make effi  cient, 
well-informed choices when they decide on their purchases. Market-based 
instruments are likewise being introduced. Th e installation of water meters 
and sliding-scale water tariff s in Cape Town are two examples, complemented 
by regulatory measures such as comprehensive water by-laws, including the 
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right to enforce water restrictions. Th e responsible agencies operate compli-
ance teams to monitor and enforce water use.
All climate action plans carry or, in the cases where approval is pending, 
at least propose discretionary fi nancing for climate action. In some cases, 
funding mechanisms have been put in place. An example is the Air Ambience 
Fund, fi nanced through a fee on the sales of diesel fuel. Th e plan in São Paulo 
proposes to use 5 percent of the revenues from newly discovered off shore oil 
reserves for adaptation. Singapore practices copayment and cofi nancing. Th e 
state sector in Singapore has always emphasized this form of fi nancing for 
supporting programs from housing to transport and health care, among a range 
of social, environmental, and other policies. In Cape Town, the Environmental 
Resource Management Department has an annual locally funded budget, with 
contribution from the Danish International Development Agency.
Opportunities and Constraints
Finally, we discuss what motivates the nexus of actors and organizations in cit-
ies that have started to develop and implement adaptation plans. Th is is fol-
lowed by an assessment of opportunities for local climate action. Moreover, we 
identify obstacles to adaptation in cities that have been more reluctant to take 
on the adaptation challenge as well as cities with local action plans in place.
Opportunities and Success Factors for Adaptation
One of the main drivers of adaptation action in the majority of the sample cit-
ies appears to be the clear awareness by local stakeholders of local vulnerability 
to climate change as well as perceptions of risk. Community safety and mini-
mization of disaster impacts are major objectives in many surveyed adapta-
tion plans (such as Cape Town, São Paulo, and Singapore). Initiatives are oft en 
linked to historical disaster experiences, which reinforces predictions about cli-
mate impacts and builds awareness of the need for adaptation. Th e creation of 
awareness and local knowledge is normally driven by locally relevant scientifi c 
information, which has to be communicated by adequate means. Th e identifi ca-
tion of risks by downscaling climate models and by the analysis of vulnerability 
generate political interest in understanding how the local climate is likely to 
change, how the city will be aff ected, and what local response options seem 
appropriate to confront predicted impacts. In an attempt to address existing 
uncertainties about climate change impacts, signifi cant reliance is put on uni-
versity scholars, centers, and programs and on consensus-building processes 
with aff ected stakeholders.
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TABLE 8.6
Response Capacity (Tools)
City 
Information fl ows, 
awareness creation, 
and communication 
Links to existing 
urban policy 
instruments
Knowledge basis 
on which plan was 
prepared
Implementation 
(compliance 
mechanisms, 
monitoring) Financing
Bogota Existing emergency 
funding budget
Cape Town Dedicated awareness 
campaign: newspaper, 
advertisements, public 
meetings, capacity 
building, newsletters
For water, expansion of 
existing sector policies
Water: Western Cape 
Reconciliation Strategy 
Study (25-year horizon); 
sea-level rise: risk 
assessment project to 
model and understand 
impacts
Water: comprehensive 
water by-laws include a 
range of tools: right to 
set water price, install 
water meters, enforce 
water restriction; 
making use of 
breakwaters 
compulsory
Discretionary budget
Delhi No dedicated climate 
change awareness 
programs, several 
“standalone” 
environmental 
awareness programs; 
National Action Plan 
proposed creation of
Delhi Master Plan 2021, 
JNNURM
IPCC reports, research 
at Tata Energy 
Research Institute, 
Indian Institute of 
Tropical Meteorology, 
National Mission on 
Strategic Knowledge to 
be set
Mix of regulatory 
instruments (such as 
solar water heaters 
made mandatory in all 
buildings on area of 
more than 500 squa re 
meters, digging of bore 
wells for individual use
Mitigation efforts 
funded through carbon 
market fi nancing 
and CDMs, private 
participation to be 
encouraged through 
venture funds; Air 
Ambience Fund
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integrated National 
Knowledge Network 
ministries, experts from 
industry, academia, 
and civil society 
organizations
banned in Delhi, 
allowed only for 
community use); 
market-based 
instruments (such as 
fee on sale of diesel, 
proposed introduction 
of congestion fees)
fi nanced through 
fee on sale of diesel; 
Transport Development 
Fund funded through 
tax receipts from 
registration charges 
and proposed 
congestion fees; 
funding for adaptation 
linked to existing urban 
development projects 
(such as JNNURM) 
and Department of 
Environment funding
Pearl River Delta Chinese government 
set up special 
institutions to deal with 
climate change in 1990 
and established the 
National Coordination 
Committee on Climate 
Change in 1998
Mentioned in the 
national plan but with 
no concrete strategy 
(the plan suggests a 
need for international 
technology transfers)
continued
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TABLE 8.6, continued
City 
Information fl ows, 
awareness creation, 
and communication 
Links to existing 
urban policy 
instruments
Knowledge basis 
on which plan was 
prepared
Implementation 
(compliance 
mechanisms, 
monitoring, 
and so on) Financing
Pune Experts from university 
environmental 
departments, NGOs
Annual Environment 
Status Report 
(JNNURM)
Fragmented research, 
such as urbanization; 
heat island; no 
local administration 
documentation
Not in place JNNURM
Santiago Limited to technical 
information; no regional/
local communication
National Action 
Plan links to water 
management, 
infrastructure, regulatory 
plans, and energy policy
No regional adaptation 
evaluation to date, no 
specifi c consideration of 
urban areas
Sectoral investment 
programs in fl ood 
mitigation, energy 
mix, biodiversity 
management
No dedicated budget 
for adaptation
São Paulo Website by the 
municipal government, 
perception that 
information is accessible 
only if the user knows 
that it is there
Land-use plan Plan based on a 
process of consultation, 
stakeholder 
participation, expert 
involvement, literature 
review, strong role 
of “external” support 
(ICLEI)
Fundo Municipal de 
Verde e Meio Ambiente
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Singapore Link to research 
and development in 
water technologies 
(desalination, recycling 
of sewage water) 
and energy (focus 
on alternative energy 
technologies), urban 
greenery (rooftop)
Study on understanding 
long-term effects 
of climate change 
in 2007, led by the 
Tropical Marine 
Science Institute, 
contracted by the 
National Environment 
Agency 
Various mechanisms
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: CDM = Clean Development Mechanism; IPCC = International Panel on Climate Change; JNNURM = Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission; 
NGO = nongovernmental organization.
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Second, adaptation plans are purposefully used to support and prioritize 
already existing strategies. As Cape Town and Singapore show, this ensures the 
integration and “mainstreaming” of adaptation action and serves as an oppor-
tunity to develop existing (local) development goals further. Th is guarantees 
continuity instead of radical change in local priorities. Th e focus of the adap-
tation strategy, however, seems to vary signifi cantly between cases. In Cape 
Town, adaptation is connected strongly to existing environmental programs. 
In Singapore, it supports a strategy for building competitive advantages in 
technological advancement and innovation. Th is is an important lesson and a 
potential starting point for local action in other cities. Our study reveals that, 
although not explicitly declared as climate action, related initiatives exist in 
all cities to which local climate action can be tied. An open question, though, 
remains as to whether these actions are underlining general goals and priorities 
or serve more solely as artifi cial labels in the fi eld of climate change.
Th ird, adaptation action requires strong local leadership, oft en motivated by 
opportunities to become recognized as innovative and future oriented. Local 
politicians or personalities, and oft en both, drive city adaptation actions. One 
objective is to raise visibility in regional, national, and international arenas, 
as the case of Delhi shows. Another objective is the intention to demonstrate 
“good governance” to the residents and to bring about innovation in local gov-
ernance and administration. Cape Town and its slogan “Th e city is working for 
you” serves as an example.
Fourth, local adaptation action strongly builds on interpersonal and inter-
institutional interaction to establish confi dence in priorities. Th e transfer of ideas, 
knowledge, and insight through “external” networks, that is, international or 
cross-country cooperation (such as C40, ICLEI, and United Cities and Local 
Governments), as demonstrated in the case of São Paulo, is strong across early 
adaptors. Memberships in networks and attendance at conferences go beyond 
enhancing reputation, as these relationships and events are important sources 
of ideas and information for cities. Furthermore, early movers utilize diverse 
types of climate-related events, including “internal” networks in cities, so that 
information is shared among politicians and departments and fosters partici-
pation in events at regional, national, and international levels. Th is involves the 
strong presence and engagement of both nongovernmental and community-
based organizations.
Fift h, a common practice in the implementation of adaptation plans is the 
creation of dedicated climate teams working within a centralized offi  ce and not 
attached to one specifi c sector. Th is appears to be an adequate treatment of 
the cross-cutting nature of adaptation and avoids confi ning adaptation to the 
responsibilities of one sector alone (most likely the Environment Department). 
An alternative is the creation of a Climate Protection Department within the 
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offi  ce of the mayor, as discussed in the case of São Paulo. Th is reinforces the 
interdepartmental character of climate impacts.
Finally, enhancing fi nancial capacities seems to play a role in driving adapta-
tion responses, but to a lesser degree than one would have expected. Among the 
eight cases, none of the local action plans has relied on external fi nancial assis-
tance. Expanding fi nancial capacity has been an issue in Delhi in relation to the 
Clean Development Mechanism. At the national level Colombia has benefi ted 
from fi nancial assistance in drawing up the national framework.
Constraints on Adaptation
With respect to adaptation constraints, several lessons arise from the expe-
riences of Bogota, Pearl River Delta, Pune, and Santiago, as well as from the 
“early” movers Cape Town, Delhi, and Singapore.
First, we observe very limited levels of awareness with regard to the relevance 
of climate change for local conditions. In addition, local offi  cials contacted in 
surveys tend not to recognize or promote the potential connection between 
climate change and existing development goals. Nor do they make reference 
to the potential of adaptation planning to address other priorities. In general, 
adaptation to climate change is not seen as relevant for the local development 
agenda. Where these links are reported, they are related to carbon dioxide miti-
gation, which local offi  cials view as the major response. Overall, adaptation 
does not play a prominent role. Th is perception is mirrored in the opinion held 
by the public. Awareness is low, and climate change, let alone the need to adapt 
to its consequences, is not viewed as a problem associated with local urban 
development or connected to personal consumption patterns, not even in the 
emerging middle classes.
Second, the existing defi nition and distribution of political competences and 
responsibilities are reported to be inadequate. Th is observation relates to the local 
versus national level and likewise to the distribution of responsibilities between 
the various subnational entities. In all cases, respondents report a multilevel 
coordination problem with overlapping competences resulting in weak politi-
cal competences. Although numerous coordination units between these entities 
exist, they are not defi ned by a clear division of competences that empower the 
responsible level. Adaptation to climate change is harder to achieve in such a set-
ting, because the interests of the diff erent entities tend to ignore those of others 
or to create confl ict—and do not allow an overall planning process.
A third obstacle is the limited competence for managing fi nancial resources 
at the local level. Even in the cities where local action plans are in place, they 
do not (with the exception of Cape Town) contain dedicated fi nancing mech-
anisms. More broadly, a mismatch is reported between the requirement of 
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TABLE 8.7
Opportunities and Constraints
City Opportunities Constraints 
Bogota • Strong emergency management structure
•  Clear territorial authority structure (role of mayor and regional 
corporation)
• Civil confl ict and migration patterns
•  Vulnerability to wide range of natural disasters due to 
localization
Cape Town •  Motivation primarily internal: existing threats that will be 
exacerbated, experiences with disasters
•  Dealing with existing (but exacerbating) vulnerabilities in 
government is not actively seeking profi le in this regard, but 
rather trying to develop a social conscience
•  Environmental awareness in the Western Cape has always 
been high
•  Very highly qualifi ed academic base in the local universities; 
the city and province have in most instances been receptive 
to scientifi c input and have established committees and 
forums for discussing the issues
•  Foresight required in terms of SLR: offi cials and politicians are 
less likely to respond to the threat of a distant disaster than a 
more immediate one
•  Citizens’ involvement, “social component” largely 
unrepresented in Cape Town, thus there is little to build on, 
but public awareness and pressure from NGOs is growing 
Delhi •  International role in climate change forums, building profi le of 
a global city and leadership role in climate change
•  Strong motivation to tap fi nancial opportunities through CDM
• Links with existing urban renewal missions such as JNNURM
•  Existing Bhagidari initiatives in priority areas, increasing local 
awareness
•  Rapid in-migration (20–25% slum dwellers, higher 
vulnerability)
•  Limited local revenue-raising capacity, complex relationship 
with neighboring states in National Capital Region, weak 
coordination among departments, climate change seen as a 
distant problem, development needs perceived to be more 
pressing
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continued
Pearl River Delta •  The national plan is advertised as the fi rst climate plan from 
a developing country; its presence and mandate for regional 
application will motivate action at the local level
•  National Plan has very few references to city adaptation 
action, suggested local government action is connected 
mostly to agricultural sector adaptation and the protection of 
coastal zones
•  Emphasis on mitigation action in National Plan
•  Emphasis on adaptation for agricultural production in 
National Plan (protecting yields for wheat, rice, and maize); 
strengthening forest/wetland conservation is also considered 
as enhancing adaptation capacities
•  Reduced governability capacity due to extremely rapid 
urbanization with limited control (comprehensive plans do not 
guide the observed levels of urbanization)
•  Top-down governance structure (a fi ve-tier hierarchical 
structure) imposes limits for local action
•  Policies are implemented differentially at the local level (spatial 
differentiation of governance)
•  Lack of an independent budget for energy savings, 
environment protection, and adaptation at local level
•  Economic competition among regions and special economic 
zones increases the probability of no action (China insists on 
not sacrifi cing economic growth)
Pune • Traditional water management systems (such as harvesting)
• Investments through JNNURM
• Strong engagement and involvement of NGOs
• High level of civil society involvement
• Strong refl ection and discussion in local media
• High poverty levels, increasing vulnerability
•  Rapid in-migration and unplanned settlements (40% slum 
dwellers)
• Weak coordination between local authorities
• Low levels of climate change awareness
•  Rapid dynamics of change with low reaction time in a 
multistakeholder environment
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TABLE 8.7, continued
City Opportunities Constraints 
Santiago • Increasing (local) research awareness
• Incorporation into (national) political discourse
• Engagement within regional planning instruments
•  Limited regional executive decision authority
•  Low awareness and communication
• Nonurban bias in national adaptation
São Paulo • Leadership (mayor)
•  Attach the issue of adaptation to “prominent” and cross-
cutting problems (transportation, project “Parques Lineares”)
•  Adaptation is not a priority in relation to mitigation
•  National and regional levels not perceived as meaningful 
support for adaptation agenda, national level too concerned 
with international negotiations than with “local” concerns
•  Distribution of competences between municipality, state of 
São Paulo and national government
• Lack of scientifi c knowledge on vulnerability
•  Lack of understanding of concept of adaptation and the 
potential to solve “other” priorities
• Lack of knowledge on economic implications (action, inaction)
•  Confl ict of interests (political leaders at local, regional, and 
national levels belong to different parties)
• Short-term “project” orientation
• General: lack of enforcement
•  Awareness (problems seen not related to climate change, and 
climate change not related to personal consumption patterns)
Singapore • Technology development
• “Tradition” of foresight planning
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: CDM = Clean Development Mechanism; JNNURM = Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission; NGO = nongovernmental organization; 
SLR = Sea-level rise.
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adaptation as a local challenge and the availability of local resources. Th e cases 
included in this study, despite having concentrations of a large population and 
oversight functions, mostly (with the exemption of Pune) have a limited degree 
of autonomy to decide on adaptation action according to administrative pri-
orities. Th e examples of early adaptation we have discussed highlight that set-
ting priorities is a decisive element for adaptation strategies. Setting priorities 
is primarily a political process, and it is more diffi  cult to defi ne priorities if the 
resources come from an external source, such as the national government.
A fourth factor relates to limitations in administrative competences and 
fragmentation. Developing adaptation strategies and implementing them are 
primarily tasks for the public sector. Th ese responsibilities include the provi-
sion of public goods, such as infrastructure, sanitation, public transportation, 
housing, and social policy. Across cases, constraints relate to issues such as the 
lack of regulation compelling the private sector to meet minimum social goals 
and to share public-private planning. One prerequisite for fulfi lling these tasks 
is adequate and state-of-the-art knowledge and information about (local) cli-
mate change impacts, including economic costs. Th e administrations in cities 
such as Pearl River Delta, Pune, or Santiago do not yet possess detailed and 
downscaled information about climate change impacts across sectors (such as 
infrastructure planning or water provision) and more important mechanisms 
for cross-sectoral coordination to properly address the problem of adaptation. 
Nor do mechanisms exist to capture and integrate existing local knowledge of 
adaptation that lies with aff ected stakeholders or organized community-based 
or nongovernmental organizations. As an aggravating factor, the current “frag-
mented” institutional structure prohibits a cross-cutting learning process.
A fi nal obstacle relates to the relevance of national climate action planning 
for local responses. From the perspective of city representatives, national plans 
are prepared primarily as a response to the international negotiations and pro-
cesses of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change with 
a primary focus on mitigation (instead of adaptation). More important, for the 
most part they take a sectoral perspective and, with the exception of reference 
to coastal areas, have a nonurban bias. In some instances, the national plan 
has been “victimized” by confl icting political interests with contradicting and 
vague results. Th ese arguments raise concerns about the adequacy and legiti-
macy of national plans in terms of guidance and support (table 8.7).
Conclusion
Th e examination of opportunities and constraints associated with the imple-
mentation of local adaptation measures and action plans provides insights on 
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the capacity of local actors to internalize climate change into local responses. 
Th e exercise demonstrates that the challenge of climate change adaptation to a 
large extent connects to and emphasizes existing local development concerns 
that have been debated for quite some time. For example, the eff ects of sea-
level rise, changes in temperature and rainfall, and changes in the intensity and 
frequency of extreme events add to existing vulnerabilities of populations or 
infrastructure. Likewise, they are inextricably linked with local driving factors 
that determine vulnerability. Examples include migration, land-use change, and 
the inequitable distribution of risks and opportunities across diff erent popula-
tion groups. Equally, many of the obstacles highlighted here with respect to the 
political, fi nancial, and administrative capacity are not entirely new. Th ey have 
been identifi ed and discussed in previous contexts, for example, connected to 
decentralization or, more recently, “good urban governance.”
Aside from reemphasizing existing necessities, what new insights do we 
derive?
Th e cases of Cape Town, Delhi, São Paulo, and Singapore show that cities (or 
city-states) can play a leading role as forerunners in designing local responses. 
Th ey highlight the multitude of existing options, including the instruments 
needed to ensure compliance and fund sourcing. In addition, they show how the 
issue of climate change can be integrated into local development strategies. Even 
in the most proactive cases, the main emphasis is on mitigation action. However, 
all cases off er important lessons. In each city, opportunities exist for connecting 
local climate action to already ongoing activities or instruments in areas of major 
concern. Th us, a fi rst lesson for applied research and policy is to better understand 
existing local opportunities and the ways to connect them to local climate action.
Although the cases highlight that local climate action is integrated in “estab-
lished” policy fi elds or sectors, they demonstrate the need for applying holistic 
approaches, particularly in respect to consumption levels. As the water sec-
tor shows, individual and collective preferences can no longer be disconnected 
from the policy and practice of service delivery but, rather, need to be inte-
grated. Th us, a second lesson is that a main strategy to confront the trend of 
growing scarcities will have to focus on adjusting consumption levels as a com-
plement to reuse and recycling schemes.
Adaptation will invariably push concerns about the distribution of scarce 
resources across sectors (for example, domestic water use versus water use for 
agriculture) as well as across communities and locations further to the forefront 
of the adaptation debate. Th is will be particularly true and highly problematic 
in cities where scarce resources are linked with highly inequitable access of 
diff erent population groups (Johnston and others 2008). Th us, the third lesson 
is that policy needs to pay increasing attention to long-term regulation of the 
distribution of resources between competing uses and users.
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Th e experience across cities likewise shows the need to fi nd strategies for 
engaging citizens in local adaptation action. Probably with the exception of Cape 
Town, attempts have been moderate, as has been the success. What adds to the 
task is that citizens do not correlate climate change and local eff ects with their 
own preferences and lifestyles. Th e lessons that follow is that the implementa-
tion of local climate action needs to consider communication much more prom-
inently, perhaps needs to use a large variety of communication instruments, and 
might need to emphasize the links between the local eff ects of climate change, 
“mainstream” development, and individual consumption and lifestyles.
Finally, confronting the challenges of climate change will continue to face 
uncertainties about the direction and magnitude, the eff ect on levels of expo-
sures, and the implications for policy despite attempts to bring climate models 
down to the local level. Th us, learning how to deal with uncertainty and to 
design processes that lead to “legitimate” action will be a major new challenge 
for local action.
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A Conceptual and Operational 
Framework for Pro-Poor Asset 
Adaptation to Urban Climate Change
Caroline Moser
Th is chapter introduces a new asset-focused framework whose objective is both 
analytically to understand and operationally to address the diff erent phases of 
urban climate change as they impact on the lives of poor urban communities. 
Th e framework builds on earlier research on asset vulnerability, asset adapta-
tion, and urban poverty reduction (see Moser 1998, 2007; Moser and Felton 
2007, 2009), as well as preliminary climate change–related work (see Moser and 
Satterthwaite 2008).
By way of background, the chapter briefl y reviews current approaches to 
climate change adaptation. It then describes the asset adaptation framework in 
terms of two components: fi rst, an asset vulnerability analytical framework that 
appraises the types of socioeconomic vulnerability and groups most aff ected 
by climate change–related disasters, and, second, an asset adaptation opera-
tional framework that identifi es a range of “bottom-up” climate change strate-
gies at the individual, household, and community levels. Complementing this, 
it also highlights some of the “top-down” interventions of external actors such 
as municipalities, civil society organizations, and the private sector. Th ese are 
discussed in terms of four closely interrelated “phases” of urban climate change, 
namely, long-term resilience, predisaster damage limitation, immediate 
9
Th is chapter draws heavily on numerous recent papers, including Moser and Satterthwaite (2008) and Simatele 
(2009). I would like to express my gratitude to David Satterthwaite, Danny Simatele, Alfredo Stein, and Christine 
Wamsler for their generosity in allowing me to cite from these documents and for their substantive contribution 
to this chapter.
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postdisaster response, and rebuilding. Given the importance of robust method-
ology for both research and practice, the chapter concludes with a brief descrip-
tion of the research methodology for an asset adaptation appraisal, as well as 
techniques associated with action-planning implementation strategies. Again 
these are contextualized within current methodological approaches to commu-
nity-focused climate change research and practice.
Th e chapter is intended to provide a useful theoretical framework for 
researchers seeking to better understand the link between climate change adap-
tation and the erosion of assets of the poor in cities of the global South. In addi-
tion, the operational framework seeks to set out guidelines for the development 
of specifi c tools that can be used to support pro-poor adaptation strategies 
in urban areas. Th ese may assist local authorities, community organizations, 
and other relevant institutions to design strategies to support the poor’s exist-
ing coping strategies to protect assets, as well as to rebuild them aft er climate 
change–related disasters.
Background
Th is section briefl y sets out the case for climate action in cities of the develop-
ing world and reviews some existing approaches to climate change adaptation.
The Urgency of Recognizing Climate Change 
in Cities of the Global South
Urban centers of low- and middle-income countries concentrate a large pro-
portion of those most at risk from the eff ects of climate change—as lives, assets, 
environmental quality, and future prosperity are threatened by the increasing 
risk of storms, fl ooding, landslides, heat waves, and drought and by overload-
ing water, drainage, and energy supply systems.1 Th e evidence that demon-
strates the vulnerability of urban populations to climate change is based on 
data collected over the past 30 years, showing a dramatic upward trend in the 
number of people killed or seriously impacted by extreme weather events (UN-
Habitat 2007; see also Hoeppe and Gurenko 2007). Within cities and towns, 
almost all serious disaster-related injuries and deaths occur among low-income 
groups. Th e principal driver of increasing loss of life as well as social and eco-
nomic vulnerability is poverty (limiting individual, household, and community 
investments) and exclusion (limiting public investments and services). Climate 
change not only exacerbates existing risks but also reveals new hidden vulnera-
bilities as more locations are exposed to more intense fl oods and storms (Moser 
and Satterthwaite 2008, 4).
A CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK ■ 227
Current Approaches to Climate Change and Their Associated 
Methodologies
To date, climate change mitigation has been the main focus of attention, given 
the importance of getting governments to accept the scientifi c evidence for 
human-induced climate change. Nevertheless, increasing concern with the 
complementary issue of adaptation has led to an increased focus on this aspect 
of climate change. Approaches have ranged from disaster risk reduction that 
broadened in scope to include climate change to the emergence of new specifi c 
climate change adaptation approaches. Th e diversity of approaches to climate 
change adaptation is complex, interrelated, and oft en overlapping and, there-
fore, diffi  cult to disentangle.
Table 9.1 therefore seeks to summarize some of these diff erent adaptation 
approaches in terms of the historical period when developed, the key objec-
tives, and current emphases, as well as other characteristics. It shows, fi rst, the 
critical importance that the disaster risk reduction (DDR) and disaster risk 
management (DRM) communities have played in addressing disasters over the 
past 30 years long before climate change per se had even become identifi ed as a 
global development priority; second, the emergence of newer climate change–
specifi c approaches such as climate risk management; and, third, the increasing 
convergences in disaster risk and climate change communities with approaches 
such as climate change vulnerability resilience. Although community-based 
approaches to poverty reduction have been widely implemented in the past 
few decades as a consequence of the work of community-based organiza-
tions (CBOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and participatory 
rural developmentalists such as Robert Chambers (see Chambers 1992), more 
recently this approach has also been applied to climate change adaptation.
As identifi ed in table 9.1, all these approaches to varying extents focus on 
assets primarily from the perspective of vulnerability. Th e following section, 
as identifi ed in the last row of table 9.1, elaborates on an approach that focuses 
primarily and directly on assets.
An Asset Adaptation Framework: From Asset Vulnerability 
to Asset Adaptation
Th e asset adaptation framework comprises two components that can be sum-
marized as follows, with a brief description of each:
• An asset vulnerability analytical framework that identifi es the types of 
socioeconomic vulnerability and groups most aff ected in four closely inter-
related “phases” or “stages” that can occur during urban climate change.
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TABLE 9.1 
Summary of Selected Approaches to Climate Change Adaptation
Name of 
approach
Period of 
development
Key objectives and 
current emphasis
Examples of 
institutions using the 
approach Origin Focus on assets
DRR/DRM 1980s Reduction of underlying 
factors of risk, intensity 
and/or frequency of 
disaster occurrence 
in the predisaster and 
postdisaster context 
(development, relief, 
and response) including 
climate-related and non–
climate-related disasters. 
Current emphasis is 
on the integration of 
DRR into sustainable 
development through a 
management perspective. 
Tearfund, Environment, 
Climate Change and Bio-
energy Division of FAO, 
GTZ, IDS, SIDA, DFID, 
and others
DRM (emergency/relief 
organizations, social 
scientists)
In the context of 
strengthening capacities 
and resilience 
of households, 
communities’ and 
institutions’ assets are a 
major theme
CRM 1990s/2000s Reduction of vulnerability 
to climate risk by 
maximizing positive and 
minimizing negative 
outcomes caused by 
climate change with 
the fi nal aim to promote 
sustainable development.
IDS, Energy for 
Sustainable Development 
Africa, UN Secretariat of 
ISDR, ADPC
Climate change 
adaptation community/
DRM
Due to its orientation 
toward community 
adaptation and 
institutional capacity 
building, assets are 
addressed
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Climate change 
adaptation
1990s/2000s Reduction of vulnerability 
to climate risk developed 
as a reaction to the 
1990s GHG debate that 
promoted the mitigation 
agenda. Emphasis of 
adaptation is on dealing 
with physical impacts of 
climate change.
South North, Acclimatise, 
TCPA, IIED, ADPC, ACTS
DRM/climate change 
adaptation
Assets addressed 
through the interest in 
local knowledge and 
competence
Climate change 
vulnerability 
resilience
2000s Increasing the ability 
of communities to 
withstand and recover 
from climate change–
related external shocks 
and stresses with an 
emphasis on economic 
well-being, stability of 
a community, social 
and political factors, 
institutional capacity, 
global interconnectivity, 
and natural resource 
dependence.
IDS, Tyndall Research 
Centre, Acclimatise, IIED, 
Practical Action
DRM/climate change 
adaptation
Assets addressed 
implicitly as approach 
attaches signifi cance to 
governance quality at 
municipal and local levels
continued
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TABLE 9.1, continued
Name of 
approach
Period of 
development
Key objectives and 
current emphasis
Examples of 
institutions using the 
approach Origin Focus on assets
Community-
based 
adaptation
2007 (adapted 
from poverty-
focused 
programs of 
1990s)
Support of knowledge 
and coping strategies 
of individuals and 
communities to reduce 
vulnerabilities to climate 
risk, based on individual 
and community 
knowledge of climate 
variability. 
IDS, Eldis, ACTS, ADPC, 
IISD, IIED, Practical 
Action
DRM/climate change 
adaptation (infl uenced 
by development 
experts such as Robert 
Chambers)
Assets form a central 
theme due to the bottom-
up approach emphasizing 
people’s capabilities and 
abilities 
Asset-based 
vulnerability 
and adaptation
2008 (building 
on asset 
vulnerability of 
1990s)
Analysis of asset 
vulnerability and asset 
adaptation relating 
to the erosion and/or 
protection of human, 
social, physical, and 
fi nancial assets at 
individual, household, 
and community levels for 
resilience, predisaster 
damage limitation, 
immediate postdisaster 
response, and rebuilding. 
Global Urban Research 
Centre, IIED
Asset vulnerability and 
asset accumulation 
framework, climate 
change adaptation 
Assets main basis of 
focus at different levels 
including role of external 
institutions such as 
municipalities, NGOs, and 
private sector 
Source: Adapted from Simatele 2009.
Note: ACTS = African City for Technology; ADPC = Asian Disaster Preparedness Center; CRM = community risk management ; DFID = Department for International 
Development (U.K.); DRM = disaster risk management; DRR = disaster risk reduction; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization; GHG = greenhouse gas; GTZ = German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation; IDS = Institute of Development Strategies; IIED = International Institute for Environment and Development; IISD = International Institute 
for Sustainable Development; ISDR = International Strategy for Disaster Reduction; NGO = nongovernmental organization; SIDA = Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Authority; TCPA = Town and Country Planning Association.
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• An asset adaptation operational framework, linked to the analytical frame-
work, identifi es the range of “bottom-up” climate change adaptation strate-
gies that individuals, households, and communities have developed to cope 
with the diff erent phases of climate change. It also identifi es the range of 
“top-down” interventions of external actors at city and national levels—such 
as municipalities, civil society organizations, and the private sector.
Asset Vulnerability
Analysis of the risks arising from climate change to low-income urban house-
holds and communities is grounded in the concept of vulnerability. Th is draws 
on an the development debate that recognizes poverty as more than income 
or consumption poverty and that captures the multidimensional aspects of 
changing socioeconomic well-being.2 Moser (1998) in an urban study defi nes 
vulnerability as insecurity in the well-being of individuals, households, and 
communities, including sensitivity to change. Vulnerability can be understood 
in terms of a lack of resilience to changes that threaten welfare; these can be 
environmental, economic, social, and political, and they can take the form 
of sudden shocks, long-term trends, or seasonal cycles. Such changes usually 
bring increasing risk and uncertainty. Although the concept of vulnerability 
has focused mainly on its social and economic components, in applying it to 
climate change, vulnerability to physical hazards is oft en more important.
Also of climate change, operational relevance is the distinction between vul-
nerability and capacity or capability with its links to resilience. Th e emergency 
relief literature has shown that people are not “helpless victims,” but have many 
resources even at times of emergency and that these should form the basis for 
responses (Longhurst 1994; see also ACHR 2005); there is also widespread rec-
ognition of the resources that grassroots organizations can bring to adaptation 
(Satterthwaite and others 2007; see also Huq and Reid 2007). When sudden 
shocks or disasters occur, the capabilities of individuals and households are 
deeply infl uenced by factors ranging from the damage or destruction of their 
homes and assets, to constraints on prospects of earning a living, to the social 
and psychological eff ects of deprivation and exclusion, including the socially 
generated sense of helplessness that oft en accompanies crises.
Th e fact that vulnerability can be applied to a range of hazards, stresses, 
and shocks off ers a particular advantage to the analysis of climate change–
related risks in urban contexts. Urban poor populations live with multiple 
risks and manage the costs and benefi ts of overlapping hazards from a range 
of environmental sources under conditions of economic, political, and social 
constraints. Climate change also brings a future dimension to understanding 
vulnerability. It highlights the uncertainty of future risk and, associated with 
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this, an insecurity concerning the bundle of assets that will enable adaptation 
and greater resilience or lead to increased vulnerability. An asset-based vulner-
ability approach that incorporates social, economic, political, physical, human, 
and environmental resources allows for fl exibility in the analysis and planning 
of interventions that is harder to maintain within a hazard-specifi c approach. 
It also highlights how many assets serve to reduce vulnerability to a range of 
hazards.
Vulnerability is closely linked to a lack of assets. Th e more assets people 
have, the less vulnerable they generally are; the greater the erosion of people’s 
assets, the greater their insecurity. Th erefore it is useful to defi ne assets as well 
as to identify those of particular importance in the context of climate change. 
Generally, an asset is identifi ed as a  “stock of fi nancial, human, natural, or 
social resources that can be acquired, developed, improved and transferred 
across generations. It generates fl ows of consumption, as well as additional 
stock” (Ford Foundation 2004, 9). In the current poverty-related development 
debates, the concept of assets or capital endowments includes both tangible 
and intangible assets, with the assets of the poor commonly identifi ed as natu-
ral, physical, social, fi nancial, and human capital.3 In impact assessments aft er 
disasters, assets are shown to be both a signifi cant factor in self-recovery and 
to be infl uenced by the response and reconstruction process. Where survivors 
participate in decision making, psychological recovery strengthens the recov-
ery of livelihoods and well-being. Reconstruction is a period in which either 
entitlement can be renegotiated to improve the capacity and well-being of the 
poor or poverty and inequality can be entrenched through the corresponding 
reconstruction of vulnerability.
Asset-Based Adaptation
Asset-based approaches to development are not new, and, as with poverty, 
defi nitions are rooted in international debates of the 1990s. Assets are closely 
linked to the concept of capabilities. Th us assets “are not simply resources that 
people use to build livelihoods: they give them the capability to be and act” 
(Bebbington 1999, 2029). As such, assets are identifi ed as the basis of agents’ 
power to act to reproduce, challenge, or change the rules that govern the con-
trol, use, and transformation of resources (Sen 1997). Moser (2007) distin-
guishes between an asset-index conceptual framework as a diagnostic tool for 
understanding asset dynamics and mobility and an asset-accumulation policy 
as an operational approach for designing and implementing sustainable asset-
accumulation interventions (see also Moser and Felton 2007, 2009).
To get beyond vulnerability and focus on strategies and solutions, this chap-
ter introduces an asset-based framework of adaptation to climate change that 
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identifi es the role of assets in increasing the adaptive capacity of low-income 
households and communities to this increasing phenomenon. Asset-based 
frameworks include a concern for long-term accumulation strategies (see 
Moser 2007; see also Carter 2007). Clearly the asset portfolios of individuals, 
households, and communities are a key determinant of their adaptive capacity 
both to reduce risk and to cope with and adapt to increased risk levels. As will 
be discussed, they also infl uence capacity to make demands on, and work with, 
local governments.
An asset-based adaptation strategy in the context of climate change includes 
three basic principles. First, the process by which the assets held by individu-
als and households are protected or adapted does not take place in a vacuum. 
External factors such as government policy, political institutions, and NGOs all 
play important roles. Institutions include the laws, norms, and regulatory and 
legal frameworks that either block or enable access, or, indeed, positively facili-
tate asset adaptation, in various ways. Second, the formal and informal context 
within which actors operate can provide an enabling environment for protect-
ing or adapting assets. Th e adaptation of one asset oft en aff ects other assets that 
are highly interrelated; similarly, insecurity and erosion in one can also aff ect 
other assets. Th ird, household asset portfolios change over time, sometimes 
rapidly, such as death or incapacity of an income earner. Th us households can 
quickly move into security or vulnerability through internal changes linked to 
life cycle as well as in response to external economic, political, and institutional 
variability.
An asset-based focus on climate change requires, fi rst and foremost, the 
identifi cation and analysis of the connection between vulnerability and the ero-
sion of assets. Following this, an asset-based adaptation framework then seeks 
to identify asset adaptation or resilience strategies as households and commu-
nities exploit opportunities to resist, or recover from, the negative eff ects of 
climate change.
An Asset Vulnerability Analytical Framework
Hazards created or magnifi ed by climate change combine with vulnerabilities 
to produce impacts on the urban poor’s human capital (health) and physical 
capital (housing and capital goods) and their capacity to generate fi nancial and 
productive assets. Some impacts are direct, such as more frequent and more 
intense fl oods. Th ose that are less direct include reduced availability of fresh-
water supplies. Finally, others that are indirect for urban populations include 
constraints on agriculture and thus on food supplies and increased prices that 
are likely in many places.
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To assess the vulnerability of local population to climate change, it is neces-
sary to identify the variation, in terms of both the hazards to which they are 
exposed and their capacity to cope and adapt. Th ese include settlement varia-
tions in terms of the quality of physical capital and homes, the provision of 
infrastructure (much of which should reduce risks), and the risks from fl ood-
ing or landslides. In addition, a local population’s interest in risk reduction 
through building improvements will vary depending on ownership status, with 
tenants oft en less interested, especially if their stay is temporary, for example, as 
seasonal migrants (Andreasen 1989).
Th ere may also be diff erences in people’s knowledge and capacity to act. 
Th ese include issues such as gender, with diff erences between women’s and 
men’s exposure to hazards, and their capacities to avoid, cope with, or adapt to 
them. Age is also important, with young children and older groups facing par-
ticular risks from some impacts and with reduced coping capacities. Individual 
health status is also crucial, regardless of age and gender (Bartlett 2008).
To systematize the broad range of vulnerability and “unpack” these gener-
alizations, it is useful to identify diff erent aspects or types of vulnerability to 
climate change in terms of four interrelated “phases.”
Long-Term Resilience
First is long-term resilience, which requires identifi cation of those who live or 
work in locations most at risk from the direct or indirect impacts of climate 
change, lacking the infrastructure necessary to reduce risk, or both. Among 
those most at risk are lower-income groups living in environmentally hazard-
ous areas that lack protective infrastructure. Th ese include concentrations of 
illegal settlements that oft en exist on hills prone to landslides. Risks faced in 
such sites have oft en been exacerbated by damage to natural systems, including 
the loss of mangroves or hillside vegetation and deforestation—yet areas con-
stantly exposed to fl ooding still attract low-income groups because of cheaper 
land and housing costs. Extreme-weather impacts frequently relate more to the 
lack of protective infrastructure and services than to the hazards inherent to 
urban sites. Th e lack of attention to building long-term resilience (and thus 
disaster prevention) may simply be the result more of government inertia than 
of any policy.
Predisaster Damage Limitation
When discussing predisaster damage limitation, it is important to clarify who 
lacks knowledge and capacity to take immediate short-term measures to limit 
impact. Generally high-income groups with good-quality buildings and safe, 
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protected sites do not require “emergency preparedness” measures in response 
to forecasts for storms and high tides. For groups living in less resilient build-
ings and more dangerous sites, risks to health and assets can be reduced by 
appropriate actions in response to warnings. However, to be eff ective, reliable 
information needs to reach those most at risk in advance—to be considered 
credible—and to contain supportive measures that allow them to take risk-
reducing actions. Th is includes the identifi cation of known safer locations and 
provision of transport to assist them to move.
Eff ective community-based predisaster measures to limit damage require 
levels of trust and cohesion—community social capital—that are oft en not 
present. Such social capital depends on a complex set of factors, including 
length of time in the settlement, pattern of occupation (including tenure), and 
state infrastructure-delivery mechanisms (see Moser and Felton 2007). Diff er-
ences also exist in knowledge and the capacity to act to limit risk based on age, 
gender, and health status, including diff erentials as simple as the capacity to 
run or to swim, with speed variations among diff erent groups; infants, younger 
children, adults caring for them, the disabled, and older people all move more 
slowly when responding to impending risks. In societies where women are con-
strained by social norms from leaving the home, they may move less rapidly to 
avoid fl oodwater, because many women take responsibility for young children.
Immediate Postdisaster Responses
Immediate postdisaster responses concern groups less able to cope with 
impacts. When disasters occur, they oft en separate communities, inhibiting 
responses by established community organizations. Particular groups, dif-
ferentiated by age, gender, health status, and other forms of exclusion such as 
ethnicity or religion, face particular diffi  culties in coping with the immediate 
eff ects of extreme-weather-related disasters. Infants, young children, and older 
age groups are at greater risk from the disruption these events bring to, for 
instance, supplies of safe water and food. Disaster events can also endanger the 
personal safety of girls and women, with higher risk of gender-based violence, 
abuse, and maltreatment associated with displacement, household stress, or 
both (Bartlett 2008).
Rebuilding
Poorer groups not only get hit hardest by the combination of greater exposure 
to hazards and a lack of hazard-removing infrastructure, but they also have 
less capacity to adapt aft er disasters, generally receiving less support from the 
state and rarely having any insurance protection. Postdisaster reconstruction 
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processes rarely allow the poorest groups and those most aff ected to take 
central roles in determining locations and forms of reconstruction. In many 
instances, the poorest groups fail to get back the land from which they were 
displaced, because this is acquired by commercial developers (ACHR 2005). 
When populations are forced to move, gender inequalities that exist before a 
disaster can manifest themselves in the resources and services available to sup-
port recovery and reconstruction.
Women’s needs and priorities are rarely addressed in resettlement accom-
modation, with particular problems faced by women-headed households and 
widows (see Enarson 2004). Women generally assume most child-rearing and 
domestic responsibilities. At the same time they oft en “struggle in the fast-
closing post-disaster ‘window of opportunity’ for personal security, land rights, 
secure housing, employment, job training, decision-making power, mobility, 
autonomy, and a voice in the reconstruction process” (Enarson and Meyreles 
2004, 69). Equally problematic is the failure to recognize women’s individual 
and collective capacities for recovery and reconstruction. Finally, children 
oft en experience greater physiological and psychosocial vulnerability to a range 
of associated stresses, as well as the long-term developmental implications of 
these vulnerabilities. Th us, many of the well-documented pathways between 
poverty and poor developmental outcomes for children are intensifi ed by the 
added pressures of climate change.
Community Responses to Climate Change: An Asset-
Based Adaptation Framework for Storms and Floods
Where city or municipal governments have proved unable or unwilling to pro-
vide the infrastructure, services, institutions, and regulations to reduce risks 
from extreme weather events for many of their people, they are unlikely to 
develop the capacity necessary to adapt to climate change. Th erefore adapta-
tion frameworks need to be developed to support household- and community-
based responses, as well as supporting citizen capacity to negotiate and work 
with government—and, if needed, to contest government. Th is section outlines 
such an adaptation framework, focusing on one set of likely climate change 
impacts: the increased intensity, frequency, or both of fl oods and storms.
As in the earlier discussion of vulnerability, it is useful to distinguish 
between the four closely related aspects of adaptation: long-term resilience, 
predisaster damage limitation, immediate postdisaster response, and rebuild-
ing. For each of these, asset-based actions and associated institutions or social 
actors at household, community, and government levels are identifi ed. Obvi-
ously, the greater the success in building long-term resilience, the less is the 
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need for intervention in the second, third, and fourth aspects; similarly, good 
predisaster damage limitation can greatly reduce the impacts (especially deaths 
and injuries) and reduce the scale of the required postdisaster response and 
rebuilding.
Asset-Based Adaptation to Build Long-Term Resilience
In most instances, the most eff ective adaptation in terms of avoiding disasters 
is establishing the infrastructure and institutions that prevent storms or fl oods 
from becoming disasters. For most urban centers in low- and middle-income 
countries, however, this is also the most diffi  cult to implement, because of the 
lack of funding and government capacity and the large defi cits in infrastructure 
provision that need to be remedied. Th is oft en relates to the way higher levels 
of government have retained the power, resources, and fundraising capacities 
that urban governments need.
It is important to start by recognizing that most low-income urban groups 
already have a range of measures by which they adapt to risk and to changing 
circumstances. At the same time, their survival needs and economic priorities 
oft en confl ict with risk reduction.
Table 9.2 highlights the importance of a number of issues including the 
following:
• For poor urban households, housing is the fi rst and most important asset they 
seek to acquire (see Moser and Felton 2007). Th e relocation of existing houses 
and settlements away from areas that cannot be protected from fl oods and 
storms, coupled with land-use management strategies to prevent new settle-
ments in such areas, is an important component of an asset-based strategy.
• Homeowners and renters alike will oft en resist relocation, however, because 
it can result in a decline in fi nancial capital and social networks, as well as 
the loss of the physical asset itself, the housing. Th us those who have built 
their own homes are more likely to opt for housing improvements and risk 
reduction rather than relocation.
• Home and possession insurance is one of the main means by which middle- 
and upper-income groups protect their asset base from extreme weather 
events. Th is is oft en not aff ordable, however, for low-income groups living 
in poor-quality housing at high risk. Although there is oft en scope for 
community-level action to build more resilience to extreme-weather events, 
this is diffi  cult to manage without representative, inclusive community-
based organizations.
• Community organizations cannot address some issues, however well 
organized and representative the groups are. Much of what is needed for 
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TABLE 9.2 
Asset-Based Adaptation Framework for Long-Term Resilience against 
Floods and Storms
Asset-based actions Institutions and actors
Household and neighborhood levels
Households choose to move to safer sites 
(perhaps resulting in erosion of fi nancial and 
social capital)
Households, housing fi nance agencies
Households improve housing (providing better 
protection against hazards); risk reduction 
through community space management to 
reduce local hazards (for example, install drains, 
keep drains clear)
Households, CBOs, NGOs
Households protect productive assets Households
Households get insurance (property and 
possessions) with implications for fi nancial capital
Insurance companies, NGOs, 
community-based microinsurance
Community-based disaster-response and 
preparedness training, including early-warning 
systems, safe sites, and routes to them identifi ed 
as preventative measures for human capital and 
family fi rst aid
NGOs, CBOs
Municipal or city level
Local government provide or upgrade protective 
infrastructure and adjust offi cial standards for 
building and land use
In partnership with CBOs and NGOs
Local/city government support for household 
and neighborhood action to improve dwellings 
and infrastructure (including slum and squatter 
upgrading)
Government agencies and 
households, CBOs, NGOs
City/municipal hazard mapping and vulnerability 
analysis as basis for identifying adaptation 
strategy; land-use planning so settlements do 
not end up in the most risky sites; and, where 
needed, wetlands and fl oodplains are retained 
and can fulfi ll their natural protective functions
Government agencies working with 
NGOs and CBOs
At regional and national levels
Risk-reduction investments and actions that 
are needed beyond city boundaries (such as 
upstream or within watershed)
Local and extra-local government
State framework to support the above Regional and national government
Source: Author.
Note: CBO = community-based organization; NGO = nongovernmental organization.
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long-term resilience in cities is large-scale, expensive infrastructure that 
is part of citywide systems—for instance, storm and surface drains (and 
measures to keep them free of silt and solid waste) and components of 
an eff ective piped water system, which includes getting the bulk water for 
distribution and its treatment.
• In addition, most sites at high risk from extreme weather can have risks 
reduced if building quality is improved and infrastructure and services pro-
vided. Th is, however, requires government agencies to reach agreements 
with residents over the transfer of land tenure.
• Oft en those people require resettling will not want to move if the sites 
off ered to them are too peripheral. Meanwhile, nonpoor groups will gener-
ally object to the resettlement of low-income groups close to them.
• Confl icts can develop with forced relocation, including standoff s, physi-
cal resistance, and even personal injury to those trying to defend informal 
property and associated livelihoods. Th is is exacerbated when alternative 
sites are inadequate or not provided at all.
Asset-Based Adaptation for Predisaster Damage Limitation
Turning to the second phase, the immediate period before an extreme event, 
well-conceived interventions can greatly reduce loss of life, serious injury, 
and loss of possessions, while also having the potential to moderate damage 
to homes. Th is is particularly important in cities at high risk from extreme 
weather events that lack the capacity to invest in the long-term resilience mea-
sures just mentioned. Households and communities may have well-developed 
immediate measures to cope with storms and fl ooding, based on past experi-
ence with these events and their timing. However, climate change can alter the 
frequency, timing, and severity and intensity of such events.
Table 9.3 summarizes an extensive range of interventions not only by house-
holds but also by local government, CBOs, and NGOs. One of the most impor-
tant of these initiatives is an early warning system:
• One of the foundations of predisaster damage limitation is an early warning 
system that not only identifi es the risk but also communicates information 
to all neighborhoods at risk.
• Th is is not something that low-income communities can provide for them-
selves but depends on government institutions. Many low-income countries 
do not have an adequate weather-monitoring system, although the impor-
tance of this is now more widely recognized.
• However, a warning system does not in itself necessarily generate the 
required response if local communities and households do not trust the 
information provided.
240 ■ CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
TABLE 9.3 
Asset-Based Framework for Predisaster Damage Limitation
Asset-based actions Institutions and actors
At household and neighborhood levels
Social assets in place to facilitate the 
dissemination of early warning and knowledge 
of how to respond
CBOs, NGOs, coordination with 
state agencies for early warning and 
responses, including identifi cation of 
safe sites and routes to them
Households temporarily move away from 
high-risk sites or settlements 
State provides transport to safe sites 
to those without access to private 
transport; police and civil defense 
prepare to protect assets left behind 
after the disaster has passed (such 
as from looting)
Households prepare property to withstand 
event (protecting physical capital)
Households, CBOs, NGOs
Households protect or move productive assets Households, CBOs
Community-based disaster-response and 
preparedness training, including early-warning 
systems, safe sites, and routes to them, 
identifi ed as preventative measure for human 
capital and family fi rst aid
CBOs, NGOs
At municipal or city level 
Preparation of safe spaces with services to 
which people can move temporarily
Government, NGOs, CBOs; 
oversight in early warning to ensure 
communication between state 
agencies and local focal points
Organizing corridors for mass evacuation Police and civil defense clear main 
routes to enable fast evacuation 
and to prepare for the distribution 
of relief aid
At regional and national levels
Flood management upstream Private and state-owned fl ood-
management infrastructure
Disaster early-warning system State at national and regional levels
Source: Author.
Note: CBO = community-based organization; NGO = nongovernmental organization.
Asset-Based Adaptation for Immediate Postdisaster Response
Aft er any disaster, two separate intervention points are the immediate response 
and then the longer-term follow-up. Th e two are separated largely because 
responsibility for them is generally divided between diff erent institutions, both 
within low- and middle-income countries and within international agencies. 
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Table 9.4 illustrates the role of actors at diff erent levels for immediate post-
disaster response.
One of the main infl uences on low-income groups’ capacity to address their 
postdisaster needs is the eff ectiveness of their predisaster eff orts to protect 
their assets. In addition, growing awareness of the assets and capabilities of 
women, men, youth, and children aff ected by a disaster, and their importance 
in immediate postdisaster response, has resulted in more community-focused 
approaches, which include the following:
• Maternal and child health care and nutritional supplementation are among 
the fi rst support mechanisms set up in the immediate aft ermath of disaster.
• To address the needs of human capital, health interventions beyond 
the availability of health services and provision for personal safety and 
environmental health in postdisaster situations are oft en very inadequate, 
especially for children and girls and women. Awareness of the heightened 
potential for injury is also critical aft er an extreme event, especially where 
children are concerned, requiring careful assessment.
TABLE 9.4 
Asset-Adaptation Framework for Immediate Postdisaster Response
Asset-based actions Institutions and actors
At household and neighborhood levels 
Reducing risks in affected areas (such as 
draining fl ooded areas, clearing roads), 
recovering assets
Government (mainly agencies 
responsible for disaster response), 
perhaps international agencies
Adopt cash-based social protection measures Donors, NGOs
Help restore infrastructure and services Utilities, disaster-response agencies
Support for households to restore livelihoods 
with gender-disaggregated analysis
Local governments, NGOs
Planning and implementing repairs Households, insurance companies, 
local contractors
At municipal or city level
Rapid repairs to key infrastructure and services 
such as health care, safe water provision
Government and utilities
Human capital social protection of displaced 
especially for elderly and children
Government ministries of health/
education/welfare, NGOs
Protection of physical capital to prevent looting 
and further erosion of assets
Police and security services
Support for community action Local government, NGOs
At regional and national levels Funding and institutional support
Source: Author.
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization.
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Many of the problems experienced aft er disasters are related to delivery sys-
tems for emergency and transitional assistance. Local people frequently feel 
little or no control over their lives and no role in decisions that aff ect them. Th e 
resources, skills, and social capital within local communities are oft en over-
looked in the rush to assess risks and needs. Th erefore, among the key guide-
lines for responses are the following:4
• Th e emergency response stage should be kept as short as possible, with a 
shift  to cash transfers and microfi nance projects rather than direct supply of 
goods and services.
• Where people are displaced, shelter should be organized with the aim of 
keeping family members and communities together, with a tracing service 
established to reunite people and families. Normal cultural and religious 
events should be maintained or reestablished.
• Adults and adolescents (both male and female) should participate in con-
crete, purposeful, common-interest activities, such as emergency relief 
activities. As soon as resources permit, school-aged children should have 
access to schooling and to recreational activities.
• Th e community should be consulted regarding decisions on where to 
locate religious places, schools, water points, and sanitation facilities. Th e 
design of settlements for displaced people should include recreational and 
cultural space.
• Where ethnic or other excluded groups are aff ected by disaster, they should 
be included in all postdisaster responses.
Asset-Based Adaptation for Rebuilding and Transformation
Although the reconstruction process can be an opportunity for transformation 
to address both short- and longer-term development issues, it frequently fails 
to do this, simply replacing old problems with new ones. One oft en fi nds lim-
ited understanding of how reconstruction can be turned to better advantage to 
rebuild social as well as physical assets. Table 9.5 outlines the key asset-based 
actions for rebuilding aft er a disaster. Various important interventions can be 
highlighted here:
• For poor households the most urgent issue is their housing—whether they 
can get back their previous home or the site on which to rebuild—but lack 
of land title, and government decisions that prevent rebuilding in aff ected 
areas, can both act as constraints.
• Solid gender analysis should be included in rebuilding. Oft en individual 
reconstruction does not work well, and community-led development works 
better.
A CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK ■ 243
TABLE 9.5. 
Asset-Adaptation Framework for Rebuilding after a Disaster
Asset-based actions Institutions and actors
At household and neighborhood levels
Displaced households seeking land rights and 
titles associated with political capital, rebuilding 
physical capital
Households and government 
agencies, NGOs 
Building/rebuilding homes and physical capital 
undertaken with community involvement that also 
rebuilds trust and collaboration relating to social 
capital
Households, NGOs, CBOs, 
government
Households rebuild productive capital relating to 
income-generating activities
Relatives sending remittances, 
fi nancial service institutions
Building/rebuilding houses and neighborhood 
infrastructure such as transport links and water 
and sanitation infrastructure
Households, CBOs, and government
Securing provision of infrastructure to enhance 
well-being for affected and host populations 
where relocation has been necessary
Affected and host households, local 
government, NGOs
Recovering the household and local economy Households, CBOs, NGOs, municipal 
and national governments
At municipal or city level
Building/rebuilding infrastructure (to more resilient 
standards)
Government agencies working with 
CBOs, NGOs
Rebuilding of systems of safety and security in 
communities to ensure accumulation of assets
Police and security systems
Building/rebuilding livelihoods and productive 
capital
Government working with households
At regional or national level
Rebuilding productive capital of region Financial services and banks 
Regional reconstruction of natural and physical 
capital—such as water systems
Contributions of state/provincial 
governments and national 
governments to reconstruction
Source: Author.
Note: CBO = community-based organization; NGO = nongovernmental organization.
• Th e location of rebuilt settlements has obvious implications for livelihoods as 
well as for access to such amenities as schools, markets, and health facilities.
• Housing in new settlements is oft en placed in a grid pattern on leveled land, 
which can fail to make optimal use of space from a social perspective.
• Recovering the household and local economy is a cornerstone of progres-
sive adaptation aft er a disaster. Without this, recovery and reconstruction can 
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easily reproduce or even exaggerate the social inequality and asset poverty 
that led to disaster in the fi rst place (see UNDP 2004).
• Where possible, local sourcing of materials and skills should be promoted, 
with decision-making powers transferred to survivors. Th e recovery of the 
local economy and landownership are interdependent. Loss of rights over 
land and forced resettlement during reconstruction, under the guise of 
“adaptation” or “risk reduction,” serves to transfer land rights from the poor 
to the rich.
Given space constraints, this section has highlighted a few of the most impor-
tant interventions during the four phases, prioritizing those focusing on local 
communities—even though, as shown in the tables, city and municipal govern-
ments play an equally important complementary role in adaptation. Obviously, 
eff ective adaptation strategies depend on more competent, better-resourced, 
accountable urban governments that are willing and able to work with poorer 
groups. Th is also means that urban governments need support from national 
governments and international agencies.
The Research Methodology for Testing an Asset-Based 
Adaptation Framework for Storms and Floods
To date, the asset adaptation framework described is largely hypothetical in 
nature. Although each phase is backed up by empirical evidence, as a holistic 
comprehensive framework, it still requires testing in practice. Th is fi nal section, 
therefore, provides a description of one such potential methodology. By way of 
background, as with approaches to climate change, this is contextualized within 
a range of community-focused methodologies.
Current Community-Focused Methodologies
As shown in table 9.6, within community-focused methodologies, a range of 
diff erent methods exist. Many originate in emergency or relief with objectives 
that are quite similar. Essentially they seek to map vulnerabilities and capa-
bilities of local populations as the basis for then identifying risk-reduction 
measures and action plans. Equally they all use a range of participatory rural 
and urban appraisal tools, fi rst developed for poverty analysis and the imple-
mentation of poverty reduction measures (see Chambers 1992, 1994). Th ese 
range from communitywide vulnerability and capacity assessment (CVCA) 
to participatory vulnerability assessment (PVA) to participatory impact assess-
ment (PIA), with the diff erences in names appearing to be more a question of 
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institutional branding related to organizations such as the Red Cross, Action 
Aid, or Tearfund. Th e extent to which participatory methodologies are specifi -
cally adapted to focus on climate change as against being applied generically, as 
suggested in table 9.6, may ultimately be what distinguishes them (if at all). It 
should be noted that none of the methodologies appear to focus specifi cally on 
assets, which is the unique feature of the participatory methodology for asset 
adaptation described in this chapter.
Toward a Participatory Methodology for Climate Change Asset 
Adaptation
Th is methodology combines three components: fi rst, “bottom-up” participa-
tory research undertaken in poor communities in each research city; second, a 
rapid appraisal of policies, programs, and institutions; and, third, the triangula-
tion of results using a microaction planning or consultation process.
Participatory Climate Change Adaptation Appraisal
Th e purpose of participatory climate change adaptation appraisal (PCCAA) is 
to appraise the mechanisms through which climate change directly or indi-
rectly leads to the erosion of assets. It is undertaken with diff erent social groups 
of the urban poor in research cities or towns. Th is process includes community, 
household, and individual perceptions of current policies, programs, and insti-
tutions that directly or indirectly constrain their adaptive capacity, as well as 
their recommendations concerning pro-poor adaptation policies. It comprises 
two parts.
First, an asset vulnerability analytical framework identifi es the links 
between vulnerabilities and assets. Th ese relate to both external shocks and 
stresses, as well as to internal capacities to resist or withstand them. Th is frame-
work identifi es the groups most aff ected and types of socioeconomic vulner-
ability in four closely interrelated phases or stages that can occur during urban 
climate change, namely, long-term resilience, immediate predamage limita-
tion, immediate postdisaster (including disaster emergency), and rebuilding 
(long term).
Second, an asset adaptation operational framework identifi es concrete mea-
sures to increase resilience and to reduce vulnerability in the face of long-term 
changes as well as immediate shocks that result from global climate change. 
Th is framework identifi es the range of “bottom-up” climate change adaptation 
strategies that individuals, households, and communities have developed to 
increase their resilience to cope with the diff erent phases of climate change (see 
the earlier discussion).
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TABLE 9.6 
Summary of Selected Community-Focused Methodologies Applied to 
Climate Change Adaptation
M ethod Main users Main objective Priority tools
CVCA Emergency/relief 
institutions, such 
as the Red Cross, 
city municipalities, 
NGOs, and CBOs
Analysis and mapping 
of vulnerabilities 
and capacities to 
identify risk-reduction 
measures and action 
plans (including non–
climate-related risks)
Participatory 
methodologies for 
sustainable livelihoods 
including mapping, 
focus group discussion, 
needs assessment, 
key informants, and 
institutional and 
network analysis
PVA Emergency/relief 
and development 
institutions, such 
as Action Aid 
International
Analysis and mapping 
of vulnerabilities to 
identify risk-reduction 
measures and action 
plans (including non–
climate-related risks)
Participatory 
methodological tools 
including focus group 
discussion, historical 
profi le, vulnerability 
maps, seasonal 
calendar, Venn 
diagrams, livelihood 
analysis
Vulnerability 
mapping
Emergency/relief 
and development 
institutions, such 
as Tearfund
Analysis and mapping 
of vulnerabilities to 
identify risk-reduction 
measures and action 
plans (including non–
climate-related risks)
Participatory tools 
including focus 
group discussion, 
semistructured 
interviews, key 
informants, and ground 
truthing
Local options 
for communities 
to adapt and 
technologies 
to enhance 
capacity 
(LOCATE)
Emergency/relief 
and development 
institutions, such 
as African City 
for Technology 
(ACTS) and IDRC
Identifi cation and 
implementation of 
context specifi city 
adaptation action plans 
(part of methodology 
development for 
community-based 
adaptation to climate 
change, thus including 
only climate-related 
risks)
Participatory monitoring 
and evaluation tools 
including discussion 
groups, needs 
assessments, and 
mapping
PIA Development 
institutions, NGOs 
and CBOs, and 
researchers
Identifying intervention 
measures and action 
plans
Participatory tools 
including needs 
assessments, well-
being ranking, focus 
group discussion, key 
informants, historical 
profi ling, mapping
continued
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TABLE 9.6, continued
M ethod Main users Main objective Priority tools
Asset 
adaptation
Research 
institution (GURC)
Identifi cation of 
adaptation measures 
and implementation of 
community-focused 
action-planning 
processes to address 
climate-related risks
Participatory urban 
climate change asset 
adaptation appraisal 
tools including 
community maps, 
historical profi les, 
causal fl ow diagrams, 
Venn diagrams
Source: Adapted from Simatele 2009
Note: CBO = community-based organization; CVCA = communitywide vulnerability and capacity 
assessment; GURC = Global Urban Research Centre; IDRC = International Development Research 
Centre; NGO = nongovernmental organization; PIA = participatory impact assessment; 
PVA = participatory vulnerability assessment.
A range of PVA techniques (see Moser and McIlwaine 1999) are adapted 
specifi cally for use in the PCCAA that will be undertaken with a range of 
groups within communities, identifi ed by age, gender, economic status, and 
other appropriate criteria. PCCAA tools include the following:
• Participatory community maps: to identify most vulnerable sites and 
households
• Historical profi le or time lines: to list key historical events especially relating 
to past climate change–related events
• Seasonality calendars: to identify climate change issues such as patterns of 
severe droughts (water scarcity) and issues around food security, heat waves, 
fl oods, and peaks and troughs of diseases
• Well-being ranking: to enable local people to identify diff erent social and 
economic categories in the community that will help identify the people 
most vulnerable to climate change within a community
• Listings and rankings: both general tools to see the prioritization of climate 
change issues as well as the climate change priority problems; these will help 
identify the assets diff erent groups consider important in adapting to cli-
mate change as well as the major climate change issues that local people 
consider most severe
• Climate change, disaster, and community problem time lines: these will be 
essential to identify community perceptions of changing patterns in the 
weather (and whether these coincide with those identifi ed here)
• Causal fl ow diagrams: to identify perceptions of causes and consequences 
of climate change asset-related problems (identifi ed in the problem listing 
and ranking); causal fl ow diagrams will also be used to identify individual, 
household, and community solutions
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• Institutional (Venn) diagrams: to identify institutions both within and out-
side the community that play a role in climate change adaptation strategies; 
these may be positive and negative and diff erentiated by level of importance
• Diagrammatic representations of strategies and solutions: identifying the 
type of danger, strategies, solutions, and institutions required.
Th e PCCAA is intended to be undertaken by two local research teams over a 
four-week period. Teams need to be selected in terms of their prior knowledge 
of participatory appraisal techniques, though almost certainly not on its applica-
tion to climate change issues. As in other participatory appraisals, the following 
components need to be undertaken in this time frame: training, piloting (one 
community), PCCAAs in two communities, and analysis and report writing.
A Rapid Appraisal of Current Policies, Programs, and Institutions
Rapid appraisal of current policies, programs, and institutions includes an analy-
sis of the institutional landscape; evaluation of relevant national, municipal, and 
institutional policies, regulations, and mandates, as well as scientifi c studies (such 
as weather forecasts, mapping, and research); and evaluation of relevant pro-
grams and practice from the perspectives of the stakeholders on diff erent levels.
Th e asset adaptation operational framework mentioned in this chapter is 
used to identify institutions, policies, and programs that directly or indirectly 
constrain the adaptive capacity of the urban poor; are instrumental in design-
ing, implementing, and monitoring pro-poor adaptation policies, or have the 
potential to do so.
Appraisal tools include a range of appraisal techniques, such as the following:
• Structured and semistructured interviews: these will be undertaken with 
offi  cials, program managers, and operational and technical staff  of diff erent 
institutions. Chain or purposeful sampling will be used to select the inter-
viewees working at the municipal level, such as Ministries of Housing, Envi-
ronment, Education, and Health; local-level authorities; NGOs; multilateral 
and bilateral aid agencies; and the private sector (for example, construction 
and insurance companies). “Rapid Assessment Check Lists” will be used, 
followed up with more open questions guided by interview protocols.
• Focused interviews: these will be undertaken with identifi ed key informants.
• Secondary data reviews: review of “gray” and “white” literature, including 
program documentation, national, municipal, and institutional policies, 
regulations, and mandates, as well as research studies. Th e aim is to identify 
key stakeholders and to analyze relevant policies and programs.
• Observation: identifying and analyzing key measures of selected programs. 
Th is will be carried out together with operational and technical staff  of the 
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respective implementing institutions. Recording of data is in the form of 
pictures and fi eld memos.
• Participatory research workshops: generating additional insights about 
inter-institutional cooperation and barriers in the interactions between 
selected key institutions; if possible, workshops will be organized with 
institutions working in the selected communities together with community 
groups participating in the PCCAA. Th ese will use a range of participatory 
appraisal techniques.
Th is research is undertaken simultaneously as the PCCAA by one or two team 
members.
Triangulation and Validation
Triangulation and validation of results of the programs just discussed are 
undertaken through one of the two processes.
An action-planning exercise can be used to triangulate the results from the 
diff erent actors. Th is is a participatory exercise that allows urban poor com-
munities and public authorities together to articulate and identify common 
problems, to defi ne and structure strategies and solutions, to reach consensus, 
and to negotiate collaboration (Hamdi and Goethert 1997).
Th e microplanning exercise involves, fi rst, a general assembly of the com-
munity to explain the purpose of the workshop and to select participants for 
the exercise, and, second, a microplanning workshop; this takes one day, during 
which participants from the community and the local authority identify and 
prioritize problems, identify and prioritize solutions, and reach consensus on 
the major activities that could be executed to strengthen the asset adaptation 
strategies of the community. Th e results of the workshop can then be taken to 
both the municipal council and the general assembly of the community for 
ratifi cation.
In other contexts, a formal consultation process may be appropriate. Th is 
will involve representatives of the communities in which the research took 
place, the local government as well as other local governments, NGOs, national 
authorities, and members of the international donor community. Th e results of 
the study will be discussed in groups.
Collaborative Partners to Undertake Participatory Climate Change Asset 
Adaptation Research
To undertake such research requires various research partners with compara-
tive advantages in working at diff erent levels. Th ese may include the following:
Primary research counterpart: A national, regional, or local-level institution 
is needed to take responsibility for carrying out the research and administering 
250 ■ CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
resources. Th ey will need to train and supervise local researchers who will 
carry out the PCCAA methodology research in the designated communities 
as well as the action-planning process. In addition, they will be responsible for 
systematizing and analyzing results of the participatory research, institutional 
analysis, and planning workshop results.
Research center with links with local communities: It may also be necessary to 
identify a local research center with community-level trust and contacts. Th eir 
physical installations may be used during the entire exercise: for the working 
session the fi rst week, as a logistical center during the piloting and application 
of the PCCAA in two additional communities, and aft erwards, for the week of 
systematizing the results.
Local government linkages: Personnel from the municipality are oft en needed 
to help identify the communities where the PCCAA and microplanning exer-
cise can be undertaken. Th e action plan needs to identify potential concrete 
projects to be cofi nanced by the municipality and the local community.
Scaling-up of research results and replication of methodology: To scale up 
research results it may be helpful to involve a second-tier organization whose 
staff  undertakes the PCCAA so that, as a second-tier institution that works 
through local governments and microfi nance institutions, it can replicate this 
methodology in other municipalities in which it works.
Concluding Comment
Th e Global Urban Research Centre as part of its research, teaching, and training 
program on “community empowerment and asset-based adaptation to urban 
climate change” is currently in the process of fi nalizing various case studies to 
test the research and action-planning framework in various southern African, 
Latin American, and Asian cities. As a whole, this comparative research proj-
ect will undoubtedly modify the climate change asset adaptation framework 
described in this chapter. Th e outcome then is intended to be a more robust 
theoretical framework both for researchers seeking to better understand the 
link between climate change and the erosion of assets of the poor in cities of 
the global South as well as an operational framework that sets out guidelines for 
the development of specifi c tools and methods that can be used to support the 
development of pro-poor adaptation strategies in urban areas.
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Notes
 1. Although it is diffi  cult to generalize about likely risks of urban climate change, the 
scale and nature of risk vary greatly between and within centers and between diff erent 
population groups or locations. Th e following grouping, according to certain shared 
physical characteristics that relate to climate change risk, was identifi ed by Moser and 
Satterthwaite (2008, 4). Th is includes cities already facing serious impacts from heavy 
rainstorms and cyclones (including hurricanes and typhoons) and heat waves, coastal 
location and thus impacted by sea-level rise, location by a river that may fl ood more 
frequently, and location dependent on freshwater sources whose supply may diminish 
or whose quality may be compromised.
 2. Sen’s (1981) work on famines and entitlements, assets, and capabilities, as well as 
that of Chambers (1992, 1994) and others on risk and vulnerability, infl uenced an 
extensive debate that defi ned concepts such as capabilities and endowments and dis-
tinguished between poverty as a static concept and vulnerability as a dynamic one 
that better captures change processes as “people move in and out of poverty” (Lipton 
and Maxwell 1992, 10).
 3. In addition to these fi ve assets, which are already grounded in empirically measured 
research, more “nuanced” asset categories have been identifi ed. Th ese include the 
aspirational (Appadurai 2004), psychological (Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland 2006), 
and productive and political assets, increasingly associated with human rights 
(Ferguson, Moser, and Norton 2007; Moser, Sparr, and Pickett 2007). 
 4. See Batniji, van Ommeren, and Saraceno (2006) and Sphere Project (2004), cited in 
Bartlett (2008).
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Epilogue: Perspectives 
from the 5th Urban Research 
Symposium
To do justice to the wealth of research and discussion that took place during 
the 5th Urban Research Symposium, this fi nal chapter condenses the fi ndings 
from a selection of 42 symposium papers.1 Written by leading researchers and 
academics, this synthesis is organized into four sections, refl ecting the fi ve 
thematic clusters of the symposium: (1) models and indicators to measure 
impact and performance; (2) infrastructure, the built environment, and energy 
effi ciency; (3) city institutions and governance for climate change; and (4) eco-
nomic and social aspects of climate change in cities (this last section merged 
from two of the symposium clusters).
Models and Indicators to Measure Impact and Performance
Anu Ramaswami and Joshua Sperling
Scientifi c knowledge and accurate measurement techniques to address climate 
action in cities are only now catching up with the magnitude of the urban cli-
mate challenge. Th is thematic area reviews key gaps in our knowledge to date 
and summarizes available models, fi eld measurement, and indicators in two 
main areas: (1) energy-use and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated 
with cities and (2) understanding climate risks, vulnerabilities, and adaptation 
strategies in cities.
Signifi cant transboundary exchange of energy and materials occurs between 
cities and surrounding hinterland areas. Th ese exchanges are refl ected in 
trade and transport among cities and in large-scale infrastructure such as the 
power plants that serve cities but are often located outside city boundaries. 
10
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Such transboundary activities confound measurements of GHG emissions 
at the city scale and raise many important questions, such as the following:
• What are the best methods to measure GHG emissions from cities when 
human activities in cities transcend the small geographic-administrative 
boundary of cities?
• What are the principles by which GHG emissions are allocated to urban 
residents? How is trade between cities, national and international, incorpo-
rated into GHG accounting?
• How can city-scale GHG accounting techniques be more policy relevant 
and compatible with existing methodologies established to promote carbon 
trading?
• Can city-scale GHG emissions be benchmarked and compared with 
national-scale GHG emissions and with other cities?
• What do we know about current baseline energy-use benchmarks in build-
ings and transport sectors in cities across the world?
• How can urban design—the layout and choice or urban materials—enhance 
GHG mitigation in the buildings sector?
In the commissioned research paper “Greenhouse Gas Emission Baselines for 
Global Cities and Metropolitan Regions,” Kennedy, Ramaswami, Carney, and 
Dhakal address the question of GHG accounting to incorporate transbound-
ary urban activities. Th e paper reviews key methodologies for measuring GHG 
emissions from cities and covers multiple activity sectors—energy use in sta-
tionary and mobile combustion addressing building and transport sectors, 
industrial nonenergy process emissions, waste emissions, and land-use change. 
A major breakthrough of this paper is to harmonize diff erent methods in the 
literature for estimating GHG emissions associated with cities and to develop 
a resulting consistent methodology that is applied to 43 cities across the globe. 
Th e methodology distinguishes between energy-use and direct GHG emis-
sions within urban boundaries (Scope 1 emissions) computed consistently with 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) methods, transbound-
ary contributions associated with electricity generation for use within cities 
(Scope 2), and emissions associated with marine and airline travel from cit-
ies (Scope 3). Th e paper demonstrates that data are available and that overall 
GHG emissions can indeed be computed in a consistent manner for numerous 
cities across the world. A key fi nding of the paper is that required reporting 
on Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, supplemented with optional reporting of 
Scope 3 items, off ers a robust methodology for representing GHG emissions 
associated with urban activities.
Growing interest exists in assessing spatial variation in GHG emissions both 
within urban areas as a function of urban form and across the urban-rural gra-
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dient. For example, in the paper “Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions 
in Urban Counties in the United States,” Parshall, Hammer, and Gurney have 
mapped direct fossil energy-use and GHG emissions associated with 157 urban 
areas in the United States; their paper enables analysis of geospatial variations 
in transportation-related GHG emissions with parameters such as population 
density in a case study of the New York City metropolitan area. Because the 
Vulcan data product used in the analysis does not track end use of electricity, 
overall energy use in the building stock could not be compared geospatially. 
However, the paper demonstrates the power of spatial visualization. Future 
work in this area of spatial mapping of GHG emissions will require more 
detailed utility-derived data on electricity use at higher resolutions, including 
the neighborhood level.
Th e commissioned paper by Gupta and Chandiwala, “A Critical and Com-
parative Evaluation of CO2 Emissions from National Building Stocks,” demon-
strates the importance of benchmarks for understanding and mitigating GHG 
emissions from buildings. Th eir paper provides a comprehensive analysis of 
energy-use benchmarks and GHG emissions from the building stocks in India, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States as well as insightful comparisons 
between the three nations. Th e paper examines end uses of energy and reviews 
technology and policy strategies to reduce GHG emission from the urban 
building stocks in the three countries. Changes in energy consumption profi les 
are assessed from the 1990s into the 21st century, and quantitative metrics are 
developed to represent energy-use intensities in the three nations. Design and 
policy strategies applied in the three countries to reduce GHG emissions from 
the urban building stock are surveyed and compared.
In the construction of new buildings and neighborhoods, a variety of 
factors—including density and form of buildings, orientation, building materi-
als, and landscape characteristics—all play an important role both in reducing 
energy use in buildings as well as mitigating the urban heat island eff ect. In 
“Mitigating Urban Heat Island Eff ect by Urban Design,” Bouyer, Musy, Huang, 
and Athamena provide a synthesis of some of the research streams addressing 
how urban form (characterized by the spatial proportion and arrangement of 
buildings in a neighborhood or block) along with the selection of rooft op mate-
rials determines surface albedo, which in turn aff ects energy use in buildings 
and the urban heat island eff ect. Th e authors propose preliminary indicators 
of urban form and eff ective albedo as design guides for designing blocks or 
neighborhoods with reduced energy use and, hence, lower GHG emissions. 
Th e utility of the method is demonstrated qualitatively using simulations of two 
city blocks in France.
Th e same spatial scale issues that render GHG accounting in cities chal-
lenging also arise in assessments of climate-related vulnerabilities at the city 
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scale. Currently, climate projections for the present century are provided by 
the IPCC, most recently in its Fourth Assessment Report, but these have sev-
eral limitations that inhibit their application at the city scale. First, the projec-
tions are typically provided at coarse spatial (such as hundreds of kilometers) 
and temporal (such as monthly) scales, and decisions have to be made at 
fi ner regional or local scales and require information at submonthly time 
scales. Second, the projections provide average temperature and precipita-
tion, whereas vulnerability assessments require a suite of climate informa-
tion (such as wet or dry and hot or cold spells, extreme events, and the like). 
Last but not least, they do not capture urban features, and near-term decadal 
projections are less skillful than long-term projections. Furthermore, climate 
model projections have not been linked systematically with distribution of 
vulnerabilities and societal capacities for adaptive governance. Th us, key 
questions in the area of climate adaptation at the city scale include issues 
such as the following:
• What are the best methods to downscale climate models while integrating 
key urban features such as anthropogenic heat fl uxes and urban surface 
characteristics?
• What is the range of extreme events that can be expected in cities as a con-
sequence of climate change, and how are they diff erent from larger-scale 
projections?
• What are the available frameworks for translating climate impacts into haz-
ards, risks, and adaptive strategies in cities, as planners recognize the dispro-
portionate impacts on the most vulnerable populations?
Climate change is expected to generate a range of impacts that cities must 
address in adaptation planning, including more frequent extreme heat events, 
droughts, extreme precipitation and storm events, sea-level rise, and changes 
in disease vectors. Such impacts can aff ect public health, ecosystems, and the 
many infrastructure systems, including water, energy, transportation, and 
sanitation systems, that serve cities. To better characterize these impacts, 
climate models downscaled to the urban scale are gaining more attention. 
McCarthy and Sanderson are leading the work in this arena, as presented in 
their paper “Urban Heat Islands: Sensitivity of Urban Temperatures to Climate 
Change and Heat Release in Four European Cities,” on preliminary results 
from downscaling regional climate models using an improved urban surface 
scheme (MOSES2). Th eir results indicate that when fi ner-scale urban layers 
are included—particularly anthropogenic heat fl uxes and surface characteris-
tics of urban areas—more extreme temperature impacts may be seen in cities 
than previously projected. For example, the number of hot nights in London 
for the decade of 2050 is projected to be three times greater if urban areas and 
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anthropogenic heat release are included in model simulations, when compared 
with rural areas.
A holistic framework that integrates climate impacts with associated cli-
mate hazards in cities, resulting vulnerabilities, and society’s adaptive capac-
ity is off ered in the commissioned paper by Mehrotra and others, “Framework 
for City Climate Risk Assessment.” Th e paper presents a detailed review of the 
body of literature on hazards, risks and vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacity, 
woven together in a comprehensive framework for climate adaptation in cities. 
Th e three-component framework is developed and tested in four case study 
cities—Buenos Aires, Delhi, Lagos, and New York City—and covers a range of 
hazards, including sea-level rise for coastal cities and extreme heat events for 
landlocked tropical cities such as Delhi. Th e authors note that the vulnerabili-
ties identifi ed in each city suggest diff erential impacts on poor and nonpoor 
urban residents as well as sectorally disaggregated implications for infrastruc-
ture and social well-being. In response, they highlight successful policies and 
programs at the city level that aim to reduce systemic climate risks, especially 
for the most vulnerable populations. A four-track approach to risk assessment 
and craft ing of adaptation mechanisms is proposed (including assessment of 
hazards, vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and emerging issues) so that city gov-
ernments can respond to climate change eff ectively and effi  ciently.
Although the papers in this thematic area represent recent developments 
in the fi eld, research is progressing fast. Knowledge sharing among research-
ers and between researchers and practitioners is needed as new knowledge, 
measurement tools, and appropriate indicators are developed. Currently, there 
is no single place where city-scale climate change indicators and metrics are 
located. A fi rst attempt at putting such information together in one database 
is discussed by McCarney in the last commissioned paper in this thematic 
area, “City Indicators on Climate Change.” McCarney describes the process of 
developing a standardized set of city indicators, which includes a full range 
of city-scale climate-related metrics, addressing GHG emissions, mitigation, 
adaptation, vulnerability, and resilience, while also measuring city services 
and quality of life. Th e outputs of the Global City Indicators Program can be 
expected to respond continuously to new and improved methods of measuring 
city-scale GHG emissions, sectoral energy use, climate impact projections, and 
climate adaptation capacity.
Infrastructure, the Built Environment, and Energy Effi ciency
Sebastian Carney and Cynthia Skelhorn
Cities are both large energy consumers and large GHG emitters. Th e energy 
consumption of a city is due, in part, to its infrastructure, building stock, 
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culture, economic makeup, and population densities. In addition to the energy 
directly consumed by cities, we should recognize a wide range of emissions 
associated with the production of the goods and services that are consumed 
within cities but that may have been produced elsewhere.
Th is thematic area brings together examples of research from around the 
world on how cities may decarbonize over the coming years and decades. 
When planning for reducing GHG emissions, cities must recognize their cur-
rent emissions sources and how they may seek to reduce these emissions, with-
out increasing emissions elsewhere. With the global population expected to 
increase further in coming decades, and with much of this growth expected to 
take place in cities, how future populations live, work, and travel will determine 
the energy used to perform these tasks and, therefore, the signifi cant part of 
their potential emissions.
Th e application of mitigation policies at the city scale remains in its infancy. 
Although targets for GHG reductions and (or through) renewable energy 
implementation are regularly touted, the policy linked to delivering the tar-
gets does not always enjoy the same clarity. As a consequence, it is important 
to learn from those cities that have begun to implement change. Th is is taken 
forward in “A Comparative Analysis of Global City Policies in Climate Change 
Mitigation” by Croci, Melandri, and Molteni and in “A Comparative Study of 
Energy and Carbon Emissions Development Pathways and Climate Policy” by 
Phdungsilp. Th e former considers a range of the world’s global cities, whereas 
the latter concentrates on Southeast Asian cities.
Th ese analyses are particularly complemented by the detailed work of van 
den Dobbelsteen and others in their paper on the REAP (Rotterdam Energy 
Approach and Planning) methodology, “Towards CO2 Neutral City Planning—
Th e Rotterdam Energy Approach and Planning (REAP).” Th is team modeled 
the current and potential future energy requirements of Rotterdam and com-
bined it with available renewable energy resources within the city. Th e meth-
odology follows established principles of mitigation, namely, measuring energy 
consumption, establishing areas for reduction, and minimizing waste fl ows. 
Th is structured approach, when considered with the wider documentation that 
exists online, aff ords a variety of graphical ways to communicate to wide audi-
ences the types of changes necessary to deliver emissions reductions over dif-
fering time scales.
A city-level mitigation strategy is inevitably a function of its parts, with 
buildings contributing a sizeable component of a city’s energy consumption. 
Th is requires investigating options for reducing energy consumption in the 
buildings sector in diff erent contexts and creating a situation where buildings, 
both existing and future, may be considered “more sustainable.” Th e transition 
to this point will vary across cities. Th e future energy consumption of a build-
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ing is likely to be driven by a series of factors, including behavior, building 
design, and future climate. Kershaw and Coley demonstrate the impact of the 
latter point by applying a set of existing climatic scenarios to a set of diff er-
ing building designs in “Characterizing the Response of Buildings to Climate 
Change.” Th eir research demonstrates the need for building designs to be able 
to control their internal temperatures with a variable outside temperature and 
highlights the importance of existing policies on building design on both near-
term (2020) and long-term (2080) energy consumption and wider climatic 
resilience.
Th e amount of energy consumed by a building should not necessarily be 
considered in isolation. A building has wider impacts associated with its upkeep 
that are not always included in energy balances, water being a particular exam-
ple. With water becoming scarcer, using rainwater for particular functions in 
buildings may lead to an overall reduction in energy consumption. Schmidt 
presents four demonstration projects in Berlin and provides wider insights with 
respect to rainwater use in “A New Water Paradigm for Urban Areas to Mitigate 
the Urban Heat Island Eff ect.” Th is wider impact of buildings is taken further 
in “Indicators to Assess the Sustainability of Building Construction Processes” 
by Floissac and others, who consider the emissions impact of a building’s entire 
life, from construction to demolition. Taken together, the papers in this area 
reaffi  rm our understanding of the key role of future building design and ret-
rofi tting of the existing building stock when considering both mitigation and 
adaptation—as well as the synergies between the two.
Aft er buildings, the transport sector is a key user of energy in cities. Th e 
energy consumption of both sectors is infl uenced by how a city is designed. A 
variety of approaches may be taken to reduce emissions from road transport 
within cities, which pertain to both demand- and supply-oriented measures. 
Bertaud, Lefevre, and Yuen consider both types of measures as they present a 
study on the relationships between GHG emissions, urban transport policies 
and pricing, and the spatial form of cities in the commissioned paper “GHG 
Emissions, Urban Mobility, and Effi  ciency of Urban Morphology.” Th ey suggest 
that price signals are the main driver of technological change, transport modal 
shift s, and land-use regulatory changes. Th e use of road transport within cities 
is also aff ected by other forms of available transportation, as well as travel to 
and from a city. Recognizing this, the paper by Ravella and others, “Transport 
Systems, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Mitigation Measures,” analyzes GHG 
emissions mitigation measures for diff erent modes of land transport within cit-
ies and wider interurban networks in Argentina.
Individual aspects of a city will each provide part of the mitigation solution, 
but they must be consistent with one another to deliver the best outputs. Th is 
potentially requires a framework for assessing the current emissions sources 
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and how each may contribute to a city’s emission reduction. In “Getting to Car-
bon Neutral,” Kennedy and others establish measures of cost eff ectiveness for 
reducing GHG emissions from 22 city case studies.
Th e issue of adaptation is perhaps deemed “closer to home” than mitiga-
tion, because it has a clear local impact rather than a more global impact. Pen-
ney, Ligeti, and Dickison, in their paper “Climate Change Adaptation Planning 
in Toronto,” document Toronto’s process for creating an adaptation strategy 
and framework document and refl ect on barriers to integration with existing 
city plans and programs. Th ey note the specifi c departments and programs 
involved as well as the process by which adaptation strategies were incorpo-
rated into these, but they also note barriers to implementation. In a very capti-
vating example related to addressing urban form, Carbonell and Meff ert assess 
large-scale ecosystem restoration, fl ood protection, jurisdictional advocacy and 
oversight, and land policies that promote climate change adaptation and miti-
gation for New Orleans and the wider regional ecosystem in “Climate Change 
and the Resilience of New Orleans.” Th ey make a series of recommendations 
regarding the restoration of ecosystem services and the potential benefi ts for 
urban systems.
Although we cannot accurately predict the specifi c long-term conse-
quences of a changing climate for a particular city, we should embrace this 
uncertainty; it is important to move forward with the current state of knowl-
edge and for cities to determine how best to mitigate GHG emissions in 
their own context—taking due care of national and international policies. 
Although uncertainty remains on the impacts of climate change, particularly 
at fi ne spatial scales, the research presented here and elsewhere demonstrates 
that new insights are being made available to others and are developing at 
a rapid pace. It is important for these to be translated into useful policy-
making tools.
City Institutions and Governance for Climate Change
Shobhakar Dhakal and Enessa Janes
Appropriate forms of governance and institutional involvement are critical 
for achieving successful urban climate change mitigation and adaptation. Th e 
papers in this thematic area explore a unique aspect of governance and provide 
insights on current institutional considerations in the context of climate change. 
Together, they address a set of important questions, including the following:
• What are the motivations of cities to address climate change?
• What types of climate-related governance systems are currently being devel-
oped, and what are the institutional mechanisms that have emerged?
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• What roles do nonstate and other stakeholders play in the governance 
process?
• What factors have enabled local institutions to become early adopters of cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation strategies?
• What are the major institutional barriers to successful climate change miti-
gation and adaptation in cities?
• How can we improve upon institutional capacity to enhance preparedness to 
the impacts of climatic change?
Numerous important themes emerge from the discussion of urban climate 
change and governance. First is the analysis of factors that motivate cities to act 
and their willingness to make explicit commitments to build climate resilient 
cities. We have observed that the discourse on the urban impacts of climate 
change has been historically led by municipalities and municipal networks, 
associations, and organizations such as the Mayor’s Climate Summit, ICLEI, 
C40 Cities, and the Climate Alliance. Recently, other regional initiatives and 
multilateral organizations have joined the discussions.
Th e growing role of city governments in climate change can best be attrib-
uted to the following major factors: national mandates for cities to shoulder 
climate targets, lack of leadership on the part of some national governments, 
the willingness of some cities to participate on global issues without making 
serious commitments, expectations of new technology and funding related to 
climate initiatives, and new business prospects for local economies. Moreover, 
it is not uncommon for cities, oft en in developing countries, to make climate 
mitigation commitments without developing a clear idea of the ramifi cations 
for policy and implementation.
For these reasons, local knowledge, capacity, and governance are impor-
tant for achieving successful adaptation and mitigation approaches. Carmin, 
Roberts, and Anguelovski show in the commissioned paper “Planning Climate 
Resilient Cities” that the enabling factors for early-adapter cities such as Dur-
ban and Quito are largely internal. Th ese factors include local incentives, ideas, 
and knowledge generated through local demonstration projects and local net-
works, linking adaptation to ongoing programs, and the ability to enlist the 
support of diverse stakeholders from within the city. Th ese dispel the prevalent 
notion that external factors are always the main drivers of action and help us to 
understand how a city’s internal needs and priorities act as powerful agents for 
institutional responses to adaptation.
Th e second theme in the climate change and governance discussion has to 
do with the various forms of climate change governance, many of which are 
path dependent and refl ect priorities and characteristics that are unique to 
each city. We observe that strong political leadership, very oft en by a mayor, is 
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a key component to the development of appropriate city actions. Th is is espe-
cially true in cities in developing countries where international donors, local 
scholars, and civil society groups can help advance the climate agenda at a 
rapid pace. It is clear that the ability of local governments to gather resources 
and to muster the legislative power needed to devise and enforce plans is a 
crucial factor for successful climate change governance. Th e commissioned 
paper “Cities and Climate Change: Th e Role of Institutions, Governance, and 
Planning for Mitigation and Adaptation by Cities” by Bulkeley and others 
points out that local governments can govern climate change mitigation in 
four ways: self-governing (reducing GHGs from municipal actions and activ-
ities), governing through legislation, governing by provisioning, and govern-
ing by enabling.
Th e rising interest of local governments in assuming more responsibility on 
the issue of climate change governance is a positive trend for cities around the 
globe. Nevertheless, policy debates oft en overemphasize the role of municipal 
governments and fail to take into account the limited ability of municipal gov-
ernments to induce substantial levels of emissions reductions. Th is limitation 
is due in part to structural factors in cities, such as the city’s dominant role as a 
facilitator rather than an actor, the provisioning of municipal utility services by 
the private sector, and deteriorating fi nancial performance.
Local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other urban insti-
tutions (including state and national governments, scholarly communities, and 
local stakeholders) have their own impacts on fostering climate-resilient cities. 
Although the role of municipal government is absolutely necessary for imple-
menting urban climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, it is not 
the only responsible institution. It is evident that the most successful model 
for building urban climate resilience is a multilevel system of governance. Key 
issues associated with multilevel climate change governance include how to 
integrate a city’s climate agenda into existing institutions (and vice versa), how 
to allocate responsibilities and actions across scales of governance in ways that 
allow capacity and resources to match policy infl uence, and how to foster col-
laboration and communication between various organizations and stakehold-
ers. Th e paper by Bulkeley and others, mentioned earlier, as well as “Governance 
and Climate Change” by Gore, Robinson, and Stren and “Viral Governance and 
Mixed Motivations” by Warden, address these issues with several examples, the 
last two papers focusing on Canadian and U.S. cities.
A third theme is that of governmental policy frameworks and the position-
ing of policy instruments (economic, fi scal, regulatory, information and vol-
untary, and the like) into the prevailing socioeconomic and cultural contexts 
of cities. Th e ability to formulate sound, implementable policies and to ensure 
eff ective, effi  cient results both relate to urban capacity and context. In “Adapt-
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ing Cities to Climate Change,” Heinrichs and others show us that early action 
requires strong leadership, risk awareness, interpersonal and interinstitutional 
interaction, dedicated climate teams, and enhanced fi nancial capacity. In 
“Understanding and Improving Urban Responses to Climate Change,” Sanchez 
Rodriguez emphasizes the role of urban planning in cultivating climate-resilient 
cities and questions whether planning institutions currently have the vision, 
capacity, and fl exibility to guide future urban growth in resilient directions. He 
notes that collaboration among scientists, planners, policy makers, and urban 
stakeholders is paramount. Overall, the papers in this area have perhaps weakly 
addressed the issue of policy instruments and their implementation. However, 
several papers illustrate that institutional capacity, forms of governance, and 
other factors are fundamental to the success of policy instruments.
Current discussions about climate change mitigation and adaptation take 
place in a range of forums and involve diff erent sets of stakeholders and insti-
tutions. Mitigation is oft en seen as a globally salient topic and is typically an 
intensely political issue. In contrast, adaptation is usually undertaken at the 
local scale and is less politically sensitive. Both strategies, however, should be 
integrated through the concept of urban resilience building. Th e shortcom-
ings associated with planning separately for mitigation and adaptation include 
missed opportunities for developing effi  cient infrastructure and fi nancially 
optimal climate solutions. Certainly there are no silver bullets for governance 
and institutional solutions. Every city is diff erent, and each requires diff erent 
sets of solutions suited to its social, economic, institutional, and cultural con-
text. Ultimately, we should strive for an integrated approach to resilience, char-
acterized by better coordination and coherent planning and governance.
Economic and Social Aspects of Climate Change in Cities
Chris Kennedy and Elliot Cohen
Th e papers in this area, discussing the social and economic dimensions of cli-
mate change, provide several key fi ndings. In particular, the papers demon-
strate the enormous social challenges faced by the urban poor in adapting to 
climate change and the inadequacy of current fi nancing mechanisms to address 
these challenges. Some approaches to meet these fi nancial demands are pro-
posed, highlighting the specifi c roles of the private sector, community organi-
zations, and local governments. Broader economic issues also are associated 
with climate change, such as potential changes to industry strategy and con-
sumer preferences.
Th e uneven social impacts of climate change in urban areas and the distribu-
tion of risks among populations is stressed by Bartlett and others in their com-
missioned paper “Social Aspects of Climate Change in Urban Areas in Low- and 
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Middle-Income Nations.” Hundreds of millions of urban dwellers in low- and 
middle-income nations are at risk from current and likely future impacts of 
climate change. Th e risks, however, are distributed very unevenly because of 
diff erences in the magnitude and nature of hazards in diff erent locations; the 
quality of housing, infrastructure, and services; measures taken for disaster risk 
reduction; the capacity and preparedness of local governments; and the social 
and political capital of vulnerable populations. Th e authors emphasize that 
vulnerabilities can be overcome by removing the hazards to which people are 
exposed, noting that measures taken to address climate change–related risks 
can be pro-poor, but many are antipoor and increase poverty. Th ey stress that 
pro-poor development has strong synergies with helping the poor adapt to cli-
mate change.
An asset-based framework for both understanding and operationally 
addressing the impacts of climate change on poor urban communities is pre-
sented by Moser in “A Framework for Pro-Poor Asset Adaptation to Urban 
Climate Change.” Th is framework has two components. First, the asset vulner-
ability of groups most aff ected by climate change–related disasters is appraised 
for four interrelated phases: long-term resilience, predisaster damage limi-
tation, immediate postdisaster response, and rebuilding. Second, bottom-
up and top-down strategies for climate change adaptation that individuals, 
households, and communities have developed to cope with the four phases are 
identifi ed.
In looking at the funding available for local governments to address mitiga-
tion and adaptation to climate change, Paulais and Pigey in their paper “Adap-
tation and Mitigation” fi nd there is a “mismatch between needs and fi nancing 
tools.” Existing funding sources are found to be insuffi  cient, highly fragmented, 
and generally not designed for local government use. Th ey note that an inte-
grated approach to investment in urban areas is required, and they are con-
cerned that carbon fi nance through the Clean Development Mechanism in part 
may be substituting for, rather than adding to, traditional offi  cial development 
assistance. Moreover, though estimation is diffi  cult, Paulais and Pigey suggest 
that the investment needs for mitigation and adaptation are one to two orders 
of magnitude greater than the funds available.
Several diff erent approaches to meet the fi nancial demands of climate 
change may be taken. To get more funding to local governments where it is 
needed, Paulais and Pigey consider cases with and without national interme-
diation agencies that can support or pool borrowers. To create more leverage 
and incentives for local governments, they suggest that climate change and 
pure development investment mechanisms be consolidated. Th ey also suggest 
that incentives such as hybrid loans, credit enhancement, buy-down loans, and 
various tax incentives for the private sector be used. Th e authors also encourage 
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a more prominent role for wealthy industrialized cities to partner with cities 
that are at low-income levels.
In contrast, Dodman, Mitlin, and Co in “Victims to Victors, Disasters to 
Opportunities” examine the potential for community-based initiatives to help 
the urban poor adapt to climate change. Th ey draw upon the experiences of 
the Homeless People’s Federation of the Philippines in responding to disas-
ters. At the center of the organizing methodology are community savings pro-
grams, which provide a versatile means for acquisition of and relocation to less 
vulnerable areas, thereby enhancing disaster preparedness and risk reduction. 
Th e examples from the Philippines show how appropriate responses to some 
aspects of climate change can be implemented through partnerships among 
local organizations, professionals, and city offi  cials.
Th e private sector has a substantial role to play in mobilizing resources to 
address climate change adaptation and mitigation. In “Mobilizing Private Sec-
tor Resources toward Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Action in Asia,” Park 
explores this role, particularly in Asia. He suggests that increased investment 
could be achieved using institutional structure and public policy that can facili-
tate and create business-led innovation. Park also notes that it is challenging to 
ensure that climate solutions help, or at least do not harm, poor, energy inse-
cure, and economically marginalized groups. He proposes a triple bottom-line 
strategy for fi nancing climate change action in Asia. Th is involves the following: 
(1) investing in sector-based carbon mitigation strategy for industries, encour-
aged, for example, by reduction of fuel subsidies; (2) fi nancing of community-
based ecosystem and clean energy microenterprises; and (3) building resilience 
to climate change through market-based adaptation strategies, such as catas-
trophe bonds, contingent surplus notes, exchange-traded catastrophe options, 
catastrophe swaps, and weather derivatives.
Whether as part of market-based approaches to address climate change or 
otherwise, the cost of carbon is likely to rise, which will have substantial impacts 
on municipal fi nances. Th e paper by Annez and Zuelgaray, “High Cost Carbon 
and Local Government Finance,” examines the fi nancial impacts of rising car-
bon costs using case studies from the Indian state of Maharashtra and from 
Spain. Th ey note that local government revenues are generally not dependent 
on the price of energy, and therefore local governments see negligible fi scal 
gain from increasing energy prices. However, many public services that local 
governments provide, such as garbage collection, are energy intensive. Conse-
quently, higher energy prices will create an adverse fi scal shock for local gov-
ernments. Hardest hit will be smaller, less diversifi ed governments currently 
operating at low levels of service because the most basic services tend to be 
most energy intensive. Annez and Zuelgaray suggest that the appropriate pol-
icy response will be for higher levels of government, which generate surpluses 
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from taxing energy, to compensate local governments hard hit by high energy 
bills. Th is is to protect the fi nancial integrity of local governments and to ensure 
reasonable service delivery.
Climate change also has broader economic implications for cities, a few 
of which are addressed by other papers in this section. With respect to eco-
nomic strategy, Zhang asks in her paper “Does Climate Change Make Indus-
trialization an Obsolete Development Strategy for Cities in the South?” 
whether industrialization still represents a viable development strategy in 
the context of climate change. Th rough considering the development expe-
riences of Shanghai, Mumbai, and Mexico City, Zhang argues that climate 
change makes industrialization an even more important strategy than before. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of local and national prosperity, as well as the global 
sustainability, it is critical that developing cities decarbonize their indus-
tries. Zhang suggests that the experience of Shanghai shows that this can be 
achieved. In “Th e Price of Climate,” Cavailhès and others demonstrate that 
economic benefi ts to climate change may be found, albeit in an industrialized 
country context. Th e authors use a hedonic price method to study consumer 
preferences in the face of climate change in France. Although very hot days 
are not desirable, the research shows that French households value warmer 
temperatures. Gross domestic product is calculated to rise by about 1 percent 
for a 1 degree Celsius rise in temperature.
Th e research fi ndings presented here and discussed in the symposium demon-
strate the interest of the research community and the rapid pace of production 
of new insights. At the same time, the symposium also revealed numerous areas 
where further work is required to strengthen diagnosis and policies. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the areas where most urgent research is required 
include adaptation in general, economic and social analysis broadly, and the 
specifi c needs and circumstances of developing country cities. Meanwhile, 
despite considerable uncertainty on the specifi c long-term consequences of a 
changing climate in any particular city, it is important to move forward with 
the current state of knowledge. Cities need to determine how best to mitigate 
GHG emissions in their own context—in the context of national and interna-
tional policies—and how best to respond and adapt to a changing climate. It 
is important for knowledge and research insights to be translated into useful 
policy-making tools, which we hope will follow from the 5th Urban Research 
Symposium.
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Note
 1. Apart from the papers included in this printed volume, more than 30 other edited 
papers are available as a companion, online publication at the symposium website, 
accessible through http://www.worldbank.org/urban. Titles and abstracts of these 
papers are in the appendix to this volume. Th e full versions of all papers presented at 
the symposium are also available through the symposium website. 
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in This Volume
A Critical and Comparative Evaluation of CO2 Emissions from 
National Building Stocks of Developed and Rapidly-Developing 
Countries—Case Studies of UK, USA, and India
Rajat Gupta and Smita Chandiwala
Th e IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (2007) on greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sion mitigation potential identifi ed buildings as a sector where the fastest and 
deepest cuts are likely to be made in the period up to 2030. Given such a con-
text, this paper answers the questions: What can be done to achieve signifi cant 
reductions in CO2 emissions from the existing building stock of developed 
and rapidly developing countries to reduce the worst impacts of climate 
change? How can we measure, benchmark, reduce, and manage CO2 emis-
sions from energy use in the existing building stock? What are the barriers in 
implementing appropriate CO2 reduction measures in buildings, and how can 
these barriers be reduced? A critical and comparative evaluation is undertaken 
of the approaches and policies to measure, benchmark, reduce, and manage 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions from the existing building stocks 
in  India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to share the lessons 
learned in implementing CO2-reducing policies in each of these countries. 
A comparative analysis is also undertaken of environmental rating methods, 
BRE Environmental Assessment Method/Code for Sustainable Homes 
(BREEAM/CSH) in the United Kingdom, Leadership in Energy and Environ-
mental Design (LEED) in the United States, and the Energy and Resources 
Institute’s Green Rating for Integrated Habitat Assessment (TERI-GRIHA) 
and LEED-India in India. Robust performance-based standards (in terms of 
kWh/m2/year or kg CO2/m2/year) are proposed for reducing the energy con-
sumption in existing buildings, which could be adopted by any developed or 
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developing country. It is realized that, although the United Kingdom is at the 
forefront of developing standards and methodologies for reducing the envi-
ronmental impact of existing buildings, there is a lack of good-quality bottom-
up data sets of real energy consumption in buildings. However, in the United 
States, there are good building energy datasets available, but CO2-reduction 
policies seem more fragmented in the absence of legal national-level targets 
for CO2 reduction. In India, work is ongoing on target setting, policy evalu-
ation, and initial data collection to provide baseline energy consumption in 
buildings.
Framework for City Climate Risk Assessment
Shagun Mehrotra, Claudia E. Natenzon, Ademola Omojola, Regina 
Folorunsho, Joseph Gilbride, and Cynthia Rosenzweig
Estimation of spatially and temporally disaggregated climate risks is a criti-
cal prerequisite for the assessment of eff ective and effi  cient adaptation and 
mitigation climate change strategies and policies in complex urban areas. Th is 
interdisciplinary research reviews current literature and practices, identifi es 
knowledge gaps, and defi nes future research directions for creating a risk-
based climate change adaptation framework for climate and cities programs. 
Th e focus is on cities in developing and emerging economies. Th e framework 
unpacks risk into three vectors—hazards, vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacity. 
Th ese vectors consist of a combination of physical science, geographical, and 
socioeconomic elements that can be used by municipal governments to cre-
ate and carry out climate change action plans. Some of these elements include 
climate indicators, global climate change scenarios, downscaled regional sce-
narios, change anticipated in extreme events, qualitative assessment of high-
impact and low-probability events, associated vulnerabilities, and the ability 
and willingness to respond. Th e gap between existing responses and the fl ex-
ible mitigation and adaptation pathways needed is also explored. To enhance 
robustness, the framework components have been developed and tested in sev-
eral case study cities: Buenos Aires, Delhi, Lagos, and New York City . Th e focus 
is on articulating diff erential impacts on poor and nonpoor urban residents as 
well as sectorally disaggregating implications for infrastructure and social well-
being, including health. Finally, some practical lessons are drawn for successful 
policies and programs at the city level that aim to reduce systemic climate risks, 
especially for the most vulnerable populations. Additionally, a programmatic 
response is articulated with a four-track approach to risk assessment and craft -
ing of adaptation mechanisms that leverages existing and planned investments 
in cities so that city governments can respond to climate change eff ectively and 
effi  ciently.
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City Indicators on Climate Change: Implications for Policy Leverage 
and Governance
Patricia McCarney
Risks associated with climate change are increasingly fi nding expression in 
cities. Issues of greenhouse gas emissions; sea temperature change; sea-level 
change; land and air temperature adjustments; air quality deterioration; shift ing 
rain, wind, and snow patterns; and other unstable climate shift s, while global in 
nature, fi nd particular expression in the world’s cities. Th ese phenomena serve 
to introduce new layers in our interpretation of urban risk, new complexities 
in governing cities, and new research challenges to measure and monitor these 
risks in order to inform policy, planning, and management. How do we address 
this multiple layering and new complexity? Th e vulnerability of cities to cli-
mate change is largely underestimated. Th ere is no established or standardized 
set of city indicators that measures the eff ects of climate change on cities and 
assesses those risks, nor is there a comprehensive set of indicators with a com-
mon, accepted methodology designed to measure the impact that cities have 
on climate change and the role that cities play, for example, in contributing to 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Eff ective and long-term solutions must be anchored in an empowered city 
governance approach that acknowledges the respective roles and contributions 
of a wide array of actors. Addressing climate change risk in cities must also 
be considered in a broader framework of risks confronting cities. Cities in the 
21st century are facing unprecedented challenges. Th e world’s urban popula-
tion is likely to reach 4.2 billion by 2020, and the urban slum population is 
expected to increase to 1.4 billion by 2020, meaning one out of every three 
people living in cities will live in impoverished, overcrowded, and insecure liv-
ing conditions. Social cohesion, safety, security, and stability are being tested by 
social exclusion, inequities, and shortfalls in basic services.
While the literature on urban governance is extensive and the research fi eld 
of city indicators has grown and strengthened in very recent years, there is little 
work to date on how city indicators can be used for improved governance. It 
is the intersection of city indicators and city governance that this paper begins 
to address.
Detecting Carbon Signatures of Development Patterns across a 
Gradient of Urbanization: Linking Observations, Models, and Scenarios
Marina Alberti and Lucy Hutyra
Urbanizing regions are major determinants of global- and continental-scale 
changes in carbon budgets through land transformation and modifi cation 
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of biogeochemical processes. However, direct measurements of the eff ects of 
urbanization on carbon fl uxes are extremely limited. In this paper, we discuss a 
strategy to quantify urban carbon signatures (spatial and temporal changes in 
fl uxes) through measurements that can more eff ectively aid urban carbon emis-
sions reduction scenarios and predictive modeling. We start by articulating an 
integrated framework that identifi es the mechanisms and interactions that link 
urban patterns to carbon fl uxes along gradients of urbanization. Building on a 
synthesis of the current observational studies in major U.S. metropolitan areas, 
we develop formal hypotheses on how alternative development patterns (that 
is, centralized versus sprawling) produce diff erent carbon signatures and how 
these signatures may in turn infl uence patterns of urbanization. Finally, we 
discuss the fusion of observations, scenarios, and models for strategic carbon 
assessments.
Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions in Urban Counties in the 
United States with a Case Study of the New York Metropolitan Area
Lily Parshall, Stephen A. Hammer, and Kevin Gurney
Urban areas are setting quantitative, time-bound targets for emissions reduc-
tions within their territories; designing local policies to encourage shift s 
toward cleaner energy supply, higher energy effi  ciency, and transit-oriented 
development; and exploring ways to participate in local carbon markets. Th ese 
eff orts require systematic estimates of energy consumption and emissions pre-
sented in a format and at a spatial resolution relevant for local governance. Th e 
Vulcan data product off ers the type of high-resolution, spatial data on energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions needed to create a consistent inventory for 
all localities in the continental United States. We use Vulcan to analyze pat-
terns of direct fuel consumption for on-road transportation and in buildings 
and industry in urban counties. We include a case study of the New York City 
Metropolitan Area.
Mitigating Urban Heat Island Effect by Urban Design: Forms and 
Materials
Julien Bouyer, Marjorie Musy, Yuan Huang, and Khaled Athamena
Th is paper provides a synthesis of three complementary research works 
that contribute to the same objective: proposing solutions to reduce build-
ing energy consumption by modifying local climate. Th e fi rst work explores 
urban forms: It proposes methods to describe them and analyze the climatic 
performances of classifi ed urban forms. Th e second work focuses on one 
parameter of direct relevance to urban heat island phenomenon: the surface 
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albedo. Th e albedo of a city or a district depends on surfaces’ arrangement; 
materials used for roofs, paving, coatings, and the like; and solar position. Th e 
third work proposes a simulation tool that permits one to evaluate the impact 
of the outdoor urban environment on buildings’ energy consumption. Th is 
analysis permits us to propose morphology indicators to compare the relative 
effi  ciencies of diff erent typologies. Th e conclusion discusses the relevance of 
using indicators (based on physics or morphology, related to site or to built 
form) in the urban design process and proposes a methodology to produce 
indicators.
Towards CO2 Neutral City Planning—The Rotterdam Energy 
Approach and Planning (REAP)
Andy van den Dobbelsteen, Nico Tillie, Marc Joubert, Wim de Jager, and 
Duzan Doepel
By the year 2025, the city of Rotterdam, with the largest port in Europe, aims 
to reduce its CO2 emissions by half, an ambitious plan that will require a revo-
lutionary approach to urban areas. One proactive response to this challenge is 
an exploratory study of the Hart van Zuid district. An interdisciplinary team 
has investigated how to tackle CO2 issues in a structured way. Th is has resulted 
in the Rotterdam Energy Approach and Planning (REAP) methodology. REAP 
supports initial demand for energy, propagates the use of waste fl ows, and 
advocates use of renewable energy sources to satisfy the remaining demand. 
REAP can be applied at all levels: individual buildings, clusters of buildings, 
and even whole neighborhoods. Applying REAP to the Hart van Zuid district 
has shown that this area can become CO2 neutral. Most important, REAP can 
be applied regardless of location.
An Investigation of Climate Strategies in the Buildings Sector in 
Chinese Cities
Jun Li
About 60 percent of Chinese people will be living in cities by 2030. Energy 
consumption and GHG emissions could increase exponentially with unprece-
dented urban expansion and constant rise in living standards as a result of life-
style change without drastic policies being undertaken immediately. Because 
of its long lifetime characteristics, the quality of large-scale urban infrastruc-
ture is critical to the achievement of long-term GHG emissions mitigation 
objectives in the next decades given the spectacular pace of urban develop-
ment (for example, China will build the equivalent of the whole EU’s existing 
housing area of the European Union [EU] by 2020). Here we investigate the 
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role of urban infrastructure in shaping the long-term trajectory of energy and 
climate securities protection and sustainable urban development prospects in 
China. Based on a quantitative analysis in a selected case city (Tianjin), we 
demonstrate how China can set its large cities on a sustainable energy supply-
and-demand track by building climate-resilient-buildings infrastructure in 
cities, and we also discuss the implications for fi nancing policy and institu-
tional change.
A Comparative Study of Energy and Carbon Emissions Development 
Pathways and Climate Policy in Southeast Asian Cities
Aumnad Phdungsilp
Th e United Nations has estimated that about half of the 6.5 billion world popu-
lation currently lives in cities. Moreover, an additional 1.8 billion people will 
move to urban areas by the year 2030. Understanding the relationships between 
energy-use patterns and carbon emissions development is crucial for estimating 
future scenarios and can facilitate mitigation and adaptation of climate change. 
Th is paper investigates the development pathways on selected Southeast Asian 
cities, including Bangkok, Hanoi, Jakarta, and Manila, which are major cities 
in the region in terms of energy consumption, carbon emissions, and climate 
policies. Th e paper investigates the development of energy and carbon emis-
sions and climate change mitigation strategies of the selected case studies. In 
addition, the paper attempts to estimate the energy consumption and associ-
ated carbon emissions. Th en, it compares overall patterns of selected cities and 
analysis of their climate policies.
Characterizing the Response of Buildings to Climate Change: The 
Issue of Overheating
Tristan Kershaw and David Coley
Many buildings currently demonstrate levels of overheating close to the maxi-
mum allowed by the building regulations of the countries in which they are 
located. Th erefore there is the potential that such buildings will clearly breach 
the regulations under the climatic conditions predicted as a result of climate 
change. To examine the problem, weather fi les indicative of possible future cli-
mate were created and applied to a variety of buildings. Using numerous com-
binations of buildings and weather scenarios, the modeling demonstrated that 
the projected levels of climate change engender a linear response in the internal 
temperature of the buildings. Th e resulting constant of proportionality that this 
implies has been termed the “climate change amplifi cation coeffi  cient.” Th is 
paper demonstrates that optimization of the climate change amplifi cation coef-
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fi cient during the design process of a new building will promote the adaptation 
of architectural design to the eff ects of climate change and thereby improve 
resilience.
Opportunities and Challenges to Electrical Energy Conservation and 
CO2 Emissions Reduction in Nigeria’s Building Sector
John-Felix Akinbami and Akinloye Lawal
Using an energy demand model, MADE-II (Model for Analysis of Demand 
for Energy), the electrical energy demand for household, commercial, and 
industrial buildings over a long-term period was estimated for Nigeria based 
on the concept of useful energy demand. Th is analytical tool uses a com-
bination of statistical, econometric, and engineering process techniques in 
arriving at the useful electrical energy demand projections. Th e associated 
CO2 emissions were also estimated. Th ese projections reveal that the electri-
cal energy growth is enormous, especially considering the associated fi nan-
cial cost, and the estimated CO2 emissions are also substantial. Th is study 
therefore discusses the potentials for effi  cient energy use in the buildings sec-
tor in Nigeria. In addition, obstacles to the full realization of energy-saving 
potentials in the nation’s building sector are discussed. Finally, a framework 
of strategies to overcome these obstacles, to promote energy conservation, 
and thereby to enhance sustainable development in the nation’s built environ-
ment is suggested.
Indicators to Assess the Sustainability of Building Construction 
Processes
Luc Floissac, Alain Marcom, Anne-Sophie Colas, Quoc-Bao Bui, and 
Jean-Claude Morel
Th is paper proposes a way to assess the sustainability of building construction 
processes. Th e impacts of building materials, energy and material consump-
tion, waste and nuisance generation, management of materials at end of life, 
building construction organization, and social impacts are used to evaluate 
sustainability. Indicators are proposed for each of these areas, and the results 
from applying these indicators are assessed.
Th e case study presented here concerns the construction of three private 
houses in a developed country (France). Th ese houses have the same architec-
ture, but each one uses a diff erent building process: local materials, standard 
industrial productions, or “fashionable” industrial materials. Th is paper shows 
that the proposed indicators can help to facilitate the choice of construction 
materials with respect to sustainability.
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Transport Systems, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Mitigation 
Measures: A Study in Argentina
Olga Ravella, Cristian Matti, Nora Giacobbe, Laura Aon, and 
Julieta Frediani
Th is paper aims to present the results of the analysis of greenhouse gas emis-
sions mitigation measures for diff erent modes of land transport in Argentina. 
It traces eff orts to analyze diff erent transport patterns by applying a bottom-
up analysis from the study of interurban corridors and urban areas. Th is 
type of analysis as well as the collection and organization of disaggregated 
information is the fi rst attempt of this type in the country. Th e methodology 
comprises two sets of activities: (1) the estimations of indicators on transport 
patterns and their related emissions and (2) the formulation of scenarios to 
analyze the potential impact of diff erent mitigation measures. Information 
related to interurban corridors includes data on highways and geography 
recorded at intervals with diff erent levels of activity, while several studies of 
urban areas rely on contrasting compact and dispersed areas of the baseline 
city and the extrapolation of data obtained to fi ve cities in the country. Th e 
study analyzes four potential measures: mode transfer, lower speed, changes 
in cargo transportation schedule, and good practices. Finally, limitations and 
recommendations related to the study and application of the analyzed mea-
sures as well as further research required to improve this type of study are 
suggested.
The Role of Intelligent Transport Systems for Demand Responsive 
Transport
Robert Clavel, Elodie Castex, and Didier Josselin
Demand Responsive Transport (DRT) is a public transport system that pro-
vides the user with the advantages of both public transport and taxi services. 
It was oft en considered as a marginal mode of transport reserved for areas 
with low population densities. Since the end of the 1990s, the number of DRT 
systems has been increasing consistently, with new investments in urban, 
suburban, and rural spaces and with varying degrees of operational fl exibil-
ity. Th e fl exibility and effi  ciency of DRT systems are infl uenced by several 
factors, the most important being technological. Most of these technologi-
cal developments are in the fi eld of information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT). Th is paper illustrates the use of technology to improve DRT 
effi  ciency with two case studies from France (Pays du Doubs C entral and 
Toulouse). Th e type and level of ICT used is strongly dependent on the type 
of DRT service, its level of fl exibility, and its specifi c optimization problem. 
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Th e examples of Doubs Central and Toulouse, two diff erent areas, show that 
technology can play a key role to optimize DRT trips and to bring quality 
service to the population in a large area or when the patronage is high. Tech-
nology off ers the potential for achieving real-time demand responsiveness in 
transport services, particularly in complex networks, to a level far in advance 
of manual systems.
Urban Sprawl and Climate Change: A Statistical Exploration of 
Cause and Effect, with Policy Options for the EU
Istvan Laszlo Bart
Th e EU should get involved in regulating the growth of cities. Th e great impact 
of sprawling urban development on greenhouse gas emissions makes this 
inevitable. Governments cannot aff ord to watch idly as the hard-earned gains 
in reducing emissions elsewhere are obliterated by cities built to require ever-
greater car use.
Th e growing demand for urban, car-based transport is a main driver in 
the growth of transport emissions. As the ever greater demand for automo-
bile use is rooted in the car-centric way cities are being built today, these 
emissions cannot be checked alone by technical solutions that reduce per-
kilometer CO2 emissions. Because people want maximum comfort, this can 
be achieved only by building cities where not having a car is an advantage, 
not an impediment.
Urban planning is no longer just a local or national issue; its impact on cli-
mate change makes it a matter for the EU to regulate. It is also clear that in 
most places local governments are unable to prevent an ever-greater sprawling 
of cities. Th e objective of regulation should be to make sure that new urban 
development is not exclusively car oriented, thus minimizing the increase of 
transport-related greenhouse gas emissions. EU-level regulation may be done 
through establishing minimum standards of certain indicators, but emissions 
trading with the participation of parking space providers is also a possible 
method of controlling transport emissions and at the same time ensuring that 
future urban development is not exclusively car oriented.
Th is study provides a brief evaluation of the relationship between trends 
in transport emissions and urban land use. It concludes that the growth of 
transport emissions is a result of specifi c urban planning and land-use policies 
(or their absence). Th ese policies can cause an increase in transport emissions 
even if the population size remains the same and there is no economic growth. 
Th is implies that governments need to implement sensible land-use policies. 
Such policies may not be very visible, but they have a huge impact on transport 
emissions.
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Finally, the study outlines a few possible measures that could control 
transport emissions by addressing land-use issues. It explores ideas related to 
benchmarks, mandatory plans, and the possibility of using the concept of emis-
sions trading in connection with land-uses causing transport emissions.
Getting to Carbon Neutral: A Review of Best Practices in 
Infrastructure Strategy
C. Kennedy, D. Bristow, S. Derrible, E. Mohareb, S. Saneinejad, 
R. Stupka, L. Sugar, R. Zizzo, and B. McIntyre
Measures of cost eff ectiveness for reducing GHG emissions from cities are 
established for 22 case studies, mainly involving changes to infrastructure. 
GHG emissions from cities are primarily related to transportation, energy use 
in buildings, electricity supply, and waste. A variety of strategies for reducing 
emissions are examined through case studies ranging from $0.015 million to 
$460 million of capital investment (U.S. dollars). Th e case studies have been 
collected to support a Guide for Canadian Municipalities on Getting to Car-
bon Neutral (G2CN). Th e cost eff ectiveness, given by annual GHG emissions 
saved per dollar of capital investment, is found to vary between 3 and 2,780 
tons eCO2/year/$million for the G2CN database. Th e average cost eff ective-
ness of the database of 550 tons eCO2/year/$million is signifi cantly exceeded by 
solid waste projects in Canada (FCM) and by developing world projects under 
the Clean Development Mechanism. Five case studies in the G2CN database 
with GHG savings of over 100,000 tons eCO2 are highlighted. Yet, cities need 
to start planning projects with reductions on the order of more than 1 million 
tons eCO2/year in order to substantially reduce emissions below current levels 
for smaller cities (1 million people) and megacities.
Climate Change and the Resilience of New Orleans: The Adaptation 
of Deltaic Urban Form
Armando Carbonell and Douglas J. Meffert
Using New Orleans, Louisiana, as the departure point, this paper discusses 
emergent trends of climate change and hurricanes, along with policies and 
practice representing adaptive land use, mitigation, and governance. Th e role 
of urban form in adapting to and mitigating climate change will be addressed, 
including an emphasis on natural wetland and water “ecostructures.” Th e New 
Orleans case study off ers information that can inform international sites, par-
ticularly historic, vulnerable port delta cities.
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Vulnerability and Resilience of Urban Communities under Coastal 
Hazard Conditions in Southeast Asia
Vilas Nitivattananon, Tran Thanh Tu, Amornrat Rattanapan, and 
Jack Asavanant
Most coastal cities are facing complex interrelated problems associated with 
greater intensity and frequency of climate extremes. Oft en times, these chal-
lenges require adaptation strategies that bring together comprehensive vulner-
ability assessments and implementation actions. Th e main objective of this 
paper is to apply the concept of vulnerability and resilience to coastal commu-
nities facing climate hazards in Southeast Asia. Southern Vietnam and Th ailand 
are chosen as representative regions for the purpose of this study. Th e results 
show that fl ood risk has several consequences at diff erent urbanization levels 
under increased climate variability. Th e main factors infl uencing the vulner-
ability of coastal communities are related to economics, institutional capacity, 
and the accessibility of knowledge for local community-based organizations.
Climate Change Adaptation Planning in Toronto: Progress and 
Challenges
Jennifer Penney, Thea Dickinson, and Eva Ligeti
Th e city of Toronto is one of the fi rst Canadian cities to establish a citywide 
process to respond to its vulnerability to climate change. In 2008, Toronto 
developed Ahead of the Storm, a climate change adaptation strategy. Th is case 
study describes past, current, and potential future impacts of climate change on 
Toronto, along with the steps taken to develop the adaptation strategy. Th ese 
steps include the creation of an Adaptation Steering Group and the develop-
ment of an initial framework document. Th e strategy was underpinned by 
existing programs that provide protection from current weather extremes and 
included short-term actions as well as a longer-term process for developing 
a comprehensive strategy. Th e city is in the early stages of implementing the 
strategy. Th is paper also refl ects on some of the barriers to the integration and 
mainstreaming of adaptation into the city’s plans and programs.
Planning Climate Resilient Cities: Early Lessons from Early Adapters
JoAnn Carmin, Debra Roberts, and Isabelle Anguelovski
Climate change is expected to place increasing stress on the built and natural 
environments of cities as well as to create new challenges for the provision of 
urban services and management systems. Minimizing the impacts of climate 
change requires that cities develop and implement adaptation plans. Despite 
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the imperative, only a small number of cities have initiated the adaptation 
planning process. Drawing on theories of diff usion and capacity and empiri-
cal assessments of initiatives in Durban, South Africa, and Quito, Ecuador, 
this paper examines two questions: What is driving cities to initiate climate 
adaptation planning? and What is enabling the eff orts of early adapters to take 
root? Scholars argue that incentives from external sources such as regula-
tions and funder requirements, the diff usion of international knowledge and 
norms, and the presence of suffi  cient capacity are critical drivers of subna-
tional change in the policy and planning arenas. However, rather than being 
driven by external pressures, the early adapters examined in this study were 
motivated by internal incentives, ideas, and knowledge generated through 
local demonstration projects and local networks and the means to link adap-
tation to ongoing programs and to enlist the support of diverse stakeholders 
from within the city.
Governance and Climate Change: Assessing and Learning from 
Canadian Cities
Christopher Gore, Pamela Robinson, and Richard Stren
Canada hosted one of the fi rst international meetings to address climate 
change in 1988. Th e Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere helped 
focus the attention of national governments on the emerging international 
challenge presented by rising concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmo-
sphere. But in Canada, this event did not translate into national leadership to 
address climate change. Many pragmatic reasons exist to explain why Canada 
has been ineff ective at reducing emissions, particularly the size of the country 
and the associated use of automobile and truck transportation to cover long 
distances, as well as its cold climate. Political and intergovernmental reasons 
are also signifi cant.
Th ough national leadership on climate change action has been lacking, 
Canadian cities are national and international leaders in climate action. Th is 
paper examines and explains why Canadian cities have taken action to reduce 
GHG emissions, while also adapting to and mitigating climate change. Th e 
paper also inventories the activities of select medium to large Canadian cities 
(populations between 300,000 and 2.5 million). Th e paper off ers a simple yet 
unique approach to analyzing action. Action is classifi ed as an initiative, out-
put, or outcome.
Using this approach to understand the climate action of Canadian cities pro-
vides an opportunity to draw lessons about the character of these early and 
ongoing leaders and to identify the specifi c actions of Canadian cities. Th e ini-
tiatives documented include shorter-term technical actions and medium- and 
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longer-term actions that require more complex coordination with citizens and 
the private sector. Th e goal of the paper is to highlight how and why cities in a 
country with limited national leadership have chosen to act. Th is provides an 
opportunity for cities starting to initiate action, both in states that are actively 
engaged in national GHG emission reduction eff orts and in those that are not, 
to understand how cities in Canada have independently taken action and how 
future collaborations with other cities and levels of government might evolve to 
better mitigate and adapt to climate change.
Understanding and Improving Urban Responses to Climate Change. 
Refl ections for an Operational Approach to Adaptation in Low- and 
Middle-Income Countries
Roberto Sanchez Rodriguez
Th is article refl ects on the construction of an operational approach for adapta-
tion to climate change in low- and middle-income countries. I depart from 
the assumption that climate change is a development challenge for urban areas 
and that adaptation to its impacts needs to be considered a learning process 
rather than a single product. I argue that an operational approach to climate 
change needs to address the formal and the informal process of urban growth 
in order to be effi  cient. Th is requires attention to the balance between struc-
ture and agency in the construction of the urban space and the combination 
of top-down and bottom-up actions. Th e article considers the role of urban 
institutions and the collaboration among scholars and local governments and 
stakeholders as part of an operational approach for adaptation.
City Health System Preparedness to Changes in Dengue Fever 
Attributable to Climate Change: An Exploratory Case Study
Jostacio M. Lapitan, Pauline Brocard, Rifat Atun, and 
Chawalit Tantinimitkul
City health system preparedness to changes in dengue fever attributable to 
climate change was explored in this collaborative study by Imperial College 
London and World Health Organization Kobe Centre. A new toolkit was devel-
oped, and an exploratory case study in Bangkok, Th ailand, was undertaken in 
2008. Th is study found that there is a clear lack of research in this area, as most 
research looked at impacts and not at responses and preparedness for eff ective 
response. Th ere is also a clear need to develop and scale up national capital 
city eff orts to assess and address the implications of climate change for health 
systems. It recommends further case studies to validate the toolkit and generate 
guidelines on how to develop eff ective response plans.
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Climate Change and Urban Planning in Southeast Asia
Belinda Yuen and Leon Kong
Th e challenge of climate change is real and urgent in Southeast Asia. Southeast 
Asia is one of the world’s fastest growing regions. Th is paper presents a desk 
review of the state of climate change research and policy in Southeast Asia. 
It highlights the challenges, knowledge gaps, and promising practices, with a 
specifi c focus on urban planning interventions to increase cities’ resilience to 
climate change. Th e discussion refl ects on how urban form and planning can 
support people’s sustainable choices in terms of transportation, housing, and 
leisure activities and conveys the drivers and barriers to urban planning as a 
strategy of climate proofi ng. Issues that can be addressed through appropriate 
urban policy, planning, design, and governance are highlighted.
Social Aspects of Climate Change in Urban Areas in Low- and 
Middle-Income Nations
Sheridan Bartlett, David Dodman, Jorgelina Hardoy, David Satterthwaite, 
and Cecilia Tacoli
Th is paper discusses the implications of climate change for social welfare and 
development in urban areas in low- and middle-income nations, especially for 
those people with low incomes and those who are particularly vulnerable to cli-
mate-change impacts. Hundreds of millions of urban dwellers in these nations 
are at risk from the direct and indirect impacts of current and likely future 
climate change—for instance, more severe or frequent storms, fl oods and heat 
waves, constraints on fresh water and food supplies, and higher risks from a 
range of water and food-borne and vector-borne diseases. But these risks 
are distributed very unevenly between nations, between urban areas within 
nations, and between populations within urban areas. Th is is underpinned by 
diff erentials in the following:
• Th e scale and nature of hazards by site and location
• Th e quality of housing, infrastructure, and services
• Th e extent of measures taken for disaster risk reduction (including postdi-
saster response)
• Th e capacity and preparedness of local governments to address the needs of 
low-income groups and to work with them
• Th e social and political capital of those who face the greatest risks
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Does Climate Change Make Industrialization an Obsolete 
Development Strategy for Cities in the South?
Le-Yin Zhang
Th is paper attempts to explore the implications of climate change for economic 
development strategies in cities in the global South. In particular, it examines 
whether climate change makes industrialization an obsolete development strat-
egy for these cities. It starts by examining the eff ects of climate change and the 
challenges posed for the cities concerned, followed by a discussion of the role of 
industrialization in economic development and climate change. It then inves-
tigates how these issues aff ect Southern cities by considering the experiences 
of Shanghai, Mumbai, and Mexico City. In conclusion, the paper hypothesizes 
that climate change will make industrialization a more, not less, important 
development strategy, even for those cities that are currently aff ected by pre-
mature deindustrialization.
The Price of Climate: French Consumer Preferences Reveal Spatial 
and Individual Inequalities
Jean Cavailhès, Daniel Joly, Hervé Cardot, Mohamed Hilal, 
Thierry Brossard, and Pierre Wavresky
We use the hedonic price method to study consumer preferences for climate 
(temperature, very hot or cold days, and rainfall) in France, a temperate coun-
try with varied climates. Data are for (1) individual attributes and prices of 
houses and workers and (2) climate attributes interpolated from weather sta-
tions. We show that French households value warmer temperatures while very 
hot days are a nuisance. Such climatic amenities are attributes of consumers’ 
utility function; nevertheless, global warming assessments by economists, such 
as the Stern Review Report (2006), ignore these climatic preferences. Th e social 
welfare assessment is changed when the direct consumption of climate is taken 
into account: from the estimated hedonic prices, we calculate that GDP rises 
by about 1 percent for a 1 degree Celsius rise in temperature. Moreover, het-
erogeneity of housing and households is a source of major diff erences in the 
individual eff ects of climatic warming.
Adaptation and Mitigation: What Financing Is Available for Local 
Government Investments in Developing Countries?
Thierry Paulais and Juliana Pigey
Th is article reviews specifi c funding available for adaptation and mitigation 
investments of cities and discusses the mismatch between needs and fi nancing 
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tools. Th ese funding sources are insuffi  cient, highly fragmented, and not really 
tailored to local governments. Th ey are narrowly sector based and risk being 
counterproductive in the urban context. Furthermore, they are complex and 
costly to access or else targeted to sovereign borrowers. Th e article makes pro-
posals to adapt these fi nance tools, to reintroduce local authorities in mecha-
nisms from which they are presently excluded, and to create incentives in their 
favor. Finally, it proposes an initiative for cities in fragile states, based on greater 
involvement of wealthy Northern cities and the recourse to a specifi c fi nancing 
mechanism.
Mobilizing Private Sector Resources toward Climate Adaptation and 
Mitigation Action in Asia
Jacob Park
Th is paper will explore the current state of and future outlook for mobilizing 
private sector resources in the Asian post-2012 climate policy context, with a 
special emphasis on the energy-poor and environmentally fragile urban pop-
ulation. Two issues and questions will be explored in this paper. First, what 
is the current state of and future outlook for public and private investments 
to address global and Asian climate change concerns? Second, what new triple 
bottom-line strategy of fi nancing climate change action is required to respond 
more eff ectively to the urban climate change dilemma in Asia?
High-Cost Carbon and Local Government Finance
Patricia Clarke Annez and Thomas Zuelgaray
Global climate change has certain unique features in terms of optimal policy. 
Some of these have been discussed already at the global level and some at the 
national level. But what is the impact of these features on local government 
fi nance? Th is paper examines the impact of high-cost carbon on municipalities’ 
fi nances. We compare municipalities’ fi nances in India (State of Maharashtra) 
and in Spain. We conclude that raising energy prices will create an adverse fi s-
cal shock for local governments, the magnitude of which will depend on the 
structure of spending. Smaller, less diversifi ed governments currently operat-
ing at a low level of service and with a very small operating defi cit will be harder 
hit, precisely because the most basic services tend to be energy intensive, and 
their energy bill is high in relation to their scope for borrowing to weather the 
shock. However, all municipalities would appear to be hard hit, and a system 
of compensation from national governments would be needed to avoid disrup-
tion to essential services.
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Victims to Victors, Disasters to Opportunities: Community-Driven 
Responses to Climate Change in the Philippines
David Dodman, Diana Mitlin, and Jason Christopher Rayos Co
Advocates of community-based adaptation claim that it helps to identify, assist, 
and implement community-based development activities, research, and policy 
in response to climate change. However, there has been little systematic exami-
nation of the ways in which existing experiences of dealing with hazard events 
can inform community-based adaptation. Th is paper analyzes the experience 
of the Homeless People’s Federation of the Philippines Incorporated (HPFPI) in 
respect to community-led disaster responses, with the aim of informing future 
discussions on the role of planning for climate change adaptation in low- and 
middle-income countries.
The Urban Poor’s Vulnerability to Climate Change in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
Lucy Winchester and Raquel Szalachman
Cities in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) currently face many environ-
mental and sustainable development challenges, with signifi cant impacts on 
human health, resource productivity and incomes, ecological “public goods,” 
poverty, and inequity. In this context, climate change impacts in the region 
will exacerbate and create additional complexity, particularly in urban areas. 
For hundreds of millions of urban dwellers in LAC, most of the risks from the 
impacts of climate change are a result of development failures. For the urban 
poor, this fact is disproportionately true. Th is paper seeks to contribute to the 
limited body of knowledge regarding climate change, cities, and the urban poor 
in the region and to inform how institutions, governance, and urban planning 
are keys to understanding the opportunities and limitations to possible policy 
and program advances in the area of adaptation.
Built-in Resilience: Learning from Grassroots Coping Strategies to 
Climate Variability
Huraera Jabeen, Adriana Allen, and Cassidy Johnson
It is now widely acknowledged that the eff ects of climate change will dispro-
portionately increase the vulnerability of the urban poor in comparison to 
other groups of urban residents. While signifi cant attention has been given 
to exploring and unpacking “traditional” coping strategies for climate change 
in the rural context—with a focus on agricultural responses and livelihoods 
diversifi cation—with few exceptions, there is less work on understanding the 
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ways the urban poor are adapting to climate variability. Th e central argument 
of this paper is that signifi cant lessons can be drawn from examining how 
the urban poor are already coping with conditions of increased vulnerabil-
ity, including how they respond to existing environmental hazards such as 
fl oods, heavy rains, landslides, heat, and drought. Knowledge of these exist-
ing coping capacities for disaster risk reduction can help to strengthen plan-
ning strategies for adaptation to climate change in cities because they draw 
on existing grassroots governance mechanisms and support the knowledge 
systems of the urban poor.
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